7th Marines Special Action Report 17 August - 7 October 1950 Box 8-8

I 

KOREAN WAR PROJECT 

SPECIAL ACTION REPORT INCHON-SEOUL 

VOL III OF III FIRST MARINE DIVISION, 

FMF [NOTE: FOLDER 2 OF 2]

.llllTEK ~CGJR. liCG~ ..... '10 1ST ltmTIT] DrVISIC'}TSPllCIAL ACTION R]]?ORT 

7th Mtrines 

1st ~r1ne ~ivisi0nr Fl~ 

In the Field, )hsan~ Kor-oo 

2 January 1951 

• 

From: 

To: 

Subj: 

Commnding Officer, 7th l-t:trincs 

Commanding General, 1st I-nrincDivision, FMF 

special Acti~nRaport for period (17 August - 7 OctoOGr 1950) 

Raf: (a) Division G~ndral Ordar No. 16 

\ 

1. IN!tRODUCTION. 

a.t} This is a rcpcrt of th3 activities of the 7th l-hrinGs (Rain- 

forcod) from date of activation (17 August 1950) a.t Camp Pendlaton to 

the conclusion of the Inchon--S001ll Oanpaign (7 October J.950)~ 

be The porsonncl ca~G from four principal sources: 

(1) . 1822 officorc and Men froM 2d ~1q.rino Division who 

forned the nucl3Us of the vari0us uni ts. 

(2) 1972 ,officers and ron of the Ihrine C0IjJS Reserve o 

(3)0 735 ~fficcrs and Men of 3d B~ttRlinn (Roil1forcG~), 

6th J!..qorines t 2d HnrY:V3 Divisinn(wh

t / 

(5) Northeast ofSeou1~ ?O SeptembJr, 1950. 

To. ca.ptureUijongbu~d estab11s}l blo9king positions 

on ,X Oorps final phaise line" Mission eOllplo~ad by 3 . 

Oc~bor after overcoming strong anemy rea1'guards. 

2. 'TASK ORGANIZATION' Period 17 August- 11 Septomber 1950 

/ 

s!JiENGTH 

R9!D-7 (Reinf) - 4754 

H&SCo 7th Varinos 

4~2 MOxtar Oompany 

303 

139 

A.-T OOl!p.ny 108 

Is t 130. tta'ion~ 7th Marinas 10(;)6. 

2nd De. t~ .. lion, 7th l·t\rinGs 11'23 

~ugmentaiion group for JdBn 515 

00 it1:3 tt 1st Medien,l Be. ttal ion 107 

0:>. u!)n 1st Enginear Battalion 163 

Co UDft 1 s t Tallk De. t tn.-l ~Ir' ~.,-~ -- 

00 "C" 1st S'nore Pa.rtyTIn 196 

~ Datta1ion 9 11th Marinos h97. 

AnglieoDataOhment . 115 

Oq "D," lat.-Motor Tranport TIn 89 

Mljor 1'0 F~ PA:RRY 

. Cal' t :n~ RALLAM9l~ 

capt Wl!!TELOCK - 

I 

2ti TASK: ~GANlZATION: Pariod 11 Septembor t-- 2l September 1950 

Col He L. LITZENB~G JR 

Major J. D. SMITH 

J.hjo r S" :P. LOW . 

, Ca})t D.. Me MA.NFtJLL 

LtCo1 R~ G. ~AVIS 

. LtCol T~o }.fo HIN'ZLE 

Majo r lt~ M)P.RI S 

Lt ~o Me GROVER (US}!) 

capt B. Co TtJRlT3R 

-' .{'Al'.... Ir .. -!.~S:g.- -- -_.'- 

)tl.jor J~ 0 0 mmD 

Nil.m- 

RC'lt-7 (Rein!) 4641 

- H&SCo 7tP. Marinas '303 

402 ~hrtar Company 139 

A-T OOJrpany 

lOS 

1st Dn.tt3.1ion,7th }tnrines 1066 

2~d ~ ttal~~nt 7th Marinas 1123 

3rdn~tta1io~, 7t~ M~~inas 1097 

Co, "iff ls~ Medi,ca.1 Dattaiion 107 

00 AD" 1st Enginoer :onttalionl63 

Co It::>" 1st Tabk J)1.tta1ion 132 . 

00 fie" 1st Shore Party En 196 

A,ng1ico Deta.chment 116 

OQ 1tJI 1st Me> tor Transport :3n 89 

Col H. L. LITZ.m3ERG JR 

Mr:tjo r J. :J. SMITH 

J.h.jo r S. ~o LOW . 

capt D. M,. J.t\NFULL 

LtOol R. G. :::lAVIS 

;It 1fCo 1 T. 11. HINKLE 

Ml.jor M. J1l~ ROACH 

Lt 3~ Jf. GROV JR (USN) 

., 

capt n. 0& TURNB 

Oapt L. T~ OHllSE 

WLjor F. F., P.ARRY 

Oapt D. HA.LL.AMImlR 

cnpt WHITELOCK ' 

2~ TASK ORGANIZATION-; Pqriod 3 October 1950 

tnT IT 

7~h )hrines (Rcinf) . 4648 

H{H"~o 1 tli Ml-r ino s ' . -- "- ~ 29.5..-- 

4~2 Jtbrtar Oompany 139 

A-T Co mpan7 # 106 

'l13t!lBttalion; 7th }.{q.r~nes 969 

91ro 

3rd Datta1ion, 7~h 14~rines 951 

Co ~. 1st MOtor Tr.an~ort3n S9 

Co 'mit 1st '.ra.nk TIattali('\n 132 

Co "D" 1st Engineor TIn ,-163 

. Co "C!f' 5th KMO :I3r'. tt;;.l ion 167 

3rd nn~ 11th, }.hr!nc~ /$7 

'. 2nd Datta,l inn; 7th M'1.rines 

Co 1 H. Lo LITZlThBERG JR 

.. ,O~i.lT.~.~SRl~L -_. 

M3.jor S. Do LOW 

. 1 stLt E. R. ~E LONG 

LtOol R,; G., DAVIS 

'}.h j~";r 1tT. D. SA trrYER 

M1.j('u.- }.~ Eo ROACH 

Qap-'u C.tU-f' 

Ca~t~L> T., CH1C)E 

capt 3 e Co ruRNER- 

Cnrt XIM 

)hjor F. F. PARRY 

. l. 

THE NEXT PAGE IS 6-Im 

- '-

PLA1T1\fI:t,TG 

------ 

,The Regimental Commanding Officer and key members of 

the 7-th M:r:'ines Staff were flown from Gar.Ip Pe!ldleoon on 

2 September, 1950 to Japan, arriving at 1iJ.:'00 Airforec 

3ase on 6 September, 19:'0 

_ 

During an i!l'ter:lm stop at Pearl Har"Jor, T~ H., the 

Reg~.nen tal COl!lJ!E.nding Officer and st .ff were given a 

0 

criefing on the current Korean siJouation by members of 

the Fleet M-'1rine Forces PacifiC rt 

staff at FlmPac Headcr.:arters. 

'8'pon aITival at- ITA-HI Airforce :Gase the group want to 

I'~OJ3~ Japan, to ~ report to the Comoonding General~ 1st 

l'arinG Division~ The Regiment Cor.u.:nnder received" verbai 

orders from the Comrranding General on 6 Septemberp 1950, 

. . 

to l;,{l.kc plans for an administrative 'landing at I1TCH01:T, 

Korea, by 3 October, 1950~ Further), the ~C¥':imcnt l'j3.S ·tio 

become Division reserve on landing~ and was to prepare 

for further operations ashore as directed~ 

Such plans as wore necessary for the accorrplish~ent 

of the assigned ml.ssinn wore -made by the regimental staff 

at KOJJE~ Japa~ d.uring tho period 6 Soptombor, 1950 0 Tho 

rec:1montnl pla!l \!

.... -- 

.il. t~ .. ining :)rog~~:U:l ( '7th l-hrinos (Roinfcrcl3d) Trrlrining 

ardor NUI!ibor L~50) WlS pra:tnrcd. nnd was OXOC'l'l tad by 'the rogi.: 

nontD.l units sirrrJl tanoC'usly, wi t~ tho rcco:;:ti0n and oqv.il?'ping 

of troops 0 Tho t~.lning progrn.m in gonora.l, inc1.udod , sm::tll 

-unit" i;..'lctics,flring of individual. nnd crow served won.pC'ns 

,and physlcnl c('ndltir'ning o SrrJ.l un+t tactics trr::.ining C0Ir- 

'.-If ,- . .. r 

, sis'ted of ';1ro.cticrt1 \-rork. in the fi~ld fr~I!l tho :eira too,nto 

cl'r.tpr'l.n1 ieval. Firlngr-.t ,indirldUr'll ,~on:)(')ns lnc1urLod; (1) 

n courso "f 40 rr-unds :var !Jldlvid.u;:tl ('In tho riflo :r[~ngQ 

for 

a.ll ind.i~'~~6 hnd flrod !,r~lr:'ltsly t~o 'trottp"n with wie.'h 

nrm~~q on eithor a f~ilinri~ti~n ~r qu~lific~tinn ~urso. 

and (2) a C0U't"SG of 250 rf.'.un.ds par indiv~duaJ. f(':r Hil ind~ 

,vid.u::tls wno'hr1.C\ navar' firod tho wOC' .. T'C'n with "bleb. nrnod OJ! ' 

01 thorn fnMi11nrlzatl('1n('r qu.-'tl1fi-~tion Ct"u:"SOfij All crow 

sorved ~~~"ne ~roro firod'sufflc1ontly to t'Min Q()orr:.inL\tod 

gun. crows.. In 8,cld1 t1r-n()."l.ch tnn throw at loost liiwn livo . 

hand gronados ~ PhVsic-1.1 c('ndi tif.lning included rnrni~ c'll~ .. 

a~')n1cs and C"nditicn!hg hikos \~ n.nd fr(,r1 training Rrcas o 

, , , 

.. 

, , 

, : Though ,t~is training porioci' -was by no noons suffici.)nt 

to insura a. hiGh state of' Ot"l!lbat' roa.dinoss within tho rcgi ... 

mont t ! tdld rroviddtho ba.sie noeds' to wold,'" So -:co·nbat I·og~· 

o.ontfrom a. gr('u:p -of both ,.r~ar and rasorvo rhrinos whOf:iO 

1.1ldividut1.1 . training fQJ.:thv ,mst ll.:'l.rt was good. Tho D.vcassity- 

ofr·ocoiving nnd oquipPl.neof troops sir.ultt:n~('uslY 

, wi th trainin{~ _ incros.&,od ~nY fold tho probloms of providing 

adoqu?:.-tetraining JY[ tho :1ndfvidllal a.nd tho unit. Evory 

a.vc.j~a.blQ hc,ur was- dOlfOt3cl to trainiIl€t and by the time tho 

.... rel{ioont· ambarkod tuoo had boonaccof-4>lishod towo.,rdin6ron.$ins 

inii"trldual prof'lcio~cYt and tho conb~t Offioionc~ of 

the :rog~mont as a.~ wholce ,',, " . .' 

. 

, . 

5. L(1;D JNG ";1\11) E1',OABr~TIO~T 

. Poriod cQvoroo.,frontho do:pa.rturo fron San Diogo, -Of:l.li- , 

ftfl'ni(}., ,t('l Inchon" ,Korea landing. " 

On 22 AU{;ll,st,' 195O"t Sh1!>' E~rka t1o'n Officers from Trans. ... 

portation Divisl(1n21'r~ortod' 'to:Ro!Jro.soritt.,.tivo t 

Floot 

l.nrino FC'1rco. P:\~ffic't' OAmp PondlGt('n, and\b~..n :cr.of'.rIcati('n 

l'Jitnnlng wi ·th :rtogimbI;tttl Embnrkatir.n Officor 0 ' Tho fnllowing 

ship's woro p.ssiGnod f~r tho lift: 

','1 

(1) USS ,DAUmD (.c\p~ J';) , 

(2) TjSS TH01{-1S JE~i.:iblaSON (.A:PA;-30) 

(3) USS O[A} T 0GAlT (AP.A,.;.:220) . 

( 4 j uss ALG0L (Jr~· -54) , 

(5)' USS '!TINS'It):tT (i\l'j\·:94) " 

(6) uss TIT.Ur.L\ (~\K.\;-13) 

. (,7) USS C.\TAHJUNT (LSD,.17) 

. (8) USS COLOm::,~ (LSD-lS) 

• > 

t 

On 23' Au{~ust t 1950'r ,Eo.ba~katif"n Offi C;Jrs from all un! ts r\)-. 

'Ported for' ?lannincct Durin{"!; bho IJ.;:h·iod ,3 to 25 Au{;ust r. 1950, 

Loadinc :PInns woro c0mp1.,:,tod o Duo to tho oxco:>t imcnt "(:TOr3 

~ru oasilY'"acc.)ssiblotnan othorbuU: loa4sd ·cn.rGQe 

- \" , ' . 

On 25 l~Uu~st-f. 1950, staging of aqu.l:")mont and 6upplies oonmen\~od 

at -liaV'y PiCr1.11d 11nvru. S'tat,"on e S~f.h Diogo f Oalifornia o 

'l~iJ,ny di"fficulties w~rl3 oX'j.Jori3D.cod dUing stBf~iD£ duo to th~ 

~. shortago 0f Cc"),rgc-(k'1.rr~~inc ,"tr3hicl,}~ fr.eIn. O!l.tnp Peri.dlot~n 't;o Snn 

7-R&.

D:'.o{;;Oo Oivillan trD.ctor trn~.l,ors ",Tore used t(' aUt--;mont t.hrinJ C()r::s 

ani. borrot-Tod navy vahicl.JS.) :t:n using civilian trucks, acl-:' .. i ":·ionn.l 

d01D.y vAS oncountarod duo to tho roquirements for cn.rofu! cs.rr:o nnnifosting 

and tho desirability of' sondinG 0nly c~rbo.of Grunt bulk r.Jr 

t1nit lrl0ight via thoso carri0rs o .Fro!3 25 to 27 !kU{~st J950, th.::; USS 

! JEFP.2E.SON was loaded and sai:'cd (In 28 Aucust) 1950 0 Othor shil~s 

lon.G.od ammuniticn at lIorth Islrtnd. Duri~,: the l,),Jriod 28 Au;~st to 2 

Sop'cember! 1950 all shiT's oxcept USS TIT1U~r ... ~ cC!TIj}lotod l;JaOirg and 

sailod by 2000 t 2 Soptcrri'Jer, 1950 ~ 

On 4 So::::,tomber, 1950" tho 11SS TIT.Utila. snilod. Tho bulk cf hor c[1.rr,o 

,.p.s dostined fer unlts othor th .... n ::.C'1!-7 i ann. wn.s slp.,tod f0T 0tilor ~~orts 

of CA.1I~ .on 9 Scr-tombcr; 1950, tho Third 3-"'ttt-'lli0n, 6th r~,rinos (Roin-. 

f0rcod), arrivGd P.t Kobo~ JA.""')n.n, from the Mcditorr~nG?,n ~rCt\ in the USS 

lmrT.:\GU1!r CAP A-9 S), ~,nd US$ TIEX.AZ (AP... ~-2 37), and unlqP .. ~;.in{~ ,,~#s Cf' r.IMcncod c> 

On 14 Septor.lbcr, 1950, tho USS T5~('~.~l.S J3./:;' ~SOrt c0ntnininG RugmOI:. 

t~:tti()n ::;ers('Innol ancl. A, c(\~loto issue ('f Cl,'tss II for :JLT 3/6 (subso 

CJ..Ucntly rodosi~natfJ)d 3/7) t arrived and 1,#tS unlo~dod tCl the extent n.Jc.;ssary 

to 2.1ormit the roorg1.nizA.ti()n

",. 

{- . 

, Tho Jd. 3r:t.ttt'i.1il"n disomh':trkcd Ftnd m('vad to Ot?Irr' SA,EA.! noar 

0S1J.K.'\.;- In.~[\.n; f0r~ro.ininp;? oqui:v:dng, a.nd \ ·.. building to W"\r 

strOll.g·~h9 Til0 aUGffi.Jntatirn Gleu11 and oquillmont fryr th,? 3d. 

:In.ttalion arrived in K03E:on tho USS TI:01-~\S J.clb:n'BG,OO}T tAPIr-30) 

on 12 So,tombor, 1950. The THOMA.S JEOcijj'BS(n~ was unloaded and 

tho ]!orsonn01 and oquil)mant joinod the 3d 3tttt'llion at CaL'!J 

SA..K.ll o 

ThJ ships of Transj?ort Division 21 arrived in KOllE on 16 

Soptomborr- 1950.:) Uort.--:tin ro-t'..djustwnts cf cargo n.nd trcOj}s 

w.ore mde on 'th0se shi:; s. Tho 3d 3a ttai ion \'IJ.S reloa.dod 0n 

thu :iJiIXAR and l·01T~U.aJf'or tho IOOVv to tha objoctivo aroEto 

-Tho 7th It:l.rinos· (3.oinforcod) exco:>t for theS\) olooonts in 

the TITAlIIA' dc?artod KOllE en 17Soptombor on thdsO shipsc: On 

21 Soptombor, 1950, tho unl·tGarrivod at DrCHON, I:oroa, two. 

days carlior th~n roquiron by v';;Tbal ord.:n-s of (kmmndinc 

GunGral, 1st ihrh~o Division. 

Tho JDovoInJnt '£rom & .. n DlOG~ t(' DTOfJ)}! w'hs rrndo "Ii th0Ut 

incidont~ Tho mJvornont, including time s:!ont at KO:JE t JRran, 

required, ~ total of 20 da.ys from 1 S~t()I!lbor tC' 21 So:'tcl:1bor, 

1950,. Training "Ins oonductod by all units "lhilc ombatkod o 

On nrrivP.l PJt IlTC:IC'fT ~'E0ren~ tho 7th r~.rinGs bc{1tn dJ-· 

bar1d.ngas directed by 1st lhrinc Div:1si("ln \J:"'Jrrtti('nal Ord~r 

8-50 v.nct\rorbnl C'rrtcrs (\f OC"~n(liD.h Gonoral, 1st !·hrinc . 

Division, 'whic...'1 rlcsi~n.~ton assembly arnc'ts fr'r tho rogim0nt~ 

Dcbp~rking C;f 7'orsonnol bogan nt 2115251. .All oxcO])t 1st 

Bp.ttalion porsonnol,. weT.o IFl..r;tdod on 1'ToL!!I-DO rslA.nd ~ .. n~ nTCH01:T 

by 2121301" Tho 1st JJn..ttRlif'n ronrtinod ab('l::tr(l ship to furnish 

'shirst platC'on f('lT unlop.niDt;o i 

UI'on~t..landillf:, troops "Tore shuttlodby tr'\in and trucks to 

a.ssi{;n~d assembly B.rc"",.s~ The 2d Battalion, whi~ bQg.1.n dobnrkiI4,"; 

f irst t was shr;.ttlod by truck to an a.ssembly area ('In 

th3 high ground (~ 0660-0661) on'th0 S(lU thwost sidv of t h.:J 

ruN River, a. distanCG0f riinJtoen m~los'northon.st ()f nrOHONo 

TbJ 2d 3at1i

Durill{; tho ni{;ht two rounds of Jnomy artillory of undotor'!J 

mined siza f011 in th0 'V'icin:1.ty of 'tho rOGimontn.l O('rr.tm-~nd Posto 

Xn tho 24. :;Ja'cta.lion arOf. Do £0\>1 rounds ('If rifl\) 'fire worc ciclL'Ulgod 

wi th infil tru tinE; onoI:lYo 

Tho lAnding and movoID.3nt ,into pC' si ti('n placod tho rogimJnt 

(less the 1st 13atta1if"n) ashore in posltif'ns ir('lm whIch it O"uld 

pro'~oct tho Divisit"ln left flank ('In th3 southwo~t sida of tha IW.N 

Riv.Jr 0 Li ttlo orgn.nic supplios and vq:u.i~I!lant ,.rcro ash0Tc in tho 

Mnds of the units, tho first dayp ,~.nd tho nvcossi ty ('If cnr1mcrcigl 

l0ad!ng in: tho U Q S. Wf'.S t~ en.usc· cri t ienl sIl..0rtp.,c;os ('If cort~in 

. su!r:"'lios within the next . fa"., cL'\YBo Those :rnintsp a,lt:'ng with th0 

fn.ct th~.t tho 1st 3~ttnli(\n W't'S furnishing shiJis t ~l~t(1('nsf were 

t n."l.rro'.':, d~st:j" ronds e 

'~'i< 

:~~

lJo oncIl\.V conts.ct.s woro nacl..1 during thJ dayo :aJ~)or,ts fr0TIl 

hichJ:o:' ochcl.on in.iicn.tJd a gJnJra1 build up of, Jn0my troo:>s in 

tho 1.1)1420 ,'l,r0a Do 

Thisday~ts moVJplaccd tho 'rQbimont(loss clements of tho 

1st 3attc .. lion s!ill unloadingshi:;.J) in positicn to r>rotJct tho 

1st ~hrin0 Division 10ft f1nnk south of thJ ~U~ includin~ 

div:tsi{'n roc..r olomonts) =:IJ.·iPO [l,j.rfiJld, -and tho forry crr fuP'tho:t· 

opJrati0ns to seize oojoctivos 9 qnd Si ann m~intain c0ntqct 

~ri th the 5th J·hrincs (1st If:14rino Divisif"n Qiore.tit"n. . Ord.or 

9--50) ~ ThG orclor i'urth3r diroctod tho 7th 2'~JrinJs to laava 

0nc b~tt~linn in tho rrosont nsscmbly ~ro~ (TA 0661) tn cr0SS 

t~..1 R~ on nivisi0n ~rdcro Tho nbjGctivcs li~tod in tha ordor 

lay ;?:onorn11y A,long a r:tdgo 1 ino o~tonding frr-m th3 f Jrry~rl"' s- 

siIlh (\n tho EA.T;' rivor t~ thcn0rth of SSOUL,. Tho f'bjoctivos 

weT0 located as f0110'Ws: (1) 0bjJctivo 12 a_ the rid?;.;) li~o 

(T.b! ... os54:--os65) north(}'l.st ('If thJ t(\itm r·f :aYOZr}1J (T.,i 0765); 

(2). Objectivo 11: - Hill 5S (Tl 116,); (3) Objcctiyo 10 .- 11:;.1.1 

, 2, 36(, ('2~\.'1566) l (4) Objectiv.) 9 L_ r~'V:c line (TA 1766-1['67- 

ls6'O; '1nd (5) Obj0ctivo S -- th0 pal?.co (T_\ 2167) ~ 

At 231130I L:oGimontn.l· H0~.dqur9,rtors and Sorvico C0nIpp.ny 

and thJ =~d. 3atta1i('>n Dogan t.h3 shuttle by LVT across the lL:.U 

IdY3r Ht th0 forry crossin{; sito~ Tho 3(: ~:).ttalion I110vod i.uto 

blockiIlb posi tions on objJctivc 12 with Eow C0~)any on thJ 

13ft and Itom Com;any on ~ho ri{.:ht.Goorgo Ccnr)A.ny~ in bat.- 

talion rosorVG~ w3nt lntO·a blocking ·J.)ositicn;~i:u t~-f,''\,:+r.;~.l'd+:y 

of Hill' 36 n.Jar' th3 town cf SOJOI~G (T.. 

i. 1064)., - RUt-~im0iljfql 

H0adqu.art0rs and Sdrvicu C0!!r)A.ny f('11owJ(1 th.J 3d :Jr1. 'jj.t ". ion 

in erC' ss iN:: t1.nd Wdn t in to ,a.nass0mbly ~roa in thJ vicinity of 

the town of SOln!":\.JC!~ (1£.1 1264) abeut thraa Bond (lnG half miles 

cast of th8 ferry crossing. The r..1{,:im3nt:;l~1 c(lm..m'ln'~- :post 

OlJ cn0d at 2}1710r in th::tt araa. .ill units c0rtq)101jJd cn"ssin~: 

'and wore in :)osi ticns desif;natod by 231S30I..l Fatrol c()n'~'1ct 

was Gst~blish0d with th3 5thlvp,rinas -on tho rif:ht at tho 5th 

}.nrinos c(lIIllrtlncl ~)ost in the town of I:_\NJA·~])OI\1G (TA 1361). 

Tho' 1st J)a tta1ion r luss 31dm0nts still H00f\rd .shi::>, 'w0n t 

into l)os:l1;tcn~~ron.:,'Hill 131 (TA 0661) 0n thJ S("luth sid.J rf 

th.J fcrr:t· cr0ssin{: •. As clements (If t.hJ 1st JRtt~.li0n C0m· 

I?lot:)ct their task ('f unlnaClinr: shiPr they yTerJ rdturn0i to 

the ~rGnt uni t. ny· the end nf this dRy A.b0Ut 50% cf tho 1st 

3A.. ttqlit"n ,,11\S nShi}re. 

Til; 2n :J~ ttA.lir>n cl"'ntinu3d its missi0n (If -""A.tr('J.Ijag in :i.ts 

se('{~r.::;:: ~ Gf'\nt'1.ci,i ~.~.S cf:.t"'.blisb,,:,;o' \"i th tho 3

N(" intGlligunce datA. on tho .3namy'known to bG in th\1 

vleini ty W.!1.3 r:n. thGrediurin.e: tha d~y b?cB.use nc- actuRl enomy 

C('ll t1. et,s wero mi3 0 

Unlo~di~~ and aSSi3mbly of ril~iD1Bn tal su}):.;lics was C('fitinu~d 

at INeZON ~ The fir~t additional tr!3.ns~"\ort3. tion a&~ 

sicnad tho rGgimant" 't'.;~S aSSi{;n3d th:t.s d.A.y - a- to ta.:.a. of 

th:t.rt.Jon trucks of Company IfDIf, 1st Motor Trans~~I("rt :3a~ 

ta1ion. Thdse vchlclcswGra distributed aIn0D.b thG Vf:l.rious 

uni ts of tho regiment and WGN used. in dis:placinb organ:lZr'J. 

ticno..l oqp:lpm"nt and to SUl:l:~a:c-tirt1 ,unit , distri· .. 

buticn of supp:ties by: 1st I.n:r.;ine ,Divisiono A regimental 

SUPIJJ.y dunt? ~s ostab1ishoo.near the 1st J~ttali0n Cornnnnd 

,Post on the southwest bank of' tho IL~R.ivi3ro This,d.um;:) 'tf\S 

sot up to receiv(} goo::: from nTCEON,. and tf' sarve as ~ storaGe 

lJ.roo and distribu.ti~ :point tctho usint~ units~ A for 

Wf.:.rd d~:was esta~ll$hi3d a.crosstho F ..... Ur River in i!A:~264 

in tho afternoon to' fa.ciii tata supnly of the uni ts on the 

nor't~:least side of the river. 

This day1 S. move 'resulted in oCCUY)R.ti0n (\f 1st M9.rine 

Divi~~\"\nObjlSctiva 12 near the t('wn ('If RY0r0EU A.nda.cc('m 

~l'ished· rel10f n:f 01eI!lcnts ('If Rnq ,cl"ntact_ vrith,. the 5th 

}~,rL1es. It-:nlaoe~ .. the regimt3nt in A. T')C' s1 tinn t(' -ryrn tcc'o 

the div'isif'n -loft flA,nk ('n the nf'rthoost sine ('f ~c }J.AlT - 

Riv'3r, f-tno. p.l

U .. fl~ Army, f-l.nd thevt tha 2d 3n.ttali0n W'lS to return to t'l.otiG-Cll 

cont:;:('l 'l.nd rejoin the rcg~I.ID3I!t on thJ n0rtheast Si(\.3 

of the lliU~$ ~Jli8f of thd 2~ 3~ttn.1i0n ~~s cn~10t0d )y 

24153Clo Th0 battali0n moved thd dist'1nco of ap~r(ix:tm.':tt01y 

five miles to tha .forry cr0ssin{~ and ",r'"',S A.Cr0SS by 241730IQ 

Tha battrt.lioL r lass l'ox C01I1l")a.nY1 A.ssemblad (TA 1065) nOA.r 

G00rr~b Cf'rr;pany. In viaw of tho c('lniP~cts in tho 3d 3attalif'n 

soctor, Fox C0II!Pan;y was pl·'tcn of ~,rot0ctinr: thG' for~y C:r09-- 

sinG si to. Tho 1st 3fl.ttn.1i('lll crossc0- th3 riv)!" ff"110win~ tho 

2;1. :J~,ttA.lif"n, r-tnt1. ontGrco. ::l.n ,p.ssembly ftrof-t n0~r J:':\.]1\fG-JU c 

ThG crossin£'" ,~~ts c0T!m1ot'Gt1 ~.t 242010 0 

:Jy this' tim;) tho 1st 

j3ns, but~ this rq,tif"n tors nf't -:lrn.cticn.Q10 

f('lr USG (If :::tny 1JY'Irc thqn 30% (If th.J Cf'mm'l,nct in yie'N 0f tho .. 

fluirtity 0f tho si'Gu'l.tif"n~ ~V1,cu')·ti('ln ~r-1.S 0st r ;.blisf10d 

'chr('lugh tho Sh('lro Pf:l.r·~.;r in th;,:; 5th }.nri!1os .L\rG

", . ." 

!, .. 

Orddr 11-50)~ Objuctivo CI1~I.m co~respnndotl in €:eneral to 

ob,53CtiVGS 9 and 10 aSBignod by 1st Ithrin\J Division Operational 

Ord...)r, 9-~50 anct replaced ·those object:iv0S. 

j 

At 2506}J thv ri3c1mcnt j~3d off in :the attrl.ck.trs sai-1:Io 

ObjcctiTG CHARLIE B.~d Objective 'll~ Th3 2d ~'\ttal'ion ~.s 

dirvcted. to saizd Objective' CHAi\LI.aI and the 3d J;l.tta1i('n vtis 

dircctGd't,o saize Obj~ctiva 11. Tho 1st 3n.tt:\li("n. was in recimontp,l 

rasorVG n.nd was f1.ircctu,;1;. tc O)VO into an assembiy 

e~rea in TA 1164 :rr\lpp.rJd t(' suJ!:"Ort tho Rtt.~,ck ('In ord3r o 

TbJ 21]3t\ttn.li('n· ju:rnclit "if with J)r.{1" ~nd ]nsy Ot"J'!I!I~.nies 

in tho ftssn.ul t p.nd 'Ft"x in roserve. :f

·' 

from 1st M3.rine D:i.vision dirootiIlb thA.t tho rVgimnt lass 

ono battalit->n~vG to an 'a.ssembly'aroo.ln th3 vicinity of 

tho village of E.A:&NJ&JE-RI (TA,lsGl-lg62) and await further 

ord.Jrst l?-aving a.' minimum force, to pro tect the'road block 

a~ Objactiva Cm:f.tIE. 

( 

;'egitnGnt directied'the: 2d ~ttalinn (l~stJ t~, c;ompeni(3) 

to ~vo' out and reeo~1tar.tb.e· 'hill mass (~ 1863) ncr~;hoast 

of IIA.1fJNJ1IO.m,..;.a~. On,o ' cO'~D¥( Fox)~ s' to rema tn ' (') n Db j act i vo 

OHA.f.LI.Euntil rolieved~r alements ·('t,t the' l~t Jattalit'n. 

, ' 

The 3d~attal~n ,,,..as ·d~,()CteO. to ~ve by r('ad C'n foot 

fr(,ln r>O'sl t1f\nsoceU"r>1ed, ('>rf 'the: Dt"r;thwGst fL'\Dk tf\ an assembly 

.' araaintho vicinity o.,f !fA.iltiJ]l)Et-RI.1 The~:lst Jattal.i("ln ~s 

'nir3cto.d t'o raiiovathaJd, ,:3~tt!i$n.n 1nl tS,~osi t~"ns p.nd 

'l'ox: CA~ny' ('.n O~joCtiva '~P"AF..LI~., 

!Ihs ,J~c1 n~ttel1~ti' .noTod t':b.t ,With E.-~8y Cf\m~ny ·'iea.dinr; and 

at n(\on ~s rGCC"~it().iM hui ,.,68 ae dirocted. e 'The 1st 

~attalion ro1iovad. tha 3{ljR.t~~,lil"\n -wt~h 4blo O(\nna.nr arid one 

pla~orl,cf~~OoItY!JA.nY. ~eCtI.P'n~"tha How and Item O(\IDJ':my 

pnsit1~ns,1\nd $f:\~lta'Q~~~y·tp:~:r3s,arvao 3f\ker Oo~ny 

less ~napla~onroll~~Fnx 'Cl'~ny.,on, ,Objootiv,o C1!Aj~LIlll~ 

Tho 3d !la.-t~~11on linvoo.. ~ut f"nfo~_~-at 2611001 t(\ J'!k)VO tho dis- 

't,a.nce of eight Ilnd.nna ~lf mIlo·s t('its ass'QIilbly,area. iho 

regimental er>mDRnd '}1cst"an~rinas: rO~3ivadlst I-nrina Division 

-~.Jo~a.ticin.· Ordar' 12:"50 cWhieh diractad, thora{tilD~nt to saiza 

Opjeotives :ooo.,~SY. FOX;- G.&l)iiGm, tha.t portion: :of"tho. city 

-,' ·o~ ~SEbtTJ:,in~~onG~ a.nd 9bj3C,tivo 3~ witdlou:td-al-~wY~CP01' 

dinatint; 'the), a.dvance' ~ththa5th Mirln-G,sc 611,· tho.:,r!ghto 

-~c ObjGctivo.s· wera a.s~fo'llows:(l) ·tbG - Hill 33f?' (TA 1960); 

'(2) MSY - F.J.l1'j42" (ii. '2101)rC5l ')'OX ~ Rill l;l(T). 2261) r 

(4) G~:aG.!1- Eil~343; ('l!a'2262); ~n.d(5)- :J~ .... :!i~l l71 , 

(T.tl 24f?Q.l~ , :.Ul of' thasa. objootJ.vos ,lay, a.l~ng tho north side 

. of 5.i!1OUL~".·.!ftladivision tiro-~tOO;th3 attadfUnantnf tho D1v:!.· .. 

den ROoo~s'Sailco COmP'ttniand,t116 ,5thKb~oe.rl- }-nriho O(\rps 

:Jfl,t~lic:n- to th3 7th ,~rinaao" , 

"'fro:~og!~ont l'repar(fd ,tC'" ~:va"out in tlloattack as rapidly 

'e.. s'·poSsib1~.:~a· 2d·~~tWi()n In:)vcri- ('ut aftar' F~x O()tq)auy 

"" . ~ -; : , - .., 

rOjr-inod.; tho, battA.linnwlth]h,J"8.;.Easl in-tho a.s'sault'at abf'ut 

'261l.JQOI frf'M the hili, nns.S ~ 'soizo Ob,joctivo GEO:aGE o ThJ~r 

IlY'VG~ A.bo1i:t1000 "ya.~O:$ '"ti" ~ho '~~h~st wllon· h~l~Q'd by hoavy 

'iJ1omr. s1r1tll- a.rlnS';R.ut~~"tict~~'n,a, ann ~rtr\l" fir.e ~ming 

'f~l1LObJGctfvc DOG, . , •. ' , 

,Nnfurthor -:nr"~l'Gss ~s mrt~o,o ' ~r. Cf'o'~...ny~ .wl1i,ch.lr.S ~ cut 

(,'f'f ~~tnthG bF\ttftli('n byi'~s JIrtVO 0Il:tlijrlri.'th3 ~rningJ 

was'lll~#c:od unrlor the ~"13t(~l,:Cf\ntrpl,(\f ,~lrogimon to ]Xlg 

u{'l~nY.Qt'ntinuOd in ·th.)' attom?t' to' 3sta'Qiisb c(\ntact with 

£r('nt\lJ~G.'· oldmont,.~:t ,th3~~tli- }.fuoiUl$ but "~ furth~r T'lTogrcss 

vt-iz. 11rido o : Wiro Crlnt.:"\ct with1ihj,'roi;im3h~lc(fInnr~nd 'pos-J; ,.,:ts 

.)l=?tabli shen.. in'th3, l,a to ,a.f:tarIlOon· 'w} th DogO~tt[J,illY b'y a ~.t:\l:..~ 

1'11:('0 L::tYi~i"T.~.' '~(1od" a.~lti(\nf ·p:ntl l-iR.t.vr W~G ~:lr jrnpp.Jd' 

t~,' tho ~:r~~j1' j'L~5'~ 'ba'f{',:c,:\ ,~~;;'k. 

" 

,15-RR 

f 

c .' '. 

,

. ; 

... ' . 

~ ' . .' . 

. ' '!he Jr.d 3attalion rno~Gd'1n·to jump-off pooitionn at 1645 

·:itth~ -br:iaco:( TA l~~) jtJ.Qt oouth. ofEAlThTJEOE-RI and junpod 

/ 'o'ff,' in tho attack., to 01)jciotiv~ DOG f~vo minut~o lat~r w:l. th 

· Gj0rgC)c.o~nY:,l~jD.ding th) D.Gaual t~ . Goorgo. advancod about 

600 prdG J4honhalt~d:.by hoavy :mo~ snnll ar~o.utonn·t;ic 

WOQ.:ponp!" ~nd ·lIOrtar firo frcIl tho Objoctivo& How Cc~anyt 

. which: wan following' G'Oorgo Ool'!llony ~ . r.ovod up en tho" righ t 

of G:Jor"g:l CO,m.p.~ny in an attempt to onvolopoObjoctivo DO~ 

bUt. wo.~·aJ.G6 '. l¥tltod'by tho romo fiJJo~ !tOI!l 00~ny rorninod 

inr.)c;or-q:q, ntlnr,-thO .j~offpooitir·np N.o 'furth~r prOGrODO 

, '. VJ.o nn.d,~ d~i;'~ tho dli.y ~ 

Tho.I'at nat~'lli'C'n' cC'no01icbtod~,lta rooltiono.on tho nortfr 

:, ~ wdet Ifl."1llk .d.ur1ng tho day' and conductod patI'r'lo to tho fron·t~ 

~T~ .~~Y contae,i;o 'w

Tho 3d ~at~~li0n m0vod out inc the attaCk. with firQsupport 

from th;:; 2d. :3n.ttt11ion, nt 063O.tr saiza Objacti ve DQG with How 

and George Cc~auies in tho . assault. How on tho ri~hto 

. Thoy moyen slowly uhtil B,b0~t ~oon' ngainst' voryhca.vy onomy 

small arta$. ·~utotat1cwoa.PQns and lDJ rtnr fire. They wore 

ht:~1tod.--ehert,~· -th'!l--Objoctlvtf~1Jlnnd'd'·-d.C·wn oyl11ci ·H1!ri.Vi 

firo. It~OrIIq>tl.nT was brou.r,bt uJ:'.("n tho·,loft of. GcorgQ Cempany 

to laUnch an attack on tho enomyright nank~ ~"to~ in 

thoda'y' ,o.-oori;.o Ck-!!1pr.tny ~vod doop into tho enomy' s' r~aJ." in a 

flanking action. wlliChplp.cod. GC(lrgo, qn' tho loft cf ItOll C('llij?any, 

nnd in a. rosition tt' onfilndo tho oas·torn ~lo:,os ('If tho 

hill mass rn ''Jllfch'lay Objoctivo OOG. Tho 3d Dntt

_ ...4any "C") rOnf11ttod n-n the road 

block' ,1nd tho 1st natta.i10n. 7th Ml.rino·s. loss Ablo ' 

O~mp?\n7t. rOD1l1nod in bloek~ pnsltions in tho n~r~hwost 

soctor~ During the ~rni~-; Abl'O C(\mpa.ny lMvod to tho 

re;';imontnl -comnnnd "PO st rtrca as l"oglmon, tnl rosO%'vo. 

. -; '.' 

Tho 2d

Ormpany TIC". 5th KoroD.Il l,hrinc Corps ':Jattal~rn~ 

\iP-S scnt 

out in tho aftonl.!"'C"n fr('lm tho 3d J)a.ttalirn tt." :i .. cc6nr~o1 tor c;.nd 

(~~c(:-.r tho }!arts ('r SEOUL in th

~his ~y1s nction carried tho regiment to its final objectivo 

a10nh tho D.0rthorn edge 0f S;moUL~ Tha novo pinched 

off tho 5th M"trinos in t:"loir z::no of netien as had been 

~lrtp.nGd (1st Mtrine Di\"isjonOpo~tion Order 12-50) and 

:i:"oliovod them fr00 further acti("ln :tn SE)UIJ(T 

- J 

At ab'""Ut 2996f)OI, the onemy launched A. counterattack 

fr~r.l ,tho vicinity 0f ITill 224 a.Rainst our ?ositi0ns on 

Object! vO ]JAXER~ a"':m.rsnj:hly unc:\,aro that DOh Cooo.J.1ny'had 

boon .roj.nf0rccdduTinr; tho ni{~h'c by Er?-sy Cf"~ny and Di visi0n . 

Reconnaissance C(lI!['any~ ThC) c0untorattn..ck \'fclS :pr0coctod by 

hoaV""J enomy mJr'c

IntelliGence inf!"rmation gathered during the :,ast fe\'l 

days ina~cated ~~t the 7th l~rinos were O?f;OSGd by tho 

Is GlI 2,ad a~d 3rd Jattali0ns of the 17th North ~orean 

Division"~ E~tim!ltod enor.1Y st:rength W1s placed at 1100 infantry 

su:pported by one battali0n of artU+-ery~ Of these 

enopY~ it was estimated th~t the 7th Marines killed 200, 

one hundred and forty 11risoncrs v]Oro ~akon~, 

• 

, 

t 

, 

I 

SU]7P~Y and evacun.tion ,¥oro normal~ Su.pr1ias to uni'ts 

on Objec'~ivo ::J.A.KE":1. were novcd throUGh the 1st I-hrines zono 

in SEOUL~ , 

,This dnyts action cleared most of the ?nemy resistanco 

fro:othc port~(:ns ('If SEJUL in the 7th M1.riJ;lcs zpne¥ and cut 

the ron to of ogress from SEoUL to UIJONG:.u~ 

In absenco of further orders from Division~ tho reg~ 

mont continued'tho nttnck at 3006301 with 2d :Jattalion 

in the as saul t to completo tho soizure of Hill 224, n.nd 

tho rirtgo rurmrlng northca.s-t fr0In that hill and Hj,ll 498 

(~ 2366) to the nC'rth\~st,. tho so bein{; tho areas from, 

which the 2d 3attnli0n clements C'n, IIill 224 had boon r~ 

ceiving-fire duri~~ night~ Tho 1st TIattnlinn (less 

2Jaker Company) had boon diroctod to move I"ut ~t first 

light, by trugk ~() non assembly aro~ to the s()utho~st (If 

Objccttve :3AICER~ :J,!"ker ON!lpany ~~s to rejoin. the battD,li~ 

as snon as rossib1e after ]('000OI, tho time at which they 

woro to bq relieved in the 5th M~rinos scot0r~ The 3d 

TInttali~n was directed to hold rositions occupied ,the dny 

bef('l~b~ 

At 300730I an' order ~s recoivod from Divisi0n directing 

that th6 ror;imcntt' with C0~ny tre ff t 5th Korean Ml.rine Corps 

~att~lion at~chod~.soize opjectivos 4 and 3 ani prepare 

for tho advn.nce ~n' UIJONG::U~ (Is t M').rinu Divi:-;ion OJ:>ora"..· 

ti0n Order 13-50) ~ Div:i.~i('n ~cc0nnD.issrtnC0 Cnm:pany n..ni 

5th Koron.n M:l.rino C~~s :DQ,ttn,lion (loss CCmrD.ny fiC") woro 

do~chod from tho roginont~ 

The 2d ]attali0n jumped off fror.l Hill 224 with Fox 

Oompany to ~lCc.'l.r 

tho ridgo to the northot'l.S tt Ec'1.sy to clour 

and ~oizo El11 498, nnd Dr-g in battalion roservo in re[l.~:· 

of Hill 224~ PrOt;l'oSS was slow ar,;ainst J.:1oavy onony nortnT 

firo~ .ArtillorY,and air wero ca.ll~d on, 9nony positions' 0n 

tho ridge and on IIill 49S durinG tho day~ -:Jy nigh tfnllt' 

Fox Cf"'npany had occup:+ed thc( ric1[,'o9 ED..sy Conpn.ny was u..:.'1C>Jb13 

to reach tho to}? of ~ll 498; :".nd duG in,for niGh'1i abl)ut 

half WD.y fronHill 224 to Hill 119S~ Totnl

against rmderato enemy sma..ll a.rms fire at d.ark~ 

I :na-ttalio~ was unable£, however, to reach ~he road nor~hwest 

of Objectiv~ 3 ac;ainst heavy small arms firo from 

Hill 1050 ))attalion riug in for nir:h t on Objective 3Q 

Tota1 adva.nce from morning jump-off positions was about 

4000 yards o . 

~he 3d J3attalion was movod by truck thXou{~ht SEOUL 

and entered a. new aSS'cmbly area onObjectivo 4 at about 

1530 0 The battalion d14; in this area for tho nir:ht and 

scnt Do patrol to Hill 97 (Til 2S65) to the east th'1.t night" 

The roar command post and riagimontal Headquarters and 

Servico COl![)D.ny join~d tho forward command post at tho 

tomb (T.A 2462) during tho rrnrning a.nd the C0mmandpost 

openadthcro a.t ll00~ 

Company nC" t 5th Korean Marine Corps I3attali0n conductod 

patrols during the af'Gor Ifoon and nicht to the 

ea.s t. along the boundary with tho 1 st i49.rincs as fa.r as 

the town of CHA.NGWI-:l.I (TA 2865) 0 cle~ing "'villages in the 

area.., 

SuWlyand .'~~OI.J.at~rn wore norml~ "Ul supplies in 

du.IJP.~ on tho northoast side of the HAlT River woro COIlsolidated 

in one dUIr[> ncar tho now Regimental CC'nmland 

Post~ Th0S0 supplios still romnini~g in dumps on tho 

southeast sj.do of tho forry crossinr, could n(' t bo moved 

becausQ of a laCk of transportati~n~ 

Tho 

This dayts actir-n consisted o·f· moppi.IlG up onemy rear 

guard cloments in that area, and placinG ~he reGi~ont in 

positil""n to bor:in the advance on UIJONGnU~ Frnr!l tho 

;r-osistanco onc('untoTC:d, it t'Ll1poarod that tho enomy was 

.dutormincd to contiuuc a stiff. roar guard acti0n up tho 

corridr-r to UIJONG:ru~ 

.A.dvanco 0 n UIJONGmT 

Tho 7th ~hrines received orders fr('m Divisi0n tr nOvance 

rapidly to seize blockinG positiC'ns in tho vicinity 

of UIJONGJJa (T.A. 2898) (1st Ml.rino :Division Oporatirn 

Ordor 14-50) ~ The fl"'llowinr:: units were' attaC".Jicd tr. the 

ra,gimcnt for this ~d~nco: 3d nattalirn~ 11th M~rinos; 

C0r:rin.ny ltD", 1st Tank J}attalir.n; C('~ny "1)", Ist·El4':inoor 

:Jr:tta1i0n; Cr~a.ny n=u t 1st }.fotor Trnnsport :nat 

l-Rrine Corps :Jat 

t!J.lion; ancl Crrlpany "crt, 5th I~orcan 

tnli('n~ 

Tho rcr;.ir.'lont, n('w Rocirlental Cr-r.lb~t 

Team ... , 7., issuod 

ordJrs to. ?\dya.ncc en UIJonG~U in a C0J~.1mn 0f ba ttali('lns, 

~ho 3d TI~ttali0n loading~ Tho 1st TInttalion ~s directed 

to mcvo out ffcm Objective 3 and claar lIill 105 to tho 

fi0;t"thwos t :pric}r to tho t imo tho ad ~nco started up -I;ne 

rO[J.d .tc UI·JO}TG:JU,. then to nnke. a f .lint I.'n a br('ad front 

to CO~·'C-r. iih,9 .. ont.:oi"Y of the 3d :Jfltta1i;~!J. into tho d.ofi10 

thrQu~h which ran tho rnnd~ 

Tho l'st Dnttn.lirn ccmplotod tho soizurG cf Object~ vo 

3 and c('lntinuod'tbc'nt~~Ck tr- Hill 105 af~inst modernto 

small amms firo~ Hill 105 was secured at about 0110301. 

Tho 3d nat ~9-1i('nt augmented by ta.nks and enginoers, and 

f·l1Iowo::L b;y· :}or::"m~r.";~l P::;~.~ou~r-:('rs~,'1d Sc:nd ~3 C('..,..,..,~\ny

moved out abootOllllOI in, colum. t{' enter the dar-i1o to tho 

~nnrth loading toUIJONGTIO' :"ith the in'tentinn of: ~d.varicinh in 

the clafile as rapidly a.s po:ssib~o •. ' . . . 

. . . 

Tho 2d Datta.lion r~Il'fl.ined in pos1 i-in~s o~ied tho day 

before,propared to move into'·the 'colu'mn~ 

. , 

•.. i.· .••.•.•.•. :.:.~ 

-"',,,.;••... ·.... 

. 

-. ,~ .:;~ , - . 

/~....; - 

--:: . 

,The cn1.UJmlad_Gd '~A tha \'oad .. ~ 'n position batt-lOon 

Objoct1vs , and Hili 105 lVhen'lt'1iBs hold up' for n.n,hoUl.ty whUo 

EnginGGrscloa.redminos in thfl.t· nroa.~Foot troops- of 3d nnttalion'C

The 3d 3attc.."ilicn continued pouring fire into the onemy 

posi~i('lns throUGhout tho dayo but no further advanc.es W3ro 

mado~ Tata.l advnnco for·tho CL"ly was about 300 ,ards~ 

Tholst Dattali0n crossed the stroam at 0530 and jUl!I.P0doff 

in the ,atta.ck .to seize Hill 22G on tho east siele of tho 

d~file 'a~ai~st nndorato o~omy rGsistanco~ Hill 225 W!lS socured 

lato !n tho aft'ornoon wi th a total advance of nearly 

2~OOO yards~ , 

Tho 2d TIn,"ttnlionremined in r~-:;imental reserve in dofonsivo 

position alOll~"; the roo.r porimoter.of the reGimontal 

. cornl1k'lnd post 0 

Oor.qpany nc" f 5th K9roan- Mlrinc COT})S :Jattali0n patrolled 

during ,tho- day along tho rIdge lino~OOO yards northwos~ of 

t.ho assaul tin{~ units. Two oncmy Groups wore dis:r>orsod Wi th 

40 enonw includillb:ono wonan inuni£orm rcrortod killc~ 

This day 1 s action proved that tho anomy was heldinG tho 

blocking positions in forool> 

. 

~oGiL1ental Combat Team - 7 continued the attack at . 

r 

03(.6301 with ·t1D3d l3o.ttc'llion on the high Ground lrlOstof. tho 

road!, 1st _jja.1;tnlion en tho high ground cast of thQ roa.~ 

and. 2d nattalion in resorvo; Tho att'lck: Dnvod rapidly 

. against moderato o:."'positi0n. At 0309301 1:hc 2d :3o.ttalion 

wi th tanks and eneinocrs in support nlr"ved b'f~ oS tho~r assembly 

aroawith -tho mission of ndvD.ncin{~ up tho road botwoen 

tho tst nattalion aild 3d J]attalion to UIJOnG13U~ It 

becamo a.pparent that tho enemy blocking position on tho 

w.ailt. had boon brc)k:on when tw 120mm .mortars, ono anti-tank 

gun~ and a supply durr;p wor 0 CD.p tur ~o 

All three battalions adVan~od rarid1y side by side 

~;a.inst modorate resista.ncc~ 'small arms, nnd -spor~dic mortar 

:fire throUr~h ou t tho clay 0 

J3y 031710I, tho 2d Iln.ttali0n had occur-ied the t0Wl1 ('If 

UIJONGnU~ The 3d nattali0n had securen 110sitions f'n the 

ridgos ('f'.A2571-·2577) west of UIJO~TG:JU~ :!ho 1st :latta.lion 

hrtd sccurodpo si tif'ns 0n the ridGo ('!!A297&- 307~) oas t of 

UIJ01TGJJU. The re{;imentnJ. ccmr.nnd :post l/IflS displaced to a 

l>("!siti0n ncar tho town of CHANGAl+--NI (~\ 2S74) ~ 

Idontifica. ti0ns dur~ the daysh0wed tnD.t Ro{;fme.!].tal 

Ccmbn.t Team - 7 had boon oll{;ngod l,;ith tho 3d o l~th~ nnSl- 5th 

jJn.t;tali0ns .. ~st ROGiment~ 31st North Koroan :ni¥isi~n. .' 

Other units ;WOre securityuni ts of tho 8E)1JL ])ivisi(\n~ Also 

encountered.' wore. olooents OI tho 2d Dil.ttn.lion, 3d 3.cGimont~ 

li'~h North Korean Division and tho 26mm Artillery J)attallon 

of this division~ OnG onemy tankbat~"lli('n of 13 tanks also 

partici:pa.ted,of which 4 woro destroyed by air a.ttacks and. 

'2 wor61..'1.tc;r.c~ptured in a d6.nn{,;ed cond::d.on; 

The regitnental'-train l'!1ovod during il~e day to the old 

'Regimental Cmnnnnd Post near liTso.-DONG o 11 motor :park ~s 

nnintained at the command post, 0.1 thollt~ the I!lajority cf 

the vehicles _were returned to tho rear at 'night and started 

moVing SU1)1!1:i~:< for,..zard tho.:f011~vi.ng morning~

,/ 

.' 

• 

This day I s a.ction culmina too in the caDture of U!JONGW 

and the completion of the missi("ln a.ssignod.;, Thls advance of 

over three miles for the day resulted. in the, cutting of' the 

10. teral ccmnun.!crttil"'lns tc the 'east and west of" UIJONGJJ1J~ and 

secu.rod an~ importnnt blocking rosition 0n the·x Ocrps fina.l 

phase line~ 

Late tbD.t aftern('\C'n R0rc~imontal Combat Team -1 received 

inforllVltiC'nthat tho 6th Rapublic rf Korea~Divisirn was to 

relieve :aogirlental C~!!lb"'l.t TCBrl -7 in rlace~ 

. 

lJbe rcglmontc('ntinuod crnsolldatlf'n of positions. in the 

area and c('!nti~uodpatrolling tC" the front and' f1o~nks~ en 4 Oct~ 

Crl'l'any I!C1f:.~ 5th Koroan M"\rino Ct"'rps !3att~ion~ s~t twr' :platcons 

to r-ec0nnoit,er t)nd est;1blish dofonsiva nosit i0ns l"nthe 

hill mas~, (iA. 2GS~~H!-o) to tho northeast of. UIJCI!IG3UQ Thr) ltilier 

p1atl"('n was sent to rodonn("liter and as t."l.bll.sn. defensive pO:::i:J.- . 

til"ns 0n lIil~ 221: (Tit 257S) wast of UIJ01T

Y:tthd~a~ -frC"I!l the area. began at 07 )5301. Tr0C:'s were 

1Il('ved by tr'i~ck a10ng the road back to SIDDL and thence tC' 

INCHON'ft Wt,thdrawal Il1("ved ahead of schedule :=tnrt regiment 

closed i. its assigned assembly aree,in INCHON by mid after 

n~()n. 

b(\ A NAR7I.A~IVE OF ENEMY OPE:'~TI ONS TO n"OLWE ENEMY, T~\~ 

XI0S~RGANIZATI(,N, ST£L~GTH9 DEPLOYMENT~ _P:tiQ3lCLE 07..DEn 

OF rATTLE. ,Ali]) EWIFME1TI' llf THE R :aGlMEThTT' CCrCAT TEAM &. 7 

ZONE F?L(",~-22 S3trTEID0. TO 5 OCTO:3~ 1950.:, 

g:';o.ssing "f; the b.t;Snl~G River by :aagirlentrtl CI"Mb~.t Te:=tM 

7 in t~evic;,ini:ty C"f the Ferry (TA 0762), c("nstltute1. a 

fla.nkin~ thra~.t . to the enemy's ftefensa ("If SEOUL, Korea, 

C('lnse~eri tly, miring the peri('la. 21 - 22 SeTlteMber 1950, 

the cner.lY began to build up h~s strength tf' n--rrC"x!nn toly 

2 ,battalions in the Renaral ~r~~ 3000 yar1s nC"rth 0f the 

,RtN GANG :cliver Ferry CrossinF'. A cartured;emy Qrern.tiC"n 

~~der indic~ted that the enemy intended tC" recapture the . 

ferry and exp~l. eliminate or noutrP~lize R~irnantal Qomhat 

Team - 7 fr("m- their rositi"ns n('lrth ('If the IL'll G .. 1NG Riv3r. 

During the night of 23 - 24 Sept~mber c0nttlct W'i.S first 

_m~de with the en~my When he sent ~isht patr('lls against I 

00 ~any· po sit;1,0 ns,- (TA 0567 .A."JC!>E) • 

,,' C0nstan.t pressure in the 3xpandin.p: Ra~,,:imGnta.l CC"mba t 

Team - 7 Z0no cf acti('ln, forced the enemy to revert to 

defensive tactics until the build up and. rcorgan:f~zatiC'n 

.0;f Us. f0rcos could be effectecl& Subsequently en 25 

-SeItombor, it was discovered that the enemy 0n the ca.storn 

fl~ of Regimental Combat Team - 7 t had mined the ... bridge 

q.i{d road leadi!lf2: northwast out of SEnUL oommenciIlG in the 

vicinity o~.: (T.t~ 1862); and several hund.red eneI!1Y tr0C'ps 

wore diggi,ng in on the high ~0und vicinity HONGJEOE-:a.I 

( TA 1862)0 _ On the north central flnnk:. ar]1rC'xirnately 100 

qnomyO~rGops ~~ro rap0rted diH~ing in at (TA 0467 H4) 

white -e:comY' tr00ps ("In the loft flank cf Regimental Crmbat 

Team -- 7 witho..rew S('lIDO 2500 yards r'ut ('If cnntact~ wwevcr 

duri~~ the night0f 24 - 25 September a 9 man onomy patr0l 

_ a:"tte~teri to onter tho RegiMontal Crrl~,n1. P0St, but wero 

rerulse~ ~\n cst1~~tod. 50 tc 75 enemy infiltrnted ar0und 

our r("lad. block (T.A, l2h3M) at 2160 but firorI. 0nly S]"'0radlc-' 

ally ~,nd were likewise rerulsed: No enOMY do.:~d wore found~ I~re were 

~~ken rriso~er in these ~ctil"ns.· On 25 Se?tonher tho cpony 

eMployod l4.5mm anti-tank rifles, of nussian design nnit 

r.J1.nufacture ll 

which fn.iled t('l nanetr!1 to thG ~J!Y'r 0f 

Regimon tn.l C('lm'b~.t Tenm - 7 t~nks. 

The f~110wing M('rnl~t 2h SepteMnor o 0n tho northoast 

:frnnt the enemy ('.fferon.. light to incron.sing1Y hoavy rcsist;..'llU~a 

late in the :1.ftern('('In as lnr.o:3r ~r0U""'S C"f well dUG 

in trnn~s were encountered. These' troops ~cro bolieved 

~o ~ a olomonts of the 21. Regimont~ 17th 1T0rth K0r0!U1 

..Jr1ga.1e 0Ir~·osinG the advance of 2d :J~ttal :,'n, 7th M1.rincs .. 

and 3d :Jatt~lil"n, 7th ~1arinos whll3 elements nf the l07th • 

Security Re~im8nt wore bolieved to be orros1to 1st . 

:Jattal:J.0n, 7th l·hrinos in tho 23gimcntal- Cl"lrib'\t Tean -7 

nQ~thwost sector in the viCinity of tho Ferry Crossing. 

There worQ 1 enemy mortar nosi tt0ns rO....,0rted. during tho 

d.B.YaI_though tho enemy empl;,yed 0~ly li~ht JIrlrtar firo. 

on 3d 3 a ttalion, 7th rnrincsr0siti0ns with 2 roun1s 

f a ll-1ng inGho vi,cini ty of the Regimental CC'InJrand Po s te; 

:By nightfall. 1000 enemy had beon rO';"'orted on the nOl'th 

oast frDnt (~.:-..'.. :,S5~"f)~" ~'-,v0,:rn.l~"~r'!~od ,;]():;:,,_,,_roportad in

in tho vicini ty 0f TA 1963~~, I:iontif1.cati('lns cf those g?oups 

CDul~ n0t be aSCJrt~inod nt thnt time o H0wovcr~ it was nrtod 

that tho QnGmy f("lu{~ht in In.rt~o compact r::r0upsas 0~,posod to . 

U. S .. ¥nTino Cr1?s tactics 0f seizing' nn4. h0Idi!4"; kO~T torrain Q 

Tho enemy ITs/i.e extensive use nf mines p c0J1!11o'i;cly mining ('Ino 

l~rge secti0n of fi0rthorn S30UL {not in R~~imelltal C('Imbqt To--'lID 

7 Z0ne ('If acti0n). The onemy strongly resisted jioglmontaJ. 

Combat Team -7's eveninf; attnck" in tho n('rthcf:tst sector ¥-tel. 

STIrlII ~rms and machine l~un firoo Hi s f01:'CO rn.nRori fr0ffi ~mal1 

unorganized grrl'Uj .... s t() l~.r~e well. 0.l:'(~anized str('lng }10 ints,~ . 

.. litor TO si ti('lns wor0 cr-nsolinrt·~(31.. 0CCA.S i""'nal snn,11 fiJ:"o f i{-;n ts 

took rla;~o thr('u~h0U t tho' niRht. .1. t 260125 the cncl]1Y tl. ttnckcd 

1st 3att:-:t1i0n, 7th ~1c'1rinos p('Isitir-ns \IIi th snnll arms~ machine 

gun and mortar fire "but 'tid nnt3ntcr 01.~ rositi('ns~ COIDmGn 0- 

ir4,; with -bhG j~l off 0f 2n1 :JattaliC'n an1 3d :J:J.~tH:.~r>n~ 7th 

¥nrinos in tho northeast sector at 270630, tho enomy off0rOQ 

fr('lm 1ir.;ht to mrd.onto rGslstanco thr0ugh0ut the .. d.ayo At 

271715 approx:t.m'ltoly I enomy com:"'n.ny (reinf0rccd) l.!1unchod 

an att9.ck at thG HAl~ GANG Fcr:ry CrossiIlh but was rorn.1.1sed by 

1st TIattaliC'n 1 7th Marines with a loss of aoout 75 killed in 

action. Durine; the night of 26 ~ 27 September thJ enemy increased. 

his mininF; activi ties and mined roD-as in rear aroos 

that had rreviously bOGn cleared .., 

The IIT'lin road nr.rth in the 

vicini ty of POIIGlLCHOT:::-Nl (Tl1. 0779) was rOp0rtod minod as well 

as having troes follodd.crcss tho roadl'.rn.y() l1hile mos~ anti-· 

tarik mi.-nes used by the enemy were n,f tho 'Wr'01en "box tYr,(jo . 

the vicini ty of TA 2063M: and small enemy r.r01.1pS WOl.'O rep()rte(~ 

• 4 

some of which were J00bd-~trn:~""cclt D. new cast ir('ln an·ti~-:::-orsruno;t 

mine of Russian make was found o During' the 'lay thc onemy 

eJ!lployed a few m0rtars of nIl-determined c

Gompany, ls~ TIat~~lirn, 7th Mari~os roceivou!small arms fir.e 

fr0m 611&1.1 o!)mr.y units at TA. l063:D at 28020r'l. In tho nC'lrth 

cGntral fr0nt the enemy oste~blished a r0ad block at TA 14n9Y 

a.r1.r1 c0ntinuod oxton~iYo miffing 0T'ernti0n 0n roads an'l 'hriflr:es 

t:1TC)U{-:hou.t tho nran.~ A.."l offioer Prisrnor of flar stated th"1t 

nnny' th0usanG:· tr00 ps we::'o nt"v:inp: n0rth f:r;om SE:!UL to UIJOUGJU o 

The enemy 1st and 2d ~attali0ns~ 17th (nivisirn- Rogimont), 

cOi1tianing Gf)() mon oach j 

"'OTO idontifiGd. DI"'CUn3nts were 

founn. from the 4th C(\mrf1ny~ 31. I3A-ttalirn of f1.n unknown 

Rogiment q.n~ from a }-h.chino G-~m ::Jattn.llrn, 5th ?ogiment 

al th0Ugh thoro hal been no inclicat:!'0n ("If their -presence 

in tho arCk'J.~ 'On 29 Septer.iher ~ r0~orts rf 12()() o;cmy in the 

nort:h.ea8t soctor on Hill 171 (Tit 2464 ~nd 500-600) d.if;ging 

In at TA 1670 in the n0rth centrnl soctor wore received 

while further reports indicated the enomy in the northwost 

sector TA 1169 1,.,i thrlrow northwcs t t() ILS.A}T. 

It is interesting to note th~t n 3rd 3~ttali~n, 7th 

M~rinGs patrol found 30 bodies along thd wall at TA 2162E, 

inclTIding soma women and one child, whoso hands had beon 

bound behind thorn and "Iho wore. then shott. A North KorC

, 

i 

4' 

• C 

2d 3atta1i0n. 17th jivisi0n wero'tentatively identified~ 

The enemy crntinucd stiff resistanco to the RJgimental Onnbat 

Team - 7 advance towarcl UIJONG:JU sufforinr; hoo.vy lossost A.nd 

by 3 Octcbor thore wero indi~~ti0ns that hs was breaking in~ 

snnll gr0urs of 40-50 men and conducting a gene-ra.l withdra-wal 

northwar4- covered by ItJortarand fla.lu tratjectory firo, ani 

abandoning wea:'.Jons, amnnmi tif"lnand sUJ.JI)l*es in c0nsidorable 

quan ti ty b It was n0 ted that the enemy at t01!&J't ed jamming (\ f 

friendly radio channels en 3 October 1950 0 Identificatinns 

made this da.yworo tho 4th Plato0n. 2nd OonPanYf Llcgir.wnt 

unknown; 2d C01I1j::any. 4th TIattt1..1if'n, 31st Regiment S00ul Divison; 

1st OompanY,5th TIattali0n, 3lst'Regiment, Seoul Divisi0n; , 

31st Field~\rtillo~ and the signal Secti0n, llcad~u~rtcrs~ 

Seoul Division; 2d O~mpanYf SpQcial II~~d~artors. Sooul Division 

(57mm anti-tank CC'r.Ip8..ny. 2 guns p;Jr C(jnpa.ny) ~ 

Durinr, trie 

night of 4 -5 October at UIJONGJJU tho enomy limited his or.e::~ 

ati0ns tl' a fow rounds ('If rrnrtar fir.;)· which lan'led in tho vi-- 

cinity 0f thoro~im3n~~1 co~nd post~ On 5 Oct0boT, twn 0nony 

tc~nks thn t h.~d boon pulled off the road !lnd had beon well carrifl~god 

woro dostroyed by Rir~ Th.;) enomys o~Grnti0n for the 

d.:'ly CC'nsisted chiefly of byp-"1.ssinr; UIJONG:JU nnd wiihitrawing 

to the n()rth~ Itwas ("n t!lis rtay th-"tt 3

7962 rom rifle ussa Mlg91/30 (s~me with foldi~' oayonets) 

7 0 62 mm Carb ina USSR 

7 ~62 mm -ff SHPAGm n PPSH, model 1941, SMG (1f:3u.rp Gun' 

lUi. TmZR.Y 

i20 rom. M193S, Rec'l.vy mortar 

82 mID, M1936 or. Ml937 t 3attalir'n Mortar 

45 mm, AT gun, ~942 

MCTORlZED and .ARMORED 

T--3~ 

Tank 

Truck, model GAZZ - 

63 4x4 

The following wen.pons were uncommon .but wero occasiC'nally 

encountorod: 

. 

lfuilo ronny US~ ~l defensive grenades and som~.USSR RA- 

42 offonsivo grenr~dGS :q,nd USSR· TI?G-43 :IJl.\T r:rena~~s wero 

found1) n('lno of tho A.bove 'Y'Qrc used tr any oxtent;" Generally 

thG enomyl s oIlIJ!loyment ('If znr,rt::l.rs -was ineffecivc. praslJ.r.1A.bly 

duo to :?oor Co rnriunicn.t i!'ns. Several t~nes he emr1oyocl· hi s 

flat trajectory. hiGh velocity P,UnS aGainst scattered trC'C'rs 

wb.ich was.in all instances ineffoctive. 

9~ ~TS OF .THE OPillR,\TION 

']he 7th I-nrines (:a.einf0rcod.) .. la.nded nt n~CEOJ:I~ Karon. 

en 21 September, 19500- On October 3, 1950, "the reGimont 

rod accoIIIi~lished its final mission- -th-3 seizure of UI- 

.JONG:JU o In t.hese thirteen cla.ys thG rOGim0nt had rr.oved 

a total distancG of ncq.rly 46 Milos from 11TCHON to '!>UIJOlTG:3U, 

and had accomplished four vi tn.l tnslcs necessary to tho soi 

Z'l;.ro of the SEOUL aroa~ Thcy/wrc~ (1) th0 C"~tting cf tho 

no r'chw'Gst ) a~)1!roach6S to S..oouL along the pyonGy.tJiG--~SEOUL 

hiGhway; (2) the ouiflankii1G and cloarinG of tho defenses 

north of s.F£)UL~ (3) ci.l.ttinc ~ho nc:rthern a:')pro':J.chcs toSIDUL 

along the SEOUL-UIJONG:JU hiGhway; and (4) the seizure o~ 

UIJONG~U whiCh established a 01ocki~~ positi0n n0rth of : 

S]bUL aI;a. cut. GnOloy-1D>torcl..).. cmmrmnico..tiC'.::ls in th~t 'aroa~ 

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DALLY SUMI\tL~RY

9 ~ 13 ~ PRlSOJ:JERS OF vTAR 

Tho In!l.jor1.ty of POrtt s taken were deserters and wourLdod~ 

InterroGation revealed that·mqny (If their fellow soldiers 

wruld like to dcsGrt but were afraid to make the ntto~t 

sinoe death YJ,S tho rennJ. ty for t~ose caUtr;ht and they woro 

closely watched by thoir officcrs~ 

1.hnj; of tho ?Vlt s t~kon were dressed in white nativGs 

clothes~ The unifom.of tho l~('\rth Korean scldiers \\6S a 

light woip,h t khn.ki oo~orert ole' th~ The shoe~ worn wore rubber 

s(llo1. cn.nvns sncakors a lJorth KC'roan soldiers !lid not wonr 

helrnets~ 

~e first IiT t.~kcn '\I11.S oartured on 22 So:"tombor 1950~ 

Subsoquently FvTl s were taken fiS fallows~ 

22 Soptember 1 

• t 

23 

" 

2 

24 

" 

2 

25 

11 

23 

26 If 

5 

27 

11 

29 

28 11 26 

29 

II 

GO 

30 

Sf 

9 

2 October 6 

3 

)f 

10 

4 tf 

:tJ 

5 

" 

32 

255 

Of tha' above totnl f 

ano FVT wns an officer, who \lD;S 

cr:rturcd tho niity fDllowin{~ tho fall C'f SECli'L';" 

• 

As indica.ted on 9 ~A~

Durin~ 

t:ho period 17 to 2], ,August 1950, the accountable 

offtcoT for the reCimon t1) reinforced, preparc:::l roquisi ti0ns 

on Ivinrine Corps &~pply Depot~ Camp rendleton 0f tho following 

bcno~ categories: 

a o To flll the many shor~~os In "K" SCI-ios (Peace; 

TIE and T/A for units aIr-ondy organizod. lliese wore sho~'...\ 

tagos in oquiImlont o:f the frmer Socrnd l-hrine D1 vis10n 

units 'whose dosignatir>ns had boon cr,.,ttnged in tho forJOCl~tion 

of tho 7th 1{'l,ri!1.es rt ,~nd which units had loft Ca~ Lejeuno 

0!11y a'bou~ a woek ~"\rov1ouslY' with m0 st of their lIEU Series 

(;.>oo.co) TIE and T/A. equil,mcnt .- less vehicles ~,nd on,~in(lor 

ocr~ir'nent~ 

- . 

b~ TC" Irf."dvic1.a r('utlne 'barracks and. acceler!ltocl tLaillinr, 

requ:!.rements~ 

c~ T0 make up the (liffcrencos betwoen lr.~r and Peaco 

allo,t'ia.n~os of equipment and S'U.I'J:lies for units alron.dy ore;~,nizw(_~ 

Equiptlen t and sU~J!ly lis ts \-TOre rre::x'}.red "in t0tn fJ 

for tho below listed units'oy the Su~~ly Officor, .R~rosentativ-o, 

Commandin ..... General, Fleot'r.hrine ]l("rce, Pn.cific~ 

and the Harino CrITs Su~'):,ly !)

• 4 

nctunlly in the Th'lnds of troo11S ancl rendy f0r usc rrior to 

sailin{~{' .A..:.""l ordnance inS";)oction team (prr-visi0nal fr0m "'er'i;)·'· 

('j~sigriGtt w9ro not all a;va!lable until the CNIlploiii0 n of • 

this p'lll8e~ Even those trucks hC"wever, were wi thdral..nl . 

piecemcx":tl du:r-int; the -ryc:-iod; only () remained'-..('n the 26th~ 

~- . 

, 

l-fadiec'l,1.SUITl1ds, rr:rtfc'Il.1tlriy blankets. shretchers J 

and r0utine aid statj.on supplies. ':Toro 0 bte .. ina"U'le gut in 

insufficient q:urtntities. Initio.l equipment ,,"~as noi; delivered 

'from nTr;H6~T until.about 2 weeks ~fter la.nding~ SIl'k'lll 

Class It_III and V dunips were set u::,in the i:rnmodiato vicinity 

('If the .Regimental Comnnnd Post; tho~o units closer to 

the ferry than to t~9 OornmandP('st drew directly from ~~o 

Shore ?artye. A combi.nati(\n of uni'c and suI1J."ly :p(d.nt di&-~ 

trlbL1.tion prevailcd~ tho' Inti.or rrodcminn.ti~~ Tho Shore 

Party maintaincq. a \du~ ofOhss I,LlI, nnd V su:prlias 

(averaging about one day levol) for '0.11 tr00ps east inthoir 

. zone of ·suppo.r·t~ F

•, 

1 

• 

\ 

JGep #155~29 W8~S destroyed by a lnnd rninc~ 

/ 

~he Shore Pnrty ferry install~ti0n rrevi0.usly used ~ws 

fnrthcr disix-:mt thn,n the other Sh(lro Pn.rty ferry in SE0OL~ 

accordinglyt' su:ppl:1es ,\..rere drnwn fr0m latter dUn;!stl OYdQrt 

~or units oneratin~ well nnrth of Rcr;imcntnl C0~nd Po~t~ 

These continued to' draw directly fr0m nDrth ferry dum~s~ 

Oombina t i('ln ("of unit anc.l SUl'"1l?ly point di strib~ til")n pr{Y'lr:l.::'.Lo,:~" 

The regj.ment rocolvodtho first issuo of fresh bread (220n 

- rounds) on 28 SGrtonbcr~ l.his item uontinucC!. to be isS't,-od 

in that· a1n0unt daily until tho bakery was sCLUTed ab0":11i 6 

Octcbcr~ .Distributi('ln (If 5 in 1 rati("ons for relatively s~ 

ti0nary units arid "Olf rati('lns for fast nJviflt:~ units still 

provn ilod~ 

On 27 September 1950, 10 truCks were assigned to tho 

Reb~mcnt by order of Co~~ndinh General, 1st Marine ~ivision 

for use as or~nic augmen~'1.tion~, They were assir,l).od to 

subordinate units as follows~ Two por bn.ttn.li()n~. one to '~ho 

Anti-Tnnk: Oompany} 3 to tho Llogimont..'1l lbtor ?ool~ 

wero in use at lou.st12 hours each daYr nnny f0r 24 ho1J.rs~ 

The rennin1.ng trucks on loan from 1st ~to~ Trn.nSI'0rt J)att~ 

lion '>JUro returned during the period 27·'30 Soptombor)~ 

On 30 September 1950 all dumps E1.st 0f tho HIDI :aivor 

woro consolidatod in the vicinity of the 00nmnnd~?ost 

the Regimen't

75 Tons commarcial oxplosives 

Several IT~d~od 

Jnp Jayonots 

3 LarGo ,~enornt0rs and stationary Rac.io Installat~0n8 

7 14~5 ?TRS AT :;-Mlo 

lTuI:lcr0us Riflo s nnCL sr!"G v s 

L'lr1':9 qu'1n ti ty of SA ]c;r.mf', :o.O,Il'1 ,~rolndos 

;~::-tillcc'y ~.mICf' 

6 Enemy tnnks c.estroyod (kno1N!l) 

9 ~ F, nTIY LOCATIONS TAlcEN 

~_n(l 

• 

Key loc1'-tionf tmconb;y tho 7th l>t>.rines c.urirlh the operation 

r:,j~O as f C' 1101vS ~ 

:JIVISION O:JJZCTIVE 11 (lUll ['[; in 'I'll. ll67) 

TbJ c"'l,turo of this objective cut tho back ro'1d runninr: 

to tho onRt rtnd west n0rth of th"t hill, thus ;oroventillf: 

f'lrth3:' usa 0f th'1.·o road by the anomy for ow.cw:tion or 

,·o:i.nforcecwont of S30UL. This objective was takon simult'ln8ously 

with the capturo of Objective CI;:''CLE. 

~TvrSION O:JJ.:'lOTIVil CllAI'.LIN (l'YOITGV.,JTGS~CUL hicln,,,,-y in 

p, 1

There were no known personnel losses attributed to battlefield 

diseases or neuroses, nor was there any concrete evidence 

on which to base the relationship between KIA. and ~IIA-, 

FOR P0riod 22 September 1950 'i.-., 5 October 1950, 2115 esti·· 

~ted.la~ 

• 

H 

• 

KNmIN ENEMY DEAD 

As in the case of captured materiel, an accurate determlnated 

or a close esti~~ted approximation of enemy dead ~s 

virtually impossible ~n the tyro of steop hills "".rfaro peculiar 

to this carppn.iGl1~ 

Q.ui te'often, as rur attA.ek ~I'tS launcheCi. on " I'articular 

Objective, firo ""'s re~i veil. i; vnryin{:: itegrees of intcinsity 

fr"m ne",rby cnmJllltnitin,; terrain, Those l'bat 

efficiency "f the regimont as related t" the status of 

unit trD.ining~ 

• 

00mb"t officioncy of the reriment \ons tested and imrrovo1 

by cO'PPrtratlvely casy stages in tho western il.efansos of the 

SE~.Aro" through rrttr01 actirn and lirht.skirmishes with the 

enemy~ As contact with the anemy rrew tn strengtJ; and intensity, 

the fkhtini; ability 0f the indivl:dUJ.4. the unit leads::? 

ant'. the uni ts I1.s a >ihrlc at all ccheloh5 imrroved, Tho ex; 

perience gained in l'racticl1.1 C1I':'lic"'l.tinn 0f t,"l.ctical and log~eticql 

I'rinciples, enablC(~ tho units to be wcl~ed together into 

a c('mbat team calla:ole of. exerting and nnintaininr, the hco.vy 

l~Qss~re of combined arms~ 

Thcugh casualties weakenGd units in l'er~0nnel strength, 

the combat efficiency of tho regiment incrosso~ rrorortinnatoly 

with the oxperi8nCG rcair.801 11' actual Domb.'l.t.

Ju.:cing the period of 15 days from 17 August, whon RGT-7 

wo.s actj.vated at CaInD Fendleton~ until 1 September, ~IhGn 

tho unit sailed from San Diego 9 

thp following agencies re~ 

formed services and rendered assist.D.nce .. and advico S(l V"uluablo 

that they are 

. 

deserving of 

. 

special montir'n: 

CG t 

.".~ .. 

, 

Marine C0rpS Recru1. t !)cpott San: Dio{;O 

Spe.cial Re:presentElti va' nf tho Qu.arternnster General' 

(Col 1b\l1L.JYC~ U:.I.T.ltt ... 1::T, USMC) 

CO~ Mlrine Co~s Supply D6pot. :C8.r.tp Pendolton 

. (Col RALPH B j)~ \tlITT (. USMC) 

Officer~ in Chr-t.rg~ at M:1:va.+ Slati('n, Navy ?ier~ 

and: Na~~ al!l!!1UIli tlnn !Jepot, San Diego '. 

Com Trans ])1 v 21 ~ncl.: 

S.ta.ff I 

'(ca:pt~ 'S~ TIe KELLy, USN) 

:aCT-7 viis' .Cr'!I[)0 sed 0.£ a.bout 51% t.esc~os and 49%. Regnlars 

o Tho liosorTesfi ttcd into their dutios and ros1!0~ 

sib ili t~os quickly and thoir p8rfnr1!lD.nCo f'n such short . ~ 

nc tlcc has proved tho valuo of the Organized l-tLrino Corps 

R0serve g . 

The combined, arms - air, artill.ory,.ongilaeers, ~nfantry 

and tanks-worked well togethor in this initial operation o 

The m~thods of coordinating theso arms, which have boen dGvo1opcd 

by the l.nrtne CQrps since 19431" are considerod 

sonnd; Thoro is Gtill room for improvement in cb~~nications9 

particularly radio sets~ . 

~ho performanco of KHC units attacho·q. Wl.S very satisfao-' 

.tory; 

?ilf'cring and unnacG.~sarily r0ugh handl~ of crlrgo at 

'~nTCHON soemod. excessive an~ caused groat loss to the gov:- 

. .ornmont and to iJ?dividuals~ 

• 

10. RECONMENTIATIO~T.s 

, . I • 

Th~, t holiC0ptors be nndo avn.ila1)Jo fc-;rtrr'op ~v~montJ 

sur:r

3 to e~Ch ~~ ttal10n . 

2 to 4-~2 .i~rtar COmpan)" 

1 tQ· AT Oompany 

'6 to bo reta.ined in Regimental,. J.b tor Pool 

.All 18 trucks c()uld. tow ona "-'ter trallor (18 are a.utho~ 

lzed. undeJ" 'present 'J!/Ebut ne p~imQ movers are providod); 

, , , 

t 

\ 

, , 

. , 

' ...

HE.ADQ,UARTZRS AIID SEB.VICE C01vIPAl\lY 

7TH ~tp~INES 

1ST ~iARINE DIVISION (IEINF) FlvIF t 

T/o RANK T/o MOS DUTIES NAUE ACT RANK ACT HOS SER NO PERIOD 

'Col 9902 Rcginontn1 COiJn'"1ndor LITZENBERG t Honor Lo 

LtCo1 0302 

Col 

Exocutive Officor 9906 

FLClRlUSOU, 03959 

0ha:.c los 11{ 

17Au(';50 - 70ct50 

~ LtCo1 0302 05lri7 

DOWSETT, Frodorick R. 17aug50 -11Sep5Q 

Mnj 0406 8-4 

LtCo1 0302 05234 

14IEi~L~ David L" 12Sep50 - 70ct50 

Cnpt Mnj 

0170 S-l Adjntnnt 0302 0'7900 

a:RL~,:'V".F; r 'J ohn Ro 17AUt;50 .... 70ct50 

Ca]!t 5230 

Cnl')t 

Spocinl Services Off 

0301 013051 

TR0rv1E~PT}nR~~ " Rob crt E. 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

Lt 

CWO 

0130 Aost S· -I; 5230 

Pe:r-~C1fn& 040662 

SHEA,} 1'li.l1iD!1 Eo 17Aug50 - 20ct50 

lstLt 

Ass{;~O 

0302 042316 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

Lt 0130 Asai; 8--1 ESK'FIT,TJ, Lnwronc9 W 

~ 

Lt 0302 Liaison Officer 4:> BALZERs lstJ.,t 0110 ~corge T. 2dtt 043498 0302 049603 17Aug50 ~ 70ct50 17Au{';50 .... 70ct50 ...::t 

~ 

1N%Nf.J,IGllli.QE SECTION 

~Iaj 0230 8-2 F~TCE~ Donnld R. Capt 0302 013596 17Aug50 ~ 70ct50 

Lt 0230 Asst 8-2 ROE, Patrick C& 2dLt 0302 049785 17Aug50 ~ 70ct50 

WO 0240 Photo Interpretor HAUS SlQJ~ 1LL bert J .. lstLt 6272 026199 1SAug50 ....: 20ct50 

OPERATION SECTION 

Maj 0306 3-3 FRIDRICH, R:'1Yeond MaJ' 039 2 08344 17Aug50 - 30Sop50 

WOESSNER, Henry J. Maj 0302 08588 10ct50 ....: 70ct50 

Oapt 0306 Asst s .... 3 WA.R.:t&1:J, Wnl ter T" Mnj 0301 010313 17 Aug50 ~ 70 ct50 

~ffiINt Hubert J. Cppt 0301 014260 17 Au::; 50 - 70ct50 

& u 

•

Tic RANK Tic MOS DUTIES HlJ,rE ACT RAl\"lC ACT McJZ SER NO PERIOD 

CHAPLAIN SECTION 

LCDR GhC Roeinontnl Chaplain CRAVEN, John E. LCDR ChC 209299 9Sc]!50 - 70ct50 

Lt ChO Asst 

II 

HE.tlRN, Kostor N. Lt ChC 

" 

399282 22.Aug50 ..... 70ct50 

Lt( jg) ChC Chaplnin GRIFFIN, Cornelius J. Lt( jg) ChC 522437 22Aug50 ~ 70ct50 

DENTAL SEC~ION 

LCDR DC Roeinontnl Dontal 0 BREIvINER, ;Goorge W. Lt(jg) DC ,4g2210 9So1'50 - 7Qct50 

\ 

MEDICAL SEC~ION 

LCDR MC Rcgin~ntal Medicnl 0 EYi:4~, Edwnrd G. Lt( jg) Me 490722 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

PLATOON HF~QuiURT~rtS 

-"",-, 

~ 

.::t 

Cnpt 3010 :SuP?1y Officer LAUBACH; Rich~rd c. 2c1Lt 3010 019949 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

Lt ,04}0 Asst &-4; TQ;M HAYES, Junos M .. lstLt 0302 04721S 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

Lt 3020 Orc.Sul:&MWl it ionO DU C}L\RM, nay H. 2dLt 3010 016038 191~ug50 -- 70ct50 

DISBURSING SECTION 

IvInj 3405 Disbursing 0 BBAZKE, Hcrr.:'k"'Ul Ao Capt 3lm5 '09373 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

AsstDisbO BURRILL, Ray M. Cn]!t 3lto5 010120 10So1'50 .... 70ct50 

WO' 3410 AsstDisbO THO~IAS, Wnl tor H. cwo 3410 035374 17AuG50 - 70ct50 

wo 3410 Asst DisbO MEZA, Michnol wo 3410 04279 27Aug50 - 70ct50 

MAINTENANCE SECTIQN 

i 

Copt 3510 Asst s-4 W'HITTEKER. Willian lstL·t 3520 09128. 20Au.g50 - 70ct50 

Asst MT 0 BEAN t :8rnos t T. Wo 0310 046331 17Aug50 - 70ct50

T/o RANK Tlo MOS DUTIES NANE ACT RA11K ACT MOS SERHO PERIOD 

SUPPLY SECTIOn 

we 3010 Aset SU:)Illy 0 MEEK, Dont'~d L. CW'O 3QIO 018692 20Aug50 - 70ct50 

PLATOON HEADQUARTErS 

'Maj 2502 Oonnunicn.tion 0 ZA\iASICY, Gcorp.;o E. Cnllt 2502 016319 17Aug50 - 70ct50 ~ 

w·o 2520 Aset Con~ Officor I\fOW1JC, Stnn1cy A. 1'10 2520 O1946g 17Aug50 .... 70ct50 

1 

CO~ HEADQ,UART:F.ras 

Capt 0302 Cor.JP ~.l'ly C onrlD.ndor SMI~H, Jofferson D. Jr. Mrtj 0302 011185 17:\u·-;50 -; lOct50 

COr.lp1U1Y Officer SHIELDS, Nicholas L. enTlt 0302 017949 lOotS!') - 70ct50 

Conpany Off~cer DIEG, Elner 11.\ lstLt 0301 034376 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

ANGLI00 D;gT 

DIV:E:r:-rr, Jo~U1 K. lstLt 03()1 033515 17J.\ug50 - 

oo~n~, Herschel G. lstLt 7302 035524 17Aug50 - 

HAYS, Robert C. Lt( jg) USN 474413 17Aug50-- 

- •

T/O R.ANK 

, '.;.0, 

,:'.: 

,', 

1st Eattalion,'7th Marines 

1st Marine Division, (Reinforced) ,]'rtt1F , 

~: ,'c/o Fl;eet':Post Office,,' San Francisco, Cal~fornia 

I " "" , ", .... ............. '" ... ! .. 

,.. ;. N»m ACT RANK ACT l~OS SERNO 

PERIOD 

HEADQUART:JRS .!lID SERVICE OO~ 

.~. ; .'" 

~l·· I~,.. . ~ .~. 

, LtCol 

.. :, Maj.' 

.;. 'Capt 

':C~pt 

,tt 

Lt 

Lt 

-',: ~Lt 

';:~ ~tt 

~ ~WO 

.'0')02 

,:",0)02 

olK)6 

'0302 

5710 

0302, 

O}O2 

! ',:0130 

5-230 

,,0110 

" ~tt~liQi(p.9'mm'~der ' ~"~A:Y~S,, -Raymond G. 

'.', EXecutive Of;f',icpr , ··SAW¥:ml. Webb D Y • ' 

S-4,' "~1il.1St Arnold: L.,' 

.: CcmpallY ,epJOme.nder , ~(ST.tULl" 1nmel/ L. ' 

Cml'W'arf.::.Rc'l.diologicalDe- ' SKVARIL.. Warren J. 

fenseO 

,"\ ::,' 

LiaisonO WRIGHT, William W. 

.... 

" L~alsoJ;l 0 ~ " . . GA1.fl" ,'Wil bertR. ,f 

,,': ~ .. 1; A..djutant )iHODE~:'Wl11 iam 'C .. I. 

, .Soecial,Services 0 , . 'cot'LnrS, l1iliiam H. 

(';ASstAdj; Pars Clfn& 0:Fffi,' .Tamas H. • 

AsgtO 

L·tCol 

Maj 

Ca.pt 

Capt 

2dLt, 

Capt 

lstLt 

lstLt 

lstLt 

, 'cwo 

COH1\RJIJI CAT I01I PLATbON 

CRpt 

Plntoon Oommander; :Bn 

. , Cor1!!O 

Is'tLt 

',- 

'2502 ,048507 17 Au~50 ~10ct50 

SERVIC~ PLA.TOO~T 

Lt 

3010 

. Pla toen. Comdr; En Q,.M. SlVIITH, Gc:lrdon' 11. ls'tLt 

/ 

'/ 

sa

T/o BADE T/o MOS DUTIES NAME ACT RANK ACT MOS SER }TO PiLUOD 

NEDICAL PLATOON 

Lt Me Battalion Medical 0 w]n~rnrrER, Rober~ G. LtJG MO 495693 2lAugJ;Q ~ 70 ~t50 

LtJG Me Asst]n Modical 0 CLARK, Dtl.ni 01 W.· LtJG Me 497706 20AU(50 - 70 c t50 

W'EAP'GNS COMPANY 

M~.j 0302 Company Commander VORHIES, lii11iam ~. Maj 0302 0127~g lllug50 ~ 70ct50 

Capt 0302 Executive Officer POLSON, "Robert J. Cnpt 0302 017051 lrAug50 - 10ct50 

HACHINE G!JN PLATOON' 

Lt O}O2. Platoon Cottrnander SHEPPARD. Edward B. • ~ lstLt 0302 046596' ~ 11 Aug50 ~ 70et50 

Lt 0302. PI,\; GomdrAT As suru t PI t FLOYD t D'ona~d S. 2dLt 0302 011956 1.1 Aug50 - 7o'Ct50 

Lt 030.2 Pl tCond:c 81L1tl HortarSoc BLANDFORD J Richard p. Jr l'stL t 0302 044314 17Aug50 ~ 70ct50 gj 

Lt 0302 AsstPltComdr' Blmr.l 'n n DONOHUE, ·Frencis I., lstLt 0302 044691 I7Aug50 - 70ct50 

itA" OOMPANY 

~ 

Capt 0302 Oompany Cot1J:lnndor :BANKS, Da.vid 'fl.' . Cap~ 0)02 01104, 17 Aug50 ~ 70ct50 . 

Lt 0302 Executive Off.iccr l:rOVATTER, ~ene~s M. lstLt 0302 O~57 17 Aug50 - 70ct50 

. Lt 0302 SecLdr 60nm MQrtarSec DAVIS, Willl~~ J • lstLt 0302 . o 9480, 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

Lt '0302 PltOr.ldr MG PIt BOLES., .. J apk' F. lstLt 0302 048041 11AugSO ~ 70ct50 

Lt' O}O2 PltCodr Rifle PIt .MITCHELL, :~''::'ank IT. lstLt 0302 048132 17 Aug SO ~ 70ct50 

Lt 0)02 PltCodr Rifle PIt BRADLEY, Bobbio ]3. 2dLt 0302 0116(;() 17Aug50 - 70et50 

Lt 0302 PltCmdr Rifle Plt STEMPLE, James W. 2dLt 0302 049931 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

trB" OOMPANY 

Capt 0302 Company Go.I:1m."3.ndor WILCOX, Myron E,,' Jr Capt 0302 . 021866 17Aug50 - 70c't50 

Lt 0302 Executivo Officer IURCABA. Jo seph R. lstLt 0302 O~O91 l7Aug50 - 70ct:;J 

Lt 0302 PI tCmdr MG PI t LEE, Ohoween . lstLt 0302 o 826 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

.... ,

-flo RA.NK rIo MOS DUTIES NA!-'1E ACT RANK ACT MOS SER NO PERIOD 

L.t 0302 90~Ldr 6or.m MortnrSec OWEN. Joseph R. 2c3Lt 0302 0149826 17Aug50'~ 70etSO 

' ,. 

.. Lt 0302' PltCndr Riflo PIt WILSON •. John B~ lstL·t 0)02 041lK>5 l7Aug50 -.70ct50 

Lt 0302 PltCDdr Rifle PIt GRAEl3ER. Will ian G •• Jr lstLt 0302 04552~ 17 Aug 50 '":" 70ct50 

Lt 0302 PltCodr Riflo,Plt KIS~" Jian-Ql" ' • ' lsttt, 0302 01q87 -- I TAU€fJJ - 7~c,t50 

"- 

. 

"e" COJ..'!PAltt 

Ie", 

CApt 030 2 C'orlpany 00 r1J'li,ndcr" DELAlLAR, Richli:rd F. III Capt ()302, 012993 17Aug50 - 7o'~t50 

• Lt 0302 Executivo Officer HILL 11 • Twyt'lall R. lstLt 0302 o4553S '17.A.ug50 ...; 70ct50 

, .. Lt 0302 PI tCodr IvIG PIt KLlEiORrH, Goorge '0. lstLt 0302 . 0119460 11 AU€50 - 70,ct50 

,Lt 039? Se~dr 60nr..MortarScc p~nTYtChostcr O. Jr lstLt, 0302 o4qoa) . 11 Arig50 - 70~t50 

.s- 

,-"Lt 0302 ~I fCt!dr Rifle 'PIt ELL!S,.1 .Grrmt' R;41 ' ,1. s t!.t 0302 , O~107 l1Au.g50 ..:' ' 

Lt 0302 PltCndr Riflo Plt NIETSC:m.wn:r, Willian·i. :tstLt... 0302 047641 17AugSO ~ 70ct50 

Lt 0302- Pl tCndr-Rlf1 c -PIt ADAIR, :Hugh D":~,r~ 2dLt· O~,2 OlJ9616 17:A~ .,..;, 

,' .. " . 

, 

~ 

" . " 

, .:,-. .~ 

.":..': 

"', ;: 

.. ,. 

• !'~ .... -!'. 

, \ 

*, 

& s 

.' 

•

• 

2d Battalion, 7th Marinos 

1st Marine Division, (Reinforcod) FMF 

0/0 Floet Post Offico, San Francisco, California 

T/o}Ul~ TID MOS DUTIES 

ACT BAtTK ACT MOS SER l-TO 

PER!OD 

LtCol 

r~nj 

Capt 

Mc'\j' 

Lt 

Lt 

Capt 

Lt 

0302 

0302 

0406 

0306 

3010 

0130 , 

2502 

0302 

Bnttalion Cor1r1ru1dcr 

Executivo Officer 

s-4 

S-3 

13n Sup:ptyO 

:en S- -11 Adj 

PorsO 

Oonr:i) 

L1a.1s'onO 

HINKLE, Thornton M 

SAWYER, Webb D. 

CAREY, RoL.,nd E. 

ANDERSOn, Walter R. Jr 

LAWRmrCE~ JnDo~ F Jr~ 

WILS01~, John E 

RYAN, Leo ll.' 

THOllTP, Kent D. 

DAV:Pl'IJ?Q.RT,Loslio L. 

SIDOR, Jobn L .. 

Lt.801 

Mnj 

Maj 

Capt ,_ 

l-faj 

Capt 

lstLt 

l.stLt 

,1stLt 

'lstLt 

0302 

0302 

0302 

0301 

0302. 

3010 

0302 

0302 

2502 

0301 

05359 

07847 

08184, 

013CS'7 

07913 

019626 

041441 

047970 

034222 

047098 

17Aug50 ~'2gS~50 

2SSep50 - 70ct50 

17Aug50 - 70ct50 

17AugryJ - 70ct!:C 

17 Aug 50 - 70'Ct50 

17Aug50 ~ 70ct50 

'17Aug50'~ 70~t50 

17A.ug50": 70ct50 

17Axi€''!/J - 70c t 50 

17Aug5Q,... 70ct~, 

Mnj 

Capt 

lit 

Lt 

0302 

'9302 

,0302 

, 0302 

Ooripany Conoandor 

Executive Officor 

.Pl tGmdr 8lnr.l MortEtrPl t 

PltO~r"MG'Plt 

LAWl1EN'CE, Jaf.1CS. F. Jr. 

GIVENS, Harry L •. 

GIVEN'S. Hnrry L. 

AUSTIN, Marshall '6. 

BOOTH" ,JosoP~, !--." . 

Maj 

Capt 

Capt 

~stLt 

lstLt 

0:;02 

0301 

0301 

.0302 

.0301 

01913 

016143 

016143 

043429 

02g336 

17Aug50 - 26Sop 

,26 Sep50 - 70c.t50 

17Aug50 ~26scp50 

17 Aus50 - 7~'ct50 

17-AugfjJ - 7Oct50 

,-'~ 

Maj 

,Capt 

Lt 

'Lt 

, Lt 

Lt 

4",Jj;t 

.' 

~ 

0302 

0302 

0302 

0302 

0302 

0.,302 

0302 

'OOQpQtq. Corionndor 

Exocutive,Officor 

6000 Mortar Sec Ldr 

MG PItCodr 

PItCndr Riflo Plt. 

PltOl'.1dr Rifle pit 

PI tOMdr' Rifle PIt 

BREENiRichard R. 

-ooobMAN. -Yi't11nn 'a. Jr. 

H.Ai4MOND,. J81!lCS D.Jr.· 

G900Ul,· tf11l.:1p;n :F. 

SEI]URG~,Edward H. 

.MULL.ANEr. Paul V. 

THOMPSON. T. L. Jr. 

C~pt 

lstLt 

lstLt 

lstLt 

lstLt 

lat'Itt 

- lstLt 

0302 

,0302 

0302 

0301 

,0302 

. 0'302 

0302 

016320· 

028391- 

028412 

044716 

043059 

OJ1t396 

0}1128

~ 

TIc RANK TIc MOS DUTIES NAME ACT RANK ACT MOS SER NO PERIOD 

. ,nEt .. COMPA1fl' 

Capt 0302 Coopany CornnndoJ;' PHIIiliipS ,Walter D. Jr. Cf'I.pt 0302 031052 17 Aug50- - 10etSO 

Lt 030a Exe'cutt veOff.icer B.ALL I 11,fIyriond -O. -. IstLt 0302 041127 ' 17 A1lft50 ~'. 

- ~ 

Lt 0302 60vJ:l Nortnr P1t SCHRI~, ·WilliD.r.1 J: lstLt 0302, 049221 ' 17AugSO ~ 10ct50 

:Lt '" 0302 MG -PIt Ldr WELLS, Ric!.k"trd P. . 2J;l.dLt' 0302 049908 17Aug50 ~ 70ctSO 

.Lt 0302 :aiflc PI t Ldr CLE{rm:iTS ,. L oonnrd M. lstLt 030-2 037520 17 Aug';lj -: 70ct50 

'~Lt 0302 Rifle PIt· ·Ldr Y.LUIC],I., John lstLt 0302 036570 17Au.g50''';'.70ct50 

.l.t 0302 " Rifle Plt Ldr SHRO?Sft~~tArthuT I. lstLt 0302 040244 '17 Au.g50' -.... 

1'fF" OOMPANY 

IJrrr.>t 0302 COr1pfu"'ll COf'\Wndor ZORN,_ El:iOr J. CP.:pt 0301 o 32l3() 17Aug50~ 10ct50 

L.t. 0302 Executivo Officer WRIGHT, Clnrk B. istLt 0302 044495 l1A~50 :... fOct50 

I 

Lt 0302 60nn Mortnr 'PI t 

SHABP, nJtI "Djf l\1tLt' .. ~ 0302 043645- 2OAug50 - 10ct50 

/) 

Lt 0302, ~~G Pl,1fLdr. SCHKITT f Ln'''rcnco J. ' lstLt 0302 044044 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

'Lt 0302 Rifle· Pl.t Ldr VANCANTFORT', Rollin F., lstLt 0302 . 041980 17 AugsQ .... 70et50 

'Lt 0302 Rifle. PIt Ldr MO C4NN,. 'Jo s6:ph H. Jr. ' lstLt OIOg· 029)O3! 31Aug50-70ct50 

\ 

Lt 0302 Rifle, Pl t. Ldr A:aELL... )iolton R. lstLt -0302 043826 ~.A.ug50 - 70ct50 

~ 

$' 

$ .' 

a

3d Battalion, 7th Marinos 

1st ~~rine Division. (Reinforced), FMF, 

c/o Floet Post Offico, Snn Frnncisoo, CnliforniR 

T/O RAJOC T/O l-iOS DUTIES lfAME ACT RANK . ACT MOS SER NO PERIOD 

HEADQUARTERS .A}ID SERVICE COMPANY 

LtOol 0302 B~ttnlion 'Connnndor ~ACHt Mnuricc E. Mnj 0302 08492 , 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

, Maj 0302 Executive Officer :MORRIS 11 Wnrron Mnj 0302 08444 17Aug50 - 70ct50 

Lt 0301 D.l s;..l, & .i\.dj RILL, Robert E.' lstLt 0301 048356 17Au€50 - 70ct50 

Lt 0130 :BnPorsClfn&:.AsgtO ·GALAZIEWSKI, Anthonyj. lstLt 0130 019148 17 Aug50 - 10ct50 

'. 

Oapt o4.06~· : l3n 5--.4 'WORTMAN, Harry D~ CApt 0301/ 018600 17A.uf!/jO - 10ct50 

Lt °302' .- * :an iJiai sonO CP~., Frt'.nk E. ~' , lstLt 0602/, 039090 17Au.g50 - 70ct50 

Capt 2502:: " .. Con~ STONE. Enrnos'~ H,. .Jr .•• ' , lstLt 2502 045147 17AU{!;50 ",,:' 70ctSO 

tt 0302' ColWhr&R:"I.dDefO FITZGEORGE, &~rold J. .. lstLt 0,302 Olt61Ji~ 17Aug5C> ":'.70ct50 

~pt 0392" CO H&S Co , ~. lUric R_ Copt 0302 018094 17Augfj) ~ 70ct50 

WEAPONS COMPANY 

Mvj' ,0)02 Coopany Conrnndcr rOSSNER, HcnI7J.. I I Mnj 0302 OB5Sg 17 Aug50 - 70ct50 

OEl.pt 0302 Exccu·tivc Off1dcr PARKE:a., Austin S. lstLt 9302 0lt9026 17 Aug50 ~ 10ot50 

Lt 0,,2 MG Plt Ldr DEPPE,Jolm J. lstLt 0302 ol4oo77 17Aub5Q ~ 70ct50 

Lt,_ 0302 , Slnn Mortar PIt GLASGOW t Joseph ~ lstLt 0302 049,22 17 A'tJtg50 - 70ct50 

" 

"G If, ('.aMP ANY , 

'.iI· • 

OaJ)t 0302 Ck>!.~ OOnnandor OCONE!') .Thonn.. E.. . Cnpt' 0301 

()~2333 12Sop50 ..... 70ct50 

Lt .0302 EXocutive Officor HARR1S,.. Hownr~ ·S. Is~t 0302 o 8095 '17 A-q.g50 ~ 10dt50 

.lrt 0302 KG Plt Ldr . MORROW, Richard C •. 2dLt 0302 049631' l1A.ug50 -70ct50' 

Lt 0'30 2 60nnMortar SocLdr 1.A..SON t J om M. 2dLt 0302 o 1491S3 17Aug50 ~ toct50 

Lt 0302 Riflo P1 t Ldr EABNEST. GoorgQ R. lstLt ,0302 049331 17Aug50 - 10ct50 

Lt 0302 Rifle Plt Ldr MOODY t Arthur R., 2aLt 0302 049894 . 17 Aug50 - 7-0et50 

.~ . 

(fi\ 

,/

J 

I~e lWtK '110 MOS DUTIES 1l..AME ACT :R.t\JX AOT MOS SER NO PERIOD 

tfRtf OOMPA}1Y 

} 

Onpt 0302 Ooopnny Co~~dor SHIELDS. lTlcholns L .. Capt 0'302 0179119, 17 Au;g50 - 70ct5'i 

lJt 0302 ExocutivQ Offic~r FOQTE t WillitUl-C. lstLt 0302 ('\1f6r,tJ'6 17AUg50 .~ 7Qct50 

Lt 0302 MG PIt Qndr FBDSliK, Dl.&relice·W. 2ll4Lt 030~ ()49947 11 Aug,., - 7o-ct50 

Lt 0302 600n Mertf:l..r Soc Ldr DJINNY. Pa.ul. E. 2D«Lt f)302 "l49794 17Aug5" ~ 70ct50 

Lt 0302 Riflo PIt Ldr NEWTON, MlnA..rd' ~ ., 2d.Lt ~302 049755 l1AugSO - 7OetSO 

, 

Lt 0302 Rifle PIt Ldr :B.'El!.ll, Robart D. 2c1tt 0302 n~~ 17J:Qg!jj - rOot,., 

"Itt 0302 :Riflo PI t ' Ldr SALVO, Victor A. Jr. 2dL,t 0302 049 ,17 A.ilg5O -" 70ct50 

'- 

I, tt COMP ANT. 

SENG:Ert4'.ALI> , 

"- 

Capt O)C2 Oonpnny Connv~dor Ri·chnrd H. '1 

Cr.pt 0302 020190 . 17Aug50'~ '70ct5Q 

Lt C3C2 Exqcutlvo Officor JOIDrSON, W111iar. .~. lst'tt 0302 0450Jg , 17Atlg50 .... 70~t50 

Lt 0302 MGPlt Ldr THOMAS, Alfred, I .. lst~t 0302 0115 17AugSO ~ 10ct50 

,"Lt 0302 60ntr Mortar PIt WEBKOW'SKI. John 1(. Jr. 2DtLt 0302 0115890 11,AugSO ~70ct~ 

L-t 0302 Mfio, PI t .Ldr, DAY., Lloyd R. lst$.t 0302 o,lJ67~ 171.i1g50 - rOot50 

~Lt 0302 Rifi.ol?ltLdr I?OJIOV..AN t Francis S. 2dl;) 0301. 6~lgg 17Aug,:J - 7Oot50 

-Lt 0;302 lana nt" r;dr KOJIIlENTE. Josoph 2dLj 0302 049841 17Aug50 - 7Oet5Q, 

,.... 

tt'\ 

'" 

.. ... • _ 'J ~ 

. 

,~. ~. 

.' ;'1 

.' 

'" 

_ . _ 

&2

,·',d' 

4.~ Mortar '~~any, 7th Marines 

ls,t Marine Divisiona, {Reinforced) t FMF r 

c/o Floet Post Office. San Francisco, Califamnia 

TIc RANK T/O MOS DUTIES NAME ACT BANK ACT MOS SER NO PERIOD 

Capt 0302 Conpany COIJIJander LOW. Stanley D. Maj 0301 08150 lTAug50 ....: 70ct50 

Lt 0302 Executiv~Officer VINC~ITt Gordon ~ lstLt 03021 O?!2C)l). 17Aug50 ..... 70ct50 .... -.. .. 

Lt ' 0302 Platoon COL~dor SEMINOFF, Nicholas M. 

. lstLt ,0302 034429 ,11 Aug50 ....: 70ct5Q -- 

X 

ll'\

lUrTI-TANK COl-'lP ANY 

, 7TH MARINES, 

1ST lvUillINTI DIVISIOiJ, (REINFORCED), FMF 

c/o FLEET POST OFFICE, SlUT FRAUCISCO, CMAIFORJ'TIA 

1'/0 RAlilX T/O MOS DUT*ES NAIvtE ACT R..ANX ACT HOS SER NO PERIOD 

'" 

Capt 0302 Coppany Co~ruldor DELOl~Gt Earl R. lstLt 0302" 04SSg4 lSAug5C ~ 70ct50 

Lt C302 Exocutive Officer ELLEDGE, Rc"'lyr:ond J. lstLt 0302 . r) 4S52'" 2~Aug50 - 70ct50 

Lt 0302 Platoon Con~k~nder TIEF, Francis W. 2dLt "302 c49935 19Aug5'"' - 70ct5" 

., • 

•• 

• 2 

" 

«

J{~.1 I1t.h Ma:r:-ines (Reinf) 

l; ,-t·Mr',:;.J'.v.. I:',f~' 1 

':~il 1';18 ~t;)'3'1_;: 

2h ::1 :lV 1950 

F~om~ 

'Io~ 

Commanding O:f1.cer 

C;Tqrr.].~ r:.g C;;12::"'1J_, 1st Marine TIiv5.sion, FMF 

Ref: (a) n~yifd.or. G8:le1.'9.1 O:':'rl.er No. J6 

1.. Ii1T30DUD?:::OlI 

f..r, 8.t::,:o-:::-Ci;;1 .... -;.ce wi th t.he reference, this report is submitted to 

T.e"pcr J ,; ~T.Jon t'-,18 8.0tions of t,h:is o!'gani~ation fo!' the INCHON ... KIMPO-SEQUL 

a.":~:8, .rpe:'e l,:r.(,,'1, :f'r~('Im ~19 l::J/ff·psy. ::!.9~~''J +,0 7 Oetot:6r, 1950. This Regiment 

was a.se:~g.ce-i ~,~~S nc~(:,l ~:~s~l,on of" p:~"ov:.dtr:g artillery support to the 

Idt" ~·1~.r,:_~;8 :~)i7i ~Lln, v;~5_ c..h is .I,ihe next l:j.~l.8"" eehelon. 

t 

a" 11th Ma~ines 

Head.r~l1.=i:{'te7'S Bt:r.y 

Se:->T:,,:.e :R:-. ';-y 

1_ ~.~ t ~;~ a-t -:~ c·~j. :f". () II 

?~V~. 

~: -9t~ 8J .. 1. C':J 

3,'~c. Batte.llon 

4;,h Battalion 

C~~~ding Officer 

Col. J .H. BRO'tvER 

Capt .. A.H. WtJNDERLY 

:JFt;::t ~ (;" B.. McKINSIJ.!RY 

Il~. (; .)l. R. M. WOOD 

Lt,~;o~ .. M. AIELMAN' ~ 

Nl'.j or F. F. PEF..RY 

MAjor W. Me REYNOLDS 

Strength 

Off Enl 

30 208 

1)+ 71 

43 621 

42 620 

43 640 

32 602 

b. .A.ttached Un~ ts 

l s tpr:.1..'i·' : l'·k eu 5 FMF 

B~~ J:7 "(" :. ;:::-~ 4. 5" Rkt 

c~pt. J. BOOKHOUT 

IstLt. E. A. BUSHE 

5 

4 

196 

73 

--- •• -t 

3. PRFI.JlfilINARY PJJ1Jll\fING 

, al)·-!~.?~~:L~ Info::'~~~_t:lon. 

(J~_'on u~·.' .. i'Tdl (;f ~bis organlz[it;ion at Kobe, Japan, on 29 August, 

1950, th8re \v?!lS no infnJm~tj on a·I,'-f'_ila::1..e pertinent to planning other than 

tr ... e fact that the unit 11as to be i::ilJ.l"ted i.n Jftppn for only a short time. 

This served as an in11cf'.J.oT 'lib.at pl~n;ng ti"e would be relatively limited" 

\, 

A representatbre from the regiI:lent t the nssistnnt FSCC coordinntor, 

had 8xrived in Tokyo on IS Allgn~:d~ 1950, with advnnee element s of 

th,e Division sta.ff rmd V,ras fpY.Jlli2.:!' v..-j ..I-,h tl:e plRlllling ,.:hieh hAd taken 

place ,,[hile the uni t \vns 8nroute :f.':I)ID the lj'n:Uied States. On 1 Seutembe"!' 

1950 tht S offi eer. ai:-rived at Kobe find ~~~as availAble for one (1) day 

to briaf the uni t comm~nder as to the plan..'Jing accomplished on the Di 

~ision level. This officer provided the inf0r~ation as to the target 

location; approximate target dalie, based on the September tidal conditions 

in the target are 8.; And furnished. a liMited number of aer-iru. photographs 

of the landing benches and tho i8la,!ld of '10L~jII-DO. Also av[:dlable 

on this date were a rough draft of an nrtillery annex Find a study 

of the' feasibility of lanC:ini~ Etrtillery on vIULMI-DO at H-Hour for initial 

support, both of whicl1 had been p!"ep9.!':::d by tht? assistnnt coordinator; 

the first tentative craft of Divisj ,)n 8pern.tion Order 2-50, l'd th 

operations overlay; and the information thp,t the 96th Field Artillery 

Battalion (155mm Howitzer) would be attached to the 11th Marines. Based 

upon the Ftbove in:form~tion, plnnning was initiated on the regimentpl 

leve~ on 2 September 1950. 

Initial planning was hnmpered by L~ck 

1 

of suitable maps; the only 

! .. l' 

\t

.dNNEX SS TO 19r l.AB1:i:'; DIVISIon SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 

Hq, 11th Ma~ines 

lstH:;.rDi v t FMF, 

I~ the Field. 

(Reinf) 

26 Nov 1950 

available map showing the target area being a peninsula map of Korea, 

scale l:l f1 

OOO,OOO. An assistant G-3 visited the unit on 2 Septeober 

1950 and hade available, for a twelve hour period, one mpp of the target 

area, scnIe 1:50.000~ As an additionp~ ~ld to plAnning, this mn~ 

was utiltzed to bTief n reconnnisspnce officer of the 2nd batt~lionf 

11th l'in:rines f 

,fEweS ~nd ~olurnns on GREEn beach cO"JDlcncing at H-Hour. 

The COMPHIBYRU ONE landing plan giving the trnctor area, rendezvous, 

area, line of departure, loeation of control vessel', etc., was re-·· 

ceived by rcg:nentp.J. headJ uarters just before sailing from KOBE; distribution 

to f~11 p,:.-tille'ry LST!s could not be llade before sailing. 

Based on the COHPHIBGRU.:plAn, detp.iled Innding instructions were fornulated 

by regimental headC:i.U8.rters enroute to the target, flnd were distributed 

to all artillery LST's pnd the nrtillery logistical officer 

aboard the G3EEN contTol vessel on 13 Septeober. There existed consider.'lble 

doubt that tni s plAn could be executed without reheflrsal, 

'.si'1ce :!. t was en 1. 1 !lusun.l plen as fa::' as nrtillery was concerned, Md 

the lack of compasses and radios in the DUK1fS nnd p, v,"Igue promise of 

guide boats provided no positive mepn~ of control. 

~. Concurrent planning. 

Due to the :fact thAot this n:r.ganizf1.tion was enroute from the 

United States during the initinl plenning phase, the Division nrtille=y 

officer had no oppo=tunity to mAke recomoendations, estimntes, 

or proposed plnns to the landing force con~nder. Consequently, concurrent 

planning wns affected only in the minimum manner described in 

p~agraph 3. a" Rbove. 

c. Alternate plans. 

Lack of aneGUc~te planning time precluded the formulation of alternate 

plans in this orgMizp.tion EtS "rell as in higher echelnns. 

d. Knowledge of enemy situation. 

Du.ring the plann5.ng phase, intelligence information WEtS limited 

to vertical stereo pairs of aeriA.! photogrAphs of the immediate target 

area. Knowledge of the enemy strength nnd disposition in the target 

area \~as totally 1,'"I.eking. The enemy capflbili ty nf firing on WOLMI-DO 

from the mainland influenced a decision to estFl..blish flash-rnnging stations 

on the high ground of the island, slightly to the renr of gun 

position areas. 

2

.&mEX SS TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPEOIAL ACTION REPORT 

Hq, 11th Mnrines (Reinf) 

1 s+·Ma:rDiv , FMF, 

e. Planning schedules. 

The planning schedule was limited to n five dAY period from 1- 

5 September 195'). as dic~ated by the t:i..me AIld spA-oe fnctors described 

apO"I8/,: 

.T'1. 

the :~ield. 

26 Nnv 1950 

fe Effect of inade~uate planning ~ime. 

~he a~celerated planning schedule resulted in the following effects: 

(1) Final landing plans were not completed prior to enbarkntion. 

which nece8sJ.+'ated d.is+:-ri'h'trt",on wh1.1e enrou+.e tc) the tnrget area.. 

(2) Th8re was no ()~ypo~tu.l'lit:r to p-:operly brief subordinate units 

as to the 1pnding ?lpu. 

(3) Coordination ~as not effected with NavAl control grnups, 

which resulted in the unit not l~ding according to plan. 

(4) Planning VA,S not p.e th'1rough fln~. detailed AS prescribed by 

current doctrines. 

(5) Time nnd spnce fe.ctors precluded R. thorough dlsseI!linn,tion 

of p1ann,~,'1g infol'nntion to subordinr.te Ull~"tS. 

4. TRAINING.AND REHEARSALS. 

a" ~ li~ining • 

.; N,o 'ro!lphibious trnining wa.s conducted by the unit prior to the 

embark~tion: '~~ing.the period 30 4~st to g Senternber, 1950, the 

uni t p3Xt;'eip~ted in 'basic individual training~ func~.Ament~l A.rt illery 

subj vet s ,'fU."ld phys~ cal condi tionl,ng. , D~"tinJ"~ the I:10Vernent to the objective.art?a,.9-~, 

5 $ep'~em'ber 1950., all elewents coriClucted intelligence 

briefinGs, indoc'·i::i.nation in the handling of prisoners-of-wa.r, and c~ptured 

eneoy doc1.lt":1ents and I!laterfel~ 

b. R~~,als,. ' , 

No r€~learSp~s were scheduled or executed_ for thi s' operatibn~. 

5. LO.tIDING AND EMBARKATION • 

.9.. Organization. 

Embarkation Group DOG was established by 1st Marine Division Ernb~rk~tion 

Order 1-50. This group consisted of the following units~ 

11th Marines (less lstBn and Det) 

Det 1st Engineer Bn 

1st AmTrkCo (less Det) 

Det 2nd Engineer Special Brigade (USA) 

Officers Enlisted 

104 1523 

1 50 

4 144 

4 100 

six SCM AP LST f S and one .AKA (USS \'I.A.SHBURN) were ~ssigned Group 

DOG. The LST t s were manned by Japanese crews. LST Q094 wns assigneC'. 

as the regimental coomand shipo LST's ~014, ,01S, an~ Q019 were nssigned 

to the 2nd Battalion, 11th Mp.~rines. The 4th Battp.1ion, 11th 

Marines wns assigned Q,059, Q071 and the USS WASHBUBN (AKA-lOS). tiM" 

Battery, 4/11 MC" the c1.etn,chnent of the 2nd. Engineer Special Brignr.c 

were embarked on the USS WASHBURN. 

b. Loading. 

(1) Ebbarkation Group DOG. 

Loading of the six LST I S commenced on 7 September at KOBE, 

Je.pan. Approxim.."'l,tely fort~'-eight hours was requirec1. to I01\~. one unit .. 

of fire of 105mm howitzer Ammunition. understowed on the tpnk neck of 

3

Al~m 55 TO 1ST MARINE DIVISIOlJ SPECIAL ACTION REFOR!: 

Hq, 11th ?-rarines (Reinf) 

1 f'tl'IarDt v, FliF. 

Ir.. the Field. 


eac~: of three LST's: ~014, ~Olg, and ~019; and one unit of fire of 155 

mm hnwitzer a.mrronition, u..ndersto\&,ed on the tank deck of each of three 

L:iT 1 s: (.,,059 .. Q071, and (",.]94. The loading of ~hi s amunl tion was a 

very slow process due ·to the fact that sho:-tage of tiMe prevente0_ ammUlli 

tj on frOB heing sorted by. types vThen unloaded from other ships. 

Anr:nm~l. tion 'vas uhloacled into barges, then the b~ges were sent to the 

LST's for reloading. There were p,lso numerous del3'ys C-J].e to unavailebili 

ty of barges 8nd short(l6es of vnrious types of f1.mmUni t ion. At 

approx.i..np.tely 2200 on 9 September 1950) the lOP..c1.ing of ammuntion 

ceasect, MC_ vehicles, 105mn Howitzers, 155mm HO"ritzers Pond DUK\V'S were 

londec_ aboarct. By 0500, 10 Septenber 1950, Rll six (6) LST f S were COf:1- 

pletely lo~ded, cargo, vehicles and personnel were Aboard pnd ready for 

sea. 

The USS ''lASHBURN (.rlKA-108) was scheduled to begin lOf\ding 

on 3 September 1950, at Kobe, Japfln. This schedule \lUtS chtmged because 

a typhoon struck the KOBE-OSAKA f)xep. find oaused great danflge to 

e~uipnent ~nc_ the KOBE dock A,rea, thus postponing the loading by t"ro 

clnys. F'urthe:::- c.elnys were caused by the la.ck of a complete lOB-ding 

pl~ prior to the cornmencenent of lORding. The equipment of II WI Battery 

filled only a portion or the ship. Division equipment and general 

car~;o was tl .... en assigned to be loaded aboard the t'lASHBURN, but WA..S not 

availahle for loading. This equipment flnc. general cargo ,.,as in the 

process of being unlondec. from other ships that had just nrrived froD 

the United States, with the result that loading \lIftS unc1_uly slow. Only 

Rfter t~e ship was fully loaded was it possible to complete the loading 

plans, The USS 1UiSHBUFlJ wt1.s cr)L1pletely lOA-ded on 10 September 1950. 

(2) 1st :aatt~ion, 11th Marines. 

TheIst Battalion, 11th l'~arinesp then a unit of the 1st 

Marine Brigade, loeadeQ at Pus~n, Korea, aboard three SOAJAP LST'S: 

~030, ~052, and ~012~ Loading co&~enceQ on 9 September Rnd was completed 

on lQ September ]950. This battn~ion was a unit of Eobnrkation 

Group Ch2.rlie I, with a plrtoon of the 1st Anphibinn Truck COr.1p:1ny (34. 

DUI0ifS) attachec ..... 

( 3) /I en Bat te ry, 1 st 4. 5 fI Rkt Bn t FI~. 

110" Battery, 1st 4.5 11 Rkt Battalion, F1-1F, ,!"in attnchec. unit 

of the 11th i·iarine Reginent upon depfl.rture from the tTni ted States was 

detached ancl .-::ssignec1 to EmbarkAtion Group Bnker anc1 att~,ched to the 

1st M~rine Regiment. Loading C0DQenCe~ on 6 Septenber 1950 nt-KOBE, 

J npar." T:18 battery personnel and e~ uipnent were efjbarked on 1ST t s 

1138~ 715, C~073, 1048 flnd 883. T,.,n units of fire for the 4.5 11 rocket 

lA.'~CJ."'A~s "las also loaded. LORc1.ing Was completed on g September 1950. 

(4) ~_Ba_~~~ion, 11th ~farines. 

Tl1e 3rd BattAlion, 11th !-iarines, ,-Jas lopned wi th ROn.:'-7 in 

San Diego, Californin, on six c1.ifferent shins. This battAlion arrived 

nt the target areA. on 21 Septenber 1950, si~ (6) CJ"Ys A.fter th.""l 1rnding, 

And joined the 11th M~rine Regiment. 

6. IvIOVE1-iENT TO AND ARRIV JU, ,AT OBJ:GCTIVE ,AREA. 

This phase wns withoutincir.ent and \-Tas conpleter_ on 15 September, 

1950, for n.ll units except the 3rrl Battn.lion. The 3rc1. Battalion Rrrive(l~ 

nt the objecti ve area on 21 September, 1950. The 1st 13attplion', '11th 

z..r~,rines, 1st Provisional Maxine Brigpcle, Reinf) FNF was redesignated 

as the 1st Batt2~ion, 

11th !'!f-Irines, 1st Mn.rine Division, Reinf, Fr,lF on 

13 September, 1950. ,.' r 

V 

4 

• I

,... 

r 

.fsNNEX 55 TO 1ST M.A.RINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORr 

Hq, 11th M~rines 

l:JtM:trDiv t FMF , 

I!l the Field. 

(Reinf) 


• 

SCAJAP 1ST.'s did not neet bornal standnrds in respect to cleAnliness 

and nessing faci.lities" "Bit rations were cons~e0 aboarcl these 

vesse~.s enroute Q 

1. 2~ERAr;:IONS. 

~ .. Assault Phase, 15-16 Septer.tber (inclusive). 

l55ep50: At about 0630. M adVflnce reconnaissance pprty of the 11th 

Marines lnnded O~ Gr.een Bet!.c-lJ., WOl~f:I-DO I sInnC-. (TA gg49Fl) 

with the assp,ult '-FA,ves of the 3rr. :Brttt~.J.ion, 5th Mprines. 

This advance recop.ne.issrtnce pitrty consistecl of two (2) officers 

and seven (1) enlisted personnel from the 1st RnG Qnd 

~attalions, with a oission of reconnoitering be~ch exits pnd 

position areas. The mission was accomplished prior to H-Hour 

and was of greRt AssistAnce to the artillery elements. especip,lly 

in view of the tide conit:1 tion.s, the confusion on Green 

Bench, and limited artillery positJ_on areas existing on vlOLNI 

DO. 

At about l400 t 

while enroute through the tr~nsport area, radio 

silence was broken aboarc. the head".iuarters LST fUld efforts l'lere 

mc..de to establish the artillery net afloat as planned:. COHPHIB 

GRU OUE OpnO 14-50 called for breaking ra::io silence ~t H-3 

hours and set D-Day and H-Hour as 15 Sept and 11001 respectively, 

unless othe"'~dse ~.irer,t~d; while Div OpnO 2-50 said. that 

D-Day rule. :i-Hm2T would be announced pnd radi 0 silence would be 

rr liftec. ::. 0': embarked trof)ps only on order of the. Officer in 

TactiG8.1 Comr;vmd (OTC) of each elefllent .. 11 In the ~,bsence of 

both the announcenent and specific orders from OTC. it was 

concluded that the times indicated above were effective, since 

the disposi"'lij,on of ships and landing craft indicated that an 

aophibious assault was about to be executed. Communications 

afloat were established with Division pnd the 1st ~~ 4th 

:Battalions, but no contA.ct could be P.l~de wi th the 2nd Battalion 

or with the Div Arty O:ficer abo~rd the AGC. 

LSTs cl'Qsed on the trac.tor area abDut 1430. About tni s time 

a message was intercepted on the LST control net giving H-Hour 

as 1130. Personnel were ordered to load in their respective 

DmaiS about 1530 and prepa~e for launching, when orders were 

received froD the Oonmander of the LST flotilla to beach all 

LSTs on Green BeB.ch. All LSTs ",'eighed p,nchor rulr. s~i18cl up 

opposi te Green Beach. Troops were recallec_ from the tMk cleek 

and the new plan was hastily explained. Upon arrival off the 

beach,. orders were receivec. rescinding be~ching of Lgrs and directing 

the launching of DUKWS. LSTs anchored where they were, 

some by the bow, some by the stern; and commenced launching 

DUKWS. The tractor area did not now resemble the Rnchor plan 

given in the COMPH1BGRrr order, and the task of forming waves 

as previously planned ~roved impossible. Columns formed up as 

best as they coul~. and -proceede(l to the bo~ch regardless of 

time schedule or sequence. To add to the confusion, some LSTs 

proceeded to move about the narrow channel, thereby cutting a - 

cross the approach route for light amphibious craft to the 

Green Beach control vessel. The ~094, upon which elements of 

the regimental head4uarters were AmbarkM r nnchnred by the bow, 

5 J 

I

; . 

\~ 

.aNNEX SS '::0 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECI.AL ACTION REPORT 

Hq, 11th Marines (Reinf) 

1 stMarDi v t Fl-1F t 

In the Field. 


thus allowing the $hi~ to he~d into the extre~ely f.aSt current 

#Utd making the la.unching of lJUK\{S very hAzR.rdous.: 

When the tt.irc D~l to go off was caught by the pnchor 

chain ~nd bow d00rs and Rlmost lost, the troop commandet 

ordered the skipper to come about and Mchor by the ster)). 

The remaining elements of the regimental reconnaissance p~rty 

were launched without incident. The fi~st regimental 

DUKW bea.ohed at 1800. but due to moving LSTs and confusion 

within the inner-ch&~nelt All elenents of the· reconnaissance 

party did not l~nd on Green ieach until 1845. 

At a.~l?:t"oximate1y 19'~5 fj.ring batteries of the light b~,ttalions 

began to land across Green Beach. The 1st Batt~ion 

occupied a position in TA 88491 I the 2nd. Battalion occupied 

a position in TA 8g49LM, while the regimental CP w~s established 

in TA 87h9O. Comnun~.cations were I.,stablished within 

the regiment at 2045, at which tine regiment Rssumed 

control. It was found that cifficulties in radio cO~JJunica~ion 

were caused by sets being out of c~librption. no opportuni 

ty being afforded for e..djustment after leaving Cnmp 

Pendleton. After re-calibrntion, conta.ct Wfl.S est:1blished 

with the 2nd B~tta~ion Rnd the Artillery Officer on the 

.AGO. Oonsider1'ble clifficulty 'w~s experienced in estp,blishing 

and naintaining the reginent8l radio. and wire nets because 

of the many communic~tion personnel whn were inexneriencecl 

:i.n artjJ.lery field operptions. 

E:r 2:5 1 } both light battRlions ~.:ad registered ancl. were in 

pOflitton prepE,T.:"eCl. to suppo~t the ass~.ult regiments. Due to 

existing terrnin, the gree.t amount of smoke overhanCing the 

city of InC3:0N. plus the light resistance being offered. little 

firing w~s conducted throughout the night. Artillery 

LSTs were beached and general unloA.ding cornrnencec. :),t ~p1?roximately 

2330. 

16Sep50: 

140re artillery LSTs were beache(l throughout the night Met 

early morning p~ general unloading continued. 

Little opposition was offered the assault regiments and 

both light battf'~ions displaced to the mainlAnd. The 1st 

Battalion, after conducting a reconnaissance t 

commenced 

displaceoent at approximately 1100 to TA 934gG, and was in 

position by 1700. 

The 2nd Ba.ttalion commenced displacement at 1200 to TA 

9246N. This battalion had completed its registration and 

was prepared to ma.ss fires in support of the 1st Marines 

by 1800. 

Element s of the 4th Battalion If-lnded on WOLMI-DO and on 

RED Be~ch and moved to their first position area at TA 

9241G. Movement was com~enced at apuroxim~tely 1700 and 

occupa.tion of posi tion W~lS not completed until after d!:lrk • 

. About 0800 e helicopter landed at the regimentRl CP to provide 

airspot. A radio (SCR-619) ~nd an observer were put 

aboard, but clue to communication difficult'i~s the first 

mission was not fired un~il about 1100. 

6

Al~ 55 TO lsr MARINE DIVI SI ON SPECIAL ACTION R]R)RT 

Hq, 11th Marines (Rein!) 

lstYarDiv. :-'MF t 

I?1. the Fic19 ... 


• 

The regimental reeonnaissance party went forward at 

Og30 to reconnoiter a new CP, returning ~bout 1300. About 

1115 th3 regioe at ~l cocna.nder landed on YELLOW beach, arri. 

yj.ng 9.t the C~;? about 19CO", 

At 2205 the 13t Battalion wes attached to RCT-5. 

Thus the asnault phase was brC'ught to a close. A min1- 

muc amolL~t of fi~tng had been ccnducted by the artillery 

batta.lio[,s du.e t.o the li~ht res~stAAce !!let by the assault 

inf~tn'ry 

'nn! t~·. 

b. Exploitation pha~e, 17Sep-10ct (inclusive). 

17Sep50: The regirl8nt displaceC'. its C? to TA 9241C at OgOO. Due 

to the before mentioned rac1.io difficulties nnd the fact' 

that the JJiv1.sinn was a.ttack-lng across n series nf crosscompar 

4 .me:rts.. the ~Or.l:!lUIltea.t~ons continuecl to be poor. A 

landing strip for OYs had bep.n s6lected on a road nenr 

Division headq~~ers, but neria~ observation WAS continued 

by helicopter during the d~y, wLile OYs were uut in operating 

condition. The regimentnl svrvey officer conducted a 

forward reconnaissance by helicopter' to assist him in formulating 

a survey plan. 

The 1st l3attalion dleplaced to TA 9950A. This battalion 

WA,S in p'1sit5.on, registered and prepared to mass fires by 

11~-3'). .... t 11 1 '/.), clue to the rapid moving s1 tuation the 1st 

13at~~al:r.~l agc;.in displ-9.ced to TA. C345L. A high burst regist!'ntion 

.lad been completed and t:D.e complete battalion was 

again sl"pportl.n.g the 5th Marines by 2230. 

The 2nd :Battalion displaced to TA 96471. This c'-1splacement 

co~men~od ~t 1200. Due to the before mentioned rapidly 

Doving situation tiE" Battery, 2nd Battclion. was displaced 

forward to target area 995CK. 

The 4th Battalion displaced to TA 9641C ,at 1400. Occupation 

of position was not completed prio~ to darkness. 

Comounications were still difficult ~d lack of c~ntact 

with the flash range OPs denied a HB registration. During 

the night of 17-18 Sep the 4th Batt~ion fIred its first 

illumination mission. This was to become an every night 

request as the division moved fl~+-her inland. 

The 96th Field Artillery Battalion commenced unloading 

over Yellow :Beach (TA 89h9Q,L) and rende zvoued in TA 9148 

NOST. 

18Sep50: 

The regimental reconnaissance party moved forward at 

Og30. The CP was di sp1aced to T 1'). 0150R at 1615. 

troll Battery of the 1st 4.5" Rocket BattA~ion. FMF, Wf\.S detached 

from the 1st Marines and attached to the 11th Marines 

at 1600 this dRte. The Rncket Battery selected, occupied 

and organizecI an assembly area in TA 035lW. Organization 

was completed by 1700. 

7 

f·

Al~JEX 

5S TO 1ST hARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 

H

.A].'i[NM S5 TO 1ST }:i1.JUNE DIVISION SPECIAL iJ.CTION REPORT 

H~t 

11th Marines (Reinf) 

l~·;_J'r9.,rDi v, F}~ t 

In "ihe :Fleld. 


At 0700 the 1st Battalion and the 4th Battp~ion fired a 

15 minute p::-epnr::ttion in the 5th lvi.:=trines sector in support 

of the river ~~o3sing. 

At 1330 the 1st Batte.lion commenced displa.cempnt to TA 

076lP. This displacement was completed at 1610. 

At 0950 the 2nd Battalion. minus "E" :Batte-ry, commenced 

disp1ac8raent to TA 0755r.i. This displacement was completed 

at approxime.tely 1300. lI~n Battery closed on 2/11 prior 

to darkiless .. 

Oc 

The 96th FA Bn completed displ::tcement to T.L\ 0150R. 

cupation of position was completed prior to dRrkness. 

Harra.ssing and interd.iction r.1issions were assigned and 

fired by t:le med.l1JIn battal:i.c:ls throughout the nj_ght. 

21Sep50: The 1st Battalion displaced to TA l157E ,q,t 0830. OccupRtion 

of position by the fir-st firing battery to displace 

was conducted under counter-battery fire from across the 

H.Al\i Rive r. 

The 2nd Battalion displaced. by echelon, to TA l152L; 

displacement was completed by 1200. 

VivIO-6 c.onmen~ed 

operations fr~m KiJ!!po airfield this da.te. 

The 4th Bp,ttp,lion d.isplRced to TA 0857M. Displacement wa,s 

cocpleted and the battalion firing in support of the division 

prior to darkness. 

The 96th FA Bn displaced to TA 0855W; displacement was 

completed about midnight, considerable difficulty being encountered 

in negotiating a poor road into position. 

22Sep50: 

23Sep50: 

One (1) 155mm Howitzer from the 96th FA Bn was attA.ched 

to the 2nd Battalion for illumination of the 1st M:::trines 

zone of action~ This howitzer remained with the 2nd BAttalion 

for 5.llumination missions only until 29 Sep 1950. 

The 4th Battalion (less 1fL" Batt,-"'ry) displaced to TA 

1156R. Displacement was comple~ed prior to darkness. 

The 3rd Battalion joined the 11th !.{arines and was assigned 

a tactical mission of Dis of the 7th Marines. The 

3rd Battalion displaced from its rendezvous area in TA 

03541 to a firing position in TA 076op. Occupation of position 

and registrati~n was completed prior to darkness. 

24Sep50: 

The 2nd Battalion commenced displAcement, by echelon, to 

TA 1852X at 1430; displacement was completed ROd the b~ttalion 

registered by 180Q. 

The 96th FA Bn displaced tQ TA l752a ~t 1000. Displacement 

was c~mpleted by 1600 with the battalion registered and 

executing its mission. 

9

.. - ... f 

Alf~FX 

55 TO 1ST MARINE DIVISIOll SPECIAL .ACTIOU REPORT 

H~, 11th Marines (Reinf) 

l~tlv;nrD:!. v. FMF J 

Ir .:!:e :rrj.eld. 


"L" Battery closed on the remainder of the 4th Battnlion 

in TA 1156H at 1100. 

25Sep50: 

In order to p,ssure more effective artillery cllordination 

between the assa1'~~ regioents, dir3ct cornmunic~.tions betueen 

the art~.llery Itaison office::-s lit the infAntry regimental 

level was established. 

Reconnaissance flcross the RAN River was cnnrtuctec. by the 

1st :Battalion in pre'paration for their river crossing. 

The }::d Battalion (less fiG" Battery) displa.ced by LVTs and 

ferry a.cross J.;he HAlT River to TA 16610. Displacement was 

completed with the battnlion registered and prepared to support 

the 7th Httrines by 1800.. . 

The 4th Battal!on and the 96th FA En were Rlerted to be 

prepared to ans".v2r calls for fi:~"e iron the assault regiments 

during tha-i; pe!'iod when the ist and 2nd Battalions 

executed. the :d."ler crossing. 

26Se~50: 

At 0440, while the 2nd Battalion was making the final adjustoent 

for a prep~ation for the 1st Marines attaCk, a 

strong enemy counter-attack was uncovered in the 1st Marines 

zone of action. Once e€ain. due to the channelized nnture 

of the en €ny ccun ter-at t eck and the accura,cy of ex! st ing 

maps. it ~l/f\S 1?ossible to select and assign concentrations 

to ~Qt~ L08 Decl.L·~.m battalions. Although unobserved, these 

fir88 togethe~ with the 2nd 3Rttp~i0n fires proved highly 

effective.. The uounter-attack was re-pulsed ann. survei1- 

lan~e reports credited artillery with destruction of six 

tan~s destroyed p~d numer~us enemy de~d. 

At 0700 the 1st Battalion coornenced displaceoent across 

the HAN Rive-r by DUlCWS. The b(~ ./litrujon occupied a posi tion 

area in TA l661N and was preparec1_ to support the 5th Marines 

in the continuance of its attack by 1100. 

At 1400 the 2nd Battalion commenced ~isplacement across 

the EUUi River, using LVTs and ferry. Displacemant to TA 

1856A was completed by 2030, with all batter~es in position 

and ready to fi~e~ 

A forward echelon of the' regiJ!1ent di splA.ce

ANN:MX S5 TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 

Hq, 11th Marines (Reinf) 

ITtM~rDiv t Fv.F, 

Ia the Field. 

26 Nov 1950 " 

. prior to dar~ess with the battalion registered and firing 

",-in support of the di'~rision. 

lIC" Ba.ttery, 1st 4.5" Bitt ··Bn. FMF, received 3500 M4SA-2 

fuzes t~5. s cl..ate. 

28Sep50: 

tI cit Ba.ttery, 1st 4.5" Rkt:Bn, FMF t executed their river 

crossing and established a rende2vous area in TA 1763I by 

1400. j . 

. The 2nd BAttalion commence~ displacement, by echelon, to 

TA 2360H at 1300. D~spla~ement was completed and the battalion 

regi3tered and firing in support of the assault regiment 

by 1700. 

The 3rd Battalion dlsplac6d to TA 2562G. by eohelon, completing 

displa~ement prior to da~kness. 

was detached at 1200, revert 

One batter.y of the 96th FA 

ing to control of I ~~rps 

~ttillery. 

29Sep50: 

The remainder of the 96th FA Bn was detached. froo the 11th 

Marines and reverted to control of X Corps Artillery at 0930. 

One, (1) 155rnn howitzer from the 4th Battalion was attached 

to the ~lld Battalion for illumination of the 1st· Marin~s 

zone of ;;,ct iO:l .. 

30Sep;O: 

. At ~pproximA.tely l215 the 2nd Battalion commen·eed displacement, 

by echelon, to TA 2861-I. Disp1aceoent was coopleted 

and the batt~lion registered by 1640. 

At 1500. in compliance with Div OpnO 14-50, the following 

attachments were effected: 

1st Battalion attached to 5th Marines 

3rd· Battalion attached to'7th MRrines 

-50th All/ AW (less It en Bt·ry) a.ttached to 11th MR.rines 

'The 2nd ~atta1ion was assigned the tactical mission of 

GIS at 1900 this date. 

tiL" Battery, 4/11, commenced displacement to TA 2662S at 

approximately .18:)0. Displa.cement was completed nt .«lPllroximately 

2400. 

l.Oct50: 

The regimente,l reconnaissance party depFtrted at 0845. 

~he reginental forw~rd CP was opened ~t TA 2761N at 1100 

and cont rol of the regiment ""',8 assUl!led at that time. 

The 50th AAA/AW comcenced closing on the 11th Marines 

area at l~OO ~his date. T~otical missions were assigned as 

. follows: 

u An 13a.ttery attaohe

.AlmEX 5S TO 1sT 14ARIliE DIVISIOn SPECIJlL ACTION REPORT 

H~, 


l~tMarDivt 

1:1 the Field. 


FMF. 

The ren~inc.er of the 4th BattAlion closed on "Lft Battery 

in TA 2662S at 1200. 

1730 anel was as 

ttM" Bat tery di apia-ced to TA 2667S ~,t 

signed nission of GiS reinforcing 3/11. 

2-40ct50: 

Little firing was conducted during these ~a'es. 

On 2 Oct, "e" Battery, 4.5" lUtt :B.a, closed their ren0.ezvous 

area in TA 1763I An~ moveo. to TA 2761G. 

On 3 Oct P.t approximfttely 0730, ItC" Battery, 4.5" Rkt :Bn, 

was dispatched_ to CO, 3/11 as requested by CO 7th Marines 

for a fire nisaion. This mission was not executed until 

after dark on 3 Oct. 

The 50th ~/ .NIT was eletached at 0800, 4 Oct. 

5-70ct50: 

During this period elements of the reginent closed on 

the regimental a.ssemb1y arena Displacements of the regiment 

(less attacboents) were BRde at the following times: 

Reginental hep.~_qun.rters P.n~. service batteries plus the 

Rkt Battery displaced nt 1415, 5 Oct, arriving in the 

Inchon are~, (TA 895lSX) at 1950, 5 Oct. 

The )!-tl:l Battalion COJ!lOenced displ!\cement to the Inchon 

::-eginentD,l p.ssemb1y a.rea ',;t 0430, 6 Oct, closing on the 

assembly area :,ct; 1500. 

The 2nd Ba~tRlion commenced displacement to the regimental 

asser.b1y area ~t 1300, 6 Oct. The Battalion 

closed on the Inchon area nt 1700 the same ~ate. 

The 1st and 3fd Battalions had closed on the regimental 

asseobly area by l700~ 6 Octo 

On 7 Oct the regiment continu~d establishing a. temporary 

camp in the assembly area.. Staging nnd planning for the 

Wonsan landing was commenced. 

8. ENEMY TACTICS, ORGANIZ.\TION! STRENGTH. DEPLOYI1ENT, PROBABLE ORDER 

OF :CATTLE, ,Al.,1) EQ,UIPIvIENT. 

a. Tactics. 

Observations nf enemy tactics. due to the employment Mel location 

of this organization, were generally confined to ene~y use of his 

art_i11ery Mel his actions in our rear areas. Reports c

AtnTEX 58 TO IS!' MARINE nIVI SION SPECIAL ACT I ON P..EPORT 

H~. 11th Marines (Reinf) 

lstlvIarJ)iv, FMF t 

In the ]'ielc._ 

26 Nov 1950. 

Locations that the eneoy shelled, as taken from shelling reports 

received by this hear.quarters, are shown on uOverl~.y of Areas 

Shelled u • appendix VI to ·this annex. Du-plicn.tions, as well as shelling 

reports thpt cUr. not inc.icpte area shellec' J are not shown on this 

overlay. 

A sUODnt ion of Breas shelled shows that 22 fnrwFtrcl. arens p.nC'. 20 

rear arens received nortn.r or artillery fire. None of them indi~'1.te 

that the eneny was able to nass the fires of More thn.n a single battery 

- or else inclicate thnt he (i

,., 

~, 

Al~EX S5 TO lsr MARINE DIVISION 5PECI~L ACTION REPORT 

231800-241800 : 

251800--261800: 

261800-271800: 

271800-281800: 

281800-291800: 

291800-301S00: 

301800-011800: 

011800-021800 : 

021800-031800: 

HQ. 11th Marines (Reinf) 

l:rtMarJ;iv, FMT, 

I.e. 'elle :1~.€ln. 


Light small arms and mortar fire received in 5th Marines 

zone dur~.ng the night. En:~ire regimental zone (5th Marilles) 

s'..;,bjected_ to Dortal and artillery fire. 

5~h Mcl~iDes - S~r.rp_dic :3Dal~_ a""os. tlortp,r. and artil 

J. :ty :rt:",· ::'ecc:iy,~d during 'd:.e ni~ht. Sporadic mortar 

and a!'ti1le:ry fire received within the regimental zone 

th!:'oughout the mo~ning ruld afternoon. 1st Uarines - 

Deternined resistance froD strong enemy pockets support.ed 

by small A.~nst oa,r'llir.e gun and nort~.r fire en 

tue 16:: i!p-.rines zone during the 

countered tJ.~,!'oUCh()"'t 

~orninr; ru:li. r.ft£.rnccn() 

5th !~~,l"in.es - No :rE;p'J~ts of eneoy artillery fire during 

the p9riod.. 1st Marines - Light artillery and nartar 

fire with delayed fuze encountered during period. 

1 st Marines - Light S-T'1all arms t mort ~r ~d B.rti llery 

fire thro'Cghout the 1st !~Ftrines zone during the 

nii?:ht" 5~~J. Mp,.:rines - :N I') mortar J artillery or AT fire 

re ~ei 'Ted du't"ing the -period.. 

Negative. 

Int~rmittent 

O'.lt day. 

mort~r fire in 1st Marines zone through 

Li~ht enemy small arms, mAchine gunt And l20mm mortar 

fire fell in 7th Marines zone, during night. 2nd Battalion" 

7th Ma:!"ines recetved,-heavy en-emy l20mm mortar 

,- fire at; 301000 in TA 2465. "By late afternoon mortar 

ft~:'e hAd practically ceased. 

7t~J. YiR::-ln6S - The attack proceeded, over rugged ter 

::-5~,.nl' egainst light smRll a:"~St machine gun and corta:-:- 

t~_re_, 

Tt~ Mari:les - As period closed the enemy WA.S resisting 

on~ ~Qv~lce with heavy machine gun and oort~r fire 

f~OM the high gr.ound soce 3;000 yards south of UIJONG- 

BO. - 

7th Mp.rines - Enemyresi stance was made up of accurate 

small arms, machine gun, moderate artl11ety and mortar 

f!res. Fa+, the fir3t ·tim.e in severru days, he 

employed Rrtllleru; sDe1ling both frontlin~s ruld CP 

areas .. 

031800-041800: Negative. 

041800-051.S00,:i Six ,to ten rounds of morta.r fire fell during t,he night 

in the 7th Marines C? 

. 

Conclusions regarding eneMY tactical employment of his artillery 

and mort~s drawn froD locatinns shelled and artillery fires reported 

as listed abov'e- fU'e"'q,s follows: 

(1) The enemy did not mass his fires. It is not known if 

this. was through choi.ce or inability. 

(2) -The. strength of his artillery effort w~.s weak in contrast 

to the pieces he had aVPtilable. 

(3) A preponderance of his artillery ~d mortar effect was directed 

against our forward positions, indicflting th~.t his tacticru. doctrine 

calls for use (')f A.rtiiiery in the supporting role. 

(4), ~how;h not clearly incl.iCA.teo. by the reports above, it is 

. 

believed that a majority of his fire was delivered without adjustment • 

~ 

;, t 

~isoellaneous taetic~l inforn~tion concerning the ene~y Artil- 

14

Am~EX 

5S TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 

• J 

Hq, 11th M~rines 

lG~·.MarDiv, FKE\ 

L.l the F:i.eld. 

(Reint) 


lery effort indicP-.tes th~1t the enemy used. by-pll.ssed J!lortars. m.A.nnec1. 

ei thar by soldi ers or communi st element s of the oi viI ptlpulp.tion. 

to ha~r8.Ss our reP.T arens. Such fires were reported but twice, pnd 

we:re:---_,oradic at:.d ineffective. There "m"s one repnrt th~.t the enemy 

used f or~{t1rd obse~,ers locptec1. behincl our fr'lnt lines, but this was 

not confirmer. by a.ctuDl frp"I)rehension or cfl':pture of such personnel. 

On pnother occasion thf' eneny W1-lS observe~. using a t~nkto fire into 

our renr areas; pfter firing two or three rounds, the tpnk would nove 

Along the. rop.d tOf'. new posi tion ~n(l. renept the fire. The p-neny WB.S 

also reported to be using the r;:dlrotR.0. tunnels west of Seoul flS p.rt~ 

:lexy positions, rnnnl.Ylg the l1ieces bn.ck ~.nto the tunnel ",hen under 

r-dr or artillery a+.tRck. 

Enel!lY ground A.ction pJ!n1nst our pos1 t ion Axea.S ""8S neglit;ble. 

Tho~h m~ny eneoy tr'lops were by-pFI.ssed, thp.~ werB e.enprpl1y unnxMeC'_. 

leaderless, Mel- only wpi tin~ fnr ~. ch~nce to surrenc.er safely. No 

rni0.s or f'ttenpts· r't p.nbotnge by the c5.- r ll nOT)ulp~ce were renorted. 

b!J OrF;ooizfttion. 

Un positive inforDP.tlon ns to eneny Artillery organizP.tion Wt\s 

gained by this orgMizfl.tion. Probable orgAllizRtion based on eneoy 

strength is covered in p~.ragraph c. below. 

c. Strength. 

Durin~ 

cation reports were ?rocessed. 

were as f 011ot'l8: 

the 0peratinn a t0t.ql ')f 52 shel1inl; reports p.nd 99 1:':1- 

The source of the location reports 

i~I (Division or Cnrps) •. _ .. 

uI (11th IvInrines). _... • • • . . 

Flash Range (11th Mf'rines) 

Air Obse:rve:-s. . " 

Inf~ntry . • • . • 

Forw~rd Obse:rvers. 

TOTAL 

33 

14 

23 

10 

9 

10 

99 

~rD positions fI.ccurate. enough to be use~tble were received fron 

prisoners of war or frOD f=iendly civiliAns. Of the 99 nnsitlons obtained. 

15 were cnnfirme0. and. 84 remainec unconfirmed. 

fol~DWS: 

By type. the nosi tions referred to nbove were classifiec_ P.S 

AAA (Battery of 3 or more guns) 

AAA (Single heavy gun) 

FA (Self-propelled gun or howitzer). 

FA (Towed~oultiple gun nosition) 

Fa (Towed-single f;Ull "')o'~i tion) • 

Coast Defense 0r Dlv;.~l "PUl"Dose. . • 

j(ortars (g2mm or 1nrger-multi'11e nosi tion) 

TOTAL 

5 

2 

4 

33 

36 

7 

~ 

-:~mr 

. ~~ 

.And the totnl nUl!lber of pieces so reported were: 

AAA - Heavy. _• • • • . • . . • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • • • • . • • • • • •• 19 

Med! 1ltl •••••••••••••••••.•••••••••• _ • • • • • • 7 

Light .....................•. _.••.•.•.... ___ 1_ 

15 

27

Al.'1!:JZX SS TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 

Hq, 11th Ms"rines (Rein~ 

IJ-'.;H9.rI'iv, FMF, 

I ~l "li:18 :'5eld. 


CD ... 45mm .......................... . •••• •••• ••••• 5 

76mm •..••.••••••••• " .. • ••• .. • .. ••• ••• .. .. . .. •• •• 4 

1 

120mm ............................................... "__ 

1_ 

SP - 76mm or 8Smm........................................... 13 

120mrn. . • • • . . . . . .. . .. • . • . . . . • • . • . • . • • • • • • . . • • .-!.-. 

FA - 76mm Gun ....................... It • • • • • • • • .. • • .. •• gO 

90n:m G ;.m.. • • • • • • • . • • • • • • • • • • .. • • .. • .. .. .. .. • .. .. • .. It 2 

l05.nT'1 I-I /')w.. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • .. • • • • .. .. • • • • • • .. • 5 

l22mn :a: ')'.'1/.. • • .. • • • • • • • • • • • .. .. • • .. • • • • • • .. .. • .. • ... 40 

152mm Gun or Gun-How ••................•..• 1 

--128 

~iortars - 82rnm.................................. 14 

120mm" ....................................... 0 __ 6_ 

20 

14 

20 

TOTAL ...... 209 

In attempting to arrive at an estimate of enemy artillery 

strength based on the lo~ations tabuJ.ated above, the following fa.ctors 

must be considered: 

(1) It ~ust be assuoed that the eneny was successful in 

employing and firi'i.g his c:rtillery ant mcrt.ars fron positions never 

detected by nny of our a~encies. 

(2) The h:.gh ra:",io of suspected positions to confitmed positions. 

This was pr':na:-ily due to rul 1nadeG,uate flow of shell reports. 

and the incoop:'ete and in~.ccurnte nature of nmy of the reports 

received. 

(3) A single pieee o~ battery, as a result of displacements, 

might be reported sev~r8.1 times. 

(4) Lack cf ~ny detection Rpparntus capable of successfully 

operating against norte.rs - a.s well f'.~ their Dobili ty nnd position 

area requirenents. 

In view of these factors, and based on tho locP.tions reported, 

the following concJus1ons regaraing eneny nrtillery strength Are made! 

(1) The total number of artillery pieees shown above is probably 

inaccurate to the extent that the eneny wns able to provide rl~ternate 

gun positions and to displRce his weppons. 

(2) It is believed thnt the list of pnti-aircraft and mortar 

po:ri tions falls consiclerRbly short of ,the totpl a.vai.1~b1e to the enemy_ 

The nature of these weapons is suc~ that shelling and location 

reports of their activity were usually fragmentary. or of such nature 

as to ~ake confirnntion of positions iopossible. 

(3) In the nat~er of coast defense pieces. due considerntion 

has been given to dual-purpose types. The type of emplacement was 

made the detemining factor 8.S to whether they were classed as AAA or 

as coast defense. It is probable thnt nany light coast defense guns 

were not reported to this orgRniz~tion. It is believed, however, th~t 

the 15 medium pie~es reported represents a fair esti~.te of the eneMY's 

. strength in this field. 

16

,i< i.. J. 

_ .f" __ l .!....:/il.:~.c:" _>,..... t 

Al~TEX 

55 TO 1ST MARINE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPOET 

H~. 11th M~rlnes (Reinf) 

l"tMry,rDiv, }li·ITi't 

t::. t. :Le r j e 10. .. 

26 nov 1950 

(4) No estimate of enemy self-propelled artillery strength 

can be made from these fi~lres~ Reports received usually could not 

di~tinguish between artiilery. self-propelled artillery, or tank 

fi:r6s,; 

(5) It is believed that the nunber of. field artillery piecas 

listed above represen'/j P.ll overestimate of eneDY strength. It is 

observed t~~t the eneny when retreating withdrew as much of his Artillery 

to new locations as possible. The use of alterna.te positions 

by the enemy woulc. elsa tend to increase the nur.lber of positions repo~tei. 

In the light of t~ese considerations eneoy field artillery 

st~ength is estimated to hBye consisted of the following: 

Approx. Six Batteries (36 pieces) 

,? APprox. :Thfee Batterie~ (18 pieces) 

.. Appr·ox. 0ne Battery (4 pieceE) 

76rnm Guns 

122r:trl How 

l05r;un How 

. (6) If this strength was organized according to best available' 

in'forma:tion' regarc1.irg Horth Korean orrter of b~.ttle, it ind:'cates 

the presence of one: artillery reg:traer:t :in the area of operations and 

four r·o five artillery companies organi.c to infantry regiments, probably 

Rug~ented by R few captured Am~rlcRn or South Korean pieces. 

t 

d. Deploymen t • 

Enemy deployment of his artillery is indicate on ffOverlay of 

Hostile, Battery/Morta,r Positions", appendix VII to this annex. This 

overlay'does not Rr-.i.OW pOHt"Jions or.f,'Jnal pr:1.or to 18 Sep 1950 since 

no shelling repo;r.·;~ 'Jr loc3.tion reports W3re received during the peri- 

. od 15-17 Sep 1950, cu'1d no positions "rere confirmed. Ene:y deployment 

indicates that he cased ~he bulk of his artillery defense of Seoul on 

positions in 'or near the city. The enemy positions may also indicRte 

that the enemy ex.,eJ·~.enr.Gd cliffi cuI ty in moving hi s p.rtillery across 

the Han River. 

e. Probable 'rder of battle. 

!nf~'m.ation as to eneoy organization and probllble order of battle 

is almost entirely negati"Te. No t~a.l1s1~tors or interrog£l.tors were 

attached to this orgAnizRt'5.on, and locally p=ocurC'cl interpreters 'ITer 

not linguistically able to conduct interrog~tions that might have revealed 

information as to enemy order of battle. 

Information taken fro~ Division Intelligence Summaries indicate 

the presence of the following nrtillery units: 

4th and 6th CODp8nies, 2nd BRttalion. 9lSth Arty Regt. 

4th Regiment, 18th Division. 

Arty Bn, 17th Division. 

~\ Company, 17th ~ivision. 

f. Equipment. 

Enemy artillery equipment examined by this organization showed 

fair workcanship 0nd sound principles of construction. M~ny refinements 

were le,eking; sighting equipnent in pnrticulp.r yould be considered 

sub-stnndard by U. S. Artillery. However, the enemy light artillery pieces 

seeoed to be designed for a ~ifferent method of enploynent than our 

own and it is probable that less stress was laid on sights anQ fire control 

equipment. 

17

.Aln~EX 

SS TO 191 lvLARINE DIVISION SPECI,.cu, ACTION REPOBT 

Hq, 11th l"ie,rines (Reinf) 

]. 3 tMarri v. Fl-,']') 

In J.:.he Field. 


No detailed examinations or test-firings of enemy A.rtillery 

equipment were conducted by this organiz~.tion. 

No comment. 

10. COMi'.iEl1rS AND RECOMMEND.ATIONS. 

8.. Planning. 

1 t ~s believeo_ that current ~.octrines related. to planning amphibious 

operations remain effective~ Events whiCh occurred during 

tr.as operation serve to emphasize certain planning cherA.cteristics 

whiCh are doctrine, but which were largely disregArded during the 

pl~nning phase of this operation. thereby causing inade~uacies in 

the final plan. That the plan was s~~cessf~lly executen despite its 

inr.deG.uacies may be P.t t.~ibuted to the ).ight defense of the beach by 

the enemy, and to the ex callent on-the-spot decisions mnde and actions 

taken by the many Harine officers ~d Marine non-commissioned 

officers who were experienced in ~~hibious operations. 

Current doctrine includes the following chara.cteristics of 

landinb force planning: 

(1) The necessity for concurrent planning in lower echelons. 

(2) The necessi ty for cletfdlerl planning. 

(3) The effect of time and sp~ce on planning. 

Concurrent plannlng requires thpt preliminary planning be ini tiatecl 

by the artillery comr.lancler on the basj_s of advance information and 

tentative clecisions CO:1cerning shippitlg, naval gunfire anr_ a).r sup~ort 

plans, location of beaches: anQ the landing plan. In this operation 

the advance infornation was extremely lioited ~nd arrived only six (6) 

days prior to the loading d.A.te; A. s':1i table map was ronde ftvnilable only 

two (2) days prior to the loading date; nod essentinl informRtion concerning 

the naval landing plan was not available until the night before 

sailing. As a result, plens for the artillery were hurriec~y 

made anel disseminatc~l;loacling plans had to be issue(t_ verbally in fragmentary 

fom; the advance reconnaissance party hail to dep~rt with incouplete 

anc tentative information on the artillery ~lan; nnd the 

regiment sailed for the t~.rget area before a det.~.iled landing nlrul 

could be 0.rawn up. 

There is a necessity for detailed pl~nning becB.use an amphibious 

ass~ult is a conplex operntion in comparison with an operation on 

land. This opera~ion. was particularly complex for the e.rtil:£ery because 

of the extreoe tid[l.l conditions at the target~ the fact th~t artillery 

was to be landed at H-Hour on en off-shore islan~_ which offered 

only very linited positions, an0. the assignment of Jal,anese-rlanned 

shipping~ To insure success, a written plan f:overing a.ll 0.etA-ils was 

indic~tedt even for troops eXI)erienee~ in ~nphibious o~erations. 

However, the planning method utilized precluded thorough coverage 

of all ·details, and important details concerning the shi~ to shore 

movenent "Jere disseminated only twenty-four (24) hOllrs prior t 0 ~0\1r. 

As a result of the lack of tinely details and other factors beyond the 

18 

; 

< 

)''''

.tUDQ S5 TO 1ST MtUUl4E DIVISION SPECI~L ACTION BEFORT 

Hq, 11th Me~rines 

1 ~tM2rDi.v ~ FI·fB' , 

Ll 'l;:~e :ii e1cl .• 

(Rein.f) 

26 ~rov 1950 

control of ~his headquarters, the Ship to shore novement was ~ ~isor~anized. 

and hapbazard affair, end the delivery of effective :\rti11ery support 

was thereb~l (tel~Ted" IIad there been c\ rehearsp~, the experience 

wo"lcl have .(I~ed. :l:'oble feat'::.rer: 

(1) Onn ~:7.': 1.:;5'IT:.1 bow~.tzer battery was respr;-.slble for the 

IOciling M(l. unlo[:t1~.ng of ::>.Il entiro .AKA r n1 ~h0U.gh the battery nateriel 

COInllrisec. on:'y a S::'lC,"1..~ por: i'on ('if the ct\:rs) elC"i'''arkBc1., nnd the bat tory 

Mel first -Ll"rio:ri ty of unJ..radJ.ng. It n;rpea:~1 unnecess8.ry to assign 

such a logistical responsibility to a tncticnl unit. 

(2) The heavy mp.te!"iel of one medtum bnttery hait to be embarked 

in nnC'. l~nC':.e(: froY!l fL'1 .i1KA, when a mOTe efficient metho0. of 

hanc 1 .1inG thi s mG.te~:le~. i:3 FL'f 0~"(1.e (1. t J the !A3T. 

(3) Rei;inl-ntal Zlea~1

Al\frTEX SS TO 1ST MARInE DIVISIon SPECIAL ACTION REPOm' 

Hq, 11th !1ttrines (Reinf) 

lstMarDiv, ncr, 

In the :If ielcl. 


Attachment of an emphibious truck compe.ny, as recommencleC'_ in 

parDGrnph c .. 

below, woult pitd about 3 CO pe!'sonnel. 110 DUKWS, 3 2t 

Ton Trucks, 4 ~~T0n Trfdle~s, onC'. 5 t~on 'l'r"~cks to the :lbove figures. 

In general, the most desi!'R,ble means of shipping MC_ lan(1~ing 

a.rtiller.y are consi~ered to be a.s follows (in the o~~~er of 1>reference): 

Light Artillery 

ll) L.3T b~acher.l. fo'!:' land.ing, if LST can be beaehed eA,rly. 

(2) 1ST n~:-eli)adec1. :.n !)UY1rs. 

(3) 18:.': -ry:'1el.)pd80. :'n ~ylr: 5) s, where a coral reef is presonted 

offshore. 

(4) l;PA's landed in LCM(6)' s or LST]. 

(5) AKA' s lanc.e~!. in LCl{( 6) , s or Iig'"lJ. 

Medium A~tille=y 

---nJ LS:': 1)0;'G~led for landin~. 

(2) LSD ,rE'lorAed. in LSU. 

( 3) A.KA lRJl de o. in .Lf"J. 

(4) APA landed in Ltiu. 

Rebimental Headquarters 

\1) LST, with 3 DUAWS preloadecl for reconnaissance. Beach 

LST to land remain~er. 

(2) bPA, lanc.ecl in Levpts and LCM. 

In all of tl'!.8 me'~bods indicated above, except the KPA, ac1.equate 

bunk spnce is not ;;;'J"f1.:l1nl'le for artillery personnel. If the sfliling 

time is short (sny, UP. to 10 days) nnd the weather is oild, lo~ding 

It maxioun of 250 ~ersonne1 on an LST is consiuered prA.cticable, and 

no a(lc~itioncl ~hilJpi!J,g for troops is neCeSSf\"i:'Y. Unr..er more extrene 

sai.ling cond.i t7..0n3, dbout 1200 t:-oops should be emb?Ike0. on other 

shippinr';, an~. be transsidI1pec .. to the LSlli at the tarGet area. 

Ita connen d~.t i on .:;,: 

(1) That 12 LST's be assignee to lift the artillery regiment 

when DUICl'lS (or 1VT t s) a:"e to be used in the ship to shore movement. 

This will allow sufficient cargo space for the mnjor iten~ of mnteriel 

listed a,bove, pnd will carry all the troops if wop.ther F.!nc1. sa.iling conditions 

pcrDit overloa.ding each 1~T to 250 men. 

(2) That when suffic:i.ent LST's fI.~e not a;'ailDble, an APA be 

substituted rnther then an AKA. In accordance with the nreferences 

listed above, it is believed that the medium battalion and the light 

battali{~ns supporting the assault regiments should be LST-borne, 

while the reginc'lta.l r.ea('~quarters anet -possibly one (1) light battalion 

can be next best embarked in rul0~ landecl from an APA. The APA 

would also offer a desirable solution to emb~rking those troops who 

could not be cnrried on the LST's. 

(3) That when foreign-~anned ships are utilized, at least one 

.American shi:!? capable of carrying the reginental headCLuHrters be assigned 

the artillery enb~rkation group in order to ,assure positive com~ 

municntion and proDer control. 

c. Use of DUXV.rS. 

The 1st AophibiAn Truck Compnny, FMF. (85 DUKWS) was attnched 

20

A1r~lD.tC SS TO JS T MARIl\fE DIVISION SPEG~AL ACTION REPORT 

:gCl~ 11th }Jiarine s (Be inf) 

1;;-.:-iJla;- G:. ,r ~ Plv[F, 


to this organization f or the landing. Since the rated capacity of 

th:i.s amphibious vehicle is 50fJO pounds &."'11 the 105mrn howit7.er (with 

acc\:>ss():::,~.es) v!8iC:;'s sJj,ghtly flare thfu"l tl.l..:,s figtlt"e, then the hC:kJitzer 

m11st 6jther be land.ed. l,;ji-r,hont a c:re\,l E.'.1r:1. 81I1TIrar.;.tion, or the .DUIGI must 

08 oyer1oaded) ~T8:i ther solution is dGs: i ,rac-le from the tactical vie,,: 

poin:',; t and. there:'ore the present DHK1'T is not an ideal vehicle for landing 

ltght artillery, as may be cOlJI1only helieved. Houever, it does 

offer the best neans nO'.1 available. '.l1lder tlost conditions, if a. sufficient 

nUIJber of DUI0JS are r.tade ava~_lable to parfait a sound tactical 

land.ing uithout ovp.rlcading~ A comppny of 110 DUKWS, distributed as 

i~icated below, is cons~de~ed ne~essary to land the light battalion, 

B...'1d the reconnaissance ele:c1ents of thG LlOdil.1fl battalion and reginental 

he adquarte rs : 

DUKW naintenance •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5 

Reginental Reconnaissance P::tr~y •• ') •••••••• 3 

llediun Ba-f:ta~~.ion RGCO~lnaiES'--~.lGe P.:lrty ...... 3 

Each light b2.ttRli on!" 0 .... p' < ... ' .. ~ ... ", •• , •• 33 

Recor.u:.lendation: That the Dille! bo re~-do signed to carry at least 

7500 pounds, or tha~ the AIJphibion Truck Conpany be reorganized as 

follolfs: 

Co Hq 

3 PIt 

g DIDOffi 

34 DUI0:lS each 

d. Suppl i ~ s p~~~_ ~qu: pnent. 

Upo:a ::0\'· J':.l; c:£" Canp Pendleton, this uni t carried \1ith it al- 

I10st lOO~J o:.~' lj~'k, .~ .:'::1.03 and equipI.1\:~nt authorized by the T/ .. ~ and T/E. 

It vIas nOCiJs~r',ti .... ' L1t;7t,.; 0.11 of this cargo froD Canp Pendleton to the 

docks at S[J.l~~-G:;:)r i.Ll.,i i·t aboard ship, unload at KOBE, and roload it 

aboard assaul'~ sIL::ppjng. :p,..ior to entry into c0I.1bat. Since tij.1o ~ras 

very linitod, ass['.1.1.1t 2~,~.l?pj.l1g v/:tS lini.tt..:l:. tUl.d it was realized thD.t 

transportation c~~rore wC".11(: coe@[; a critic;:::.l problO;.1, an eff

.al'lNEXX SS TO 1ST ·MARIltE DIVISION SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 

Hq, 11th M".rines (Reinf) 

1 ~-''';M ".r J1 v t FlMi', 

In t~le .7~elc.• 


e. Motor Transport. 

It is belie-ved. thFl.t the trn..nsportA.tion provlcl.efl. the p.rtil1ery 

regiment t with '!:he ex:.;eption o~ regimen~f\.l hell.cl.qu('I,rters an0. service 

batteries, j.s ac~equate to meet the requlrAIDents of an pJ!!phlbious oper::;~if')n4 

I~ i3 e·n.iT0mely c.:i.f:fic'.llt f0r the regimcnt~~ r.eL.C.quD.rters 

to ma~.ntain continuous and effective control during c.isp1pcements Mct 

to l)rovitita efficient counter-oftttery intelJigence wi th the number of 

vehicles now provic.ed. 

The amount of additional transportation required for extended 

land carn:>aigns is de~ep.de!'t upon sever~ variable fnctors: 

(1) The number of service elements supporting the operation. 

The lack of service elements may force the artillery to trnvel fifty 

(50) miles or more to an ASP. 

(2) The ruJ.ount of ammunition rul

.ANNEX 55 TO 1ST )'~NE DIVIRIO""J S'PECtlJ:· A~:O'I R~O:RT 

t 

R~~ 


1 st;MarDi v t n-1F, 

In the !"ie1c'~. 


(3) That reginental service battery be 8uthn.rized the following 

addi ti onal transportatinn: 

One (1) i--Ton ~ Truck, one (1) 1i-Ton Truck, and one (1) 

2i-Ton Truck with traile·re tn ::rov1a.e a Deans of floving the bulky but 

il!lportant equipoent o~ tbe per30nnel a.n(~. disbu.~sing sections. 

(4) That the l-Ton Trailers in excess of the number for which 

prioe r:lovers are a,ralJ.&Yl €: he ~.l'l")pped ft:"om the T /E, since their presence 

a.ppears to offer no p~,l·t~. cuIar advantage. 

(5) That the present 300 gallon water trf'.ilers be replaced by the 

250 gal.IQn type used' in the U. S. Art!JY. The present wa.ter trailer 

does not stand up over rough roads, repeeted failures occuring in the 

towing bar·at the points where it joins the frane. 

(6) TlL"t TD-18 tractors w/~le dozer replnce the TD-14's nresently 

authorize~. The TD-l4 is too light for MUch of the work required. 

(1) Thnt n welding unit be authorized for regicental service 

ba.ttery. 

(8) That all 2i-Ton Trucks in the artillery regiment, except 

prine novers, be long wheel base trucks so ris to provi~.e p,o.r.i tiona! cargo 

space. 

f. Coccunications. 

The cocnunication personnel an~ equipoent n~thorized for the 'rebiment 

are, in genertti, considered ndequate •. l!njor cl.eficiencies Are noted 

below: 

(1) The remote . power relay in the mounting rack of the .AJ1/!'B.C- 

5 nnd SCR-60g radio did not stand up to the long use over rough ro~~s 

and it becane necessary to remove this relay fro~ the circuit. 

(2) The BB-54 wet cell bnttery for the SCR-6l9 portable rnQio 

proved to be an inadeqUAte ~ower sup~ly. It was impossible to re-Charge 

these batteries with sufficient speed nnd in sufficie,nt nUl!lbers to keep 

fo!'Ward observers an0. l;.aison officers sup-qlier., ~..lld 

the bFtttery itself 

is not strong enough to wi that and the rough handling of norl'!1al usat;e. 

(3) Present AM radio e~uipDent does !lot hAve enough r~e for 

extended land caopRigns. 

(4) Present FM equipoent used by forward observers (SCR-619 01' 

SCR-6l0) does not have enough range to offer reliable. direct contact 

with the FDC. 

(5) No equipment is now nvailable in the regioent to net with 

the VHF radios in high-perfomance airplanes. 

(6) Battalion TIC's do not authorize sufficient radio technicians. 

23

.AJTh'2~ S5 TO 1ST MARINE'DIVISIOtr SPECIAL ACTION :.1EPORl' 

Ree ommendati ons; 

Hqp 11th Marines (~inf) 

lstHarDiv .... FiiF~ 

In ':;he l'i81d ... 

'26 nov 1950 

(1) That a "bett·er remote system be dev810:t:>ed for the, A11/H3.C-5. 

(2) That the SCR--6l9 ba ilIl1"11ed~ atoly reJ>la~ed by tli~' S0a-·t)lO 

(or later deveJopemG~t) ~ &"Ild that Entomat~.c :-eL:y ste.·!-:ions l1u :procured 

'for "boostinglt for'~la:rd obqervcrt s tre.nsD"ission back to t:1e :mc~ 

(3) That rogimcIJte.l headq:~,-2'tors G::ld ca~h, (\a·\it.al~.on be au~horized 

one (1) £1T/VRC}-·ln The; 'VHF portio:l of this set (~Q1L:.d l'D used' 

for cOlIlIIIllnicutj.on \'Ii th high,-'p8rform2Ilce aircrd't ~ 1:-1:..i10 the EH.F portion 

(SCR-193) ltlould provi~_e 

2. mere poverful .tU'i radioo 

(4) That each battalion be auth~izcd rolothcr radio teohnician 

in the regimental liaison sectione 

(5) That one addi tioIk~l 1:N/-rfRC-5 be nuthorized regimenttho 

gronter part of the ,o:Peration~ This observer hnd to ;1.Ct as both tactical 

and gunnery observer, and sinco a no,", major tacticnl missioil is 

to lorui in nir strikes, an importmlt nnd r~thor frequent tnsk, tho 

single observer could .. not possj.bly satisfy both the tactiral ru1(1~ gnllnery 

requirement So For sati sfE..ct-pry sorvice.l' the PIt l~,lo~~y ['] O:lO must 

have three, (3) plrules' uvailE'.ole for simult21100us !Iliss~.cn:s? 

Helicopters D.re vv..luab10 for artillery spot in spcci.~l si t 11ations, 

such ['.s 'carly in ['ll opcr[ltion vrhcn cirstrills t'.rc not (lv£'.iluble 11 but in 

general tho OY is considored ;: bettor spotting plane, bec['.uso it is 

moro m~Leuvcrc.ble end lcs~ vu.lnore.b10 to enemy tl..i.r ntt['.ck vnd AA fire. 

:Bnsed 011 r0cornmendations of obs0rvors, it is bvlicvod that the VLO 

should include six (6) hali-coptors for those speciD2 missions \vhich the 

W1ique" c['.pabilitios of this craft enr:.bl(. it to accoL1plish.., 

t .,; 

Rcoommer..dations: 

(1) That VNO be provided ,:lith sixtoen (16) liaison type planes 

in order to b.:; cnpablc of m£'.intL'..ining one tactical ruld throo gnnnory 

observers on stati 011;) 

(2) Thc.t helicopters bo LIMO nvniln.blc to operate from thv dock 

of an LST for crtillor,y spot dQringtho initial stages of ~~ cmphibious 

oporntiono 

h. Use of VT fuzo~ 

VT fuze ",ns us-ed on only;:,. fO\-l missions durj.ng this opBrntion becnuso 

of the wnrning restrictions ~~d nttondGnt d0lnys imposed by highor 

echelon: o.nd tho'IDQ'lJ.11'lininous tcrrnino X Corps SOP rel~~tivo to firing 

VT fuze is quctc~ in pE'.rt: 

.. 

nb(' Uotj.fic:'.tion of tho mission vlill be transmitted as 

fol1ows: "IDILLERE O:T (LOCATION); AZIMUTH 

FO~ liIl~ES AT." (Ir~li.E) (.G.Jcation $-:"'d-n.-z-imu-th 

. ., 1 1-.. - .;. " 

v1J.. '_ 'JO 30~ 

h' - d) ~ 

J In s, nCK.L.O COO) 

Ire. CO}:'ps Ar'tillery F~ ro :Oiroc·~io:i.l C~nt0r will not::fy 2.11 

[tr"~ j lIe ry uni t;:; vIi t h tho Corp S Oil t !l.1.; Co r'p s ~_:'~ i 110 :'"Y 

cornnnnd net (SCR-193) ot the I:1ission, Corps ~rti11.::;ry 

light fl.viation ''iill -be notified by Corps .. t~tillery 

Fire Direction Center on the Corps Artillery .LilR spar 

24

&mEX 55 TO 1ST KnRINE DI\TISION SPECIAL .ACTION REPORT 

Hq, 11th liiarincs (Reinf) 

1 stt-~a .. rDi v i Fl::iF, 

In tho Field. 

26 No\'" 1950 

m1l' (SCR-60g/619). Divislon Artillory "rill bo ro .• p.pnsiblo 

for notifying all light aircraft under division control 

• 

. 1!c1. Each artillery unit "rill direct its 01.m. light aviation 

to clvar drulgor aroas. 

"e. Units initiating VT Dissions DUst £1.1101.1. D. roasonable 

tine for tho disscoination of tho warning cassage. Unit 

will not proceed ',·ri th the oission 1l.L"1til 10 Dinutos after 

£1)1'])s ,.'i.rt111ory warning brr'cd~nst. - In periods of eDcrgcncy, 

the Corps Artillery Co.cnandor nay authorize tho 

firing of VT fuzos without dol~y or l;Tarning •. ~n .such 

ensas, ground observation posts cnn be utilizcd by 

un! t s. firing. so ns to c.oloy firo \

.ruaJE~~: 

SS TO 1ST Illtrut!1m DIVISlar SPECIAL ACTION ?EPORT 

Hqi 11th Em-ine s C-:. e 1nf) 

1 s tl:inr:)i v: Fii]'. 

In tho Fiold o 


j. Illumint.ting projectilos. - -; . " : J 

Illumino.ting projectiles '\iOrQ vttry:e!fectiyo, lmt have ['. rD.l1ge 

limitc..tiol1 imposed- by the: 25 second, fuze ~M54) 0 T5, nv.?~~ this li~i tntion, 

a l55mm howitzer was fre~uontly ass1gned ,to onc~,D/S Bntt~11on 

for illumil1ntion jrurposestJ As anD experiment to obtn:in grc;:yor range, 

M67 fuzes (75 sec e ) vrore modified py rcmov['~l of tho boost0i 'und fired 

vii th illuminating shell", A rel1ge of 10,000 ynrds 'tlt:'.S fired ,D...~d the 

fuzed nppenred s~tisfc..ctorYt m1t further usc was suspendc~pending 

further experiment nnd ordnnncc nppxovnlo 

Rc c or:unc rrdn t i on s : 

(1) That ordnance experts exaoinc tho possibility of increasing 

tho'range of the present illuninating shell. ' 

(2) That the ~lount of illuminating shell in the unit of fire 

be doublcd o The pro sont nllovJnncc of 7 rounds per gun is not enough 

to supplY infantry dennnds for illuninc..tion. 

k. 4 0 5" rockets., 

Battory "C", 1st 4.5" Rocket lk.ttnlion, FHF, consisting of six 

T66-~ rocket launchers, \v[LS attached to the Division throughout this 

opcrc..tio::& During the c..sSo.ult pho.se and pert of the exploitation phnse 

the bat te ry 'Was operated sirlilnrly to th0 rail-type, t ruck--nount;Jd 

Inunchcrs of ~{orld -~vGr II; being attached to ::a.CT-l j while during tho 

rODo.inder of th0 operation it \rIQS nttnched to this Regif10nt nnd operated 

as general support nrtillery~ Prior to sailing fron KOBE, tho 

battery Wo.S provided 1,vith M5L14 fuzes ['.s a substitute for the standard 

H48.A2, since the latter \10 ro not then nvc..ilable [tnd the tV/O fuze s arc 

nOrDclly considercd intorchc.ngec..ble. After firing Dissio119 for 3.CT-I, 

it becDIlo appnront that the I,i5l.n.4 fuze S \Jere not functioning properly, 

since nlDost 0.11 of the rounds f['.iled to burst on iDpact; subsequent 

tests indicated that ['. design foc.turo of this fuze prevents it froD 

DXtling UhC11. fired Hi th the 4" 5" rocke t. As D. rc 8'1,.11 t 1" tho bat tery \1/o.S 

out of action until about 27 Soptcobcr when I ... ~48.a2 fuzps 'Illere received. 

One nissio11 was fired ruth this fuZ0 nnd was considered very succ0ssful. 

This oission onphasizod the principlc of rapid displnceDcnt iLIDcdintoly 

nfter firing, since ['.n enany I:ortar concentrnti on llas brought dOl'm on 

tho firing position 1;lithin five ninutcs nftcr the rounds wor~ cO:lplete. 

Rc c onnondc..t ions: 

(1) That ord:1.D.llce D.gej.lcies COl:duct cxpcrir.1ents \vith the various 

fuZes which \'Till fit tho 4 p 5 11 rocket C-..'1d pu,hlish definite instructions 

as to which, if ru~p will function satisfactorily as 0. substitute for 

the N48A2o 

(2) Thr.t since tho 4

.' , 

'" 

"- 

ANNEX SS TO lS'1' lilillI18 DIVI 51(:11 SP3CI.AL ~IOll REPORT 

Hq, 11th tk~rinos 

lstl.,InrDi.v, FHF t, 

In 'Lb.) Fic Id. 

(Rein!) 

26 l'Tov 1950 

Tho necossity of nointaining a countor-battery chnrt and porloroing 

other counto~battory uark all n tl'lCnty-fou't" bnsis, ~s wall o.s perforDing 

all tho norual dutios of ~l &.. 2 section plncod).n Wlduo stro.in 

on neDbors of tho section. 

ROCODrlC ndnti on. Thnt tho current T/o (1-1226 w/chango 3) for 

the nrtillcry 5-< s'")cti.on bo ineroC'tsc1. by the follo\'!iIl€ aO.ditions: 

1 

1 

SSgt 

SSgt 

'Llt:C~) ig.;,;nco :·Icr.. HOS 02.J~. 

'FA i J .)C""tl"':io:'.S .i\S~" stC'.l1v !~OS Oghg 

n. Flash Rn.~ging. .. 

Tho Flash Ita::g:i"1g Sec"iion, '::roi:1forcod by tho Sound Ranging Se~tion, 

Wfl.S opcrntlvc th.'OUbhO".!t ';;hc ·c~:lp~ign. Good flash ranging po- ' 

sitions wore nvn.ila,1Jlo e.n.cL q.xcollont results \-lore obtninad •. Tho 

followingproblcLls in. tho. onploytiont" of tho Fln.sh R..'U1ging· Section 

were oncountered: ., . 

(1) In~ffic:i.cnt· pc.-rsonnel. for tl"Tenty-four hour operntion 

and provision for locn1 so·Curity. Thi,s W~I solved by nttnchnont of 

sound rnngi~ Pc:-soruro.l to' the Flash Rnng1ng Scction. 

(2) Inadequ.ate trnnsportntion. Two DUKWS were o.ttnchod to 

the section during 15-19 Scptc~bcr. providing sufficient tronsporto.- 

tion during this period. After 19 Scptcnber, only one jeep end one 

2i-T truck were nvailabla. :{ith this ODOWlt of tronsportc.tion, three 

to four round trips \-lOre necessary upon displo.ceoont t preventing the 

section froLl stL\Ying in action during fast noving si tuntiolls. This 

proble!" "lo.S partially but unsutls.fnctorily solvod by stripping the 

section to tho bare ninimm of personnel l'.Ild equipncnt necessary for 

lioited operations, c;l'ld cnrrying the rcnmni;ng personnel nnd gea.r vrith 

battory headquarters. to rejoin the section \-lhon the situation pcrr.litted. 

(3) Inadequate' rndio cooounicntions. Considering th0 distance 

involvod, lIire coonunications \'10re excellent through ..'Ut tho caopn1gn. 

During tho fnst r.1o~'ing phases of tho operation .. the flash roA~ing section, 

follo"r..ng behind tho infantry. \'lo.S not able to go into position 

Wltil lnto nftern.oon.. Under those conditions \'/irc could not bO instnlled 

unti 1 lnte at night) 0:' the following d~; and the SC:a-6l0 radio nssigncd 

tho section u6un.:'ly c~ld not reach the FDC. Ho solution to this problen 

was found. 

(4) Lv.ck of ";..lrvey control. InSUfficient pcrsoIk"1ol are providod 

in tho c."t.lr~ont ~/'J .to r-crforn into:::-io:-:- S".lrvcy, ex~ept at the O~ 

pense of other ft"J)~t.io::",s-j Tho· :4·og::'I.1cnt~l SUJ."V0Y socJliio:a is not so constituted 

as "': (; 'Jc 1."v10:,·t 0 rogu1arly :per-::or:;-.1 t~ir aedi tional nission. 

As a rosult, th:; f.13.Jo':'it~r o~ JJsi~io::ls ')cC'J.lJi'Jd b;v th0 }f'lash Range Section 

"WOre locp,t~cl bY' ':'rs~oc·;';ic... l.~ 

(1) T!lR.i +.}:.3 {,~"'re:'1.t T/o fo~ the :nash Ranging Soction (K- 

1226-,.,.) be cp..n~011.:d·?.nd tha follotdIig TIC su.bstitu~ocl: 

"FLASH RANG lUG SECT I ON tf 

Lt 

MSgt 

TSgt 

SSgt 

Flash Ranging Officer 

Ylash Rangil~ Chiof 

Chi.Jf Observer 

Flash Ranging Assistant 

0802 

os4S 

0848 

os4s 

le' 

lc 

lc 

te 

27

AlThTEX SS TO 1ST lJiARIHE DIVI SI OH SPECIAL ACTI DE REPORT 

Het:>. 11+;h 1.1113.r.ines (Reinf) 

1..:.:' t~.·ir1Y "D';."T'" -: I';,iF:. 

!:.,1.!j'::ie :tf~j e~._

MUTE:: SS TO 1ST I:ARIlIE nIVI SIOH SPECI.AL ACTI01: REPORT 

Roc o!y:;c ndo.t i ens: 

Hq, 11~h I~Ll.rinos (Reinf) 

1 s·t::nr:i v ~ F: :]1, 

In th8 }"i;Jlc1~ 

26 Hov 1950 

(1) Thnt tho sorgeD"at rlc.jor 00 curried in service battery vii th 

the person:'lcl scction~ sinco L.ll of tho p(;r-son:l

•;" 

1l.1n.r.mx SS TO 1ST I~Il!E,DIVISI01:r 

SPBCI~ .ACTIOI;;\EPORT 

IIq, ll~b. :~o.rll1cs (Reinf) 

J_fi.~:p::::\~ 7~1 ~1!.iF, 

IT' '"bc~ ri~lcl,; 

the tine it truces to trnin partia.lly experienced. officers in now duties. 

" 

32

1. INTP~DtTCTION 

let Pattal~on, 11th l~lnest 

In tl:a ]'ieJd, 

2' .. N 0Y9mOer 1950 

Ti;-~;" r~pC:·!.'t is submitted in comp11a.zwe wlthD1v1sion General Order 

No. 16·-50. ffi" •.

APF:IiINDIX Ol~E TO 11TH ~1A..tU:NES SPECI~ ACTIO:tl REPOm 

1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 

In the Fi a1d t 

24 November, 1950 

Comm'U...'lications equipment requisitioned was not made available. 

Four (4) field ranges and three (3) immers.ion heaters were supplied 

to supplement galley equipment on hand~ 

In accordance with Brigade planning and 1st Marine Dlvision 

directives, a personnal section of thre~ (3) enlisted was detached 

and readiod to join the division pers0nnel section in KOBE, Japan. 

All diaries, porsonnel reports and correspondence were brought up 

to date. Publico.tions, files and forus were so segrcge.ted as to 

furnish a field working ur:.~t,., after the personnel section 'lfJas separated 

in possession of the service recor~s and tho bvlk of tho aill~inistrativo 

paraphernalia. The rear personnel section was left in 

PUSAlJ uJldor supervis10H of Brigndc .. upon loading out by the battpJ.ion. 

4. TRAINIl~G.AND REHEARSALS 

110 fOl'Llal training or rehearsals were conducted prior to departure 

:froD PUSAN. Newly joined men were indoctrinated, \'There necessary, into 

their assignnents by tron the job U training incidentDl to reorganization 

and 'routino activities while loading out. 

5. LOADli:~G AUD EMBARK.ATION 

LOadi.!1g of the three G) I!STt s started at about 1400, 9 Septcober, 

1950 jI and \4!as conpleted at 1200. 10 Septeober, 1950. Enbarke.t1on of 

personnel ~IaS completed ipmea+ately after loading. Personnel enbarked 

in the following manner: 

LST SO-30! lIen Battery (loss LIfO and FO teams); Headquarters Battery 

(less Roconnaissrul:::o ?arty elements); Service Battery (10s3 reconnaissance 

personnel); plus one (1) platoon of 1st Anphibian Truck Compqny • 

..!:ST '

,AP?ENDIX ONE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTIOlf REPORT 

7 • OPEEATI O~IS 

a. Assa1llt Phase 

1st Battalion. 11th Marines. 

In the Field, 

24 Nov~mber 1950 

On 15 Sep.telUber 1950 , an advance party from the battalion, @onsisting 

of two (2) off!ce::-s and th=ee (3) enlisted men, la.'1o.€d' wi tIl waves of 

the 3rd Ba.tta.lion, 5th Marines on Green Beach, located at (884~F4) (Map 

cf 1(0:':6a 1: 25, 000 rr:etric U. S. Army), on WOIMI-IO I sland. This landing 

wa.s made at J657.. "Battalion posi'~ions were selected by this advanoe 

party. The fi~st elemen'ts of the battalion landed were the r8~onnaissance 

group. closely followed by the fir-ing batteries, The landing 

started at 1530~ and was ar:ccmplished in sh1p···to-shore movement by 

DHKw's mannod ~y the 1st Ai::1pnlbian Truck Ccmpo..ny, at.tached. Some 

delay was encountered ~y the small beach spacL and crowded, narrow 

roadways 0 Reg:i.st;:ration~ by high burst. e.djustment, was cOIapleted at 

2~50. ~he OP and FDO were located at (B849F!+) • Durlng the night the 

b~t;talion. fired a to'~F'~. of nine (9)' concentrattons fro1!1 this position 

in direct sup-;?ort of the 5'~h Marines. Results were generRl1y unknown 

due to poor. observa~ion ~le to rainfall and resnltant poor visibility. 

During 16. September 1:)50 the LSTi s ,¥ere successfully beached and a full 

urli t of fire off-load.ed t~ ftugmen't the bnsl0. load land€0. wi th the firing 

bat-teries. Tho battn1.ion t cont1nuing in its 11ission of direct sup~ort 

of the 5th Marines, displaced by echelon to a new position in the vicinity 

of TOB.1{A-RI, CP location (9348G3). Base po~nt registration was 

c\JmpletJcd by 1700,.. This area had been passed through by fast moving 

i.nfa'1try un.i ts eyf the 5th Mar1.~EJst A.nd many s~,,=,ttered enemy trooys remained 

in the nxea. Ten (Ie) enemy were k1lled by our security elenents 

and tVlenty-fo~ (24) prisoners ''lere ta!

-...._ .. ' .!PP~DIX 

ONE TO l+~. EA.RINES SPECIAL ACTION REPO~; 

1st Batt.al1.on, 11th M::t,rines, 

In the Field, 

24 NovemoGr 1950 

On 20 September 1950 advance reconnaissan~e chose new positions 

in the vicinity of PONGH1vA-RI. Regular reconnaissance group, with 

Battory fI Gil t, moved into position at 1330. .An infantry. fire fight 

delayed :planned earlier displacenent. All firing batteries Moved 

up and completed Ba.se Faint Registration by 1610. Nine (9) en.emy 

prisoners ,*,ere t£;Ken in the area. CP location coordinates «(:7SIP3). 

The battalion received the following motor transport vehicles: 

'1 

4 Trucks. 2t ton 6x6 

3 Trucks, i ton 4x4 

2 Trailers, i to~ 

1 Trailer t wRter, 300 gal 

On 21 Sept0mber 1950 the bp,ttf-tlion stnrted displacement to coordinates 

(:.r,.8.ll57E) at ab~ut 083". Heavy enemy counterbattery firl? was 

roceived, and continued intermittently for several hours. Nine (9) 

enemy prisoners were tClkeri ena. two (2) killed. Sixty-four (64) concentrations 

were fired. On 22 ~eptemb&r the battalion received heavy 

counterbattery fire at q,bout ')430. Fout" (4) ,nen were wOlIDded in action. 

At 0630, a twenty (20) minute preparati'on wa.s fired in support of the 

"--infBntry adva..·1.'~e toward SEOUL" At: ('931') a ptltrol found a qunnti ty of 

ari'!1S and arJrnunition and too¥-' four (4) enemy prisoners. Fifty-two (52) 

concontrations were fir8d. 

From 23 through 25 September 1950 the battalion did not displace, 

but continued to fi:o:-e s1J.pnort for the 5th l.farine s moving on SEOUL across 

the river fron the battalion position. Movement of infantry Wg~ lateral 

tc river J so supporG continued to be possible and effective. One hundred 

and twenty-four (124) 0oncen J Grations were ftred during the neriod. 

On 25 September an advance party crassed the HAl .. river to lo:~ate new 

positions. These were chosen in the vi.!inity of theIst Battalion, 5th 

Marines C? area, located Elt coordinates (16f)lN3). The advanG€ party 

crosSBd at tho initi?l :river crossing. On 26 Septenber when directed 

t"p utilize the new I1rossing the reconnaissance party encountered considerable 

aiffiaulty getting to position due to the inability of DUXWts 

used for transport to negotiate the ~larrow thoroughfares on the outskirts 

of SEOUL(t Forward elements of battalion, in>~luding Battery j1 e rt • occupied 

positions at 1100, and registration of Battery n err was cotrpleted at 1700. 

Th~rteen (13) conep-ntro.tions were fired. 

During 27 c:.nd 28 Septenber the battalion did not fire due to action 

within the city ~rop£r and ~opping-up operetions unrelated to support 

by artillery. 

29 September 195C the situation remained UlleventT",?-l. ep lOGation 

unchanged. Infantry mopping-up operations ~ontinued. 

On 30 8eptoI!lber Ba.ttery "en was detached for operational purposes 

...,to the 3rd Ba,tta~ion. 5th Marines. On 1 October tl Art Battery, 5tlth 

AA.A. (Ali) Battalion,. U. S. Amy. w~s attached to the battalion for 

operational control. On 2 October one (1) platoon of this 'battery 

was attached to B6.ttery lie".; 

4

APPENDIX ONE TO 11!H MARINES SPECI AL ACTION REPORT 

1st Bat,talion. 11th Marines, 

In the Field, 

21+ Noyember 1950 

_ During the night of 2 October 19~ Battery (f e" w.as attacked by 

twenty (20) to thlrty (3(\) enemy troops', and was broJ1ght U-l1der enemy 

mortar f':!.re. One (1) security outpost lI!as surround~d by the enemy 

but successfully defended its pO$ition. The attack was rep~l.sed. 

Battery I1Cff took forty .... two (42) prisoners the following day, 3 October 

1950. 

On 4 October 195C the U.S. Army AU Battery was detached. On 5 

October Battery ne" rejoined the battalion. At 1400, 5 October the 

battalion commencod displacer:wnt to the lot l..fprine Divisirm assembly 

area in INCHON~ Korea. 

6 and 7 October 1950 the battalion remained in bivouac at the -Divi 

~ion Assembly Area in INCHON. 

8. ENEMY T.aCTICS., ORGl1l:UZ .. ;TION J STRENGTH, DEPLOYMENT, PROBABLE ORDER 

OF 3KI'TLE) AND EC(.UIPMEl{T 

Generally 1."nknown; inform[-l,tion obtainE:ld fro~ 

world be of groater value. 

infantry S-2 reports 

~tlssions 

and ammunition expended: 

TYPE MISSION NO HE 

Area missions 346 14,974 

Precision missions 29 1,812 

Harassing missions 147 2,250 

Defons~ve Eiusions 2() 167 

assault missions 1 ~--L- 

TOTALS 543 19,218 

WP 

1,707. 

185 

131 

13 

2,13b 

Tot~ expenditure of arm-nuni t ion: il~254 rounds 

Results of firing: 

Enemy ldll3d: 

EncDy-wounded: 

I-iachine guns de.stroyed: 

AT guns destroyed: 

Automatic weapons destroyed: 

Mortars destroyed: 

OP's neutralized: 

Tanks destroyed; 

Vehicles destroyed: 

FA pieces d~stroyed: 

3,155 

3t3('9 

61 

17 

78 

28 

10 

1 

2 

IJ 

Additional pertinent statistics: 

One h~U1dred and fifty~six (156) enemy personn~l.were captured 

by members of the battp~l')n. Thirteen (13) enemy wore killed by battalion 

seeuri ty ele.r1

, 

APPENDIX OliE TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTIOli REPORT 

10. COr1! !ENTS AND- RECOlviMEN1'>ATIONS OF THE COMV..ANDER 

J 

It is the opinion of this command that the l05mm howitzer has 

proved an extremely effective weapon d"lring the conrse of the Korean 

campaign. There are t however, certain factors governing the use of 

this weapon which should be :tBken mto consideration in an e~ffort to 

increase its effectiveness. 

During operations in which this command was a l>art of th& 1st Prov- 

'lsional Marine Brigad~, it was .foUnd that a six (6) ~.m b:ittery was not 

a practical solut~o~ to the problem of artillery s~:pport. The nat~ 

of the terrain available fqruseasartll1eryposition areas precluded 

the use of_a battery containing in excess of four (4) pieces. The 

tactics of the enemy, who were adapt at infIltration Bnd guerilla 

taGtics, neeessi tated an all around perimeter of local. securl ty defense 

by artillery units •. There proved to be insufficient local security 

personnel inc},uded in cur'rent _Tables of 'Organization for artil'lery 

units. ; It was, tllerefore, necessary to c?mpress the battelion position 

into a compact a:rea in order to a.chieve the necessary securlty" 

It is recommended tJoJa.t, whenever possible, the above-I!lentioned 

factors be taken into consideration inaetermining the nunber of artillery 

pieces to' be includcd,in a battery of artillery for a opeciflc 

campaign •. 

It was also found that twelve (12) artillery pieces per battalion, 

as opposed to the eighteen (lg.) 1-ieces provided by the TIO (War Strength) 

ga~e aople fi:;-e ~upport to an i!l:fPJl try reginent in the type of caIIlpaign 

which-was fou6htby the 1st P.rovlsiG.nal l.farinc Brigade. This opinion 

is based on the fact that OVer 5/5% df' theartillery'concsntrations 

",," fired were battery concentrations. A battalion coIicentration was an 

exception .re.ther than the rule.' 

_ 0 . '.' , 

. The value of white phosph'orous cannot be overemphasized~ It was 

learned t both from observation and prisoner interrogatlon,·that while 

phi te phosphorous. shells were very effective against the enemy. Due 

to the motmtainou1l terrain. WI' shells were used e1{.trnflively for registration 

purposes, thereby sav~~g many HE -shells, which would otherllise 

beco~Alost rounds. It is believed that 'artillery effectiveness would 

be improved by increasing the amount of WP projectiles contained in a 

unit of fire. It is also believed that the percentage of.~ shells 

contained L a unit of fire should be substantially increased, and that 

at lea~t. two (2) round~ 6f cannister shells shoUld be included in a unit 

of fire. 

Both fuze time and fuze VT were found to be particularly e 1 ffectlve. 

It is to be noted, however, that very little fuze YT was used due to 

the unreliability of the vertical contro~ of the firing charta available. 

Since the use of fuze, timet was eas~ly controlled b~ direct observation, 

this problem was not present, in ,using this type of fuze. 

There is a very pressing need for an illuminating shell for use with 

the l05nnn howitzer. It is unfortun'''te thftt an accurate count of the 

\ number of reqUBsts for illumination received by this unit was not kept 

to lend support to the argument ~t l05mm howl tzer ilhminating shells 

are an ab~olute neceeel ty. 

, 

It i.e also believed that some serious thought should be given to 

the advisability of includin~ self-propelled artillery'in theT/O's. 

The extreme narrowness of. I!l(.at Korean roads· makes it virtually impossible 

to turn a towec1, load around.' The continued possibiltty of ambush 

in this type of campaign increases the need for extremely rapid employment 

of artillery. These' factore, combined. with soil oondi tions which 

necescitate the USA of tracked vehicles, are strong arguments in favor 

of the use of self-propelled a.rtillery pieces.

• 

-&'PEmJIX ONE ~O 

liTH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORr 

1st Battalion, 11th Marines, 

In the Field 

21:. November 195C 

The use of lia1'sontype aireraft in this type of warfare has 

provhd invaiuable.. However, it is believed that the effectiveness 

of their employment would be greatly enhanced if they were placed 

under the operational cont~ol of the battalion commander. This 

opinion is based on practical experience 0111.c6, in the c~a1gn at 

CHIUDONG-NI. the artillery spotting planes operated from a landing 

strip adjacent to battCl~10n h~adquarters. It was found that the 

planes could be more effectively employed when operating in this 

man!1er~ Their increase in effectiveness was due mainly to the fact 

that they were @oreeasily available for assignnent, they would be 

directod to effective. spotting positions much mora qui.klYJ pIlls the 

fac·t tha.t the pilots, observers t and .the ba:f;t8~ion operatione officer 

could establish p~g~nal liaison, which is of great value to all 

concerned o 

It is further the opinion of this cODEland that the following oateriel 

improvoments would greatly i.ncrease the effectiven0SS of artillery fire: 

a. Night li6hting devices for a1~in5 posts should be supp11ed by 

a ~')Iilill0n electrical source and should be oentre~lyi controlled fron the 

bat; teryexe cut iy A offl ce r t s post ti on. 

b o The left shield of the.how1~zer should be lowered at least four 

(4) inches to allow greater sight visibility. 

. . 

c. A radio, which cp~ be eas~ly transported by a single individual. 

should be provided for use by forward observero.. This set should be 

similar in design to the present 300 ceries used by the infantry. but 

must have €xGater rGnge capabilities. 

d. Target grids must be made of Bore durable material. Possibly 

one made of plastic or some form of parchment nay be the anSW8r. 

R. l1:. WOOD, 

LtCol. t USMG s 

Commanding lstBn llthl-1arines 

.., 

.

• < 

j 

AP.?ENDIX TWO TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL . .ACTIO~~ 

REPO:tm 

2d Battalion. 11th Marines 

1:u. the F:i.eld 

J0 ~Tuve:.nber 1950 

Fr~m: Commanding Officer 

To; Oommandip~ Officer~ Ilth'Marines 

Special }..c·:ilon P.c-pcrt f(;.rperiod ~ September 1950 to 7 October 19~O 

Ref: (a) IQviuion General Oruer No~ 16 

The Zollow!pg repcrt sots :fdrlh ~.n som~ d8ta.:tl the activities of 

this uni'iJ immedtately pr::or t.o and du.rine "':he IUGHOU-SEOUL campaign 

1:2 r»rea from 2 September, :1.950 tu '7 Oc·~obcr.r 1950 • .&"1 attempt has 

LJ3f;D.IDad8 to Sgt forth the probleme which. confronte.d thls unit and 

f 

thn met.i.1.')d.s tLS'3d in solvIng these problems 2r; clear, concise ter.ns o 

It is be1ieved· that ar~clle v"i"ihh a knowledge of a1:'t111ery can derive 

uscf·uJ.. inf6:croatlon and pr,..i':~.t by the ex:per:ten~es of this unit by analyz:lng 

the contents pf this report. 

The assi.gw=;d tacijie:U. mission of th:::~ 

of the 1-3t l-Iar5.ne Regiment?< 

battn110n V.Tas direct snpport 

The nex'~ 

higher echelon was the 11th Marine Regtment. 

2~ TASK, ORG.tJJIZATION 

C'i) TTNlrJ:! 

COHi:;lANDING OFFr cm 

2d. :Battalion, 11th l-1arines Lt C oi. NERRITT ADELI,;i.Al~, USMC 

. COIvll-iANTII NG OFPIOER STREl~GTH 1) 

Headqu3.rters Bt:t"y 

OFF EN~ 

Oa~t. G .. J. BATSON USMC 12 m 

f 

Gerviee B'~ry Capt. H.R. IvfF.JffiIOK U81,-,IC 7 100 

Deg Btry OaptoAoH.STROlli~~~GZR U3MC 8 117 

Easy Btry Capt. JOo 0 0 

~J]:C CLELLAND. USMC g 123 

Fox Btry (2-27Scp) Capt. O.M. CABLE 

(2-8Sep-70ct) Capt .• G.J. KOVICH 

TOTaL 

(0) ATTACHED UNITS NONE 

~4 USlvIC 

USMC g -11L 

liT bW 

.aP?ENDIX TWO TO llTH VllffilNES SPECIAL ACTION REPORr 

r·.: Ba:':tal1on. 11th'M1=I..rines 

IL 'V-:~ FIeld 

, ~J ji"._ -err:-::>er 1950 

It was imperative thAt only the most e3sen'~1f1.l personnel and equipment 

be in the initial landing of DUIDf's sinee t.he tide effect prevented 

add tticnDl landing of' pe:-:sonnel or equ~pment for a period of 

twelve hours... Considerations \Jers Mse illB.dt. of the weig.lJ.t limit of 

6000 lbs/DDIG1 !rnposed by the DUR1i Compan:.y~ .8_~corcting1y, the problem 

of justifying the all\Jcation of r-ersonnsl fW,C1. 6{Flipmont ngains·t the 

\'!reight restriction jmpose0. was f;:0~ved d'\Jriw-: 'this pL-rulning phase .. 

The de'tailed load.ing pJ.rul of J)UK1\~ s and the .Ile·~hods used to solve 

these p:robloms are inc:!..ude1 in pal"agrnph 5 ,:,f thi~ repor~;. 

4. TR41~JI NG Aim P..:EEEi\RSAJ1S 

, Tl~'- Pb:-i'od co·;rereJ. by 'tl:1~I.S repert 'lIaS no'~ g~_tab1e fer the conc..1:ct 

of a trcdnin.:.s pr~gre.m priv): to our ell'~·l.J· :i.nto combA.t. 'llra1ning 

f['vaj,lities at Orunp Salad., Japan arlct H'ooarcl al3s~nllt shipping\-,ere 

inao.equa/;e and used little by ·,;r... is u111 t. 

No rehearsals for the INCHON·-SEOUL opere.t:tons \'!."ere cond"lcted by 

'this uni to 

5. 1O.:iDn~G iJJD EMEARTLiTIOl{ 

Th-iG;-C3JSC.&T~isTls ·\.~re assignGd tr~,s batt,q.'J_ion on 3 September. 

LOD..cliro(:; plal'ls were iE'Jlled.iately cOElf.l€ncGd and were conplete! prior to 

OgOO 4 Se:}tcl:1.bor. One firinF~ battery WD.S ..1ssigned to each LST with 

HeaO .. Cl'k~rt8:;:'s 3 nttery P.nC~ S6rvi~e Bptter.l&\TGn~\.y S'.91it on all thr6€ 

ships. Directives from hi~~h(;r f'.uthor:i ty sPGc:lfieo.that each LSf.I: 

would carry ono b~t·tnJ.ion Tj/F ulicl.erst0we,1 o;-~ the tank deck. ,The 

as signno nt, of' perstJnnel was as below indicnted: 

EtJ 14 

IJDiI:Btry 

. Hq3try • 

Navy 

SerrBtry 

tlE,1 Btry 

IJFI1 :Btry' 

lstAmph 

TrkCo 

~·-lOO 

7--56 

1-~13 

2-0 

2--5 

2-5 

1-30 

·~o 18 

"i::;11 3try 

Hc)3try 

SOl"vBtry 

De tBIlF-; B n 

1 ~t.AL1phT:r'kCo ' 

2--95 

J-61t 

2-45 

1-30 

1-jO 

~c +9 

u:?r. Btry 

Sf;::'VBt:r.y 

ServBtrYfllt1U~RX 

]:~rG AnphTrkCo 

2-95 

2 .... 45 

'(-70 

0·-29 

LOE'c.ding \oTaS started at 1600 on 7 Septenber. The next 48 hours were 

consume 0_ in understmo[iI¥; the l05m.T2 p,.mn1.:!llltion.. Thi s WB.S a slo\'r fUld 

tcclious process in that thE: PJnnlJnition h~(:' to be 'off loaded from ships 

to· barges, the b['~rF;es \-rere towed to docks and the alJJJunition unloaded 

ont 0 tho,. LST. Considertible loading tiI!l€ would hnve been snved if any 

of tho above handlinF; could ru,'1ve been eliminated. 

Equipnent for this batt~lion was loaded aboard the Green Bay 

Victory enroute froD the United St,at.es at the ti::le t~'1.t f1ssault shipping 

wa.s assi·r;ned. This ship arrived at KOBE, Japan on 4 Septenber. 

As tho eQ..uil?Elerit wa~ unloadecl fron the Green :Bay Victory it wns immecliate1y 

p:-cocessed in preparation for lcr:.ding out on .;the LST t s. 

LOD-cling' of vehicles commenced on the I.JSTt sat' 2000' 9 September and 

was cor.;.pleted. and personnel eobarkec_ by 0200' 10 September • 

. This unit was assigned 33 TIUKW1s for use on the INCHON-SEOUL l~diI4;. 

Allocntion of the nnon a was nade as follo,"Js: 

9 D"JIDj's /fir'1ne; battery (6 gun DUXllis, 2 ~o, Rnd 1 personnel) 

6 DUID'It s "for Hdqrs and Service 3r..tt-eries 

(3 2ecol1naissence Party f 1 aL11!lO, and 2 personnel) 

2

APPE£..TJ)IX Tl'TQ TO 11TH M.ARI~ SPECIAL ACTION REPORr 

2dBattallon, 11th Marines 

In the Fiel~. 

10 If:')v€nbe~ J.950 

Each :t:irin~; 

battery was loaded as shown below: 

bG10\..,~ 

6-Howitzer DU~d's: lo~di~7 for 1 DUKW 

;Ox-lINer Mel .lsslstant Driver 

5 man (lun c r8\'l 

1 Hcwitze;:-,105rnm 

10 Rounlis uf ~.051Jm ammuni t ion 

2 nays r~tions (Type C) 

, Gallons of water 

. Section che st 

2·-Pmuuni tion DTJK'W'fl s! loM.inc;; for i T)[)'E'l 

l-ci ver ane. .d.ssi ;)tarl.·;; I'river 

• 

lOS ROlLYlc"' .. S of l05mm f

.aPPEJ:IDIX TlfO TO 11TH M1L.TUNES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 

2d Battalion, 11th Marines 

- 

In th';j Field 

IO 1'f":.7ember 1950 

not up to the normal. expected sta,ndarcl of cleanliness p..nd in that 

"En rations were consume_d abo.9Xd. when it was believed that "A" r~tions 

could have been provided. 

At tllG objective p..rea during the le.:nnc..l-lin£; of the DUE.yl s one D1JK\j 

was lost from the ~Olg. This sh:!:p got 11IlG.erway during the launching 

ClYld "did not noti..ry the tank deck. as the' DUK1'l was being launched the 

:L3I.1p dro:pped an,c. the DUK\y immediately sanko Three demolttton men from 

nEff COI:1Par.y, 1st Engineer 3attalion were drowned PJld one 608 radio jeep 

lost. The reBainder of the 7rt111ery DUIDfljf s 'afere landed on Green Be~ch 

at Ii hOWe 

7.. OP3RATIONS 

~4 ~~s s:~rul t Phaee 

b o 

15 Septe~Qer, 1950. 0640- A reconnaissance p8rty consisting 

:)f the S-3,' assistant S-,2~ ancl "four (4) enlisted personnel 

l~(lea.. on \vOLIviI-OO wi th BLT 3/5 to loc~te and establl. sh a 

position area for the battalion" Position area selected and 

occupied. in TA 8g49 L-1 v 1. 1745'- Elenents of battalion beg~m 

ID .. Iliin'~; at Green Beach.. 1930~·R!..cments of e~l batteries ashore 

and establisa~ent of position areas underway. 2150 - fl~l bat 

-~f'ry positions est.q,blished and ~he battaJ.ion reac..y to firo.., 

E'.~ f~,re Dissions COLJpleted this (tnte~ 

16 Septeober. 1950~ 01~·0 - C(:mnenced hi~h burst resistration 

using Easy Batter,y as rBgiste~ing batte~Je 0200 - Conpleted 

reGistration with the follm'linr:; corrections computed: Deflecti.Oll 

Correction .18 rjJ. left t Rant;e Correction f 100/1000:- 0735- 

COMDoncod basepoint registration usins an observed firins chart. 

0755 - COT.:lpl-€ ~ed registration" 1010 - Bat tc~ion Com~l.::ulder and 

'reconnaissance pnr'ty d.eparted fro:! old position area to reconnoiteI," 

:for a new posi ti on area.. 1200 - Fi riIh; e1enent s of b~ttalion 

disI,la0ed fO~rlT.'d to new battalion posi tic!} locn:.t&C'i. in 

1.'. :1244 J,It 1915 -, .All eleoents of battclion in position nnel 

ready to fire. 1915 - Attenpted Basepoint registration without 

. success.due to darkness. Sever~l atte~pts were naQe to estqblish 

a short b~se from which a high burst rebistration could 

be conclucted, however, consic.erable firin;~ of sciclI arms in the 

position'areapreventeC'. this. Six (6) wissions cOf1pleted this 

date 0 90 roUnd.s expended. 

3Ap1oitation Phase 

17 Septenber,' 1950. 0720 - Bettnlion ComD.an(~er and reconnaissance 

pGrty ~eparted to reconnoiter for new position area. 

1000 - Advance FDC and Survey Scction cti,splaced forward with 

one re~isterin.:; howitzer to rendezvous forward. with the battalion 

connander. 1230'- New position area estBblished in ~A 

9647 L. 1300 - Do~ and §ox batteries oriered to ~isplace for 

\,In.I'cl. 1400 - Ref-;is,trations con0.uctect with registering ho\dtzer 

fron Dog battery and. usin; services of the ,.Air Observer. 1520 

lieaclquarters battery and Easy battery were ordered. to displace 

to position area located in TA 9647 L however ROT 1 moved for 

\-lard at such a rapid rate it becP-De obvious to the battaliop. 

COIIL~an(ter that to maintain prQper support of ReT 1 he oust leap 

frOb the battp.lion. Accordt"nt:;ly, Easy battery ane. one section 

of the Fire Direction Center continued displac80ent forward 

to a position area 'in TA 9950. K. 2010 - Easy battery fired 

its noma). barrage against a SJ!49,ll counter at,tack in RCT 1 zone 

of action. Att~ck wasrepulse1 and artillery fire was reported 

to be very effective. 21 missions p~us 5 H&I missionsconpletcd 

'this date. 870' roUnd.s expt?nc:'ed.. ' 

........ · 4

~ ~ 'r,..- iT'" -' ~ 

.~... - 

- . 

.8PpnU)IX T-VJC TO 11TH l-aRI}lES ZPECI.tW ACTlON REPORT 


In the Field. 

10 N~ve3be~ 1950 

. 

I.. 

18 Septcnbex, 1950. 0545 - Battalion began firing preparatory 

fil'es prior to jULlp off of ROT 1. 0155 - Easy battery regis- 

.. tered.on acl;l.eck point using noma! ground ob-server procedures. 

· Re{~iatr2Jtion 'corrections cor;:puted were as ,follows: Deflaction 

, Correction Left lOrp, Rallbe Correction f 5.6/1000. 0930 -: DOG 

andfcx plus elepents yf Headq~~ters and Service Batteries 

. 'began displacenent forward to nairT p)sition area located in 

TA 0150 E-Io 1535 - E!l.sy bnttery d!spl~eeC'_ forward. to the 

batt~ion position area. 1615 - All batteries in position 

a~d re~~y to fire •. Rehistration conducted with corrections 

conputed as follows: Deflection Correction risht 71 f.. 

RanGe Co~rection ! 21.8/1000. 25 oissions plus 3'B&I oissions 

COnp10tBC this ~ate. 456 rou.~ds expen~od. 

19 Septenb'cr, 1950. 1028 - Cor.ltuctectBasepoint rc.;istration 

by Air Obsorver with corrections conputec. ~s follows: Deflection 

Co:crection Left 21 -p, :R~e Cor~8ction i69/1000. 1500 

96th Pi01d 2rtillory Battalion nssi~hea the nission of reinf~r0inb 

2/11. Lir..ison (;ffice:~ . reported to CODhlaIlc:..ing Officer 

2/11 fo?: instructions. 1730 .-Bt-J.f,y battery plus one section 

of the 5iro Direction Centorwere ~isplnced·forwar1 approxi 

L1~~toly 2500 L1eters to n new battel:Y position in TA 0549 L. 

~his cisplaeencnt was neaessit~tod ~ue to the fact tr~t . one 

.3m of ROT 1 woulto. be bGyonc~ t~e naximun rp~-;e of the battalion 

by clayli.,,;ht of the next G.c,Yo 2035 - Several attenpts 

vlore ·Dado· to rOF;ister Ec'1.sy battery, however, ·'registration 

corrections wore never obtained due to extrenerall;_;8S encounterecl.. 

0-'1c1 p:,C)'" observr.tion of the target e..rea experiencecl. by tho 

· fO~·Ta.rct oDB0rvers. 26 nissions plus g H&l nissions wereC08- 

pletoc1 thi"s clf'tte. 409 rounds ,~ere expenctcclo 

t 

20 Scptcobor, 1950. 0455 - :Bat t8.lion be.;an firini; Do£!; and Fox 

norIJru. barrDsos ar:ainst Ii COunter attack in RCT 1 zone of nction. 

0506,.- basy batte~ bor:;nIl fir} n,·; their !lornal barr~e on tho 

S.?J"'1C counter attack... 0555 - 96th Fiel~: Artillery Batta.lion reinforced 

2/11 ~;ainst the count0r att~ck now roported in TA 1454 TI 

Mel 1051 R-S-T. 0655'- Comnnncti,n,;; Officer, ConpAllY E, 2d Bat- 

· te.lion, 1st :Mrtrinos sent the followinG survoillP.nce, report to 

2/ll. tr one truck, two tanks P.1lc .. approxin~te1y 100 infantry - 

. troops Qostroyed by your ~rtil1cry fire; Without artillery fire 

;;:li8 CO:1p:tny woulc~ r.ave been wiped out ." 0,720 - Battnlion reconnaissc.1lcc 

party plus Do~~ tull!.7ox batteries bo{~an. c.isplncenont 

fOr\1nrc1.• 0950· ~ Ne\

? j Bat ta.lion, 11th Marines 

In. the Field. 

J(; lJovc-::.1"ber 1950 . 

Surveillance report recGived tI?Jxcellenttf results, area '\"1611 

noutr(!lizec.o 1335 - Conclucted :Basepoint re 0950 - 3nJitnlion Conr.18.1ldor n.l1.:1 reconnai ssnnce 

Petrty C:.81)DX"tod to reconnoi tor for ne .., position area. 1430- 

no,·! position :area establisllocl.. in TAl852 X. 

1645 - Concluctocl 

a :Bnsepoint rOi;istration usJ..n(~ tho Ai.r Observer. Cor:rections 

cOr..1puted 'vere as follo\-rs~ Deflection Correction -19/1000. 

1900 - noar e100ents of battalion arrived in new position 

area. 17 :;lissions plus 5 H&Ir.dssions conpleted this date. 

487 roun~s ~xpended. 

25 SeptcLlber 1950 0 0700 - Conducted. n Easopoint reGistration 

usin;~; t:lt3 sorvic0s of t!1.e Air Observer. Corrections CDfaputed 

wore 0.3 fo11ows~ Deflection Correction Left 1 3'(.1 , Ranf16 Corraction 

~f 4/1000t> 1045 - Follo\vin.:; nessai~C receivec1_ by 

bnttnlion in conjunction with n fire requost, nlnf~try cannot 

wait for artillery. Infrntry will a(1v~nc~ an~ tnke the consequences. 

Henry 3 sonels tThanks 0. lot for your artil1e-ry sUPlJort". 

(T:ds t~rt-;et :pIotto:::: behind front line J?ositions of adjaco!-1t 

unit thnt "Jore re::>ortod. 2 hours prior. S-3 attcnpte(t to check 

for sGfety nne received tho nbovc Dess~~e in reply.). In conncctj.cn 

"\'1i th tllis nission nne"!. the .:~enGrf'l~ sit~~tion for tho clay 

it ~:ril1 00 of interest t'J exp1n.in the difficult naneuver involvec 

•. T:1is unit continued its D..ssii~ned !Jission of 0_irec't 

support of ReT·. 1. Tho battalion "m.s in positlon on the South 

bo.nks of the lLUI RIVER. 2-i crosser:' the river, to the northern 

brulks, at_ do,ybrecic to a point D.11proxir.;.-:.te1y 2000 yarcts behincl tho 

front line olenents ~f ReT 5 which had boon across the river for 

.. - 

... 

, l- . 

• 

6

APP:2TDIZ TUO TO 11TH M.;ffiII~ES 

SPECIAL ACTIOJJ P..EPOii.T 

-.., . .... 

2:L .Bnttnlion9 11th M,."rincs 

In the Fielcl 

:~O ~Jt)vsDb8r 1950 

threo··clD.yse From the posi tion a:~oD. of 2/11 tho angle T 9 to 

the front line units of 2-1 was 2COO nils. During the plDJ1- 

ning st[4:;os of tiLi.s nanO'lIV'er, it acerolc obvious to the arti1- 

1017 that any noversn·o~ "rico~~ctsn lancing to the front 

of 2-1 woulC'. f nIl e'd.re etly lnt 0 uni t s of ROT 5. AccordinGly 

thls tJnit- sent a liaison officc:r. to 1/11, who were in n fnvor 

.:ililo pL/3i t5.on area to support t .:tt. Ii-Or:: 1 anel ROT 5. "110 firc 1l 

rcst:;"ic'l:dons "lore i;nposec .... on -th13 unit by rJut,.1r.'il 4,;xccnent of 

ItC~ 1 and, 2CT 5 until front 1ino elonents Doved East of a 

* 20 north-south grid. line" As the units passod the 20 gricl 

line tho an;;lu T fron tt.is unit to ::~0T 1 zone of action was 

~:yprOxiIl['.toly 1300 ::11.1s o Artillerj ~UDPort for this intricnte 

ilC..llOUVC:' \-lns not up to its norcia.l stcJ.!lclard, however, this 

u.rdt 1 .. U1S p:a."cvontect froLl n~vins to favo!"c.blo position 'l.reD,S 

~ue to the time an~ s?nzc factors involvcd r and Division 

p:ciority in crossiIli; tho F~UT nrl3R(l The Division Oporntion 

OrCe;.:- 1vas rcceivoci nnd discussed c.t an RCT 1 stnff nectinf:'; 

D,t 02.3J tho worning of ths 25th and ccllo~l for its execution 

0.::', clcyb:.'"Oak.. To nv~"'e .lvO 2. favo:;:-nble posl tion area this unit 

v,,:d.J. hn.vc hacl to CI.isp:[;.cc ave!: n. c1.tS"GnD.co of 15 niles in tho 

~:.c:'-i.lo of the nigJ.:t al1c1. be prepared. to fi::;.·o t1t daybreak. 

i)ifficult opcration~ 

of this nature Dust be clissoninatcd to 

2J]' ochelons early so thai; P;:O01)Ol' }!:tanning l1!'ococI.ure s eon be 

~J['.cle D.r,cl ~,"-fficiont tine allowci for ~hcir successful oxecm.tion. 

15 ::uss':'onB plus 10 li&I nissions conpletor.. 'tIl-is date. 385 rO"Jllds 

e::..po!lctod.(! 

26 SCIytoI:ibor 1950. 0440 -.. 3~ttalion bo~nn firinG on 1p..r;:;o cnony 

concen ... i;rB.~~_0t'l;=' 'at a rn.~i(l~ rato~ '(:Battclion oX:?enc":.ecl 3776 rounc.s 

Ol"~. t::is Di .. ~si0n). Troops an'='- tunks reported. in TA 2157 U. 

E;:~tir.lb.tc(1 ~_OOu-2000 troops with tanks novinF--; into EeT -I zono 

O~> a0t:i.ono l.~th FA Battnlicn and 96th FA BattD..lion reinforced. 

2/11 on thls nission e .1l.rea wbll neutrciizec:' nne!. artillery 

0relitecl l,vit:1. dcstru.e-t:ton of sL"'{ (6) out of twelve (12) tD.nks. 

0600 - Battalion CODl:mnC .. c:- alJ.d ~ceonn[1issan~e 2arty departed, 

tc recon..."lO:' tel' for a nov! :Josi +.ion area acroBS t~e H.Alr B.IVE:a~ 

14JO - Battalion cor~Joncod displ[1coDont across F~f 3IYEB to n 

nCM position arQ8, in Tii. 1956 Ii. Battalion used LV: 1 s RneL tho 

ferry to cross tho river. 2030 - DisIlln.!tonent across ·H...~r aIVER 

conpletod. All batteries in position and ready to firo o 6 

nissions ~lus g H&I nissions co~~loted this date. 5814 rounds 

expo n·:1e c:. 

27 Saptoubor 1950. 0600 - 3att:"l~ion fired l)repnratory fires in 

RC~ 1 zono of ~ction prior to infantry junp off. N~~erous nissions 

,,,,ere firo·J. throur:hout tho c1..rw in support of RCT 1 'f),ttack 

throut;h SZOUL. 43 nissions I11us 4 F.&I nissions cOnPletcd this 

(I.ute, 1467 rounds o~en:1od. _ 

28 Soptonbor 1950. 0615 - Ba.ttAlion fired r>ropart1tory fires in 

:aC2 1 zono of action prior toil1fantry jUlJ]? off. 0700 - J3a.ttclion 

Oon~ancor and reconnaissance party ieparted'to 'reconnoiter for 

a new position urea. 1200 - DOh and Easy butteries displuced 

forvrcxcl to the now position urea locn.tod in tho Roycl Palace 

Grounis. ~A 2360 G-H-L-M~ 1600 - Forw&rQ echelon of battalion 

in position ~n~ reac~ to fire. 1730 - 3ntiro battalion conplete~ 

~is?lucenent. 1815 - Conducted B~so?oint re~istration 

utilizin~ tho .tilr ObserVcr. . Cor~0ctions eOI:lJ?uted wero as follows: 

Deflection Correction RLjht 6 ~~ Ranr~o Corroction - 12/1000. 22 

nissions plus g F~I Dission~ cODpleted this date. S21 rounds 

eXlJendecl. 

7

APPnmIX ;::1';0 TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTIOl~ REPORT 

/ 

2d :Sat"talion, 11th Marines 

In '~be Field 

10 I[cvbII'ber 1950 

29 September 1950. OgO().- Battalion conducted a Base:point « 

registration using a grnund observe::". Corrections computed 

weTe as :follows: Deflection Gorrec'~;:i,O!l Left 27 (J, Range CorrAct:t0n 

f- 33/1000• 12CO - 9Gth FA B~tita1ion received a new 

t·3.ct~,0al miss:lon cancel:i.i:1g their raj :1t·oriJing mission of 2/11. 

19~O ~ One ho~itzer fr0m ~i11 wa~ amplaced in our position area 

tv be uded. as an lllu 

.. ninatj.on hvu-i,t~&r. liumerous mi ssions were 

fired throughout the day in SllPP".rt of ReT 1 t s mopping up activities, 

through SIDUI}o 26 missionfJ plus 3 H&I missions completed 

this date. 525 rounds expended.> 

3C'Septomber 1950. 0635.- Battalion. fired preparatory fires 

in ROT 1 zone of ~c"uiou~ 0735· ... Base~pcint registra.tion con- 

. ducted by an Air Observer 6 Oorreat~.ons computed. were as 

f?llows: Deflection Gorrecti0n Rig~t 18 ~t Range Correction 

. ·-ii-. 13/10000 0920 .... J3attaJ.ion 50-3 departed on reconnaissance 

-for a new position area ~ 1215 -. Firing clements displaced 

", fcr.ward. to the new 1>osit·ion area 1vcated in TA 2861 I. 1620 

- Basepo:i.nt registration co.nd1.1c·GPd by an Air Observer. Cor 

':r~ .. ·;·",ions were c!:>mp-:~tei as fol1,;ws: Deflecticn CorrectiOJ.;' 

R·:,gl1.t 29 ~'! Range Qor:L'ection - '(/IOQO" 1815 -- Displacement 

c.~o-ripletedt all bat-terie.s es·tabl~"sh~d j.n the new position a~eao 

).900 - P.ssiglled t"l(·· ':la·'· ';;; c" ~.r'a -, ~:J.'. ss:lon of Gene:r'al Support,. 

,1~.3.ison officers and f"or'rlard ob~en-er~ rtmained with, RGJ:! lSi 

hOlleva~~ 2/11 wa.s X"8quired +'0 cle3.X' all '1"ire requests th.:--:-ough 

'the 11th Marines due to our ass:l.g.:J.e

.AP?E11J)I.X T1~TO 

TO lITE: M.ARI:\JES SPECIAL ACTION" REPORT 

cl Bn"ttnlion," 11th Mar.ines 

~ :-. t>c- Field 

go 

7 October 1950" Battalion rema:1.nec. in assembly area •. improvement 

of C&~P site and naintenanco of materiol were the prinary 

fl111ctions of personneJ_ 1;hroug.~lJut tho day. Battf.'lion Commandor 

established. r;O:U:1and. liai son wtth P.U:r 1 fl)r planning purposes on 

1'!OlfS.lbJ ope r at ion. 

-_._, ENEMY 

Duri.ng the poriod frOD 15 SeptenbeJ:;. 1:;50 to 7 Octob.e.:r 1950" the 

intelligence section of the 2dl3attalion, 11th !\{f1.rines was actively 

engaged in operations against the eneI:ly~ 

~. . 

« 

t 

'In:f(Jrwatirm d.irectly ("oncer:ling the eneny sU0h as his tact.i~g, 

organi~nt1.on~ deploynent, etc"f WAoS rep~::'ted to the S-3 seetion by 

traso urJ.its in nhysicA.l contuct with the eneny, Division J?eriodic 

Intelligence re?ort, adjacent and attached units t and froD hig~er 

echelon •. Therefore our ::w.in sour-ce of infornation cane to us secondhand. 

In'lielllgenee data extracted froD priscners of war ¥Tas negligible. 

The g~·2· section took a tota",- of nineteen (~.9) prisoners throughout 

the peJ:'~.", L n·")ne of W:t.OI.1 WE,re at"f;1cd 8.t ~·:(.e tlwe of capture., All had 

either lest or iiscarded their weapons v Initially this section had no 

:intorp:::etJr; ho·.vever} when they were alTe to pro"c~·tu·e one ouch 'progress 

was nad.;:- in detenJird .. ng the statuo of p!'lso!lers e fhe S·-2 section nade 

proper Lispositivn of prisoners as o1:r~J..L1ed in Division Op8ration Plan . 

No. 2-s The :facilities of thts unit dId. not pernit us to carry on 

extensive int8rrogation. 

On W'O:J,,:I-DO:, rc~ our first firing position) severc.l rifles of type 

MASSIlJ-t:!'.AG.-:Utr r one r.,ea\-y nachine g"m yIAXU{ 19],0, several toxes of }:and 

grenE'..des &.J.'1d L1ucL. SI.:F.;.:li. a:..:-ns at1:.nmition wero rocovered~ All arms ,rere 

fonvaxded J'.IO liegJ.oent and la'ter re'iiurned to us for destruct1.on or 

disJGribution as so~venirs to crigina.l finder. During the rNCHON'-SEOTJL 

c~-:1paign, our Battalion recovered or found in our TIattHlion areas the 

following eqiJ.5.poent ~ fou~ (4) trucks e.nd two .(l"j c:i.v"i:linn Oil,rS t 15 

SHPAGI:r n.Bu.r!> Guns tl J four (4) S:!:r.1ONOVE .P5: !tifles s ' end several tons of 

. aDT1UllitLJn o - The disposition of recovered rw.terial varied" ALn:runition 

was bU1:'ied or dispersed, sncll arns 'eithe:: tnken as souvenil~s, forwarded 

to higher echelvn or disabled. In several instr:.ncGs the :Battalion by 

passed several caches of nrn~unition which were reported to Reginent. 

Morale of theoneny observed frOD ~risoners o£ war, was low in all 

phases of the caDpo..1gn. In latter stage~ of the operf!.tion prisoners 

were Dore inclined to surrender than in the earlier stages of the operation. 

Fewer prisoners were fo~d hiding in fields and abandoned houses. 

It is felt that the eneny began renlizing the futility of the situation, 

thus nore readily surrenderifig theoselvesat the close of the ca~paign. 

t 

It is also felt that the ener.1Y was definitely weak in artillery. 

The eneny consistently failed to shell the bcttrilion position or engage 

our guns in counter batt~ry fire at any time. Only on two ~ccnsions did 

the battalion reeeive counter bc.ttery Dorta!" fire. The first t~.me was 

on 20 Septenber, 1950: wh(;'n three (3) rounds of S20n Dortar land.ed in tha 

vicinity of Battalion Headq1mrters. Had the eneLlY continued his :fire 

it is believed that the.battalion would have suffered considerable 

datlv.ge and cC).,sututies. On the 21st of SeptoLber t 

1950. five (5) r01lllds 

of 82nn I:iOrtar lDllded' in the ,vicinity of' the :Battalion FDC narrowly 

missing our inst~llations. Here again the eneny fni1ed to follow up 

his obvious advantage. It mny be assuoed that th~ eneny was low on 

9

A?PZi:mrx T1'lO TO 11TH lW~S S?ECIAL ACTIon REPORT 

2d Eatt~i0n, 

In 'b.h.E; ylieJ.d 

)J: .;.\[ j\: ('~ll/e~ 1)50 

11th Marines 

ammuni tion and intended only t 0 harra~s our troops. cr he may not have 

realizen. iihe effectiveness of hls s1;l.ot)l:ingl> 0."1 both o~·casions when 

the Bat·('·al:'on r8cei7ed counter .lJ,':rtar :~·tl'f 9 (oratE r anCllysis W8:-;oe made 

and report, ~ Jb:r.9 forwarded to r\.~g:imen·G c J!' o J."l_T axd Cb servers wi tr.. rifle 

companies nc:rma.lly were unablet:" IDEke C··(,"':.te~: analysis fGr several 

reasons maj,nly; j,nadequate lmm indicated tha":. c:J.mo~l:flage was 1:~sed extensively 

and to good. effect~ Dll"'::!.ng the initial stages of this cam!)aign the 

-- firing 'batteries camcuflageu their rorpective posi ti·:ms" JJater on, 

due to lack of ensmy ai:r a~-t;i vi ty.. the battalion dispensed with exton- 

sive camoufJ.nge p::-ocedures#> 

The 8-2 section eEtabllshec. battalion t.)bservati\)n posts on two 

occasions. Because of haze and smoke in the air, the OP's were not 

completely effective~ 

This battalion did not knowingly experience any night infiltration 

or sabotnge. Personnel in this b!1ttalion did not encounter MY boobytraps. 

The battery positions were never raided or attacked by any 

organized or unorganized enemy troops.. Enemy ,aviation did not at any 

time nttack or bomb the battalion positionSe 

9. ESTIHATED P.ESULTS OF OPER.LTIONS 

The estimated ~Jnount of.damage inflicted upon the enemy by this 

unit during 'tho Il\lCHON-SEOUL campaign. f:rom 15 September' 1950 - 7 

October 1950. 

Approxir.t!ately two thousand (2000) enemy were killed, eight' (8) 

tanks destroyecl, one (1) amrrruni tion du.llp containiI1g a considerable 

anount of high explosives dest~oyed, thirty-five (35) trucks destroyed 

and six (6) mortars destr9yed$ In addition, an undetermined amount of 

:LO

" 

-. 'f ~ -' ~':" • • 

.. ~ 10 • >- ~ .. - 

APP~-:OIX 

T\fO TO 11TH MARINES SPEOIAL ACTION REPOm 


In the Field 

10 iit)'t' -;:~T'lbe:r. 1950 

small arms, L1nchine g".lIls. and light an:ti-tank weapons were neutraJ.izod 

over the entire period. 

,,9 , ' 

A. CO~TS 

t 

't 

(1) .COMMUNIC.ATI01~8 

The early fire missions received from forward observers 

were l~cktng essential elements. These elemonts wore aither left 

out by o11serrers or 10st in the limited. cCIJ.~Lnication faoilitles. 

The rap1.d ad\TffilOOment of troops and th0 limi'~ed range of the 619 

i..~a'l:i,ol' ~mIllod.iatelyint:,:oduced t11;e necessity of using both battalion 

ar:.1 l'og-':mental liaison offj,cers as relay stations. The najority 

oi' firo missi.ons were conducted over one' ba:~talfon coonon fire di~ect).on 

channel u Radio renotes did n-ot operpvte satisfectorj.ly. 11. telephone1.ino 

was :run :froD the rad,:l.o je'ep to the FDC 'N'ith a talke:" on 

each. ena of 'che line o By the td.IJe a mission reached the FDO it had 

been sel':-+; LhrougC. four radios a.lld :cwo 1;s:-_cphor..os ... 

- 

The rapid Dovement of the tnfrJIlt:r.oy dic~ated that relay 

Gtatio:u.t ~)e :rrainta:1ned... 'the ertl11e:ry "tloul,d displace to wi thin a 

thousaufl. yards 01.' the front lines. AnCi:)I1 occas:1 on bec-.aI!le par'ti of 

the fror..t lines? only ·to find that th'3 infantry was out of their! 

suPporfi:,n.g r~ge by night fall. By making almost daily displacements 

this ba·~tajJ.on did furnish continuous support& However t maintaining 

constant 3umTJtm.ice"tJ.ons reoained a challenge in all s1 tuations. 

T~ increase c~mmUliaatlonsp forward observers were 1nstruct6r:. 

t~ leave o·c."tj the wo~s "forwArd observeruin' their fire 

requost; t.J iJ.eni.;;.fy themselves by ba:;;1~1-·:~. and nUillber; 1""e& "Dl)gOne or 

Easy TW0 1J ~ Relay s'~at1ons discontin.ued ":r.eading ba.ck for possible 

currocf;l..cnn~ They q1~.est1on3d only that part of tho :fire request which 

\olaS no'~ unde=~toud. Remotes \t;erc repaired 01"" :r.epla~ed and l'em.:>ted 

directly "uo ·iih.e FDJ .. aJ.l stations were notified that the traffic load 

and not a ::iro m:!.ssion tied up a net.. T!le phrase U Get off the cir·, I 

have a rlrc TIliss: ... on li was dis:Jon'ii1.n·~ed", Tho wo~ds tfirc nission: denoted 

only priority. As many as three mi~s1cns can be conducted 

simultaneously over the one cormon channel. 

A forwa~d observer with a f1.'!"e clssion listened to the net 

until he was sure he could get his mission started during a transmission 

break. He would then send his mission to the EDe. With two or nore 

Dissions on the air 'each observer mi.st ido~tify h~s subsequent. corrections, 

i. o~ !lDog One) ll:!.ght 200 Add 400'11. The FDC must not ifytho 

observer that hisroun~s are on' the way by identifying the' observor;:, 

i.e~ "Dog Ono on the waylf. The 8-3 Inc"lintains close supervision of 

this cli."UlIlel~ He ke~s missions segregated and unnecessary tra::f'fic 

off tho ai.r. 

The statement uno coml'unications; no art111eryU has proven 

i tsol! many t.in8s in the Korean campaign!) In thi s fast moving 2i tuation, 

wire aoomunications were seldom e~tp.blished forwa.rd of tho Battalion 

Liaison Officer. Often wire did_not get further than the Regi~ental 

Liaison Officer. ~T1re was us'llally in to the Regimantw. Liaison O'fficer 

by nightfall. It w?-s alway-s a problem to keep in. \Virenen wculd 133 

e. liri~ only to tUrn a.round . end trouble ehoot it.· 

II

.... 

APpnmrx TWO TO 11TH I4ARINES SPECIJ.L ACTIOll REPORT 

2d Battalion~ 11th Marines 

In th9 Field' 

10 Novembar 1950 

Th~ majority of communications wore 'dependent upon radio. 

The 619 radio proved inadequate. The 610 was considerably better with 

its dry batteries. However, the 610 demand.s d6licate treatment •. This 

treatment COU~d. not be givf3n particularly :lue to insu:fflciently trained 

personnel and the fact that only one- rali0 tb~hnician was available. 

Frequently a radio operator needed. both cf his hands to climb a hill. 

The 610 vias· especially hard to carry :'i.n EJ1 cperat:~.ve position. For 

this reason~ liaison offlcers were not ;'1:;' 0(;IILl1Ull~,cations with their 

observers while they were on the mOV6 9 Communications must be maintained 

in a rapiQly changing situati~no A more officient and adaptable 

:rad.io :ls required for the forward l;'t.'SGT\TCr,. 

Due to the great .r:nreber of O'l::~post.s manned around our 

position a:roa and the necessi'~y for maintaj.ning a !fhot looplf of communications 

it wns found that the num'5er of 'tej_ephones allotted' on 'i;ho 

p~esont T/EI S was grossly inadoquate. 

It was found that the COlUr.1·Jn IJc-uf'unction of mike buttons 

cou.ld be eliminated by making a straight t.lonnec:'Ji.1.on in t...~e mike. ~his 

p:r.oduces a ndke which is alway~ :s p,live ii ; The opera.l;or plugs the m1.ke 

in only wh'3n he d.esires to use tt~ 

The f0r~ard observers han. wany ~rob~ems arise because, 

infantry cffi~brR were not f:ware of the lioloatio!ls and capabilitios 

of their Sl'PPJrt::'ng arlS.. Observers received such iIJpossible requests 

as; !II '\'lo..n:iJ fire (~~.j 'ijh Pol wide s~eep of the ann) he:r.e, here. and here; 

I want to ~eop th3.a :L~ ..."c in f::ont of G.S as we I!l)ve out. We Dove out 

in twoniiy njnutos n .; Tn0 observers vain.ly tried 't·o Deot each request, 

howevor s it was ~.l'JPoss~.ble to ;p:t'ovlde s'u!Jb, 9. genera.l preparation in the 

time spoc:i.fiod o ~ho obsorve7.'~ eventll...:u!.y \To):ked out a systeu tl'..at was 

satisfa~tory J.;o the infan't:r.yc They vl,Yll.:_l ce~tl for a battery concentration 

and inf'olu the FDC that this WftS e" p~epal~c.tion concentration •. 

They w01)~d th0n shift the fir€; for eff8c't to thl.; a,:r.-ea po:l.ntod out by 

the supported unit and advance 1;11e fir;:; d.u:r~:l.ng ~hc initial assaulto 

Thi s :-lothoc1. o.f p:r:-oparatory f:!.re s was a-pr:.,icd :i.n Bupport oi' "Jlli t s of 

bnttalicn strong~h or less~ ~rcparatlons in support of a c00rdinatcd 

ROT att,,ck \4101"e conducted 1.n the no:rnal manner,.. ~laison Officors were 

chargccl vIith the responsibillty of :frequent tj.DO checks between the 

attacking and supporting 1ll1i~. ProT.1pt reports were ]Jade of pny chc.ngcs 

in the originnl plan. . 

Mrny ~i~es tho forward observers were not inforned thnt 

preparatory firG was to fall jn their zone of obsorvntion. This occurred 

when t~c infantry failed to keep tho observers inforned of their plan 

of actionf> The operatlon plan wOll.:td be received so lnte at night by the 

infantry rcginent that it was inpossible to disseninntc it through noroal 

channels prior to the jUt.'"1p off titlo. In those instances preparatory 

fires would bo planned by tho Regioental I,iro.son Officer and he would 

subnit thom dirof.Jtly to the Fro after obta.ining approvaJ. froD the infantry 

rogioonto If tioeallowed these fires '~rG chflngcd to confo~ 

with infantry battalion co~nanderts requests upon whiCh the regioentp.~ 

cOIn.l'Jnndor had concurred. 'In the short time available for planning 

an attack, infantry unit connanders sooetimes failed to call in their 

artillery liaison officer during the planning phase. Liaison officers 

had to be aggressive in obtBining infor~at1onf 

requests being imposed on the artillery. 

to nvoid last minute 

12

APPEtJDIX T''lO TO 11TH ~tAPl NES SP3CIAL AOTIOlI REPORT 

2(1 Bc-;ttclion, 11th Marine s 

.T 11 1: he Field 

}{) j~0V-_~:1~)e:.~ 1950 

The problen of -ci.eal'ly de:flned bounc.A.ries as expected, 

areae in Korea. They did not a.l""rays follo~J' terrain features nor 

proEinent l&'1d marks. In one instance, on the ol1tsl7.irts of SEOUL, 

the artillery was furnis~:lod one get of bmmda-:ies and the infantry 

f'.llother.,) A c...'l~nge '\tras, ~ ... ::lt~ :ht ~h.~ boundaries and the artillery was 

notinformcd~ Permission to fire into adjac:ent sectors was always 

herd to ontain. The Regimental Liaison O:fflcer did not have direct 

contact with the FSOC nor the adJacent liaison offi,cers. 

Hand in hand' with the proble!!! of boundaries we"':'e the p:!"o- 

'h1 qms of front line SQ Due to tl:e :!'apj.r1 DC V:,J"!g situation E:.j:ld ths lim! tat: 

1 ••'HS of ths 619 and 610 ra~,OSt it 'Vl1.S impossible for the fOlWfu-dobse~~.rex~:; 

to k8Ap the FDC infottlAd of the dlsposition of their front 

J.tJ.les~ .t1nweyerr a generRl laio'Vrlect,ge of the front lines can be obtained 

i:f' tl16_ observer gives frequent coordinates. of his position. ~lhe'1. (Ioing 

this the observer :Dust state Wh8~jher he ~,$ obser'v~.ng froQ B..Il OP or is 

pb.:rs:i.:}ally wit!J. the front lines", Unlc!3ssta~ed it is always a~~S\lJ':1ect 

tha.t hE- i~ ,~tth his unit .. The {JbservE.:' has veJ.~y l1.ttle diffi~1.1.:l:ty in 

giv:lng h"';'R locar·j.on :,y g!':id coordina~o~ 1J:rovid~d. that he is equ1,pped 

\1!i-iih a fairLY [>,ccu:atel:lap. The najorlty of all f~re nission ::7equests 

located the t[',rget ry g't"id 30o~dinHtes cEtllPT than by refe:':"ence to 

a kno .... ln ?vi!lt ~r concer:trRt1 ~n~. !Che CH:P3 ut~ed in th'J INGHON-SEO:Jl.J 

opera·jj.c.~ \1ercsu.:ffi c.1ently accurato, bu:.i were la..!k:ing in uetail. 

The forwa~d obse=vers used tho 1/50,000 DEp as a taoticP_l ~ap pnd the 

FDG used the 1/25,000 as a f:tr~.ng oha~ .• 

f 

t 

IJluninf'tion to!as a. bi6 .problel'l. The 155:-{lLl howitzer was 

used exclusively du.e. '(,0 its liraiting l·ange of seven thous~ ...nd yards and 

tho rapiladv~collent of the frent 1ines r the 155rn battali~n could 

seldoLl fu~nieh 5.11~minat:!.on froD 1 ts p03i tioD.,. One mec.ium howitzer 

W':l.S attached .to th:=.s battalion and overcame the range liDitatj.ons in 

m~st si tu?.ti.onsr;.. On occa~io.n this hO't'T1tzer was enplaced in fr.on; of 

the 2/ll position area in order ·to :tulfil1 its i11uoination uission o 

(3) gmniE.i.~ 

The KOl.'eAll c..ru!lpaig.."l fu:rnished the Marine Corps \-lith its 

first opportuni·tiY '~o use the Targ3t Grid. System of fire carectlon under 

co.r.bat cond! trons. The system proved to be far supe ri or to t:1e old systeLl 

in thr'.t i t cliJ:lin~ted I:1uch of the lonG technicru. t raining require~ of 

observers and fire direction personnel • 

.., The Bn.ttnlion S·tlTVey Section has hfl.d Ii ttle difficulty in 

accooplishinb its nisslon. ~ to the numerous displace~ents by the 

battalion, i twa.s inposslble to shif·t; to regimcntfl.l survey control. 

Only on two occasiona during the INCHON-SEOUL canpgign was regimental. 

cont~ol car::ied to battalion in tir.1e to be of va1u~ and then only fo:r 

a short period of tine. 

• 

With the 1/25,000 nap as ~ firing Chart and combined with 

a position area survey the battR1ion was able to utilize vertical control 

and mass fires satisfactorily. High p.~le fire was used frequently 

durinE; the later stnges of the oper&tion with €;Ood results. Sone nomru. 

barrages were fired as high angle o!ssions. 

, UoroaJ. barrages were fired in as concentrations and numbered 

as suCh~ The assignment of a sPecific concentration as a nor.oal barrage 

was not done unti1 all the defe~sive fires had been fired in for the 

13


In the Field 

lID November 1950 

night. The ba.ttalion ~lalson officers would make recommendations 

to the RegitlentaJ.Lialson Officer as to which concentration they 

desired~fortheir nOrIlal barl't\ge. The Regimental Liaison Officer 

would confer with the Regimental Cornoendor and make the final' decj.sion 

as to which cotncentrations would be the normal barrages for -the night. 

~he Y.bo woul~,be~notified and batteries would ~ assigned their barrages. 

All cooputers would'computedei;a ,for their battery to' fire en all defonsive 

concentrations.- This deta w01:ld ba p:'aced on one sheet with tho 

partioulo..r battory:s nonwi barragF at ,the top of'the poge" ~is page 

would th0n be labeled. t!J!,'mergenny iJata tf and the 'batta:11on ,ould be massed 

on any conc~n~ra~ion :h:n"'ledlate~,y~ 

'The te:;."raJil onc(.uuter(;.d in KOT0a "'lias well su1-~ec .. for the 

use of',{1b5te Phos!)ho:~, Obs€~'vel.~s v:f't~!j, :L'eq\lBst~€d the use of WP rather 

th8"n BE" ,it was e~.1'P0 l,:J.clly U.~B:ruJ. in firing in n].ght defensive fir(:s 

w!lich frrquontly was dcne at'ter.ia~k s~.nce the infantry did not t:1top 

until darknosso The 1a:~"ee flerJand for 1i? made it ne~.es3a.rytu fire 

shell trlxerl to cone:G~Vv'~ llPo vlten th~s was d01'~e: the FDC had. to ;~on 

~onsate for the differance in the weight of the -~w:o pr:Jjectlles o In 

the early stages of' ~he upern"'!ion there' ye:a:e 1.netances of short rounds 

of lIP.. This 'was caused by tho dlf'feranoc1n the weight of tho t-v;o 

projectiles and the fac" 'that the' WE hAA solidl.f:t6d unequally within 

the projec+,ils_ rnstruct.:ioni~ 'I,rerC' g~,veL :to the batter.f executi've 

offi:1er~ 't:) stor~ \'!P iLl the ~uI>:r"lght position with the projectile resting 

on its base. Thlspr00edllre l:mpro'Ved :firin.g rei:'u.ltfle 'However~ 

the age of the proje0ti~.e still "a,usett eratlc rounds~ ,The proper 

handlj,ng given the p"!?ojoet:D.e" j.n thr;3 battery l')osi.tl~n '.\78.8 not s1Iffic-- 

lent to C.v·c:~cor:.e the J )11f' period of 11!lprope14 Rt(JI.'I~. :By me:tt:tng or 

sof'teni!l€ ltp ':11' ··!ill shiJ?t wi'Ghin the p:"ojecttle and. CU1l.SC el'"atlc 

rounds "ioihcaever thE: p:r-:>.it:.oti:le ha.s been exposed -tD lrl.¢L teL1pE::r.a.tu.re~ 

and ~mpropar stow~~ 

. ~~ed terrain lU~d poor roads were very hard on howitzer 

tireso rt "'Jas .nec~ssary for the Battalion to replace four (4) hcwitzc:t" 

tireaf'o:c. ""hicll 'Ghere wa.s no repIaoooents. Neithe:r the stft.'ldc= .. rd 7 e 50-24 

howitzor tire nor the combat' 94.\00-20 tiJ.'e Were iDraediately waiJ..able. 

The standard6x6 truck tire 8.25·.

.APP]}TDIX Tl'lO TO 11TH MARINES SPEOIAL 'ACTI01;r BEPORT 

! 

\ 


In. "the Field 

Ie l~!·crL.T.""ier 1950 

' 

hours he nonitor fire missions, supervises the preparation of preparatory 

fires within the reginent~ and keeps the Infantry Begioental OoomandOl" 

a.breast of the ar.tillery situation. Dm"ing the hoUrs of .darkness 

he again oonito!"s all firenissions, supervises the establishhent of 

night defensive fire~, participates in staff \}onferences for the next 

dp"ys oper.ations, and ]?lans the following mornings preparation. The 

p::'Jper aeconplishnont of these va.l.*iod and te.U.ous duties aTe felt to 

be too ouch of a work load for one offioozo. I Accordingly, this unit 

assigned an additional officer as assistant liaison officer with the 

infantry Regioente 

t 

It .oigh.t be ofintcrest to the rea.der of this report to 

bc\w tho conposition of the Regioentnl Liaison Teen, as set uy by this 

unit. !the tear..! was organized ~i~h 2 cOIJT'.J.ssioned officers and 27 en 

. 

listed. The det~~led brea~own of this toen is as shewn below: 

" 

1 Mnjor~ LiaisonOffice~ 

1 Capt ai.n , Assistant LitJ son Officer 

1 Se:r:-b'"ennt ~ Llai30n' 0 

3 Drivers {2 - i ton anJ.1-2-!. ton) 

. 15 WireneL (:~ - \,iire _ tear.Ts and 1 .- ~d tchboard. tcc:u:,J 

Wil"6 tcaoow'i.:uld 'lay the l:i.nes to t,ho 

Two of tl~e 

assault battaliQusand the third tean would Hetnb~ish. 

Go~unications with the reserve battalion, 

artillery FDC, ·and trouble shoot all lines o 

During active opera~ions these w;1,re teams laid 

~pproxiDately' 20 niles of wire per day. 

7 .- Radio Operators 

1 Gonnunication Chief 

(6) !HSGEIiLAUFriuS 

Tl'le lk'W.d1in6 and safe-keeping of classified docunent s 

becane increasingly difficult .as the C13Llpaign progressed.. The batte~lion 

safe was n constant nuisance anc;. soon became. ovorloacl_ed \'~i th nonessenticl 

c).assified material. The assistant S-2 is custoc.ian of 

cle .. ss1ficd publicntions.This unit. has cr. receipt to the Chief of 

Np..v~ Operations 36 publications of Whi~.hf at r.ost, 5 \o19re utilized 

during the op~ration. It is reconmended. tlk--:tt ·all non-essqntie.l 

publicatio.ns, for batta.1ion level" .be onintained ~t Regioentnl. or 

hi&hor . e chel on only. . 

On the whole nedical fa.cilities, .including both personnol 

and sUPIJlies, ~"'l.ve been adequate to neot the needs of this battalion 

during the period covered by this report. Casualties due to disease as 

well as enemy aC'hionhave been negligible, wi thin the various posl tion 

areas. Considering the obstacles cet. ancl ~ographical a.rea of oper'ations. 

sanitation has b~on very goo~. There have been no epidecics of 

any nature.. Gastroenteritis hc:"lS been the I:1ost common eornplaint with 

approximately fifty (50) cases occuring du:r.lhg the entire opera.tion. 

Only tl10 (2) ~.ases ,required hospitalization. The qua.nti.t1 and quality, 

of rations has been adequate. Transport-etion formedioal supplies and 

medicalp~rsonnel has been inadequ.te. necessitating an absolute ~initIUt1 

of supplies be carried. l{uch of the full 30 days initial supply 

was left in. a dUJ:Ip' in the rear p...rea. 

, i 

(B) RECO!1HEtIDATIONS 

r 

(I) .A light·, c1.urab'le.· and highly mobile radio s1nilar to 

an seR' 300,. wi'th increased range, should be developed 

and proyided f.or forward observers. 

15

~ 

_>"2"';:::'_''''~ I r-" 

APPELf.DIX ~'lO 

TO 11TH MARINES SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 


In the Field 

10 Nov€~ber 1950 

(2) The Rosinental Liflison Officer should be furnished 

with a TCS redia over which lateral cor:u:run1cations 

can be naintained, between adjacent Teginents~ and 

woni.torGd'hy the artillery rBgiment'O ~.ais wo~_1.ld 

• f~~i~5tate 

(4) The 1>:ra~£n'ii T/O ~houJ.d be e,ugI:1entect to provid.e a 

:;~al:L) t&cnn:;:-·,;.r.n ~·.n tho H.ebinr:utcl -:-daiso,:~, 1:daL 

'inc. :'-;'1-0 (2, Iif;Ll1'1.::"c~.Ct...'1,S :tn :B3:~t::U.j 011 }It;Hd-!l"al't.& ... ·f'o 

(t») T:le Reg-'L'!1e.i.lta ~ L.-~ai ](;L. ~€ )';;:;.)n dhvu.u: ll(. :i.r.:.Cr.c e,CKd 

::'n ~b8 prese.at . '.2/0 +0 :tll~}:ult1 d. Tenhn~J;a1. SergGr..n+: 

:U1 '1.~~V)J.l SdrtlC!"l 'C'h~(-d r:..'1cl Gt3.:rta~.n, .t,.s1ls J ,;ant. Liaison 

,Of:':J.CB,t'c • 

]he ?l'esen.,!; w:u-t{ne t.r.jC) fox' '3ar'!l (3) EattRlion T-i-~:::.ison 

S8Ct~,Oti;:j s~~ould. OH In~ ..l.4eaSE:c. +.c ~XJ.c't:wle .J~t. Gv:crp~eto 

W:,.T·J t3d!:'. dr.d. f'. .("f'l:'c-d :for tho .p~6s8nt )."a.:lio uf''Jrator. 

A su :Loc[:..l ~e cnr.L t:y cd: 

an ::trtille:r:y' bat·cR:.ion is a !'.nlst and yet there are c.t 

t~a pre3en~ tiDe insufficient pers~nnel of tho proper 

·:}lass)_fica·~j on t_? adoqu~te} y perf Jro the job o 

(9) -

2d Batt~liont 11th Marines 

I.':_ tb'J Fielcl 

10 l~ovc:.~)er 1950 

(12) A l-ton, trailer w/ryc.oJ ;;enerator unit should be included 

in the TIE for an artillery battalion to 

prov;.(to the scurae of clect:~ici ty usect in the fIre 

dlrectio~ cantero 

(13) To facili.tnt

APPENDIX THREE TO llTH l·WUNES SPECIJu .. ACTIOl~ REPORT 

3d Battalion, 11th M?xinos 

In '~b.8 Fielct 

15 Novenber 1950 

. Fran: Cor:tTJanc..ing Officer 

To: OOJ:1r..1anding Officor, 11th Mn.rines 

Subj: 

:Ref: 

8:?ecial Action Report f'Jr tho period l5 Septenber 1950 to 

7 October 1950 

(a) Division Genernl. O;c.er Nwnb~r16 

In accordc-mce with instructions containeit in reference (a), this 

rcpo::.-t is suboi tted. t cove:-ing the operation of this batt8~ion 1.n the 

IkCHOl'J'-Klr..['O-SIDUL car:paign. As a par'G of the Eleventh Marines, it t s 

mission w~s to support infnntry uni tSt as dirac·l:;ed.. . 

2c 

TASK ORC.AlIIzATIOr 

~"}l:,d. ]attoJ:ion, Ele:venth Marines - Majer Francis F. P.t\B.RY1' USMC 

H8adquarters nnttery~ Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines - First. 

Lieutenant Micr~l 3. WEIR, USMGR 

Service Battery, Third Battalion, Elevonth Marines ~ Captain 

1k'Jert ~ TROi\iPSOlr t USMC 

Bc.;,ttery If Gil t Third Battalion, Eleventh Marines, Captain Samuel 

Ac. H/uTl:f1.E 1 USEe 

Battery "R" t ~b.?_::-cl 3p..ttalion, EJ.eventh Marines Captain 

:Benfjaoin So IGADt} US:';:; - 

:Bittcry "I;! ~ :;:1~J rd 3L;' ;~:lion, Eleventh Marines Captain John 

M. MO L.AtTRIlT 1 T;SJ:iU 

Batte't'y "nit t 50tl1. A..Ui. AWlb.!' USA - Oaptain FIl\lI:, CAO, USA ( 2 to 

5 October, 1950)0 

Very 11 tt1e formdl preli::!!inary plaDI:.1ng Wc.s done by this un!t due 

to the fe.c,t it WD.S onrQ1lte f:i"OD tho contlnentn..l United Statea during 

planning phaso, and did not a:r:'riYG in the obj6Gtivoaree. un";:!.l l) plus 

six (6) 0 Some ::;>l.e..nn1.ng was done.' basect upon official, SOI:tt-of~:iciaJ. and 

other reports fron tho rybjec~ivo eroao 

This battnlion trnlneL1. fo?" a'Pproxir:1ato1y t~llo1vo (12) days during 

the ex:>a.'1sion p!w.se l".t Car.rp J:>end:'.eton.. ~'PrcxinatoJ.y ene-third of its 

enlistod personnel \'lLre j()~.ne(":. in the three (3) days pT.i;JI' to sgilinb~ 

All possiblo training was (.·oDclu... ~'iled abo!11"d ship cnrou'lie to the objective 

aroa. No :.':ehearsals wore hold 6 

~his battalion was c0r..r..lercially loc::,d.cc_ with Rogiocntal Oombat Tonn 

7, fron San Diogo, California, in six (6) different vesselso 

6. UOVENEfJT TO~ .AIm ARRIVAL .N1 OBJECTIVE AREA 

~his phase was without incident; arrived at objective area on 21 

Septcober, 1950. 

1

3d BattaJ.ion, 11th l~arl nes 

In the Field 

15 KCf"fOmber 1950 

7. ~Ions 

a.. 

As sault Phase: 

This battalion did not participate in the assault phAse. 

b. Exploitation phase: 

This batitalion was lano.ed. duriDF; the night of 21 September, 

1950, at II-JCHOU, Korea. On 22 Sept er.lb err 1950 it proceeded to an 

assonbly aroa sou~h of KIMPO AirflelQ. On 23 September: 1950, it 

o~cllpiecl firinf; posi-'uions near the HAJJ River., North of KIMPO f in dir- 

8'~t su;pport of the Seventh UHr.tnes& On 25 Se}?tember t 195J, the batta 

IJ.on, loss Battery "G'i J crossed the HAl\!" River via LV1r and. ferry f Met 

Q':,cupied fi:-inr; posj.tions Northwest of SEOUL. 

This battalion was the 

f:..,~st artillery batt?lionto cross the HAN Rivero On 29 September, 1950, 

tho tattnlion c1isplaced to positions North of SEOUL, along the Uijongbu 

Road, still in direct support of the Seventh Marl nes. On 30 Septeober I 

1950. this battalion wa.s attached to Ret;iDon";nJ. Coo::,at Team 7 for tho 

aC~"iiance on Uijongbu., and reBained. so until the end of the operatj,on~ 

7 October~ 1950. DU!'ing the operation ;lihis battalion fired abou~ 280 

missions and 8 D 134 rounds. 

Enen.y artillery ,,.ras in little evid.ence curing this canpaigno It 

is cst1.!1L'..tod that not WJre than one buttery of light art,illery olJPosed 

ou.,,: forcesv i~'-0ntifiec'., as the a.rt~.llery of the 17th Division. Ar.tillory 

activity- \

M'?:E1f.Drx THRZE TO 11TH Ivlm:r~JES 

SPEC! At AOTIOll i1EPOF..T 

3d Battalion, 11th 14arines 

In the Flelr.. 

15 lio-ve!nber 1950 

six ships. and sane of this equipment ~as never recovered upon lanaL~g, 

in spite of ·tho mos~; diliger:t efforts to spot and recover it. Great 

dif:ficul ty has been experienced in raaintaining both SCR 619 and SOR 

60S rarl~.os; SC2 60S troublcl:3 \-lere mostly d.UG to mechanical f ailu:-es 

of vo~..1 Gles p.nd aJ.sa oxtre~1E)ly poor psrf0rnance of the renote uni tso 

These trcI.:lcte un-':.ts are' def'ini'coly not s?tisfac'tory. The SCR 619 \tras 

found to give excellent service so-long as freshly charged batteries 

could be kept up to forward observer pa:r.ties; this p:"oblem was p!:!Xti&- 

lly solved by placing battorJchargers on the liaison officer t s ca.~go 

jeeps, auet :further by keeping chargee. ba,tteri~s on batter.! cor.!f.1ander f s 

v'3hicles so that bat-'!;eries could be exchan£ed ffVery t irne the be.tte:!'y 

CQCE~~aer went forwarc to visit his liaison and forward observer toans o 

T!·;.e SCF .. 61.9 has proven far supe r:lor to "~he SC,B 610& This canpa.ign has 

pl'oved again tr:.at artillery cannot shoot lI1 thout c.oIi1DUhicatlons!) 

(2) Liaison 

Lia:l.son and relations in genernl with infantry units has 

b'Jen s00dQ In the Datter af clearance sf fir:,st considerable dl:fficulty 

l:.an been GJCI)erienced in maintnininb current front line infornation~ 

This has been due mostly to poor connuu1.ca.i;ions, both artillery 8~.d 

i~rrantry~ TIns sitUc~t,ion iuprcvod thr()1]ghout the c~1paign, hOWHVeI'~ 

e~i/il1e:t'y mus'li know fX'iendly trooD locf:~:&ions, pa=ticulF...rly in t~:is 

t~/1?e of torrcin'r where one forward. obse;:ver does nut know e.nd cannot 

see acljacont 1L.'1i tu c 

(3) Ef~ :D :;':.IC n '; 

Z~l.u::1:.:.;1\. -~=;::.s goneralJ.Y been satisfactoryt' except thc'1t 

there '~8ro !JC.'1Y sho~ .. \;u.ges existent in too battalion j and on some 

'critical itenG~. no resu?ply was available. 

F" F. P .lL1:JtY 

f 

3

I 

2295 

Ser 72--50 

Ii ~h 3attalion, 11th Uarines, 

In tn,"! :field 

15 r~creI.1ber 1950 

Fron: COll.lJB~ac1il'1.b Officer 

To: COY..lL1a:1di:'1{; G("~1nra-~t :.st IvIarinc Divis ion~ FIIF 

subj! S:poc;_al Acticl1 Rc:.)Crt for pO!'iod 31 A11£:;,1..1_S t - 7 October 1950 

Ref: (a) D:ivlsion General Or1.or lIo;) 16 

a c Tho purpose of this rep0rt is to su~ize all occurrences 

incid.0pt to r.oi_1bat lJaJ~tic~.J?C':.:ea :i.ll -by this c·r{;~ .. nizati.on du:-inb tho 

Inchon- 'Se:Jul"~Cir:rpo aroa cperattor. includi:ng pl':'l'h"ling involved (~uri1lG 

subject I)Grioct .. 

b~ Tho r:dsston assigned this ort;~li3at:i.on '.ras that of goneral 

sup~Jort artillery of tho 11 th lic.rinGs Rcii" ... forc.)d in the zone of action 

of the Is t Liari?1c :Jiv~~.sj ')ll., 

Co The clesigik'1.tiol1. of the next higher echelon is Headquarters, 

11 th En.ri:1.Cs, 1st l.iarin.e Divis ion, Fr-:? 

2. TASK ORG}j:':JZATIOF 

4th Battalion! 11th IIari:los 

l!ajor "T:l.llian I~C 

(071B9) 

3.DYH'OLTIS 

US;iC 

Ho~dqunrtors 

3~ttcry 

Offic)rs 

l:l 

:3!lli~tod 

133 

Caj? tni:.l Chr~rlcs 

(O~J22~) 

USI:C 

- - - - 'GSiT ., -- -- • -. 

O:f:h~cr Enlisted 

1 

11 

s. G'l1'h~nIGS 

8 c~r i. ce 3n t tory 

strc';ngth 

:()f~::~~. Cf)!' s 

US::\:; 

3t1:1. is ted. 

C~p·tain .b,rr.l£'..l1.d G. DAlDAZIO 

(0:29 gl) USl~C 

letnp: :aattory 

strOj,1f;-~h 

USi:C 

O::icGrs =nlistod 

4 112 

First Lioutene,nt Robert C. H3SSr·LAlJ 

(039208) U8~iC 

strcr~;th 

rJ,ko }3~ttory 

Strength 

Officers 

4 

Officers 

4 

USI·IC 

Enlistocl 

115 

USI:C 

Enlistecl 

117 

Cnpt[.'.in La~.!rcnco 

- - - ~ ~ - ~ - 

R. (}LOffiN 

(014589) USl;IC 

- - - ~ 

Cn:ptnin Vernon U. S:-IAPIRO 

- (017363) us:~c 

- - - ~ - - 

~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 

1

~ .. ' r: tc :. 

':;'3£ 

US:{ 

E]rl~stod" 

a Q FraIl !v!~) ('

4th 3[,t·~['J .. io;.1~ 1J.t.h. i{0.!.':l.nc Q , H['.q c!J.Bx:;ed. ~J~_th tho rosyo: .. sibility of 

U:l(Lci;:'tCfl.;·L1.C Ol13 UID.t vI' ::i:·~r-.0 ol jj5;:1Ll 2.;ETd.D.:l.t;ii'~.I. Qj,l LST cp 94Q 

IS:;' . ,. _ Ie,V r-.,() ".lL. { • _ ._.J" T.""\"'~C ·;-:-·'·.1.c'~y 

~ .. .:.::C 3~.-t tfr:"y ~)OOYC:.0('. t~c ~:;,

2.-, Or~. 8 Scpte:UbE;j:- ] G~C, ~ho ;:;r-.-rtD,.11o:1 ::1"'CCClJ.t i-Ire Offic~r J ' Vi th 

cl 8!.Jor:·;~~ of rt('D.Cl\t.1lL1.::~t'J:~ :3'l." 1, ... \.~." ";.r;v"l: ::.~.; _' ~~~" ·''JTy~. ~':'1G. PJJ. o:f ~,~, OYO 

:rF-" ttc:-,f~ 0el)arke~i (~:' ='n.,"Y (~ :::"S.' ~~,. 

to 13 (;:ff ir.6::";,, .',~~L c.?'; 'J '.L':_ 7 S .,;c:~_ 

llA".~~33rril·l 

0:--: H E ~·?t':"L:0 ':;:,' J:·)S:) ..:lL::s ~':1ttc.'~~~ .',Jb,~,~;, k-:;c:' nhonrd J:,hO USS 

(Xl... ~;) (. ·."".)t2.1 ::.'_'~.'f;,.Hc':(:l CI1~;::~~kc(~ ~lIJO"t:l.'Dtocl t,) 4 officers n:1(1 

'7 ' 

l~~Oo:--:l is tecl~ 

D

:rU':;(";)!-~::"',J..'~S:L~'\.':';0 ~J

" 

0::1 ); 'icttO'I/0r~ ~·i~.ko. firor:l f,)'UJ.'· con~')ntrqt:!.ol:~ or.. .J:':locrv 1nst~.ll['..tions 

ani!. 'i;"kd; ~:;v0ni::"r; ~.~.;Ji..~ f:1 .rc·ci. -; E& 1 ~:-~'L':~ ~. +·}-..ie 'h".. ttc;.l!(J:i. ~u~a no SU(~h !].e·tJYity dUi:.l tn· 'i-;~o rJ-l 

O""'0U''l'' ,·-·-"l·· .. i·r,,; of' ~h';-:! ·~·,·.· ... ·i· .... ·J~·,,· ... "" .... ~ ..... 

..... . ' L_,: ~~-""'-u ..... .- t~; .< t.. _~.~~.I- J.J ~f···f ... ..,.,~3;] ens 

\·,hOl-ltho ,:front (L",

T)J.is s:?r;.;~di:'l(~ o;f .tb0 '·uc~t·L~'.l~c:r: :r~~·c~, :;,''r.J};Xb-~ ts r.(~~sod f:'..ro~ hOl1ovor 

f,-::rt'i'~'l:~'::-:C:~3 j,l"J?Odl~'·.j(l .-~!):J~c..i:r:jnf-·: :",:; r,,_-.~~ .. ;~:-i fi .. ~of:. oflg 15J~n:~ h~>;:i t?;~S 

.n""·;'·':'ip"·h~ c'· ....... ·.;...!:··......,·I .. ·.-·.··~·....· I,; V I t)\',} Q., y_,VJ '¢ : .....1.0. i.l1;'1. '.J'...' ·.... OIl. \-:' .;":, .... :~-.k .. J.!.J. 3U·J..... L1. ~ ..;.:.n h >:> C'J I,e rs .. 

"Io~·· . ~''l:1 " -:"l"";' 1-. ,.' . ~ .. I ~..' . • "...:1 

•. 

t . o'ht 

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'£[;.110 Tb~ f.. il}:I'~.:"i:i.:'l[""t~:i.(.n ",·t'd c·:·,~~Y';)l-:'Q(t .:1.1.:r ;ct.:'~t l':,~on t~lO D/SBc.ttr-.lion 

In' +'a~' t¢ain j}X"vi!':'ec1' 1 

,l0;:i}.ti..o!?-s t:Jhich }?xo7idod ~doqur1.to Itgoine" 

fo'r. 'ch 

... ~,~v 

'.. h .,.J: .... ~i ... ~ ... "·.,..A 

~-,~~-j_" 

..... ~ .. t J.".¥"> ... "-"t ..... ri·-L·r-fl" 

__ u. . 

~"··i·! ",'..4....:_ 1"} 7 I"!' . ~.'- 

'~" '.' ." . """d.c; ~ ios -'lIrovo(~ too nu"c""-r 

i _ _n-'M10"'''''''''''';· ,=' ~ c:.,',] nco-' 

" .. - _.Hc:,:~ " ,DV. ,-.'. v ' ~l.lV :+[!.~ . ~v- .~:. . .J.. . ....u, .'_"V l'>if".[~·' pOSiJ~j.O:lri ;,,:.\19- ~!,j::\.~.i'S~;;;-·;;o~:a .Jnl~(~'rcro 'PJ."opnrcd t '1ros~ 

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, 6~~-1-iltt --t;:p. ;to· ~ tcr:a..:\to E'.roo.S' 'Qf- 6xpcctOc. t..r-;.0ilY. C)nCcnt:rat~Ol1tiJ zOrJo 

.,p;fuIe.!i.c;9 J.);:,·.O"l!n.::.~·('J~i~:1~ -(}oul(1. hrwc 'beeL. n['~Q.~ ~n sono :~nstro:.'.!es, HilL:'h 

. :.:;l'c1l'.:'iV ,~vo 'C1.i.t dot'Jtl tilo i!ltorv~ roq;'l:l..r:e& t6 3hi'rt~ . . 

j, ~ - \~ . -; 

'Tll,O ·j.lnl"I"'~o'(

.Aa r,. result of tho ]?rOSenC0 o:f 'tho five flJ..ctors just noted. encI:\Y 

to.rrc~·~ ur:re v~blo to· 0_~.8~!e~ 30 tot-he uxtcmt thnt f:l~o' .for effoct 

""'r ,4:u(.·.i\ " "" ... s' ·t·· ...,...,.,... ()-..I•• ~-,.. -1"- '.'.' .~-: t·. ~,,)_"l ~. ().A.... ,.., ~'.'., .... +.'-, ~ +. ..... 

~ . '.... l:. . J .. ,,_ •• oL:::> . .,.. ncl sp..fcty~ . . . 

• .J 

50,.' ~~1':)t1. }Jr'~seilt· i~suo f!P tort (;;'008 not prnvidc 1u.:ffi{':i'ont rOOD for 

~n',~~-u.p'i*; of i1O-~-b.gst:·!d~ -oJ.tti.?tl6~t ·':"'''1tl'll.C!SOrmo:~~n the firedi.~o':;t:lon 

ceiJ.t~r ~;rt,l'·:l!\.{;ht ~~}Q~f'ition~ is. hn:~el"~d ifric:r.by t'l '-RccOLlL1en(!.·thc cL:'si{91 

l',.l1ii~s]~)t of t.~bl~Q;k~yut- {~ . tOl?lj-ulth; ~,;tlon~:t 2;0 sq1l['"rO f()et :floor 

, • i .. f 

6~ ~~ci':i ii p.oco~o-ndb(t ·tht".t tho 155:1:1-- ho~t-1i.tzcr bc.ttalion bo oqui-ppod 

\:it ttl solf': D:roP·:;}tl·;&--;;p..o~d:·tzors·' in' ·tho IvJn.t-ino IJ';xis:lon~, -The. clP-c.£' i:Q'" 

v.ant~:;n;Of·-· t}l.o::so:'i~'1pr?:jollcd. h6"'11tz6~ ~lic'S ·1.u ',its abjo~i ty ~o li3 Dl::\c0:t ... 

in In.ctio~'l· iT'i a. short+'i~.:e \-rhtch' 'D.dvr4J.taiois"V~oryrc:'.l;·i-n LlCJl:tng sit ...... ,·· : .. :~ .. 

untionc.. ThcUlho't·rii;;~or reauiros 1.1· hours .1;;0 shift scctO'l;, A :lis- . 

pl~c-ooont ··.In_ {:~ho~('l" ··!~"..lU£'.11i 

In. Md:t t~on-·t;bc!rf'#iJ5·t ttOY~t::lbri·t N firo- \)01.'TO:t [1;S reouricd. .':li th:t~ the 

s ec·t or' , is ~{~.~,)[·"tlY· ~i.i\;x·mTeu; '.rl,S "trt·o:xrJri·l0, hOi.ri'tr;,; ..... s s0n'i~ . fOT":i1D,Y'iL for 

n-l,{;ht ·:·(Li:li.t}!::~~:J.cto 

rou;ul of.-.155I:.1tl houi tzor 

D.rJr~¥·:Gtlrin{fthe· , 1.p#crE·of ··nny· ono prGVonts tho' use -of'the' otoo+ 'thr.cc. 

In, nd .. ~~rE6n~tho unit' 'of fire tor tho.' hj\Iitzer contr.ins12 (l.ffferont . 

eor..1pond~l~~no~ilr~4rf\ Attcntrion shcu.ld, "h9 clirec.t.o{l, in .l:oadtng to . 

l~t"e:-~1.&. ::~O~)·tcto· o.b::r6pnont~6~ n'~cJ?Or'~iont~t~b08'is 0:."1... ench cf'..rrior 

( ~hii,t.or:~·~:ot~i~le) i;--~' Ini'ti~lIy: .~ur~ll{>i6.iflinc' r!.t ~qbo- oru:y 1;1hitc 'Pl\g 

PO\f~}:ehi:d"tj6 :-\nd 'shOll HE~joro--

9... 'J~lilG ~tnginr:~ r:.t KOllG r:~ 'J~ll ['..8 ['~ ~J 8 ..... n !)iego, Cc:,li:forni£l" 

:B~:~+;1~[l~! .~.. r:eot sr.i i in;-~ d.

:Ln 

- 

c. O'hservcrs \13, th th,} Cl.l:",oct S1J.:)j!Ort bnttnlions' locn.tecl. fet" 

tD..""eOt,8 -C'or r..:ei:~ ~r:' 0/".,';:1:1.:1.,::';:.1' \: .i,i:~l. >-b0 C)':,- .;~yi~:-' 0 •. 1 0f -~hG J.:1 t~er s tnGos 

of tho o:;.JJr[\t i.)l~ 

{""i 'v~' [:-,,~crni"j :;.".... ,,; '-...su~ ~.l~ ].ttalion. both regular and. .- • ., .....-; 

r-G'3e~"o: ITovecl rO[l.(lily ['.d8.ptD})10 to r:1.~'}1(1 asscni10;tion and n:??:-oachcd'~~ 

[l,:~ tn.S.i~·j with an cn.thusi[:t1 refJ£lrl~,:blc > v:~-c;·! of tho fact that nuch of 

t h..:; llOI k inv o17p.c1 1-1[:.8 back - bre::J{.~, nc nr ~~.tt:.Lc1 tho cia ck ancl :-10 s t r.: ~ k the 

r8scrves involved ,-:oro, [', sho't"t tiTle bcfc,r'1 s ' ~)'.1rsuinc long rnl¥:(. - 

oO;iOc.t~·,!OS ir..o.id.en::; ~;o :t. ei';11inn 0C,rC0T\~ 

t 

11

,_>.J- (S 

/JI¢) , ' - 7"'" 

·fi~·~ '- 

...-~--:"-.. -~?:",.- 

'1 

2295 

EAB:aeh 

• 

APr ENJIX FIVE T'O -11TH Mb~I~"S8- ;.jP~CIAL ACrrrON REPOHT 

t 

i'~ - 

- UNIT: Btry UC" I lot: 4.5" RktBn, F'MF 

Location; Hamhung,- Korea 

Date: 1a Novemb€r~~950 

From: Comman'ding Off1 cer. 

'1'0': Commariding Offlce~l- Eleventh Marines 

Bubj; 

Speol\al Action Repo'r't for period 28 ~ugust, 1950 

7 October 1900 - ) 

Ref: I ~(a) D1 ~181on Generai Order Nq.' 16 

t( 

1. IN'rRODUC1'ION 

. lIthia ~-eport is IJ. epeol-a,l action -report covering 

,the a.Bsa'lll t; and eXJ.:;lQl tat16ri ppase of the I hchon-·Klmpo- 

"Seoul operatr6n inclqdlng; the/ ar:tiv-,a.l of the unit into'· 

tl1t;; FEe and op6ratio.pa sUcstiquent --to.th~t arrival. fle tt· 

Bat.tery ,F'irnt 4.bftt~Oc.lte~ :,fjat1ial+Qn, 'J?leet Marine IT'orce, 

wa.s att'ached' to. the ~t.yerttp. l\1a:rinen . tor opers.tionctl . "- 

.9.. nd administrati v~ - cPP~:P6.~ •• Q~ . 4. ',pUgHotlGbO and !3.Gsigned, 

as a gener:li. su.pport ;"'fl1tt~·. '... 

2. TASk 'ORGLNI ZAl l ION 

Table of organlz~'ltlon . strength of the battery is! 

Offlcern 4,· l1nliGted 86; ·act·ua~ strength at beginning of 

, the: oper-? .. tiop: Officers 4 J Enlinted 13., under' the command' 

of' First Llcuten9.n~ Sugenc b.' BUSflE, D. S. Marine Corps. 

Ilhoro. a.re no J3.ttB.chod uni to. 'Ilwa hosp1 tal Corpsmen are 

. ~ detailed .. from the E10vcnth Marinos. 

; J _ - ~ 

. 3.':' PRgt,IlVuNb.8Y: [PLArr;Il~G 

'I'he 4.!)1! Ro6.ktJtB~ttery was' 'attached to the First -' . 

i1!3.rl.ne· 'Regiment and al)sign;~d ·~o Emtark8.tlon Group, Baker 

unde~ Fi~stMarinc 8eglmenta1 Command with the-mission 

at nupporting that unIt· for th0 asc,ault and seizure of 

I nchcn. - The bQ .. tt(~rywas tolrlhd wi·th r·ocket 19,unchern 

. anclf'lrlng battcr,y personnel embqrked in L'u'Tt 0 andL~t s 

. Wer~etobe uti11Zt~d ~D prime mOVl::ro until such time as 

orgarlfc "prime nlovern ~nd other vt;hiClcG cQuld 19.nd from 

LSlt' ~. I If add1 tlon t.othe six LVT' G .ceqU:lrco.to move 

t_he rocket .1auncht:::rs and f1:r1ng battery,- three LVTJ s . 

Wtl!:-,t:i.tbbe loadt~d wi t'h 4.0" roO'ket ammuni tlon and utl1- 

.. rzeq. .. ~ as a floatIng dump onc_allt P·lansC!3.11edfC?r six. 

LVT'o'·to l!lDd the bat'\i£ry, cachLVT loaded with one _4.5. 

rocltctlauriChorJ forty~elghtfllzedrouj:1ds_ eto ,bo fuzed 

:"on. th~ w-ay '1n~o the beac·h) of 4.t5'rrackct ammt,lnltlon~. 

~pd~·o~ctlon.crew. ;. Eadl of th0 tp,ree"LVT IS 1n the float-· 

·-

I. 

/ 

in the. assault ph8.~c. In !3.c1ultion" the prime movers and 

ammunition "trucks '~cir(; to cccomb').t loaded with n0venhunc1rt;d 

8.nd tvJenty rounds oftuzes and 4.b" rocket : 

ammunition (one unit of fire) and one unit'of firo for 

small ~rm8. P8roonnel wore to be 'issued one um t of 

fir8 of nmall arms ammuni tion. iJ'he rocket batturY 

(}·arricd out planning dir0ctl VLB ofthc Elcvt::nth M.arinos 

prior 1;0 attachment to F'i!~st jVlarinen llncl thereafter 

carri;,;;d out l:'irot Marine p19.nD and directi V~:B. At all 

tlmtJJ tho .ba.'C'~ery .ceceiv(;d enGmy 8ituation and intlJlligBnce 

reports from th~ Slcventh !Vl8.rines and. First, 

tJiarines. In addition to blevcnth MJ3x-ino plans and 

4 

cliruc Livc.s .for opcr9.tion,G an

, infantry rogiflients, the tlrtl11t:;ryreg1ment ,' B,nd otht,r 

e..rf]H,)~ Of ttlc division. In addition,' thc' batt(;:ry waS 

inGtructcd~on 9.11£..tvul1acl(;inforclQtlon of the, tJnomY, 

including,hin pocitions, capatiliti0s, tactics, ntrength, 

'prot::tblc course of action, e.tc. 

( 

7 ~ ',OPERATIONS 

(8~8Bault phase. 

" 15 ,September 1900 (D-Dru 

'l'he Bat t(::ry Commard Qr lr'}"i th 'reconnB-.i GS0,nCC ~:~crgeant 

. ~nd radio operator 1andt::d on .b;:;a'0b Blue at H PJJHl 25 

in the oeventh wave. : 1'nc firing 't'lttcry ,emt.:9.r.L~~d qn 

LVT'c, l~ndcd at 184& on Blue- Bcadh 3, TA9l46X4, with 

no c~sualtieo •. batt~,'ry asnunIt:d,the misnion of" supporting 

the F'irst Me..rincn anti occupied a: firlng position on 

'th0 t~e.ch. battt:'ry l'3..ndcd wi th b88 fuzed rockets combat 

loaded on ni nc LVT 1 n. SIx L \~I t 0 were loaded \-li"th 48 

rock;:~tc, t.10c"Lion cr-cw.8.nd 19.uncher. (I'hree LV1 d c landed 

lO!1dec1 ~fi th 100 rourid.o ofrockct am11111nlt:lbri anel. fuzes. 

SD(jr~Hl.ic mort~).r o~.""76 'millir.;~tc:? f:re wah dircct~dat 

t~D.ctoro ir!h~lc apprqachintsthe bC9.ch, cut no hi t8 '\-lcre 

. f.tftcctcd. 

" 16 SepttHiibor 19t!)O . 

At 0830 the ba~'t __::;ry c~101cnecd dinpl:J.cing following 

the Pit-ot tlH3.rineo ,by 1:0 undu uoing 'LVt 1 S [.lrrprime movers. 

Part· of ,the batt;:;~ry prime movere qnd other vchicleowcre 

met duririg the morning ~t lOGO. LV1 J1 f3 Were utili z.ed D.S 

,primG movers until all vr;;hiclec rBjoined the bB..t"l~cry D.t 

T1i9t14,7J3. -,tth t~1e 2"rY'ival of ba"ttGry v-ehiclcG ,!l tot'll 

of~11308 ~ounds ofrockc~ ammunitionqnd fuzes were on.' 

harid. 'lrhl.:~battci~y 'ar.cived at thin position Rt 1700, 'and 

took fUp a firing pOBi tion in Gupport of the Firct iViarines. 

One 'Wounded pris'oner '\'\{'3.S captured at 1000 qna turned OV0r 

to bhore Part;y on the bt38.ch.. 'Ihrec clvili!3.n pri80n~rfJ 

were e.pprci1enc1ed at 'l'Ji9047J3 e.t 1730 and turned ov ...:r to 

the',F'irnt M.rt,elnes. 'lhc;.Battery Gommandt:F '1Jent forirJard 

onJthe Inchon-D(;ou.l highw!3.Y at 2110 on rcconne.itifl.!lnCC 

for firing pOt)i tion are8..8. A poni tion 'tvac 'found ';lnd 

th~ b!?tt(:ry \v8.s9.1crtcd for n1.5ht fire miDflions. 

'(b) Ex~)lOitB.tion 

\ 

PhB-oc. 

17_SqR"t.5~mg(;jr 1900 

At 1005 ~. fire misoion of 180 roundc was·fired at 

coo.rdln0.tcs (99 .. 090-49.(90) fI'om ,TA9b47.J3 on cnsmy isun 

ponltiono .!lnd aconcsntration of trbopo. Th8rc W~G no 

8ur.vci11!3.nc0 report on this rninnion. '1'h(; battci ... Y, 

Imf!ie~li~tcly dlnplo')'ct:::d to B. flring PODi tion' B.t 'l'A9647Dl. 

At 1'200 the battery disp18.ct;d to a firing pOl1itlon B.t 

1'A9646I'.2. ~At 1320 the bf;lttc:ry ret\1:rnt3dto !l r0ndezvQuG 

flre8. .!It TA9.;47J3, and 8.t 1800 again dinpl8.Gcd to arLndeZVOUB 

~rca qt TA9849K4; in the vicinity of the First 

M!.lrin08 CP •. 

lS'oep4umbcr 1900 

. At 0900 tho b~ttery dloplaocd to a f~rlng pODition 

!?.. t TAO'2bOYb. :Ii ,North Korean noldicr W8.t1 Cr'lpturcd in this 

~.rca and turned ov~r to, tht::: Second B~tt.!llion" Eleventh 

..

APPSNJIX FIVE, 1'0 11TH l'JU:.!_iINES SPSCIPL i~C~[,ION HSFOR1 1 

Marines. The ~attcry fir~d 144 round~ from t~lG position 

qt enemy mort~r crr~lacements qt coordin~teG (06. oOO-bl. b90) 

at 1500. lit 1010 the: b8.ttc:ry fil-'sd 144 rounds at encmy 

mort~r ponltionn qt coordin~tcD (06.300-01.590) from 

the n;)_m~' poei t ion. '1h8 B::: irJ(:rs hth unol) fHSrvl:d fire 

miC8iono and no 8urveillancc reDorto wero obtained. At 

~1600 the b!)_ttery ~'lD dst0.Ci1cd from the F'irst IVifJ.rincn; 

at. t 'J. C h (: d tot he J:!.s 1 G V G n t 11 iVl 9.,:(' i r.. C G I .'3. nel 9. n s i g ned 0. mi S G ion 

of Gcner!J.1 nu?port. bt :1.;1110 tiJ;iC the batt(:ry dinpl.accd 

to a rcnuDzvouS !Jrc!) at TA04:04E4 in the vicinity of the 

£1 c v C: n th t/~ a:c-i n ~Hj C F. ~ . 

19 September 190 0 

At 16CO the battery displ~6ed 

at 1'A0756Y near Kimpo A.irfic1d. 

to a rendezvous area 

20 Suptember 1960 

ilt 1000 the battery movec1 to. q rcndtJzvoun area at 

TAO?66U. At lo3b Q test mioGian of 12 raundo was fired 

at Y0rl6 Dung Fain TA13b4S'l'XY. from 8. firing pOBi Lion at 

l'Ac)900d5.. 'l'he Hattt.:ry CJmniander on an OP conflrmc;c1 GUDpieions 

thut"Mo1b4 fuzeD ~ere not exploding the rocketo. 

C cased f ire at 1540 and r~turncd to rend;::; ZVOUfi D.rea :;.;t 

'I'A07b6U. 

21-~7_~~'L.(;~bc£ 19_vO .. 

l'he bc:.tt.:.:;ry r8n~;'1in0cl at thit1 renc1GZVUU8 !lrC9. ctt-laitinti 

8.rriv~l of iVj"'~8A2 fUZGG! and l11IJ.intry.inccl local Gecu:r'ity 

with no enemy 'lctivl ty other that .spor'Hlic 0.ncl in!lCCU:cc1.te 

mortD.:f' fire. 

28 bcptccb2r InDO 

1:11c D0tt:.-·ry Comm.rync1er 9.nd f:.9.G'tt:·2Y HG!Jdqu9_rtcro (liop19_ccd 

9.crOGG the Han ri vcr !It 08?-0 with the rcmflirlucr 

of the b9_ttf ry ti. vou9.cing on the S8ou1 !J.irport in the 

vicinity of thG pontoon bridge ~t Seoul. During the 

evening M48A2 fUZ88 wer~ loc~tcd. 

29 September 1900 

'l'he remainder of the b9.tt~::ry crosned the Ho.n riv(:r 

via JUKiiJS 8.nd amphi):iouG tr8.ctoro (l~u:~pln.cing to fl'A1762E2. 

30_ SeptLmt.f~.1goo 

Routinu security m~qGurGs. Scvcrq1 night positions 

i:~18rt} located and prc:p8_ri:ltionn comp1t,tcd for niGht OCCUpB. 

tion in TA1763Nl qnd TA1664C2. 

1 October 19;)0 

At 0700 th6 b~ttery displaced to TA8661N3 J utilizing 

this sre'3.. .!).r; 8. rendczvouG flrC9 .• 

· 2 October 1950 

No activity. 

3 Octobt:r 1900 

bt 0730 the b').t Lory di8p1'3"cl~d t·o firil".g pODi tion !it 

TA'2874U6 fJ_nd \-J8.G in pOBi tiun 0..t 081b in nupport of the 

-·4 -

- , 

~ ~t _,.. .. ~ • .!' .,,: ... 

S~vcnth MBrines. A ruiosion was not fired an ~nticipatEd 

due to the lQck of ob8e~v~tion. Returned to rendclzvouS 

aree. !It 1600. By 1916 the battery had movtjd Qgain into 

firing pOGition ~t TA2876P2, ~nd 14~ rounds were fired 

~t 1930 ~t troops ~nd Qrtillcry dug in on hill a Qt 

TA287~FGHIJ. burvt:;illancc reports of the 'l'hird b!J..ttalion", 

El~venth Marin88 obs~rvcr oaidthc mission waG Excellent. 

'i'he Sev1Jnth 1.Vl·').:clnt:t'1 reported there was no fUrther acti vi ty 

from the target ar'(:a. lit complc:tlon of the mission, the 

firing battery dlGpl~ced to a r0riClezvous arc£!. in the l'hird 

D!ltt0.1inn,. Elev(,nth 1 V 1')]'in(;8 fi:clng a1'88... 

4.0ctober 10bO 

Returnecl to :('t.:;ndezvouG area:'at 0800. 

activity furing the day. 

No further 

6 October 1960 

The Eleventh M~rincn dinp1acGd by motor ffi8rch to 

its Gt~~in8 ar2~ at Inchon, Korea ~t 1630. 

6-7 October 1900 

~hc battery rClli~incd in the ctqging are~ refitting 

oquipl!lcnt ?nc.1 making p:ccp8.rcttlonn for furth~'r op.;rations. 

8. SN~iJIY 

. No org~niz8d enemy were ci~htcd. Upon complotion 

of the fire misoion at 1930, 3 October 1900, enemy fire 

dentroycCl. the prcvil:ilsly occupi rid Cqt t no rocket burnto VoTere 

. Geen in the tar~et area, therefore it i8 considered 

that the battery expended 480 rockets th~t failed to 

detonate due to improper fuzes... At no time durinG this 

p(;:ciod wac 8_:i.r otnLrvatiqn or a.ctillt.;f'Y oblit,;'rv;.ttion 

8.vail ;lblc. Upon f r0cGipt of correct fu~e8' the miBnlon 

fired in Dupport of the Sevonth M~rin~c WQS considered 

exc'cllcnt as evidenced by th~ surveillance report. be.ned 

upon til.:; r(J8ultc ottained from this miDsion, it is 

believed th~t eimiliar excellent effect would hqve been 

reported for the; m:lnnionc fired G:.lr1i cr i·n fiupport of 

the First Marines, h9d proper.fuzeD been Avqilatlc at 

th!·1t tinlt.. 

5 -

lff?SNDIX FIVS 11'0 11'lH MbHINZb S}~CI.hL 

bC1'ICN REPORT 

a. The plan of l~ndint Lho rocket batt~ry in 

LVII rei 0 cGnnid(;l'"1ed. excellent. 

b_ The principles and tactics BG taubht ~t th0 

Fiold ~rtill~ry School~ MCS 1 ~nd in p~eviouo 

training with thu ~~nth M~r~ncD arc considered 

sound. 

c~ The MolA4 fuze appar8ntly f~ilcd to arm whon 

fixed with th~ rockctD. 

d. It is recommended that: 

(1) 

(2) 

(.3) 

( 4) 

( 5) 

(6) 

Rounds com8 fixed With fuzeD. 

'lh!J..t !J.n artilli.::ry rcconnaifHFJnCS 88I'ts Cant 1 

111108 (0846); be inclUded in the b8.tttSry 1].:/0. 

That a TCS radio be aGGigned for use when 

opcrqting qS a direct supporting unit to 

an inf~ntry regiment and for air observer 

control. 

~hat the rocket launcher be a uclfpropclled 

weapon capiJ.b1e of tOil'Jlng Dn ammuni ti.")n 

trO.i1l;r. 

r~ehat 0. more relia-cle· ratl.io LG Gubstl tut cd 

f'or the BCR 619. 

11he lVi5lA4 fu z(; not ·Ce uned wi th ruckst 8. - 

~4J l;6..v/t7~ 

E. A. BUSHS 

AlJNLX 

- 6 -

THIS 

SECTION 

CONTAINS 

OVERLAYS 

REFER TO 

ORIGINAL 

FOLDER

·Al\i~\f:.sx ~I'AR::' T;'~'f:~F:.. ~O 18rl~ lLL.-qI~~j: DIVISION SPZ;CI.!i.L 

bCTIO','J HEPCRT 

1i cr, S?J:. Kcre 0'1 

25 i\J7Cr~b6:C' 19[0 

• 

Frorn~ 

To: 

Subj: 

Ref: 

CosD8.r:cltng Of I'lc e~'" 

C:;~J:'1'J.L(~in6 lk.n0:t·;.?ny 

"Blf C'.:;;!Tl~~~'tny 

II C II C O::1~!r' ny 

UBi,fC 

USN 

USMC 

USN 

USMC 

DSMC 

USi~C 

37-819 

2-10 

16-l98. 

2--10 

7-·214 

7-202 

'7-20'5 

L t Col. E • F. U_~NN 

C~pt. 

Jr. 

F. Z. GF .. ·:~NUCCI 

IvIHj •. J.P. TREADli~LL 

C~p t. R. Hb.AL~T ~ 

It.£.' .. j 4 A. J. NOON_;:j~ 

Al'>JlJ.2X T; .. R~ T~~ TO lST14;ucJJIV SPE;CI.::..L ACTIOl~ R~PORT

R. The GRr1y om)lsymcnt :f this livisi_n nrevon 

to"~" havint: cr:,m~j1e tc,L I irc0ti 1r0S fr _,m hi.i:h2r ('3ho- 

1,: ns R'\rqi1pl'l.:: - t the ti:!lc: '-;l~nnin;j hy'.: t," 1'::6 ini ti!4.- 

t8 -, • Pl~~nnint~ J then, :'L~:2h ',8 ''1 .' n f'r~t[Ll2n tt~lry ins true t- 

i,ns ?n~ "Jr ,CCc.;,'c '1 ,:...n !:~ c nTurr.;nt :"::~lcic in '-'·11 units. 

L~~;is tic IJIRnnint( '"tlHS, f.r ths :!}- E t ~:Y1rt, p,:;cr~'J.'~;lish 

~'.. ~:,y ,1ivici,n, since the strtvinf! p.,n~~ 2TIfnrk!:',ti,_ r.. f:~r 

K rep. hR_~ t_ '-; start.:'l im::'L:: '.i~tt61y u-;:'n HrrivP,l !J. t 

h.,_Le. . • 

!,:. r::his t~~tt~:lifn v-l:-'S y 89 .hut-"us t. On 3C .=tui-'us t 1 

th.; "Jl~ln5 

f .. r' 1:...?~ '~inf: " f LVTs :_ n LST.:; lI{flich hf!.·~ t . -,.C 1),8,2'::;.:'1 .n 

the ~l~n f.r l~n,~in~. 

, In -', n '. r ':I 1 t'")·,,::- r . -, r ri n" 1 " f 'r q 

L. C'V 1 e.. c. ,. ,1 ... ,-, . " c.; ~·r,.l. t.-. .. ~. 

II. . n"- '- 

tri) If Ship-t, ..-Sh' r:.:: IIL 7c:m,. r:t ---.f thl: 172 LVTs in th8' 

i·~_ t t 0\li . n, l·',n .. :inf~ the '::,8 S~tul t t,?. t t;:'-.li. nE ... f t h-.:. 13 t 

J.Jlp~rinC8 'n PL]i:, 2E:~Ch.s3' Ol~:~.qn' TjO, ::;{l·:.tr!:lnG')',rtini:~ 

tr 'l'.: tr ~',c l"nlr-n~ t t:;""""lor ·;'J·:', 

c_, .... tl·-:r~~c.J . V,,-\...I" l.n .. ,:",- ...,.~ll'ti,'n 

~ '., '.-'. !:l 

_ 'oJ' .,/\......- .... - .,... vlJ.'-J '_.t. , 

1. ~tt~~li ,n p 't;ninistr:-1tivc . r,"1,Er 1;'1.9.2 ~-~r,>Ci~~r~/: t su,)"'; .rt 

the..; 1.~.:;n1.in(i} ~")r' vi·~,in· th~~t suff'i~'icnt' su~·)"'}lic.,s 0.11::. 

equi~')!Tlcnt ijV,l/_l'~ ~,c c!:'lrrie;, in the RB.£9u1t LifTs t: su-::-)~)',rt 

this ;-:,.'.ttr:..li n !'s!1'r(. until t,icn{'r'='l,unl~rt",inV WP.S in 

8ff\:.;c t n _ th'Jr L2 P CI1CS ~ Nl'(istic t:~il =;'-u:) ,f DLUE 

BS~CH vas pl~nn2~. The 1st M-rin:c wsr0 ~-visG~ ~f 

th·.:::, c8:)pt-ilitics ·:--f LVT::: f r trc'ns~) rtin;-J ';;r,:;-lrR.ls H~ 

:11:'l::i1:: :lurft"',)s pn' t,· k full ? Tv~nt~~V': ;,'f this 8U-:!'-}~lrt. 

(;. ~::":;.'qU?t,; ~,8ri8,1 ~)h,.t s \'\T2r.~; n, t QV!:1il!,:l:lc 

t:' trief \-tP.vc C'ffi:Tl?n":crs ~ n' Berch (;:x;i ts. Suell 1:ri8fin~ 

'n the ~l~n w~s ~{8sit10 ~n1y 'n m~~s Rn~ h~lft 

n.:: r 11 t ',_ S • 

ANf";X T;.B~ Th.R~ TOlSTMiiRDIV SP::'CliiL .nCTION RS.?ORT 

-2- .

4. .J'RAINING ~¥'JD REHEARSALS 

NONE 

I 

t 

I. 

5~., LOADING AiJD ~'iBARKATION 

a. Slnc6 tni~ u~ltl8 organic equipm~nt was 

on eight v66sels 8.pel un~ce.dlng 'v~s interrunted by 

8. sev~re typhoon, loaqlng ,c.tnd. ol1bark3tion actually 

toe;k pIp.ce while ~Qrn~ eqll~pmant was still being un~ 

loadedi . ' 

b. Because mc~t of the battalion's LVTs, except 

those f1lreqdy In Kopewl th n.A n CO!!l!)o..ny, \vcr£) 

shipped directly f~ci~ ~Rrs~oW to the deck stqging 

area in S~nDi6go and th~hQe to Kobe, thorGugh inspection 

~nd maintebpnoe ~~~ nccess~ry to re~dy them 

fcr the ceming c"?elHJt~on.' +fl thIs phase. of the operation 

this un! t ~/PS fbr~unRte In h~ving "An Company 

less 1 plRto~n p.l:rC24y· ~et llP in Kobe and rC8.dy for 

cperqti~n. Immedfa~6l.f ~pcp,arriv81 of the.batt~licn 

an LVT pnrk WP.s o~t~.b+~elle4' ncar the foot of pier 

six. All LVTs b~lng' ~n+~a4~q were transported by 

wAto~ to this aroBfPr000eeed;briefly by battalion 

maintenanCE; s~ction, dl'strl»u'Sod to eC!:l::>anles and at 

compRny lev'e1 were madf; ready for oper8.tion. "Att , 

ConpRny was plRGcd 1n charge cf unloftding LVTs and 

other companies were assigned tel readying their own 

vehIcles as they arrived 1n LVT park. This work was 

hindered by many things including insufficient room 

and facilities at LVT park and l~ck of ~quipment, 

spare parts etc, some of which had.. not been Unlo~ded 

by the tirnethc battalion sailed. "An Company 

lived ,at Camp Carver while th\3 remainder ot' bRtta1- 

ion weB housed aboard USNS MEIGS at pier four. 

Lack of lighting faci11 ties at LVT park lim! ted 'work- ,~ , 

lng h0urs'to dp~y11ght. The typhoon of 3 Soptember, 

made it impossible to doe,ny l:crk th,::,t ;:1o.y.' 

Ne~r the end. of this period uAnCo!Il~)e_ny was brought 

up to a strength of 52 LVTa wi th the f "r'"1':1tlcn Cr '" no 

platcon. On 6 Septe!llber tha finel landing plA-n was 

received from 1st MRrines and the landing diagram, 

assignment of LVTs to waves was accomplished., Until 

'.these plans were completed the loading plan was 

necessarily delayed until' thelaat minute. On? 

a~d 8 September lo~ding of LVTs on LSTa was accomplished 

qt pier six. At 1130 8 September at a conference 

'~i th theS-3 of the 1st Marines on board 

USB NOBLE 1 t w~s found necessA.ry to change wave 8 ':In 

BLUE BEACH T\iO to wave 9 on BLUE BEACH T1JO. Emb~,rkation 

of ryersonnel on LST wes completed at 1200 

on 9 September. On 9 Septe!l1ber p.t 1500, 1 t w~s "founa. 

that tr()ops on LSTs611 and 1123 were reversed in 

rel?.ticn to landing plan. It was therefore necessary 

to change wp.ve co~~e.nders between t~e6e ships. On 

10 ,September this uni t sRiled :rrom, Kobe ,for the targot 

area'abo~d following ships;' 

LST 611 

742 

745 

1123 

1138 

0058 

KA 106 

LST, ?15 

802 

1048 

1134 

Q,C)36 

QO?3 

I • , ...... 

. ANNEX TARE TARE TO lSTl·~· .. -liDIV SPECIAL ~I-eN REPORT •

F:. 

R-:-utino 

7 • OPEfu~T ION 

(1) LSTs in which'this tattf11i:n W~lG cmtarkca 

l~unch~l,all LVTs ~t 1530 ~n D-~aYl 15 S0~tt3mL.0r, 

tc l)r,=·cce,'~. t, thcc'-..-ntr ,1 vcs8(;1 at tht:; 

Lln~ r:,f D2parturc which lvas 5500 y~rls fr '!!l BLQE 

BEn.CH. ~ll ~)hgSL;S' :,.;f Ship-t~-Sh_r(l m--vt:mcnt were 

extr8m~ly c~nfus01. J.J!:"l.ck'.f· 8uffici-::::nt tui,·l.c t._ :-t.ts 

ne~rly causc'l c _mD18tc failure ::f Shiry--:-tc .... Sh:ro·. 

m~vcmcnt. Fc..ur (:1) t(ui'ls t:.ats war,: pr.~vi:1C'1 .wpor~. '. 

d~,ctrine in U. S. F.e c~110~ f.r 2 ~6r w~vs- ~r_32 •.' 

(FGr c(m~ents ;~nccm:nunic"',ti .DS BCC- ::1!)~l€nlix):,,' 'Tho 

8tr',~ng' ti(l€: in ·the- 'rendczvrus. "ar6R 'r8sul t~~'. 1'n 0' n 

sl:':er~cl~lc mlxln,." :'f W8.VCS . .in 'T")::'Sitl':-n \\Thllc wpitin'-" 

t~· 14 

,..., 

[' " ...Jt,; "l·S-.... 

... ~,::. 

"'·t'·C'l"'>,l 1.v>- t ~'n~ LJ ,..; "·:"'3c'n , ..;;;..'. -~ 

"ctup-llv '. ___,], ·t'l·' It:...- 

C ntr':~l c.r -;_is~!p.tchinC;f-:n.... cell W!:.'.vcs 1ct~'cncrptc',~ 

t~ such q St~t8 th~t it WqS n~cose~ry f:r LVT p0~ornncl 

tc b:R~1, Lqnlin~ Crqft t- relly wqvce an~ 

""iv~' ,-r:~ "'\~.Q fr·-'m q'h'r~r'",!· t'h' ., f'\ ntrr 1 V"'C! or;l t ,'1l' c_ 

r Ow- .~~~-.., • L, __ • "._ ....... '-' ... Vv ........ · ... "-' 

:latch them tc ',~6~.ch; Visi'--ili ty fr-l"11 th2. Lin.: ~ f 

Dc~)~rturc ·t= ,p.~·F)r,~-;xim~tcly 80C yqr'::.s fr"(T!l _the lHn'~- 

1nf t,c pcll 1.- e t\v80n H .':')lu8 2C p.n' H l)lus 1, 50 r,q,nf~t;'1. 

frcm a":maximum: f 400 y~tr'~ s to', a minimUl'll :"f· 1{'. yn.r~ls) 

c,'ns8quen tly the· :;.'Il~:S :'-nco (f. f:ui'~c ;~ - ~ ts qn'l the .q;- 

sence '·.f ;c !fi~Jass\;s· in the 'LV'I's m:l·'.c th0 lan~;in

, 

l~e8.rly 9,1.1 of tll.2 172 LVTs Gf this unl t lqnded Gn 

BLUE BE~CH TER3~. In spit0 :f the c0ngesticn, in 

all Cp ses t{}~,:r0 l.JPVC6 l!"'naod in t~c t on BLUZ BEACH 

THRE~ the Fts8 C1 ult trJ::ns lJ"cr8 tr,:,.nslJortsd in LVTs 

oi th-sr tCi th0ir in! ti0.1 ':bjcctivDS Gr other selected 

loc?:. tions clcp~nc1ing cn th~ decisicns ITlf'.de by infantry 

unit cs~~~nders. By 2015 15 Sc~tamb~r all 

LVTs 8xcept six \A[cre ~shcrct! Of theEe six, tilvO srtnlc 

in dC8p wpt6r after ~ngine frl1ures, two sw~mped in 

mud flats f!:r to the left ')1 BLUE BEACH ONE aDd twc 

8WaD1U8d off BLUE BE) 

.. CH T1l0. Onc 'Jf the LVTs sunk 

in decD 'tfPtcr c.~nt?in0d 'all ':;f the: bntt!'\li'Jn t s sll~.ll 

stock ;f LVT s9~r6 pRrts, thD ether c:ntqlned Rll 

cC.Jlrrlunicpticns rcpnir oqul;?mcnt ?nd s~JPrc 11?rt8. 

Tl;1e bPtttClll:)n yP 't-.ras 6st·qblished 100 YF.rde inland 

at center 8f BLUZ EEACH.· Security mc~sur:s were 

t2ken but n,Jthing cf no:: to occurred during the night. 

Congosticn sf vehicles on the b00Ch W2S extreme and 

. it W!='~8 nscessary te, ;n~;vc all vehicles r:.ut Just befcre 

davJ'n in crder te, disncrs'o the7:l in F'cniiciDRtic;n 

~f en~my artl118ry fIrs, ~Thi$ wns qccGmpliGh~d 

successfully th:jugh it tiP'S dlffi~ul t ?nd d?~ngcrous 

,beoause ,qf tho cc,ngestl~n of' tr':Y)l")s in thc' area. 

--'i .. :' • - 

(2) Throughcut tho. day :-f 16 S,optember this 

battall::,n c':',ntinucd in diro-ctsu'D")ort Qf 1st Narincs. 

Most LVTs st~ycd with the units they transported ashore 

and Rssisted in dis~lqclng them f~rward, 8VRCuRting 

cRsuqlties and trRri89:rtin~ ~~munlti8n and 

supplies '¢lir6ctly·t8 thC"units reqll:qsting them. 

Exam3/1es vf types nnd chPcrp,cter 2Jf' support furnisl1.sd: 

. (a) TSgt Pe . 

- ~ .. I I 

.-lmer H. DARR0:H J NCO in 

~Gharge flB" Cs~pany LVTs 23) 24, 46, 48, 49)1 mcvcd 

,. cut from BLUE B~CH THREE, with "Cn B[1.ticry 4.5 rock 

. e'ts and tc.,ck up p::;·si tions pt crcssrc9.ds TA 93

, 

\. (;,1 :1.: 1-:, L{ -1~" 0r;~ -= .~~T~~~:,N:COROUGH, It c tt 

C'::iTI.;any.. 16 s.e:)·tC:;:T

t 

raoonnaie··.·~e:.,:; Vias UP6Ucc8e.sful :=lni} the forces wi thdrew. 

FOl.~r~VTs v:riQh 1\:I.J~CC !'}lire:1 in the; river mud 

were ab':::irJl\.·~·nc~1 C~lt ~,TC1>2 r.:-:ccve:rec1 by their plRtoon 

leader during th~ Res9.ul t Gress ing the following 

mcrning~ . 

Al though tentRtiv0 p1f-tns f:·r the fcrmRti0n, 

time of dCpHrturc Bnd assignment of troo;?s to LVTs 

had been made cArlier, the first indications that·the 

reconnaisance had baen un~ucccssful necessitated a 

review of planning. Cons2qu~ntly, r8~roscntatlves 

of this battalion c~nforrcd c~nt!nuausly at 5th 

M~rines CP from Rbout 2230 to 0430 20 September, at 

which time it was clecided to cress at a nqtive 

ferry :')oint, in w~ves of fr:.:;m two (2) t:; ·six (6) 

LVTs. All I.JVT wavc,s beating th;:; 3r dBn, 5th lvlarines 

fermed in WFtV0 fcrmaticn ~,t th~ Lino of Do:)arturc on t.e 

friendly bank cf the rivar and remA.in2d in, pl8.o'e for 

ten (10) tc fifto0n (15) mj.nutcs - l'); 

.. ssibly a dangerous 

cxt2nsicn e,f stanriRrc1 ShiT)-tc-Shcre t~ctics. During 

this :)cricd naval gunfiro·- c:ncBntrR.tlons :9l~qnned ao 

prelimlnQry bombar~llJnt 2000 YP,rds inl~nd, in the final 

salves fell unccmf')r~ablY close t;. the 'lssembled waves 

at tl:;l.6 Line :if Dt:;parture, '+110 1st w~.vc left the Line 

of Departure at 0645· at TA 0762-G with "Att Ccmpqny, 1st 

AmTrFlcBn trf=l.nsporting 3rclBn, 5th M~rincs. Aggressive 

action of th~ LVT(A)s of the 56th &~TracBn., U.S.A., 

which wertS in 8up:Y)rt, c(;ulJ. have provided very e:ffcctivedirect 

fire s\1I1~!crt from pc,si tions near the Lino ot 

Departure. Al thcugh LVTswere unjcr fire fr()m .rifles, 

anti-tank rifles and heavy machine guns during the crctJs ..... 

ing, and recelv8cl no less thRn tw·:; hundred fl1 ts including 

a few 11.5 mm AT and.. 80JlO ty~')e sf small, ex,lcsi ve 

projectiles, the armor 91ate and cov~rs on the LVTs, 

,(.LVT (3) c), prevent eel Rny casual tie s t-:' the inf an try, 

while this unit sUstPtin€,1 only 1 KIA an~l 3 'vIA. This 

was t()rtun~te since LVTs were f:.rcod to stop at the 

anposite eh~re and form into cclumn due t~ the narrow 

bee.ch ex! t. As was attompted in th0 Inchen landing, 

LVTs'tr~nsport€1 th~ Inf~ntry dlr~ct1y to their obJectives 

and assembly areas as far as 2000 yards inland. 

Amphibious Trucks (DUIGv I 8) were schc;luled to carry 

Kcre~n Marines acr~ss th0'rlve~ Rft~r the 5th M~rines, 

but the firet DU~ifS lca~eQ with troops found that once 

in 1{he river they could. net exl~ on elth~r b~nk, SQ 

the LVTs alsc·tr9.nsp'Jrt.;)d the KMC battFtlicn across • 

. From 21 to 23 September this un1 t su:")ported. 1st 

Shere Party BattRlion in .est.~blishing rln1 operating 

a river ferry nt TA 0762" and by hauling supplies and 

eqUipment tCI fcrwE,\.rc"!. elements of 5th MRrlnes. At 

the river ferry, LVTs· trqngp~)rtl0cl Jsc;ps, KMC p..n:1. ROK 

troops I ammuni ti"., n, supplies anc. eqUipment acrC8S, 

river.. On roturn tri~s they carriecl woun;lecl anel POlvs. 

At 20311:n 23 Se 1 Jtember this battalicn r·eceived 

orders at. Divisi'~:n, CP" to transpc"rt the 2nttBn, 1st 

harlnes acrose the Hen river in th0 vicinity of TA 

1556-M.· Again plans .w-a"re ma·,le hastily stnLl a· route 

fer LVrs 'was r8c~nnciterec1. fr~m tho .AmTre..cBn areCl. 

t·: th0 pr.::spactive crcsslng sitB. LVTs departed the 

CP aroa p_t 2/ 100 and. trR.velc·,i tr; thB infantry assembly 

area ever the prcvlcusly r0cGnncltere~ r~ute 

ANNEX TARE TARE TO lSTMARDIV SPECIAL ACTION REPORT 

-~

on 

j, 

avoiding. thcr·fbh 'li;;_''',~l';,:;V~''l' Y>,'f-sJ 1'j_~ p .-It ·~1:'11r.;n :::n 2.:1 

Sc:p ..... t :··m1~ -' _.v nr 

-J .~ ......... T'" ··c, ~J--_L ..... ' ··t:,_ ,~ _ ~ 

~ ..__ ,'."1'" ~ 0,·:_ ~ 

~~~! . - '. ., 

fJ ",.) (f~:-... :- .~~:::._ '-)r;:,:·.=;~l·'a--. 

tl ~,n, . nti C ~m;)(-~r .. ~·,.' I J ,-, ,.:, ~.: ".": ~ .'(' ,~:~. :- \'IJ..~:-- v\ir~''''~'! r:"c ':'~ v 

_ ..... L .'-' . ........: .•-..J 1 

'::"\ 0 

in :'"'m1-] "- F')"" ,. q -. '{ -,.~ -.,,' .• . .' • r·· ,.. -. . .'•.-' 

tho 

. s:;; c~~ .... VL ,•.:.••,1 ,..• -;. ". J ..... ){It·, v dH. ·C'.' .. I .• ...... r. bdul ... ~ 

riVer ..... The crt,3sint=- ·V0.8 DUCC~88fuli~" ~:..;~.:m1.)11oil.s .. 1 

at .Os'QO: w.l.th .tt'AIl C ..:"ni~)RnY·f-ln,J.'n#. ~l!1f.'_t.=.C~1 ('f' "Gil C';m- 

.:J.~1l¥"l;\w;:P}~e. 

. . '1,.1' t 

_"B.' ': C ·~Jl~)any{1~;j:~:~.}~~~~i·l~~;J:'~~~l):rp.tc .f.orry 

1fI' O'r]62 1 lfRJt·~.,.,····,,,,,~,,,· ~.'l~ ~.-:. . ., ' 

·lIR. . ~~;a ..' ·... n . f ·-!:r~. ,i:.. ~~';''';: ~ '.1 ~ ';L,~~l~"~_ 

m Ve, .'. ~\f~J.l J_~ R,. ,...:t .., t, . .l.C"" '- 1 b __ .L.'"" _ t. Rn 

aJ'ct.F! in 'X"nt',}:: nr·'-,,3?;· n":,A.r 'T.A· 1~,52 ...,E" '.·.ll13,tL~C.(im....;.. 

"I). 1'tl .. tho :lst· ,Mar::Lric:. Dlvi-sir:nZ.I.",.f :H:ctl::;n 

1;1~,·terr1cs 

""-\t T.i1 :u?'6'2"':'GJUl·; TA' 15G,s".r\f,! 

;Ii'" t: .;' . . , . . 

: select1' n .. -:.f ,the. or~ S'binC, si'te ,. th-:; b~·t- , . 

. 1nf',:-'rm:e\.' it ~lR,S t~. ,su;~~-~,0rt ,t:1C. ,3Zn~~. ·.Ih{~n t 

,R6s~.ul·G·· cr:'8.s,lnt ~.:: ,T1E): ,:S.P:.t,t':'l:ll:n· Ccj'!:nf:l,n.~_(,r 

:••• V(};~sl:t,c -;. tho, 32nrl:Ipf!";n:~:ry ,'.. QPan I ii-, i tl.~{tc~l 

.1'1ann-1n..:" ,q t 1600. The, 9rc o_tint'- E 81~c t8:-~ waa 

~_iQ'~}1·~1l.'· )tar; .~ .~'q mH.'~.c';!l~t· 0630' ,(0·;25 Sc:~tolli' 

A1i; -, . 

. ~ ..." f. f -~;" . f apc'my~ ln~ ~ :ui ,.~~)?~n•. r~x:1:~::ja1~: ,tl~'~:~' 

. nl.'G,· an~nc11rcct r.cu~.;; W!lS- (t6.cl,~:e..#', u~·cn. '. T!1As 

.Oh·ta.11D~:' c,v'orlr..n!l travel f::-r P. ::'lst'ancc of .28 

~c'c·."':;~J.JIa.·fr:·m·· ~'·:n~·~l·",n

C 

' 0 

" 

". 

• 

• 

• 

At ·n.-b,)U~t' 1.300 the CGr~)s COffi'j9.nder visl. t,sc1 th~::; 

crossing site, dirBct8~ 2 domcnstr~tlan firin~ by 

LV~(A) IS ':;f the 56th A'11TrR,cBn, USA., vvhich hp.d ba(;n 

ord6rcr~ tb",C~,(:S8" the;' r+ ycr, . p,pd r'Jde qcrc ss the river 

in hl8jca~) ::l.boqrdanLVT.' During this pariod the 

ccmpl~te l~ck of qnything similar to q Shero P~rty ori 

the friondl:Y"be.nk':was· mcto·C1. J 

whlch resulted in th;) 

cffic8+S' of this batt~lion ,lsEuminf thrtt rols-.' They 

dirbctsC1~h0r'Jturn ,at cp.su?.ltl.Js frc,m the fpr'bank, 

ovacuq tien from the fr18ndly 8~:iO, priori ti8S of It:lter 

vehicles ~n~ 8u~~li68f~r er6ssing, qnd tr~ffic in tha 

ber:ch !:).rca. 

By 1600 25 Scptcmbev,tho 32nd Inf~ntri Regim0ht, 

axcept f~r !:) tew vehicles, w~s comjletcly ~cross Han 

river. As seen qS thiswe.~ 

nc~r the cr:Jssrc£:>,cls :tn, ~/j Gini ty :;f S:tnsn-Ri r:.nc: ombR.rkad 

~ ROK regiment fer trhneDcrtaticn 3crcss tho;river 

tc the right of ?"~h tJl"'"ici,:,n tr8r.;~1s~ . .h6'8.in, n.s eqrlior 

'in the s~=tma fLqy,' O-"12"'1Y C:)TjC 81 ti·'n Wf-lS cncQunt0red 

in the. f:::rm Df 76:nm pnt;i...-t~nl~ ~~un ·~.nc:'m.Jrt~r firo cn' 

landing beaoh. H~wev0r nc sarieus CRsuqlti~s to parscnnel 

or veh~olcs were received. In this l~nding due 

t: l~ck cf exi ts frc·m the be?ch" trc~'~')s 'ticre c1obarl{c;d. 

cn the levee. 

eccc;-rr;lishocl.., LYTs' ::tssomblcd 

UDen c:::m:;.;lctic:on cf tfi8 0.ssQ.ul t phR.SO of this 

crf)ssing, tho battt-"'.lic,n c18l)arted for i·ts CP qr~C:l. 

nOPer Ki::1po. airfield lE:?ving He" G~!!l~Jo_rJ.y nC,

; " 

Asc,::'m'Ct ty"" t~l.)r\:J)y ~vr'l :,int~ the usp. "("f MSR as much 

2.S 'l';)(8'8i:::10'.· ' 

"(j~~~';~f;'};i i·';~k.~t!~,~:.~~.:,:" . 

. Tho bF.tt'rtc' inf?~p.try 

was ",il~dF'~ in SUCC 68sfully, R t ta.inin~, i t::!~· 

jcctivos. In th...; CP.S"'; _f uUl"r-/~rt furnishel the.; 7th 

Infantry Di visi ~n, U3~~) 0r..~1~~ sur:::: (1), 1e tt.sr --:f 

c:::;m'TI0n:l~~,ti~:n fr_m Ckjplr-n-:1in: 'Goncr~l is'f intc,rost. 

nctu~l nUffil r sr o~8u~lties inflictc~ ~n the 

enemy Ftrc n,~t kn::..wn, '11 tll'.:u~h 8 'JD un ;,::-u::t0:1y \1Cre 

,inflict8,~. ' -In 'i t's ,;iJ:}c-r2~ "_ r~ 10 as·~, 8U~T')"rtinl:: 

unl , . t ,'c 1 8men 1-:' v8 ,,;.;·fU_S f t" ~ .. ·: .' C,C".J l' n t 'urn.:;;,,: 

~' 

vcr l)rlS' . :·ners 

:f war t, 'tlljP_c0nt uhi c~~, l)tirin: the y8ri,-::, 'rur'\:Jn 

c~su~lti08,w~r~ 3 KIA, 3G~I~J 2n, 1 Di~~ .f ~cun18. 

a. Ple.nnin f 

£n Rm)bi~ifn tr~ct:r srfanizpticn has the 

misGi-=:n~~;f trp,ns-'j':l·tin/ pn" I p n".in( e.ssP.ult tr,:-c~s ;--:-;n 

~asi~nate~ ~c~chj~~ In 'th~ Inbh:ri 1~nJlnfth0 plqn 

c!:l..l] E>T fr c~ntinu5 n~, inl~n'~ 0.n"1.ischarginf~~, tr',:,:,'~!8 8.t 

thoir cb"i8C1;;ivc;s •. 'J:' 'c:~cc,':c:lish this, tnt. we,ve 

c·~mmon lore ?ni~ crcVl chi-.;fs :~f \ c q ,o:':1 LVT w!:'vc must ;)€ 

th;.'r':, Ut'hly ;:,riefe"'. Du' t,..· 8ccuri ty c' nsi '~.0r~ti :ns 

thcs0 ~)Or8 rtnsl Q~[l. 1:-::8 :l~iofc' ~ nly nftcr sr~il:lntJ fer 

MLiEX Tr..RE T,:-R~ TO 18r:t:~L'i?~DIV SFECI;:..L _7Cr::ION -REFORT 

, -10-

\ . 

.\ 

AJIIti ... - 

'. 

• 

the.tarEct.Fcr~th~ _~~vemcnt t: Inchen, psrscnnalof 

this p,attf.l·i'~.n ·11.ere. .'R15·7·£1·r:~ 12 LSTs. 

, Duririg 

L· .' V C'. . '\;j 

r8st .re,l. Tho tract'rs f l -'r~leqse(l ",r:.,ulcl 80 replRcec'.. Ftt' 

r"nc~;"· ~f n: ,..".';1=;1 'Q'n'! m .. r· ..... t=:ffl'C1' i-"Sn. t SU'_.J-.:J·: ... rt c;.~,·ul{l 'DC 

",. ,t;. ~ ... " . v ,c.;: __ 'oJ~!., , .... J. , .... ~ ll. ..-.,. .., ~ . ~ ._ 

ru.r-ri1iheJ.·b:~r'ti10 iimTracs .(I.Lte t:: bc~tcr c'-~·ntr,:l, I 

me.lntenn.n·ce ane:' 8Uii~)ly ,; 

\

.""i :Vert· hit~'h'=~ t~r~C'1 ''''f:m,t.1;:iii~Y .. was ~chl(:ve,:t. ";Y' 

this be~tt~li:,~nlur1h~.':~e::£tch, ~_n:l.· than: ::'".n .inlp.n,'. t'· the.ir o;!jbc ti V6{ 

. A~""'~' ,.:,,.., -as·s""ult1"!:I,ttr.1ll··-n ·n'l1· ·... ht· thu' '"" 1"c: 1,,.·.nt .... ., as 

0 .... - v.~.~~ •.. ~ ~.1~."~._ I. '." ·X- -..,. ~_l"t-:-"'~. ,;". ,'._

. 

... 

~, 

•• 

vl- ul" h~_vc c:.::rtqin 'tvic.us 9.~_vpn tnt'cs in r2,pi·1. seizure 

:f ~bJcctl~os, sccuring bettor c ntr~l, re~ucinf ~qnfer 

fr:mba'~:.ch ')nininc, ·an-1·lnr2·1ucing c' 'ng',;sti::'n- f brth 

tr·:- ~p£,' ?j'I\-'~ :vehiclc.s',cn ·b8?cll. 

" 

It is rccc.m:non--1,c·!1 thq t f.:l. stuJ_y be mq.~c " f this 

t:y::>~ ~f l ,n p ling ~'tn'l ~.m·Jhlt1··us expcrcisos ~JG G'-n'-=1.uctc,1. 

tc test its suitability.' ~tla n0t6~ thRt b~sontially 

thi~ type ~frn~ncuvcr wAs f~rcd~'cn the 5th MRrincs in 

th~ firs t rj:'v:cr'cr- g.s,lng. ·cf tho HRn, by th--::. np. tur0 \(-;f the 

bo~ch c~its; ~~r0 ~ll vahl01ae ~r~cec161 ~nlan~ ViR 

ns ·r8st·r·iC te/L exite, .. H0rc · th0 ~');rimary -1.. .ngcr 19.Y in 

Q 

the G nVGstl'-;nf WPVBG RS t flcy. f"rinc:-lint~-; c: 1umns cn 

thz enemy sh~rc. bcf:rc-pr~ccq~lnt inl~n~. ~n this CRsa 

a f _rma'ti,·/.n 11hioh ·was. fr-c.m the bcFinnini; a C·.:lumn 

eve-Iu ti~>n w'('ul-:l h r lV8 b0fHl ')roferat10 .n". \icul:'. 11'-:vc 

Q 

c~~nsi'1or?bly r0~:ucc'1 th,: C-ht:~8sti'=n p.t tIl":: ::;o'-'C1'l exit. 

I 

'd~ Ccmmuni8::-t~ ns 

(1) F

,:--, 

.Inthis c-nncctl n ;~lY ;ive(5/LV'rNPair P~Hot~' 

wcr~ carric"::" ty this ba;ttA.ll-n., 1.e.~: cne, (1) re- 

, triever 'pall~t per e ;:Ii~.'~!t~Y','~r~:pq. !(~:t) 'hul1~·r81)alr anJ. 

'n" (1) c"'nsurnn :'l"o l'.f.i IJ IH,Xiid ",," i~,,".> l, 

. v." .u '-.:"" tJ u'., tI /'":~~ Ill; ),,',' J- 'r1i :::\' :' , 

f 

,I • -; > .4-- 

Le ;:o,4. 's tr"r 0 ,Vc ba tterles D ~,ntinue . t:~ bo a 

s'"'\lrCG rf maj -:r \lGEl:J~ir in LVTs. Almcst Hll bg:tter- 

K("1yo' 

F!.n:fw~'·ul(1. nc't tFlkc q ·chqrge~ Tnis< w~s' (verce-mo by 

impr\::visQtl r ,nusing.1-1I m:,tr,r trqns'!,'rt b.at;tcri88 ~nl 

mcdlfylng the tarminale. ~ bRttery'wlth'lcn~cr 80r-' 

vice lifo thB.n th;J prJsent lcp.'1--c.ci,:1 be.tt~ry Is nee'1. 

etl. 

'iDS in th8 trqctnr·s W0re ·l.on/t 'vJ'l1onunl·~~tl"er~·at 

, .. 

Sl)A.r8 pe.rts f ',"r LVTs shr:ull [,;;:; r~>:,rganlz~'i A.n:l 

catalc)gue1 s,~ thFl t ,tlltJ 'Js.rts 1.istt.L".. f:'::r i,ssuc ::tn,;, 

usc by B.n am'·)hibie.ritrn,ct'~ b,qtt'CI,li;"n \vill su~":r')':rt 

the :;?resent -'(ltfinl ~l:, __ n (f '~r~'E'..riizp..ti,:·n~,l maint-onqnco. 

Quep tities:.f such i toms EtS 8D!J.:~k "")lu}/e, t::tr8 much tc~ 

l:,w, 3.n,2, in£-th~r items scl,':,·.m U80~=t qllanti ties are 

oxcossive.' It is fel t thqt n': s:v:.ra p~,-rts. sh,'-=ul:l :"6 

uso1 in rebul11in~'LVTs in Rny r~pair echel)n qbcve 

the us .. l.nb-::r.g:tniz ':t ti ,:::n t:.n.til j ::.:n:,unle.s8; IV'l: (3) s-P3r8 

~qrts 'arc R.f~air., in ~?r-: ~lucti;-,n. ':;xistinf st~cks ::f . 

spare parts in th~Unitc1'St~tcs arc in many categsrio 

s insuffici on t t.' 8Upj)Cr t ;' r ~~~ni ZFi, tl _' n '11 mc:;,in t enancorequ;i.rcID,snts. 

If ~)arts are 8X)9n~,C J. in ~rf;bui1:' 

in~'trqct~rs fGIl~wln~ extorisivc use, this c ;nditl~n 

w.;-ul,:l be furth6r ~e;~r?,vf:' tc,l. 

, ,A rcqulrcm0nt V?0.S n te' in' th~ 1 ~,n ",in f ( it Inch::n, 

anI particularly in th0 rivorferry c~crqtiGnsJ fer a 

lRrgo LVT C!1.:7.o,tle rf CA.rrylnf~. R .2 1/2 ten 6X6 'truck• 

. Thd lqck :f casuqltico t~ the 5th Mqrincs 

~,~urinfl ,the first ere ssinF:: '.... f th8 H~n River cnn 'be 

attributo1 iRrgcly t: th~s~ c~vc~o~ t~nctrs, with 

th6ir, inc~eAs0·1 ~erssnncl ~r~tccti:n. 

" . Tho LVT sh·:,:ul,·l. :),). L /., ~:)::-:>c': vii th fixc:=t hoa111ghts 

f":-:.r usc io.· ni~'h t m'~'vernci':' i 3 uhcn the s1 tu:;" ti:::n '11erm1 ts 

an.-l 8sP8cl~11yin lJ8:=tc;i'':' l~c;,I,-Fl'=tinr:: ::':7erHtl~~;ris ,which 

. n '. rm,< 01-1 y l-{r~Ct;v.. -,,. "', '~"'~.' :: ...... J 

r 

_ un>.~ ' , '1'" 1.:.1"_, " 'c"-c·~ .1.. .£~ • 

.h.n im~)r:~ vel 808,1 1 s n,;c)~:c:1 -:n ,th0 r?ITll,).. Tho 

life:;f the· ~')r8sc:-.r'I~ s-::r-~·i.: :1 s n': t, ~::oC!u.qte, ftl th;,-u~h 

::,1,'" rubber in thooe s6P .lsTl?y t..3 ,the .rc?s ~ns f:r' 

til"':;i!' sh::.rt lif6.. ' 

It ,was n, tc;, I~,n :tr~ct::r6 :ueD~0xt8nsively L'1 

river forry ·,.:pernti'."ns· that i.n:p. ,')cri':'" :-f'less th'rtn 

tttf. 1t{scks Jurinf': ",,11.1ch the ro.mp wHs',pr_bab,l'Y r.,qis.-) ~ .. 

"f:tn:i lcwcr~:"" ?OQ,-lOC;Cti(!l'=;s',"the raml) , cn:~l&. W.l/€ n,;tnp~t)tl;J-Y 

thr .uf~:h t'!:1C rcun-} c':'.bl~' guir~i} 81c~vo':n til": , . 

r?lIlpprcY)sr, s-licin~': i t f;~r P. t21stancac}f, sOV,or.z-l.l' . 

incheS • .J. Flel:~~ fix C, nsisto'~ cf wol:..llnt:~· 1:A.ck up, but 

~ht rOllbP' wcl;;1~~ oaUS8 s 'r~~-;)I,--i. wGP.r.~~ c}1.~JI~ssubsBqucntly. 

T..JtE ,T.riR~ TO lSTI·L~RDIV SP.~CI~il; ... ;'CTION.,~PORT 

) ,

'f ( 

/ 

This ele",;:v0 sh.~ul~'bc. :£Jt'rcri~th~.H1G;=1. nt the p:,lnt'~ 

f ,c::ncrt:'::enCt1 ,;:,f thE:; c'~tle, ,~n 1":L~ th siJ.cs. 

.. ':.' .. 

, The 811J"i tchbcx f'~r th0" lnt'srccmmunica ticri. 

syste~ i~ the LVlJ:(3):,(6) gh "ul:":, be re-1~catc:l, 

t,.' l)~ P.cc8s·£iblo,t .. the crc\v chiof\iTl1en s t.8.n:'.. 

inr:: in no c,f the hRtchE;8 on 0.1 thc.r S1/:.6 -:-f tho 

I!lr-:.chinc· [un ·mc;urits .'; 

It is, :felt, th·9.t TGB r~:tll,:--' installFlt1' ns in 

'LVTc ~h" Ull 1- ~ .. 1" cc : ;-'"\t':.nu·-", 'rp.. n· ..... y '.:)~ ~ 8,-:">1:-' r'm u c·,·.,· 

'U I,J,.. '-~ '-' ':~ '-' J. ~.1 t,... ". ~.... • '.+ t; ...... '... ' • .,... v ,~ 

~;y oT!lt-Jctancy f·.:r the. majcri ty 

:::.f the '.. th':l· majcr assGm::lics, lnc1ulin~ the . en .... , 

tine-. 

f. Rcccmmenlc~Chanies' ~n TablES cf Equi~ment 

Hn~l b.llc\lp.nc c s L' -' 

• 

Delete the 2no (1) truck, 2 1/2 t~nJ 6X6 7 

wrecking, p~r batt21i2n~ This item lcosrict have 

suff .rcient cap8.city f~r ~I(n8ral use in this Lattali 

;'::n • 

Delete the :nc (1) tract~r, he~vy, TD-18 

'w/ant···le:;'c.zer. ;'.nut18·-:;'rum ");~wcr c,'ntr~-l unit, anrl' 

n~~ht 1ightihC cqlli~)r;Ie\l t j y,er a:n~hibian ~rqc t.:r, 

cr"m)any R.n~l [1::' l. :. no tI.i cf thp.t 1 tern tc H&S Comp-. 

nny, makint.~ '? t>:'.l =:f t\vO (2) -per.cattnlicn • 

... ;'1-.:1 0nd (-:) tvJ'C wl:scl crRne (15-20) ten to 

T/E 4667 f'--:'r ·i.·I.;s..; with ~}resent tract -r· heavy, TD 

~8 W/Rnflelzc~~ 

'Ad~ f~ur (4) 'trucks,.·2 1/2 tcri, 6X6, tank, gas0- 

l ;n~ 71:=0 "",-," t:~. 111/::;' /:667 1"'1.l'nes p 

-I._v, \..1" ' ". ~.!J... 

-Y' ''':1= i .. i./"p q in

~·nc 

Glasses, ·>ficl'·.~.?· X: .56, ~utp.'~ri.z·c:' cy V~l.· II, 

:n tho ~2Bis _f ~n2 (l) nar line ~ffieer qn1 ~nc 

:Jcr LVT slLul:..to {{u_th:rl,zc:.;·':, .Dly _~n a ~c;asls of 

11) per lin0 sfti6o~~ 

R3 _luce the '9.1,:::" '~vrlnc0" ~ri ''V"J. II T/ ~ sf cc~ns . 

8X~)c~:.i ti)nary, ~5.3· ,:,'r ci1~ 5; ·f";pll~n" . .frrm fifty loO) 

~)cr LVT tc- fi-/c (5) ~0r LVrr. This' 'w"ul,1 rc '.uce the 

prosen tly auth~ risE>1.. t - t'-t1 fr -m 9

HE_~DQUART&-qS 7th INFANTRY DIVISIGN 

OF' :{1I'~;E OF THE COMY~NDING GENERi:.L 

APO 7 

5 Ootober 1950 

'SUBJECT: Oommenda'~ion 

Comm~nd~ng General 

~: C~r·ps 

aPO 909 

/ 

TO: 

!~:'r:'m&nrl} ng Offieer 

1~:3t ... L..:::p2:.io:l.!~n T::'c:~ctor B[~tt&lion (LVT 3 1 ) 

1?lE:et Ivi&ri .. le Fo:'ce 

i -'. 

I ""Jish to commend thE: offl cers £lnd men of the 

1st l'mp'kl·b·"r.n T'YH"'~~O'r" 'D r t:t r -l"i··, (T''1'T 3) who performed 

~. J.~ .... ,,,J.~ .\. ct.,.; U .... J--;),'.'

AG (5 Oct 50) 1st Indorsement 

HEADQUARTERS J X GOR?:) I APO 909, U • S .... ~my, 5 November 

1950 

I 

TBRU: Commc.ndif!g Genera7_ J 1st Mc'-'rlne Division 

Cornman·iing Officer" 

1st .b.mph:!.bi[~n 'rrLctor Bc"ttLlion (LVT 3) 

Fleet Mfrine Force 

It gives me gY'CDt pleD,sure tJ express my 

LppreciLtion fer L .job ~ltJ.l done .. 

.M--

• 

• 

• 

• 

2895·- f30 Is t_~'nT::,?~cBn, Ii'MF 

UODSE'.l1·, Koro~ 

22 Novembor 1950 

Apl)f;r.t:"l.tx: ~.~'vJ Annex TAEE T;_RE to 1 f, +:~l':r 11 J.~{ Spcc1:1l 

Ac tion Ei.cIJOrt fJ 

1. PL;;J~ N IN G. 

COHMUNICb.TI-ONS 

All comrnunie~~tlorJ. porsonnel of the 1st; A[\:)hibi~n 

Tr~ctor B~tt~lion wo~~ utilized to the utoost 

during the ten d?y ~jcriod. tho orgqnizD.tl.Jn st"'.gcd 

~~"t Kobo, tJ~.p"-n~ P.CC)P2I~ f'Y'oqucncic8 l,TUrC sot up on 

the ten chnnnuls ~nd the r~dio cquin80nt of t~o 

1?2 LV~r! 8 of thi s b,·~tt··llon 'tv-p.e CD-3(;l\:od" . All~~phiblqn trqctol"'S l?.nding th::; 

inf'~ntry BLT on BLUE F~ACH ONE "ltv-ould. bu on the C0~mo 

froq'ucnc:r r~:gn..~(':ilc2 s \i1:' tllc cOrJp2ny to liilich aCb~ 

ignodo Those tr~ctorc would b~ under tho control 

of the cO!J.Y)0.ny CO::l"'}'-.nclt>r. i!,rJth li;noill the r~LT cor.:I".1"rld"r 

irVr c r..L-~ dl' '-; .}~. 'Th' c.-,rn C 1r;r c:' 'ty'u·< for BLUE EE..;.CH 

v . ......... "-b :.l -. '- '-' _ .. J. ., _ v Irr.oJ _ ... .....,;- - 

TWO. As SGon ss ths initi21 mission h~d been co~plctcd 

rtl1d the crfc:'1rl~,;~ troops di8ci:vlrgcd, tho 

tractors would ~~turD to their p~r~nt co~p~niesl 

fr.:..q1..Acncy ,0.nd c!:..cc;}:e in vli 'l~h their otln Co~p?ny Com 

,it::,ndcr for f'nt~~::-'0 i~18 true t lons., 

T'l"J" d ~ cp" " ,. ·:--em '·n..... 0 f' +-'ll~ . 1 n t !; m-'" 'ill" b 1" .,... n f'1.L r C) c tor 

._.l.; . .a~l..' J...- ..... "v ... .:.~v ..J .......... _ ~ ~~....J . ,!,. .. 

BC'.tt,'"'.lion C(;~n~':.nd ?uct; C'..Gl1urC c'l.llcd for the 

.~.-L"!lphibl . ?c_ .. ~ ;l~~H __ 1'0 ]_.':''1:':.'. ~DIV ~;'J.' -_C1 . ..L 

'4C'~ ...i_G.b. \.~_ UET

f~nQ one' mile of illllr'e .. ,tVD-l/TT was prelcaded luts 

the executiV,€(3 tr&;et:~q~1LtrrL-9f~~~\{t;{1e neee: arcse' fr;r 

the in8tE~11Htio:-l Df~'\~~~~el~~PU'bfi~fi',llne immed.ietely 

upon arrival eSl1c;re ~ The remainder nf the comm. 

unlccition eoulpment d~-sj,red88hor,e, 8S soen fis 

p0ssible afier the initial lartdlhg,~~8 preloFded 

in an LVi' assigned to the communlcation'sectlcn .., 

Tbls-equlpment included an hN/MRC-?, 'rBX-8,_ BD-72 

Girll t-chboard:,' Twc ,SC:R-'510 Radio -Sets, Telephonesanrl 

:f;lTire-, 'sp&re trensmit'teru bud r60el vers for the 

8Ch~52b ,and sufficient maint;E'nf;nCe ec.:!uipment to 

eRtablish adequate m&inten~nce shop 0 ~he ~sslgn~d 

LVT w~.s,t,::'be trcnr;ft'X'r:18d. Into 8 mrbilerepair sIleI' 

ariee hsh~~e. 'hll signal maintencnce to be perf~rmed 

'by thin orga.rii'zc< t~'1n ~,(;uld be cc~. r1ed .. Jut e t ha ttLlil"')n 

level. ; .?he crrrrrbnic8i.\r0ul d 1-::--ing th€:l:-c' unservice~Lbl(l-,rFdlo 

,erU:l:pm~>nt t'l "'Gbc: _ ~;b t·eE: lion confi£ nil , 

pc,st- end receive in e~c'~h;'::1ge [) 3 e:.""vlc('c ble':ike ,item. 

Ccrnmunicct lon T!erGOLncl ~Ter·t:' eoilelcl:cd t,ffiung the ' 

c0mmf'~nderg, the executive officers vndthe communi 

CDt lon LVT .,' 

I 

. ,'!]hG ,)r.1lY truining tb~t' . could :be eccomplls~ed 

at th.1s,:-tlme" "tiTLsv.ery ,clcmentry instructions -, to 

trac,tor crews en the, ~·pE'ratiJn of the rrdio Get in 

their t-r.~ ctcr end '&.ttemptlng to tec-ch -cveryon.e cou- 

ccr,ned. proper rL.dlc pro'~€dtire [nd'the rpI=ropriP've 

ce11.si~ns ,t~ be used~ - 

F-r.-c"1:'~,_'iA·,{·'r'l.~ v ~ _ ..1 -,iT(;.'~·~:' ..... ~ _- -, '._ ~ r) \. ..._.,;.. 'l:'(,l';'li'~f , -.. _ .. L .J. "r> ... k "I v Y''''' .-

.. 

.-, - ". ~ - ~ - ~~ 

t 

• 

• 

• 

R~dio co~~un~c~tion~ on sll bottqlion 2nd C03- 

p".ny nets W',:,,::;0 V0Y"JT po:)r ,durlnf~ the Ehil)-·to-shoro 

:noVCT:>_:n t c:

~.~ . ~r.": :-:~:.5~~~~ .. 

.'. 

f 

... ". ~ ... -..-~ --.. ~." ~j,l ",'. 

adS

·' 

I 

~. 

• 

D1~li'ing the· river crd,Ssinf:; by the Fifth Me.rines 

by mO::'DS o1~-:1li;Dhibiqn' tr ctors,Q radio set; b.~/MRC...;. 

0 

7, W'~'8 est~:~-(~,'~ L~.h~8d·on hill 131, TA 066l-V, the b·-:t....; 

tR110n CO]:'J·--;;nder i)~ OP' OVE;ir16oking the 'crossing 'site.: '. 

This s'tf'.tlon W?S ustd to monl'tor the Com:;11~.nd net' df : 

th8 ~o~p?r~le8 .mp.k1ng ths cra~slng ~nd en!:l.bled· the' 

b?tt?lio::1 cOrr1:rl p nd.:cr to i,;~e'J'cise control from his OP 

on ~~y co~p~nyorb~tt~liop~ommqri4 n~t. 

On 24 Stpt~~ber ths exscutive officer ~r6ceeded 

with bEL~ tom~~py for tli0 1st MRrlrt~~ ri~cr 

crosstng. A r0.dio ·oDsr ..... tol· 1-:i th ,AN/N.,R.C-·7 ?CC0!}111!lnied 

ths exccutiv~ cr~i6c~; This 8t~tion nrovcd·effactivE) 

In .c,:,ntrol uf tr!"·.c.tors durlYl§ the crossing 

~nd th.;; r~l~.yln£ of i:tlfurmp.tion b"'ck to tho b~-tteclion 

cOrrl7!lEnd yost., 1'u8 to th·o dlst"nc(; ~nd the intervenint; 

I.llbb·t~round.~)t;t':':'i-;~n the crossing site llnd' 

th.s C o:1f1:nd '9cet J -=-n..::..N/··i'~,~ :·'1" -. ,... , r fjlT,,· .. r Ci. ., :- n t' ..., ~ C! t abl-l o'n 

nl;u· .-ICC:....... .J,f, .:: r :j,•. t:.,.t .i ._'.... t.'..) 'J.n\;.; _L).".~l' UPO. Ill;,; t,;;...., '::.. u ... - 

In0!1t of 1:>.1../ ":{):-~~~l!:'.nd I-JC;SG" f~Or'i:1rl GO~::nU!11Gr'~tions 'ticrc 

e s t!'lblJ..shGll.:.-d. t~l til.; f·.d:C.~.tJ-Qn of ~ tclL,"')hcno lino 

!'ro~' c.ivif:;];()l:;, r.:o :),!':.t tf'_1.;.,on. cor.:m!'l.nd' net "yo-.s 6stE'~b·- 

11shi:.~Q.o h.~=L~ :lfJ.0. r~~~-{.~,:ELT:~, GO""'lT)r:.ni8s' "tJ~'ro in nearby. 

a8£c~bly r.l'CQ8, t:;;A.Y:~~}l ~~f):-r-ip!::ny w~s op8r~ting'f.ts 9. 

ferry- ?c"G' t~lf· '3:;.J(;Ond. G:r'o83inftsite 1.vC2t of Yangc1ongpo.', 

·'1J'h..s G.~e·~~f-i..nc-c s~'pErf\ti.;r:§'· the b,!lttQ.lion p.nd BAKER 

Compr-tny i·{·-' 2't:V) ~~'r'81ARDIV' SPECtAL 

ACTION RSP()R,:.I ,

. \ 

. On.~·O'ctob€r:' ~'rd~ ·t·ne battel-lon moved .bsckto. 

Incho-n~' .. Norm::1. .10 c·~ 1,' wlr~p. n.e·ts, 1/lT€r c e s tf: hl i shed'; 

A trunk li~e \~'e_s '1~~ ~~d to·:"T.h.e 1st· A,~r:lored .hfrr.;hlbl&n . 

B£l.ttrlion.., ",to; ':g"i ve .:t;.h~ b-e.l tr: llon Wil~(3 COTI1rrlU!1iCF t iorts· 

'tilT 1 th dlvlsi6n .(vlf:..l~l~ :~~q'~.~4; ,~~oJ!lb['.t Scrv'lceGt'oup J 

a.nd the 1 ' X ,~6r:ps.. . }!~tg·;~~~~tQf!t;}~4i~:pC:Qrdu~ to -che 

number of· s1rJi1;c.hb0er·dsI~1vGlv:cd. [-"nd thet2.r.18 t')bnsumed 

in g6t-'Ging"[i. oc"'1·1 ,_·'G.h:r-Qugh" ,I

e trRined in the field ~8 switchboArd operators 

to au~~cnt t,hE: co:nsunic p tlan pers~nnel organic t~ 

the be, ttC' 1.i, :';!1 heqd.quaftc:r~ 'It 

" :Tllc ~th;ve' u~c sci 'SLI ncrsonnel for cO::l2luniQPc- 

t'ion \J0I."'k ..'iJrq'ved .~~Rtf.s·f~~:t9.ry 'during' this opcri-J.tion, 

b~t IC,pqn .. nst t~· .. c·6ns~'qp,:rp~d·.8:.4£ellable ,S;(?te:n un:l.er all 

~lrC1tl;:18 't:::-'nc,c s.,,; It ~tC;r.(31t . .:;h;?, t't.n~·' ?.dC:.l tl:Jn cf . 

tcle:)hsn80,nC:::1GssaE~¢¢ntcr' p~r.sc.nne~ tc the ~/O of 

this orgp_nization iiould"bo htghly d.0sirtqble.· The 

co.ntinucc1 tp .. c tic.01, e:n.-:.J+cy:TI8.P,t ,cf the A'TI})h:L.bic.n 

Tr~6tcrB2ttsli~n ~n Rn inland GDcirRtion neceislt~ltes 

the GBt;:'tbj.is!l';;16nt of' e~'oOr:1piet~ 'vell org·i:Lni'zod. 

oOr:1r:1unio;.;,tion sDctiol1 o ThQ utilization ofvlh2t6ver 

people th!.-' t !!1.ii.(nt. bef'vA.:l~blB is not ·conduci ve to 

trlG hi§:h dee-'rcc .:;1" G·f·fjcl:;l1~Y :required it' CG::1~upicqti~nSe 

' 

'. 

Sppco

} \ 

... ~ ~- 

"L •• t'~ ....... _ 

- ,.' 

SubS80uent ,IDDinten,L:T1C,e r t the tnrget t ret:' WEts 

rou tine. .T'rri,cfo.r cj"c:~~c~:n.l:e.,p \suhrili tte.d ecpipment t;'ley 

w~re iunc.ble.tQ ',r8d~~1m' ~i#~~;:ft~r;,aqu£lrters(nd Se:~'vice 

CompC:vny Comm1Jnicn,t'~-b':rt;(11l~br.r.,"'cln ~the few Clses 

where H&S cout'd'nu"t eft,e'ot repe;lr} the unservlc€~ rle 

36-GB wert; sent to 'Divl'sion 'SignnlRcpr ir for mere 

techniccI ~'djus'tment 'qr f()r survey,.' < 

.. The -'te.blc' cf, eauipment fOT [·n pmphiric.n trnctcr 

bn't"Ghlion or. fer'Ei. c'brnp~,r..y ·QPc':PE.ting" c·lorie should 

lnclud::e: 

. .\ 

'{ 

, , 

1 

..L 

...L 

J. 

1 

Pc:wcr'UniG, PE--:-75 

1(,01 Set J TE-IJ . 

V r: cuum . 01 e~ n er 1 

'Ie S'G - Get} CP~:. 

hB-44:.h/U 

To 01 F1qu l.;.mE._':L t 1 TE-·!l 

.. An nllowAnce of CE·~: Tc:~=- Eft} 10223, per technicic 

ric or rep.airmr n' ''';lcU:.d .. ce extremely desirE ble. 

Leaking thi.s,r cpccicl ~!ll:)~i.-r.cc of f!.crcv-.;driver3 

(3/15" blr'o.e rT_d 4t n .shr.r..k) cr.d. c ::'2 volt 301dcring 

lrcnft,1ATculd, .tn- seIne extent, remedy srr.rl::L teol 

re(1ulreiTI~n.ts.' ~\TIen8Ver instt'llftlor: or rei:1stclletlan 

problemd c'ccur, hc[-viex- tcc:'fJ rre rcculred .. 

The T:ool Se,t ,TE-:--llor r G imilrr' cot 1NGU~.C, mr tcri£'c11y 

reduce time invol v,cd [net ml[nif~8 of 8ffiDllcr tecls. 

: ~ ~r~cls1~n test eauirment of the .CEQ' type would 

.speed up ccnslderfhly test bonch:checking of rrdics. 

The rF'dlb l~st(llhticns o'f [mphirit:n trflctors 

fire subjected ·tohigh, humidity conditions (floet 

end thect\llection cf di:a:-t [lnd dust 1/I T hen E' shore. 

Perjodlc Cletlning t'nd 'drying 'i/lrlth [:.. Vccuum Clel ner, 

HD-44A/U would D.llcvit::te mt-nymcin:tent nce I'robJ.ems .. 

. 1 

\Q~~;~ 5S-:y7~;j-v 

~.L-L\',; l~.. Ii ~ \lnJ,\Jt\l Jr. 

~tCcl~J u~ 3.M~rin~Corps~ 

, '; ·.,rr..l,~Y}d':,ng 

i. 

; APPENDIX 1 T~' bNNEX' rrlu"iE :r:'.tillE Tn l8 =-i1.h ... BDIV -S.P.ECiAL 

/ herrON REPORT 

" 

1 

-8-- 

"~ . - 

~-'-"t: ... ~-~-.• -~-~~:.;r~~~!:';~~~_''--:''_~~~''''~~' l~;,'i~ ... ~>--

. ( 

'. &rlalt 

03 

,~·t 

" . 

1st· Combat Servioe Group, 

. Se rv 1 ce . Command, P1IF, 

I~ tho FIeld, l1asan, Koroa 

as Doo 1960 

£'.rom: Commanding Otficer 

To: . Obtnmand1ng Genot-al .. 1st Iiarlnu,~lv1s1on-, Fl·J1'. 

. , 

SubJ: Sp~~1~1 Action Report for pcr1bd 2SAug·- ? 

Oct, 1950 

t • 

Rot: {.a)DIv1s1on General Order No. 16 ... 

'Enol: 

(A) Sketch i1s.p of Combat Servico Group i~r0a 

in Inohon, Korea' 

t 

t 

I. IHTRODOO'IIOF ..... 

It ls' tho purposv of this r~pottt·. ·to-·do.soribe 

tho lo~lstIaal support provl~od.'by .~ho~l·st Combat 

Sorvice' Group . to· ol(;;IIl(;nts of th(~ X Oorps, U.S.A., 

in the INCHON~S:COUL Operation during the ,pcx:iod 

trom·. 27, JiUgust to 7 Octobvr, 1950., '. 

The location O.r tilL Group during t.hls· period ,.,8..8 

as follo\,Js: . 

27Aug - l09cpt. 

11Sopt- 14Svpt. 

• 

Kobo .. Jepan 

~~board shIP.. '(;nrou~tc to Inchon, 

- Korea • 

Inchon, I{or.ca 

. Th0 1st Oombat Sorv1c~ Group at. thcboginningof 

. the pcrlodw8.s at tachcd to the 1st i:arlnc D1v la10n 

:t11 th tho mission 'of provi9-1ng lqg~st1cnl.· support 

to the D1vision _thin the limits of ita oapabl1- 

1 tics. During this period th~ ·J-roUp. '~a8 ,subs,-qu('ntly 

attachud for operational control,to tho 2nd 

Ejlg1nc( r Special Brigade, ·U·~ B.A., and to ~hL Inchon 

Baso Command (redosignated 3rd Loglstlcal~omrnand) 

ORGAHIZ~TION 

- .. 

1st Go~bat Survloo 

(109-1522) 

HcadquartLrs Oompany 

l:alntonancu Compst:ly 

Supply'Company 

Support Company, 

II. ~.ASK 

-Truok Company 

At taoh(;d: - 

Al~ Dcllv\.-:ry Platoon 

r:F 

Group, Servioe O~mmand, 

Col. John H. COOK, Jr. 

(36-284) Capt •.. J .'C. :~USG~O~ri 

(21-425)' !i~J. E~H. VOORBLES 

(42-406) ::aJ e' R'.t.;. HBfG::SB~~C 

( 5-170) ilaJ ~. D.B. COOLEY 

( .3-l). o~ ) .~ .... pt· T'·;. 'P~~ "ROO j\" 

c: v~. .~ • .n. ... Ln.· .:;.~ 

( ·1-66 ) 'Capt. H. D. c. 

, BLASIfG,A::r: 

2,'7,Aug_19SL.pt. P'umlgation and Bath Platoon, (1-31) 

-. lstLt. J. L. DUI~_~S 

1 

, ' 

. 

. _-...........,

,"1 • 

AnneX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Harlno D1.v1s1on Special . 

,#Q~l()n ~port 

. ls~C5G,F ..,(Ja~ ,,£ollolQ.n, Kobc,~ Japan (~l) C·apt. A.F.: 

.'., . ,,', ". '. '.," ..... '. . ·rILSON Jr. 

- , >' _, ,,' _ " • '. _ • " :" ~ -;" .... t. '!mcp'1~M+Og Ph4.S(;/ot this 'op:cratlon f-or·}thc 1st 

, ' Combat~ Servico G.r.a·up~.,as;basodc.:OI)~· .th~: fOl.l0l"1~ . 

Order.s, ·aQQd1X't),o1;l:vcsredc1v.cJ,d! . '0:., ,'-" '.~ , 

. . . -. " ., ,(.~..,. .". - ~. : . - .... - ; - . - '. . 

. .. 

r ,l (al' l( 'c9~Admin1fl:tl'ativ9: Onder ~50,..···dtd .. 27.Aug50 

. ~ l}»):',:Ll1t:;~D~'V, ~.a·t ~att.,,' ~t: !)pnPl~~ ~~-po,_: .dtd ' 

," 2:eAu~g50". ' .,' ,; ..:...... : .'. 

( C )" 1,sJ;~IarD1~ .~ainQ.2-50,dtd4S0pt50 

(d) ~ 2nd' Lhgl'nQcr'Spoelal Brigade Field Order 1-50, 

.. ,',dtd." 2SoptpO .. . . .:. 

,,~','"~ , Tl~o-·:pl:a~ri~,ng;:Phasu. of th~.s· oP9ratiQlp T:!a,s;.sho~:t 

.'{:., ~ t!~«;)· we.~,lt~) .. an:d· cotncldcd··11'1th .. t.ne ... pof"if)d. of: in tc nSf; 

. ·.:a~tlv~:t.Y':.:¥lVO~"'J~a ~n,. u.nl.~di.ng:., ECg·!':..;g2~·t1~g~ a.nd ;f!)- 

· loaQ.1Nt;~·\~lj¢,ent!reD:'..v1,slon at Xc-bp} ~:~r~):l::1'C', Important 

probl~fila ~ :wl;ii,q~: re

, Annex UNCL~: UNCLE to 1st Harlne Divl sian Special 

A1Jtion Report 

3.)· Detailing of pc.rsonnel'and planning for th~ 

rear echelon warehousing in KobG~ Japan of all 

supplies and cqu1p.ment of the Is t -liarinc Division 

notaccompanylng tho assault shipping, In.accorda~ce 

with IstiiarDiv Adni'lan I-50, dtd 2? August, 

1950.· . 

d.) Planning l;'0quir(;mcnts of Fourth Resupply 

for tho '1st i:arine Plvls10n on itGm£; peou11ar 

to t~~ Haripe Corps, 1n ~ccordanoe with the 

asslgnment,·.of this m1ssion 1n (c) above 

. r' .~ ,~.. .. " .' ", ' , ' 

These neoes.sary plans \-1ere oomplo~edprior to 

B September and the 1st Combat S6ft,ji0C Group Adm 

0'2-50 was issued on 5 Scpternbc:r covering tho de~ 

tailed administrative plans for the command • 

. IV T~~INING A~~ FXHEARSALS 

No rehearsals wcrcConductcd. 

Training consisted ot-lvcturcs on thu SOp· and 

mission of the various' sections and platoons, held 

aboard ship cnrout~ fran the United States. Due to 

thl! very 'oolls1dur&blo and hltrrivd tncrcaso of per .... 

sonnel. prior tQ dopnrt~refrom' the Ur~ltud states, 

.rious shortages of skilled personnel 'tiore evident. 

No ~doquo.te tre.ining of the S \..; n(;\4 p0rsonnc1 was 

possiblo until after the comQcnooo~nt of the operatio 

i .,., , 

.v to IDING AND E1 iB;:.RifJiTIO N 

-Uhen the 1st ~·~E'.rine Division arriv(;c. in Kobe, J~pc:.n 

it 1:ias ncccss[~ry to"'~riload thu Division froI:l trE'.l1sport 

shipping ~nd oo~bot load into the assault 

shipping. The directives oov(;ringthis reloading r'7l,rC 

(a) lst~larDlv JidI'lPlan I-50, dtd 2? ... ug50. 

(b) lstl~arDiv LI:1bOrder 1-50, dtd 3l.~ug50. 

The ~~inistrntivc Plnn 1-50 established the OVLr~ 

nIl plan tor b111uting D.ivislon ·troops in the Kobe 

area, and for the unloading, scgr0gatlon, a no. relanding 

of the; Division's supplies and cqulpnent. 

The Embarkation Ord0~ 1-50 gave tho specific detailed 

instructions for the Conbe~ t loading of the 1st I:arin£ 

DiVision. The Commanding Officer, 1st Combat Service 

Group, aug~ented by the 1st Shore Party Battalion, 

was aeslgned the responsibility far supervising and 

coo rdln.:;.t ing the' entire Division unloading and reloading. 

The Co~~anding Offioers of the 1st Combat Service 

Group and the Shore P'arty Battalion with a clerical 

forc(; of 6 enlisted personnel and 6 dook superv1sory 

officers carried out the mission of coordinating cn~ 

supervising the unloacting ana cmbarl{ntion of the 

Div ision. The COf!lbat Service '-Group suppl.1cd trucks, 

truck drivers and ll.uterinl -·hantling i::quipm0nt to £'.io. 

in this operation. Prcpnrntion of loa~ing plans.for 

the I:"ivls1on ,,,ore made during this perlod undvr th\.- 

'direction of the 1st Ooobat Survice Gt-o'up Er,1barkntlon 

Officer. . 

3

" . 

Annex UN::LE UNCLE to 1st l~arin(; Division Spocla.l 

Action Report 

During this period of staging; a typhoon struck 

Kobe. hnrbor on, 4 scpt'cf.1bcr from 1130 to 1530. 

E.pprbxir.1c.t01y t~'10 days tine T:JO'rL; lost du .... to tho 

~ork involved 1n sccuring gear prior t.o tho storn, 

the t1L10 lost' c1ur..1ng the storo, and the; tirJC 10 st 

in clear1ng d~bris urt& r0pniring store drulage. 

4d61 tional delays T~1(;re caused by tho disruption of 

co ol-:.1unlcat1oQs and pOt'1cr 11nos. Onlyvory minor 

daf.iagc to supplies resulted duo to -:Jatar soal\.agc. 

One point o·f lntor~st 1n this, unloading irJns the 

hnndllng of al!1Dunition 'and 1'.O.L. supplies. Ar.1 .. ~ 

unition and P.O .L. wure unloaded into Japnncso 

light\,:rs and kept aboard the lighters until rclocr1od 

for cnbarkat10n. AOI;1unltion was loaded out o~ Snn 

Diogo with each Eobnrkation Group carrying f~vc Units 

of' Fire. Upon unloading the ar.u:.1unition in Kobl) it 

was found to be ,e&, :o1xcd that it 1'!-1[1S nccos",ary to land 

ru:lDiunl t10n and sogregnt'c it in orner to cot~ply \'11 th 

the Eobnrkatlon Oreer. 

]A; spite the originally tight sChoculc :p.ri(1 the t1r.:o 

, 10 st cae to the typhoon, ColI ,lonfing' dcc.a:~incs "lore 

DC 1;'. 

,The COT.1fJnnd1ng.Off1cer, 1st Cor:lbnt Service Group 

, was ass1gnocl as COf.lI:1G.nc.cr , l:nbarknt1on Group ABLE 

cons~st~ng of thel.,llowlng connands: 

.-lstCSG (1~s8 Dets) 75~l019' ': 

- £un&Bath PIt. 1-29 

- ;'1rDclPlr:t 1-6~' 

-- HqBn (LesE!. Dets). -9Q..631 

).stSorvBn (Lu ss Duts) 28-616 

lstSigBn (Loss Dot.s) '~712 

~ Gat'ricr PI t. ,~, "2-84 

-Is tl~TBn (Lc ss II g," &'''0'') 3,3-460 

'lstOrcU3n (Less .Dots) 21-371 

Ist:~c{J3n (~css Det s) . 43-279 

Det HqCo.,' lstTankBn '4-50 

-lst."S.P. Bn.(LouB De"te}19.;...149 

.1stEngrBn (Los$ D~ts) 34-590 

7thiiTBn 32-399 

UK Volunteer DGt 19 

ru~ Oor..:f.1[;,l1C~O s 210, 

Spec. Opns Co. ' 137 

l~[~r lne .h1r Jo n tro 1 Group 500 ' 

Te an 3, ~ Gp Balr\.., r, 12-200 

Dot., 1st 71ilin . 1-10 

,Det., Ist&Jph.TracBn 1-10 

•• '" I 

The 1 mjl;;,,;=o L1ba t Service Group ,.yas er:lbe.rked 

aboL1r~1 tho following ships: . '- 

Hq~o' 

Supply Co. 

l;uint6nanciJ 

Support Co. 

USS CLl'MSR (ABA, 27) ( 29~183) 

liST 859 .,' (3~121) . 

LST 973 (6-lle) 

L5T 898 (6-57) 

Co. USS~JHIT:;SIDE (AK.A.. 90) (21-425) 

:LST 802 (0-6 ) LST 742 (0-6) 

LST 973 (3-27) LST 1160(0-2) 

LST e98 (I-3D) LST 1125{O-2) 

LST 859 (2-25) Q036 (0-6) 

LST 883 (1-16) Q037 (0-7) 

LST lO~18 (0-6 ) 

• 

4

I 

_ 

..umEX UNCLE UNCU to 1st i"'l8.rine Division, Special Action 

Report 

INCHON 

Oity Map 

1:12.500

Pa.i"t~ 

". , 

" 

- 

,\ 

....,. 

.Annex Ur:~CI.E 

.. 

:-i't' 

.. -~ .. -.( ~ 

UNCLE to, ;L.st 1:a'i'lne· Divis10n Special 

Actton Report, 

It 

.. 

VI. :·iOYEl:ENT TO .AND ARR~V AL AT .,O;§JECTIVE .AREA 

-". 

This COI:'~L1[u1(1 sai~El'd fror..1 Kob,e, Japan "'on 11 

Septenbcr 1950, and. arrived ·at In9hqn,Koroa 

on D-Day, 1& Se;ptenbcr.' ~he .t).!:e E..boa::rft ship 

vias spent 1n ~horoughly ··b.f1~,f111.g all " h?,l1cts 0:1 

the geography and ~:,no~In ericny a1 tUB. tion in the 

target area, 'and "regarding the:', operational !:liseior 

rlnd plans of the', 1st Gonbat Service Group ai1r~ Gaet 

. "organization ther~ in. ?il:al checl{~ "lc~"Q,,~rr.adc to ir. 

sure that all or.;~:anizatiorlal ~eaulptlent '>Jas in 

proper ''\'iork1ngorder. 

't",_· 

VII.; OPERATIONS 

a. Assault' Pha-ae, 15-10' Scptenber ' 

15Sept At 1800 I EST 1 B "859, ~7S'!}and: e98 l."anc.ed on 

Red beach, \vi th a total' of '28 officers anC: 449 

enlls:tcc1·of:t11C·~ '1st COEbat Service G~bup to 

augrjen~ the"ls~ Sr~l'~ Party Battal~o'n. T.:.1181;-" 

personnel" lnntrot1 unc:or sparacio snip.er' and ~ . 

t1ortu1" . flr'o Icof:lt16rrcct~ unlQ,Eu:ii1g, ,~~l~iorlt,y 

" vehicle s and cargo~ 'enG durlng"tlic -~i8ht built 

up bC['.C~l ciur.:ps, ,operating undQrt~1q:' 1st 2Ia::lnu 

Division Shore Party, Cor~lGnndQl'~ , -....... : 

. . - - .. ~ .' . .. -" .. 

. ' 

16Sept Hca(1quartors, ,.hst': 9ojba~ $er1icie < Group, 

, lunded a~~ 0630 ~bn ~.grecn bench". ~'Jolr.1f""!'.co, I slann 

and cOJ:--.r1cnced roconalssaaOe for 61 tos suitable 

for the 0ste.bllshr..'lcnt' of '·consolic1at~:;e. ~,lml)E. 

'The aroas, sclcctt)ct 'Ylcrollo~£.tcd t'n'·the' 8o~lthcast,;l"n 

p8.rto'f 'Incho'n' a.s'-- ),nc11crto0. -n the' '" 

~fLlt tachc~. s~\:C:t'cll adapted t:roc' th~ 1: 12. 500 :-lCl.P , 

'of Inchon '( e..nclosur0 '(A).' . , . 

,This a:lea-Vlc.s,.' o'ho,sert, Bat"G~ 'or wo.rking a's sh1ps . 

pla"c@,ons. vo'ncurreKtly 1,01.1 th the establlshr:lcnt 

of ,·the" c1urips, lIarino C,orps and .Arny un1 ts uere 

dr-alling larg'~ quantiti-cs of supplios fror1th~s~ 

:-'ins tallations. The, large r.uaber of, receJ-Pts an, 

.. 188(1(,8 i~1i tiallf r-Jtard'Jr:, the off'icicn.t opcr ... '" 

ation of, the con'solidate( dutJPf:1, but ,~8 stoc~:s 

.,~cc\l-:ulntcd,. dumpoperatlons il1cren,scd in 

": ef-flclel1GY. ' 

~'-~'r • • 

i, 

5

.- ~ -"< , 

Annex 

'1st Larine Dlvi sion Special 

"otion Report 

b. §X~~~,~~,:~' FHASE 

17$,ept' Normal work of 'unloading -. ship~ end establishing. 

dumps' cont1nued on a 24 hour basis~, CornraenclIig 

1n ·the 6or1ll1ng', the 'Tid~l' Basin was' 'j;n- use as 

,a oenterot'general' t4liload1ng,6f suall craft; 

'Naval ,C~aft",up"to ~eslze of, LSU1s, a~d Jap'-' 

anesa' :'~Q,ru-Tal cIass. ohips ,were, tinlo'aded 1n "he 

Tidal Basin. ' ' , 

. O:n .order ofthc-,'OommandingGencral, 1st Earlne 

Dl:v.1sion' (Dlf.Wat~hi 171520liJ I the' 2I!dEnglnecr 

Sp0elal BrigD:d~~aasu6ed,oPe~~:t1ons, . relieving 

Division 'Sh6re'Par,ty.The 1st'ShoJ;'o,Party - 

Ba',ttallon- and the 1st COP.lbat, Service 'Group '!lcre 

attqched:to",thc '2hd ESB for oJ>eratlonal oontrol. 

18Sept -~(jgan: to rCgnln- dontro.l of" personnel who haC. 

" bee'n 'aiigment1ng 'Shore p'ar ty,-.eont.1huc.d unloading 

. shlp&g "and ,opci'rit1.ng 'auops:,_ an~1'~upplyi~-all 

,c~craQntsof tho X Corps D.shor" II A ·Grqup ,labor 

office 'oJ'ttS e stubllshed for th~ Procurcr.lent of 

c' 1.n~lg~~ou9 .. labor J.rt ,large' "numb~.rs.' Uaintenance 

",';:Sc'¢tlo,n, . Headqun.r,tul's 'Ob~,ai1Y-,'. 6stn,blishcd a- 

. " ,',l(d'te-rpo 1'1'1 t' ~'1l1foli' suppll c: a. '9 ~ 000 g~110 ns of 

'. 'lluItlt:1-Qdwuter p~r ':day',to Inchon area units. 

,;.. - .~ - . 

'. ' 

21Scpt::. ':In ~.~eordtlnQ,e :w1th X Corps' Adminls:trat'ive 

, Ordo~ 2-50, dated' ~l Scptpmbur, th~ Inchon 

, :3nSt;'O'6tnnand'j' as anagoncy .d1'thc.X Corps, 

assum-cd7rc-spon's'l,blli ty" for provid1ng logistical 

suppo-r-t,to .alI,un1 t.s a~horc.'. Tlle,2nd_ ZSB, with 

'~:' . l·B~;.Co.mbat:.·Serv'icc Group' 8til~ attnahca, was 

'atta~ll.6d· to ',the Inchon ,Base ·C9mnanc.i ~'11th the 

ois.slon ot, 'opuratlngthc',beach and port, devololng 

port faol11tl.~sl and providli1g b~~ch dGfcnse~' 

The -miSS-ion ond~opcratlons of the 1st Cor.rbat' 

Scrvl'cc Group rcmnincQ unchanged. ,. 

-. The Air Dcl·lvery 'Pl::~toon ooved to K1r.~ ~1r 

Field and c0r.1f.1en~cc1 'air' drOp operation. 'Truck 

.,·'C~~rii't ,1st 'C'ombat Service 'Group, was a,ss1gned 

, ,~t-o.-I a,Mullng·tl1s£lonfor *tpJ·7th Army ,',Division.. 

'Twent.y~thrce (,23) 'trucks T!ler-e. Used on,s 24 hour 

ha-als~hauling 'ra~lonB~ fuel and ammunition to 

Suwon ·tor·a "tWo day period. 

' 

-, ' 

22Sept', . At ,approximately th1s date- the '65thOr{nance 

AplrJUnl-t,1.on Coo,pany, U. 5.'A.,' setup and commenced 

operat1ng a Class V dump!" 

2-S:8~pt, In accordance ,1J'1~.};h Inchon' Ba'se Carom'anG Special 

'Orele:r :#1--:24$ dat.o(t .... B4' S'eptember, the 1st Coobat . 

Serv1ce Groap l1ras detached from the 2nd ESB ani, 

a-ttaohed for operational coritrol' to t~e' Inohon 

. Bas'e ..' COfJfl!and( S\1bseqtleritly..redeslgna ted a.s the 

3rd Log1stlcal~ Coomand'·) ~. -The'rnl.as~on assigned 

t,o,thelrt. COI!loat Service Group '-wa's that of 

,c(.}nt;l:'1J~lng to operata supply dumps in the Inohon' 

Poit area, and, to· furn1f?h cadre for es,'tab11sh1ng 

.;a gener@l, dt:p()'t in "tho :Aso'ol:1 Cl'6y,~ea( Target 

,.. ~ea;'geQl oneection 'SS26-II!, 1:50,000 'map' cit 

Korea) • 

6 

I

Annex UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Harinu Division Spocial 

Action Report. 

t 

EleL10nts of l'~alntonnnce Conpany ·ooved . to ...liSCOL1 

City and commenced setting up i'aai11tiefj for a 

.... genera1 depot. By' this' date :the· Groups Labor Office 

was supplying approxiDatc1y 1800 indigenous 

workers to the Group da11" and as ~any more to 

"c.rious Arny organ1zations 1n the Inchon Area •. 

. .. 

25-30Sept Continuod operating suppiy dUJ:.ps and l:-~:::11 ted 

maintenance facilities. Llencnts of Supply Company 

moved to Asooa City on the 27th. 

During this period galleys were set up cnd 

serving of hot T!loals c041f.lenced. Bakery and Laundry 

platoons provided breod and laundrysorvicc to tIle 

Group. ' 

Dur1ngthis period the.506th Qli Petroleur.1 

'Supply COr.lpany I U .-8. A. and a, de tachr.1cnt of tho 20tt 

,SubaistonoeConpany began dq.6p operations ~o 

supplcfJcnt tho Conbat Scroyiec 0-roup'C1ass I and III 

cltiDpp. . ,', ' 

~ '.. . 

lOot ", Receiver} '3rd Logistical ;~'ocil:lnnd Op 0#2, dated 

1 OctobGr,~!~lhleh directed the 1st .Cor.:bnt Service 

Group to' cdntlnuQ opcrat~ng c".un:)S 'f:tnd supply points 

as directed. 

' 

R~tt1on and P .O.L. p(rsonnol of Supply COf.1:')O,ny 

Dovon to Asoorl.Olty, ~s rtUf:lPS of c.ll: classes in 

tho.;Inchon Port a.rea t'lcre ~~pendud. 

2-60ct ·C'6ntinu0:d r'outlrte opc.:ra.tlon of 'aunilS ahd Dalntcnunee 

fao'ili tics in the' Aseon ~Cl ty llr·ea •. 

, .. " , . , -:.i .' . ., . 

?.Qct '''5:.coolved prc11nlnary 'orch:.rson 'reCobarl{a tion ::nc 

cannorieer: prepara tt~ns for s0c,u'rlng 9Pcrations a~lO 

outJ,.oa(~ln'?:. ' !. . 'r • :: .'. .• 

, \.-,: .. 

VII1- ENEHY (Not 

IX 

ESTI:.ATED RESUL'£S OF OP:'RA::IOIJS 

1. Supt-rviscG the suocessful reloading a:f the 1st 

liarinc Div islon at- Kobo, though ~i!ork1ng against 

a tight t~!:.1e pc~edule and delay.ed 'by a typhoon. 

2~ Augnente9- the. 1st ~.iarino Divis16n Shore Party 

Battalion ,,,1 th appro:z!natcly 500 officers and [1en, 

. as 'tvall as trucks and naterlal ho.nC1.11ng equipGent, 

during the aasault phase of the operation. 

3. O~orat0d su:;?Ply dUr.lps "lhich sU;::Jorted the entire 

X. Corps during the early phases af the operation. 

( Unt 11 Elf tcr . D,!lO ; 

4~ =stal~~_i8ht;d ahd built, up pcrnanen,t depots for tl:: 

Incno n D::: sc Conr.lc.nd. 

5c P:::':.' \~~ ~.'j4. a riunbcr of niscellaneous serv ieGs to 

-~&r-i:?"lB i'iO-:';':'ineand ArcyOrganlzat1on, such as Irair:.t 

cnancQ.l transportatlon, bLking, laundry a>u llator 

sn:31.)).Y (J 

"R', !r,(~:"oughtho -~lr DC,llvery Platoon, l)roviclcd air 

["reps of e,ll'clansesof supplies for isolatoc ... units 

ot' tho X Corps. 

7

Annex UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Harlne Division Special 

Action Report 

X. C.OIU·IENT SAND 'RECOiJlIENDATIONS 

'. '. _. 

. --. 

- • • .. J 

1. Organization and'Personnel 

a.)' l:laintenanoe, ~'nd Supply., The present 

Organization o~. Hal.ntenaI?-Ce :Jpr;tpan:l anc1 Supply 

COfJpany ~as such, is, not "'1orkab;le • The very 

· nature .of their ,duties and the ave.ilability of 

storage and work space require these Conpanios 

to be: \>;ldely scattered, making, it r11fficult for 

the Company Comanners, to. exercise adnin.1strativo 

contreil. Operatlo~al contr,ol of. the' platoons of 

these compnnieswas ot 'necessltyinvested in tho 

respective special staff' offic~:rs, anG, T'1l1cnever 

poss1blo, maintenance and supply j;:.latoons ~!lure 

located in the BaL~e areas. Inorc.er for the st:).!! 

off,icer,sto keep CO;ltrol of their, respective 

'supply ~ncl ~inintoncnoc plc\toons it "IID..S 'necessary 

. to 'naintuin 0'10.60 li~i$on. Hith the Conpc-ny Comc.ancrers·.~ 

In orc~cr 1'011 the' COfJpu,oy connr;.nr:'crs to " 

dctriiloen for .~lousckc0:)·i~.' dut.ics (ease, polico, 

guard, etc,) 1 t 'NUS nCC0S'S.'l.ry for the:l to coordinate 

1~Jith five dlfferlwnt stc.ff offic,- rs. 

~lio.org['~n1-zation of the II,,",int~n[~nce ~nf Suppl:! 

· Coopanlc's~, ·ris it nO't1 exists, i~1P080S an ,ar1(~l tionc.l 

chain OfCOf.1L1anct vlhich is undesirable. It is rocconC'ndocl 

1;hat tho conpanios be. organizeG in Q Gcorc1- 

ance"·~Tith. the·ir technical cntogory (l.c~, Ordnance, 

Engineer., Autorloti1%C, Slgnnlc..nd General Supply), 

·conblJ..1ing supply~ !.1aintenance, anc-: actI:1inl struti ve . 

control unc1-er ono CO~J.GC:.ntcr, and tho t that CO[j!:~anfor 

be Qpslgncc1 adc11tloric.l c-:utios as ?pccial Staff 

,.Oflicer f.or his cognizant technical c~~.tcgory •. 

·b •.) OrdnanO;;; Personnel - Duri!'.lg this op:_;rntlon 

the st3ry;icos of tho . sc£'..ll erDs, ficldartillory, 

and firccontrol instruf.1cnt f.1c..inton['~ncc section 

of the Ordnanue :~aintcn['.nco Platoon Norc, not required 

by the Division. I t is bcllevGc1 that the 

Division has anplepcrsonnel in these oategories 

within the Or~nan~ Batt&lion a~d the ~rtiIlery 

· RegiJ:1ent' to ta.ke care of their 0"1n needs. It. 1s 

further bc11evec. the. t any SI:lUll arGs, artillery J 

fire control instruGi.-nts,ahc. '·la~ch~.B requii"'ing 

ropalrsbeyonc1 tho C&pa:jil1,ties of the Division 

should. be turned. in to the Coobat Service Grou:;:; 

forshipocnt to' Base Depot for r.epair. It is "'l"~. 

recQooenc1ed'that. these sections be Gleininatcct 

;froQ' tho T/o of the Cooba-t' Serv ice Group. 

'l'he persQnr:cl. of' . the LVT repair scction of 

. tflD GO::1ba t Serv ice(:'~8up ,vere, a6signef~ f1.uty ,~i th 

~;llj J b'~ :?rov!.sione.l ~~2.:rine Brigac1e. I;url.ng the 

')P

10; • _ ~. 

; 

Annex UNCLE UNCLE to let :,=arine Div lelon Special 

&lc,tio n Ropo rt 

The Armunlt10n Section of the Or~nancc Platoon, 

cone~etint; of 22 nen ls not evon large enough to 

eu~erv lse the laborrcqulrod in the ·anr_:unlt ion CL'.:~:;> 

on a 24 hourbnsle. 'rln'AnfJunitlon Conpany of :3 

officers and 152 e~..::n is the sL1a1lost unit th'~t CL".n 

effeotively support a division o,r'lc.rgcr unit. 

e.) General Supply -. ,It is considerec1 th2t both 

tho Ration' and Fuel Hundllng Sections of the Gonera: 

SUPD1y Platoon arc too snall to adoquatcly O~)CX'E'.tc 

. 'Cluss I and III du1:1ps on n ,24 hour basis. It 1s 

rccomeendcc1 thClt' the TIO hc" fncrcascCl. to D. oin1r:ur.: 

of 2 officors and 51, enlisted, 1n a Ration Platoon 

ancl 2 offic('rs and 55 (;nllstocl',in [l. Pucl Pl~":toon. 

t 

t 

'(1.) Truck Batta110n - It,is considored in tho 

light of experience in this opuration thnt the ':2rucl 

Cor:llJany orgnnic to tho COL1b~t Sorv ice Group 1s ip_ 

Cl.c1cquntc to c~~)ct the, tr£l.nspo.rtntion roqulrcr.cnts of 

tho Gro~p'inthD flclfu ~"o noct these rcquirOLlonts 

it 1s rocor-1L~on(cd that- tho Coc:bp-t Scrv icc Group T/O 

provide f-or.r.u1 :orgnn~c Truck F3nttnllon to be organized 

as fol19:~lS; . . 

2 - Stnndnrd'2t ?on 6x6 Truck Co~pnnics. 

1 - Cargo ~onp3.ny -- On n d.1aplnccr.lcnt of tho 

Grou:') this Go~p~ny 1:1oul{~ f~rnish pri.::e !1ov'ors fo: 

Grou:1Enchln.ory trnllers. " , 

I _ Llght 'Tr'uck ConpD.ny ~- to be oquiPpe0. 11i th 

30 trucl~s of .ar::?roxir:u.. ~tc'l:{l ton ,c[~pCtci ty, '['.nC, 4:i 

IJcrsonnclcarrioT's of, i ,-! ton c:-:paci ty. This 

Conpuny ~'1Qulc1 be used to a.coonodato tho' housc- 

:"keeping ncods of the Group ,1ne. to prov ide tl"r.r:'8- 

"l)ortntlon for contact pnrti0s to su)por~oc1. units 

In the grou~ E'.S D.. ,\-lholu n nu!]b~r of CI.,.1 .. tor.:o ti vo 

r.1cchr:.nics '0.£ Holl as vchlo1csj\sc:tttcro0 nbout th 

Co~;un1os. Buttor n~lntcnnncc'of ~utoDotlve uqu~ 

Gent and f.:orc officient usc of ~ll v0htclcs Troul 

result froe j:1D.v1n~ nil or[;unio vehlcl,,:s f:uintr.lnl 

at nnc1. dlspntchJcl b~" [t ~rotl:) :~otor Pool O~)Cl"ntO(~ 

by this' L~"-",1'1t: ,.La ... r~ruck J. ..- "'or v •.•.• .. ~"','-",·~'"ly :' '-.... • 

0.) Guarc1' end Scouri ty ,- The Guo.r(~ PIn toon of the 

Conbat S0rvico Group consists of 1 6fficer cand 24 

enllstoc~, .,of iflhich 11 r:0n are·,'assigncC, firo,-fightini 

(~utlos. Tho. P9rsQpncl c.vailo.hlo froD. this platoon 

for so~urityor. SUl1~lics bot1'tJG0n ship and cur..~ljs, nn( 

within thC:dU;:1~?9" ,arc negligible in number. 

Tho sJf.cu'rity of supplies \'11 thin the c.iJnpS "{jEtS an 

a(Lc1itional tuty i;,~pos~c1 upon suppl~1' p-.:;rsonnel uho 

t-:ere clrcady. ovcr"Jorl~o(l, segr'ogo.:tlng, 'Narehouslng, L 

iBSll'~_71~: ::3u:Jj;:'] lr)S. '~'hesocurl ty of supplies bott."Joen 

(,:' :.i'k !}::"~.;: :,,~r:G dunps i:U:'B loft to the honesty of the 

'I~f',)~;;_;: (:':: )_./~;rs. 711.e sccrulty of sur:plics on tho (::'oc~,: 

'·JL.~5 ~):r.":"\' l'lo,(~,. byn s::lull detachr.~ent of ben' fron tho 

~'rl''1 'l~"~"'·""""""'r SP"'c'o\al Br;-rnc~A Q'''urit~r of su',--)11 n fl 

, ~-""'. .J···~e ....... ""'\.; v.. "'b'-Ar Lv. ·.....,Iv'tJ , . ..1. -J.J.i ....... \"...~ 

1 r j';:';,.::LBl t fron ships l!EtS depondent on thuhonC8t~?' 

0:f the boat cre;,\]s ~ , 

9

- f&.abhlftno'· :shop ~ra11.crs' rtndvnns arc Qf ,'~ 

height llrid :tfclght- ~hetthey-canonly ~bot9~dcd 1n 

~ ~ol1K:ho:I(l':~t; ';'norr.lal .' available :shlpr;·ing. ':rl1t a , re- 

, ,,:sulted-)ln"}.~£tv!ng·1~·6hlnd cqu1prlont_ bccc.u-se- of, lack 

':"Qf,>~·sh11>Pf'ng ':Sl>:aGe•.. It 1s reconrlenc1ed that'lill 

pucblne shop ·trnl1ersan(lvlJ.n~ be· redeslgned~i th 

'.' $he'~p'~Jll'p'o·se,of re(:'u~1ng-the1rhetght' to, ap~>:rox- 

. ,.- "imfitoly- -!'/-. ,',oe't ,ant'. wo1ghtto-ap)ro%lo~tcly 5 'tons. 

.. _. '. '" -:'~. ........ ~r- ~.' _. ~ • , • f , 

" ,-,', .. b.,J:"~~14 :7i~l'H~1}es.ilteo~n ,Orane' __ -~ 7hls lton 

of,equlprlent 'prevcc"t tooslo\1 1n '(jj,J"ertttlop and the 

boor:l proved too-' short' to. be, of t1U.chvcluein dunp 

-- op~ratfetl5; ,It, is' reQ0r:1Del1'cl9'c1 'tt.L'at··this equiiJ['lent 

be replaOecl ~'il th' high spe(;;d cra1;11or crarie,s 'tJ,tth 

. boot:l~ 40 ·:feet in lel1gth anel -a: ~lnl:'.:u~ capacity of 

-1: t().tl. - . - , ' 

_., ',c~ l~Otl(;r Co~~eyor.::- .,Ska~e .trlheel:,_r?lle, r,conveyused 

bythis"organ1znt1on to ,:scgregnte. 

'. ors 1f~rc 

~ -' and' store ,ratio,ns. -It' '\1a~' foul'};d 'that -those --convey .. 

'ora-·arpno1)"strong enough tOsta,1jnup'·, und~r 

the 

" , ',u?age' to iwhl'oh 1;hey: oust b~ \~u~~ ;or 12.00 Teet of 

-. .;' '~ll(jr'~ ,opn~e.tor·brought.ou~ by ,thfs ,organization' 

':onli 100t:et:. t . ~are ~bwlri~'u~db~e oonrl1 tlori. 'The 

tal1o't.,lng ,defec'ts, vIere' notedr ", .-:' . 

, ,,'l) -The ,~aluI:11iiuL1 'aXles 'bEihd~;as1ly_, 

II} !?5%- or' the -end _:,co~1l+1ngfl_b;t'pkeof,t 

:'rj[ Ll·The .-alutli1?urJf~QQ..o 'b~~~(ls @d sags under 

-) '" '. h:ea~.1or b6xe-s.. >' . , . i. 

,~ . i,,: 'IV)Conv~tora:arc~; 'too' Iiarrcnt., .-' 

_ .. ~ -.; ~-, , t..... : 

-10 

,.-,

Annex m~CLE t1NCJ,.E _to~$t lIar1ne D1v'ls1on :3pec1al . 

-Act10n Repo,rt 

t 

It, -ls,rccopoended .. that tho. whtJ~ls, ~~$8,., nn(~ 

f' .. r£U:lc, should., be .~a.pitb~@ g"r' "11thEttnndlng th~, (i.rop>_ 

Ing .. ota?~ pcitina '1X)x t~nn height of '~g, :1nc:-:r.os. 

, F'rabesshould be: st~ong e,nough .to's~pl?ort ,a; :f.istrl- 

.'buted 4!:Jf)#.1~a4~.-:'tJ1thoutnotlc,o·ablt; :·~ng~. ~pe conv~;yor 

, 'shou~d be .. 50% 'Vliclel' to acoonoclnte lar'gcr ,sizes of " 

,'boxes. .".' , " , .. ,. ,. ' 

,,~ol'oller: ',conycyors, were avnl1.e.ble to ttlls organize:. 

tlon. to,r thL?s(jgrt:gfl .. t1ono,., :·aor:~urt1tl()n t- . 

~It 1s tUr~he:r.rec.;()r.lOe~e-dtl'l.f~t thoi'feasib1l1ty of 

powored oonv9yo~8" foit'. usc. 1ri rutl0.fl Jint.l [..1:F::un1tion 

dutlp..s. £l.nCl 1n shore to dUIJ.p op(.rntlons I be lnvostl~ 

go. tod." _, -, .' 

c,. )'~torrLitts.,. 

crl~rko' an(l Rosa ~orkiirta p

Annex UNCLE UNe!,!: ::~o ·l.i?t ·~·~i='-~;ny:.;D1'~J.'slon 

'" ';' 

. 'Aotlon Report 

- 

Special 

P,,'!.,:',:: ~5!U.W.~~~ ::::~ r::': .. ' .. ' 

, ..... J. • ~ , ~b "fll;s'slon, arid asslt;nncnt ot ',this' Grou~ 

, I",fn ,1.o.g1~tf9~1 ~u'r?i~or~ b1' ,f': qorps 'frlns ~~propr1ate 

, .:~~ :~ .a~ ~Ul.~;{nc.with',a~!}ePtpil CLo-c.trlnc. Dur11)g tho, 

. ,e~rly p1:i.'lses o.f thJ.B· op\'!rat1,o.n the 1st Conbat 

.~~~~}~etr'~0LtP~·lcta :·~p.e. onl:Y·.l~f!1~tlcal ·op~,~f1t~ng 

k .:age:ney .. ~~~o~~~n.g'A:t~14;'+~4por:pB' "'~~!ig,-:,~~ ;:pcriod. 

; trotl 25SopteuDe.p:.tG·, ),!qc.tp·bur. t1io ~ut)··\faB , 

" . • J. )juppl~:oe.n.'t'Q·tr- by.t·t~lir~\}~, ;.:roy-· ... unl.~ ~'~:-,~ (1,.. • :.:'. ; •. :' 

..... ·S5.,:th 'qr(tnan~C'·#~n.i ti·on~r1panl" . tiSA' ' . 

. D~t. 20th ':~li S,ubs1~tQnce ,Co. ," :t1SA.: 

. ·~®6th'·.~lLPot,rQ.le~ Supply·CQ·~T .USA. ." '.' 

O'ther'3rd" Logl.st·loal>G'orJOandDeP9.~·.C,o.rnp~n~~s· 'and 

. ~atta.11ons W0r~ not ,.In 'ope~t!on~~ntl1 the 1st 

Harlne Division conr.i~nactl,outl~!c.Qi..ngJ>Qn about· 

l.QOc·tober... ", "'~ ~:. ,:. " " ',- " .. ..' -' . . . 

. . . . In'joint, o":;era tldns .:'il.th ; tho br.uy ~ where' ~thcre 

~ :. ~ ·~~'s·~9rQ.Y. 'i?~~.t}·,~¢nO. .·T:llp~·:t$.1Qn' ~ll>.l£n ·Ar!-~y~' ~~o r~ s 1 t 

." :·.~s(,:c()·h:s,fd~r9t~ tlu;tt ',"~hv; C'o-r.)ba.t:,lSG..~l.zo .. Grou1-: J ... 

:'·,·.;~~J\~~~2:i~.1r~~: J)lvislon. ; Shc),I'e . ~a~ty .But t:allon, 

",.,' .!,;.~~~.~A:'~:~~Q."V:~~~P~~, 

0f;J?Qo~Q .,R,~rty.:.B~ttallon, 

··:,~~t\:'o~'~r4'~c:,,~t1ach ape~t',PQr:t- ,l~staJ..latlon8:. and 

, .."',fi'itl~~1~:s, :-'and: 'p~o.v1de·10:glstl.9al· sUPPO,rt· '.f'oJ' 

.':.r' .. /~'~ ~;-Of:>~li?·$~.;·;~tn JQl:nt' ,ope:ratioIis ,wh·er~'.:Arny ~.Cprps 

. '{.' , '."". ·~~~V+C.f;f (t,ro()p~.p.re .P:rov.~(lea It·,1.&·90ns1c1(.:re~1'', . 

. ~ .. ~:.tM$,·: .th.o lI .. a~1,no~'Dlv·1.S1.on 's.cr;Vlo.e elcne.nts~ :shoulf!... p,.~. 

",,' :··p.Q.·-ircsp~ne:1blc,' fO.r .Class·., II ana IV- sUpp'iiCB., .... . .: 

'. , ., ',~l?p.~ul1ar.'.to'~th.ei~rliirlne .. d9;rp8~:··a.n:cfthat; t~e . Conbat ._ \ 

· ·.··',::Scl'vl~:O.··.GrpLtp nOt 'be~: enp10 y'Ca 1n .this faBhione: .. :.... ~ :.1 

> :' . It' ,,·t~(:aQcor.-.:Rll sh :1 t~t· r:l1. ... ton of. air' 'supplying 

"..\.~" 1~q:~~_a .~lil~~ un;11.:':Q/7 ... ,22~Sep~Ober.• .It·is . 

~.! .. reqo~enJ!ad .~hat ,,~n'r'uiure; op.~r,at1o'ns,prQvlB1ons 

. '·':be··~mQ.de.torJ./t~·, 'A1r1)~11vcryPlatoon to o'Pc'rate. 

;'~;" ' .. :tl!QQ ··a·~ro,~Q·:ft:;· ()~rrle.:r$ ·Ul),tj;l ,.such": tirtle ~81a~d 

.. ~>':,\la~~. tac11f:tt~~,£\rt).':a v ~il~:Ql.e .•,.+ nth1s nanner- 

";, ," .;.. th~:··Q~P~b1~tle.a. .(rr,:·.thi,s.Pl.~lo:o·ri'·woulcL>not· be lost 

· : •.. ~Qr·~ng,~~~. ·aar.~~~I._ Grit.1o~l;· PMae,.:~f .tb~t~hlblous 

':~:"" 

,:'~.:,,:12;~,:,::,,:.::~'(': :'" 

;t

~ ..... "''' "' ...... I~'- - ...... ' ~ \ - 

- - , 

Annex· UNCLE UNCLE to 1st llarine Dl ~1$1an 'Special 

.&lotton Report 

Tho experiences of this operation cle&rly 

denostrated that a b~lanae of ucterial h~n(11ng 

equlprrent, personnel, -and transportation nust be 

l:laintuincCl. C'. t ships I bt;ach unloating po ints I OCE'.cl.4 

rcloa

.) 

,.. - 

',> ,'; 

• • •..•• ::.: .. ' .. "~.' 

·. '." ..: .,.; .:.', . c'.· • " '.: : .' ,\ . ' , ' 

qr~i~ t d1tf1~uit~~i~ :__'QtPe*~~nc~5i,~~' .re·turning 

In . add 

'~ille,se' .,ad!,$ ,::to'~.truf·:~roperOi'Q£ln1z~.tio.n. ~ 

·~t"1011, ~9re;~·Wcr.~ l;tPt.;;:r:oxlp~~Q.lY200· ~en ot Oo[lbc.t 

'. ': ~n1 tfj' 9.:!' .. ~ho·.D1'V 1'~~, d~~t~;+~~ ~o ~s~rd. ul)i t ~ 

. cqil1pccnt lntho £Ol':t ,:aroc.. ijac1 tluch ,-1 teoa of 

'Conbn;.. Sorv 1co (lrroup 

;' 'equ+pmoA~·· b~cn 'C!ltl~!~,{ ';~ 

·.sUPpl"iT~.~ o,cpi:w.Qul~\:hct'v.e Jl)~en: ~ va1~41bl.~ to 

the 1rtin1~:s ,fo:1.' .~Q~'b,,:t,~ du ty.. .... ...... . , ~ ,,' 

.::: ~

'- .. - 

~.il.NiCc,;tr;,!CIZ·. miCLE'~O 1st'Marine' Dlvlsio~ 

S?ECIAL, • ,.. • 

2. TASK ORGANlZA'TION: ~ ",',. f ' 

Engl.ne6r::',8~eclal Staff' Se,ction (HqOo) , ' 

l-SJff-1cer , 4-En11sted,Capta.in ,N~ J., DEMEIS 

Eng1n~,er' SUpply:.Pl-atoon {Supply' Co) 

'3-0f"flcers' 23-.Enl1sted lstLt., J.' H.' AFFLICK 

Engliieer ,Ma,lntenano6:Platoon (Ma1ntenance ,Co). 

3-0fr~cer8. 62-Enl-isted, ' CWO !.f. 0 HOGUE 

3 .. , ,gat~I-MIYA&t: P~"iNIliq: 

Coincident with the arr1vai a~ Kobe, Japan; on 

2'1 August, 1950, .the 'hastily organized ele{Dentsot f the 

, engineer activ1ty ~Tere" regrouped by pl,at'oon and seot1or 

according to the Comba~Servlce Group T/O, "and necessary 

plans .'were for.mulated ~'ror the 'acooJDpllshment of 

. . 

the mi" s ions .. a e s 19ned'ln 'th~' SOP. - 

4.. TB.a.INli~G A~m ,R!:H£ReAL~: ... 

~ . ,_. _ _ ," _ . { ~"'. . ., 

- '

... E}lBARKATION: 

a. " Out~loadlng tor the obJect1 va,. Inchol~r,·Korea, 

was accomplished'fPr.actlc-ally .,simultaneous:ty' 'YTlth 

the U#16adlng or ships arr1vlng~at ,I{obe,"Japan~' 

All orgqnlc 'property andequlpment,~1a.s assembled 

~ into 'staging areas-, , ~egreg~:tcd, .. processed, reboxeti, 

"rep~iredJ . andse.liviced., Elements. of 'the 

Supply' and Maintenance Platoons Tffera utilized 

as shiP-l:-0ading 'details. ,The unusUal requlre- ' 

ntent'and loading . facilities ~"'ere overcome tby . 

shee'D'dc'termination and'lvill of all involved. 

DUG to the .intens1ty of' the 'loading activ1ties, 

in~_t~_a.tlv.c and Impro7isions greatly re4uced 

pro~J:J..ema, 'w~i~h could easily have become magnl- 

I tied and h~mpero

. 

. ' 

~ 

f 

( 

•• 

16 Sept~mbel';·:~rtor all ships' "JOre ·un.loadc,d, the 

clements of the-Supply Flatool1 't.j~rca~Bcrubled by 

the P1.atoon,--Leac"iGr ;ctnd· eontlnuc'd ~rorkirig in the 

Cla.s 3 'III Dump.~ At 2,100, this Pia toonlntnc t ", 

r8vcrted' to CS1-',t ""hlch l~,a~.undc,r th~ operational 

controi of the 2nd Enginodr SpecIal Brigade.- . The 

elements of tho Staff Section la'-/1.cd from the.· , 

USS G,!;ORGS· CLYISR·{.AP:1 .... 27) . 'ano. "t'TG~e ihtegr~\ec1: 

into,'the op~r[ .. tidn • . . 

b" Exploi ~~t·:j.OD ~hase: (17: Septchlher t~; 7' Octo~'Jr 

IS50) .. 17 Sap"v6illocr th0 Supply Plato'o~, dis'plac 

;:5. ~o ~ _pro.viouslyd.:. 8ignato-d .. ~i te' on 'lare_ st· aide 

,YT' tho T.jdaj~ Basin 'and cstablishod a Cla.ss IIJ.and 

LlaBs IV damp, covered and'-opon.~storagc, ~oJ'1?-cir~ ... ,' 

6 ' 

).pplies Hcre'reo-cived ·&~a;issued· on"a t""cnty- ' 

fOl~r (24) hour basis. : The J.faintcn'an'cc' Platoon 

landedanc1 l~a$ billeted' in CSG' dump area. . 

18 Septomber, tho l1Ialntanance Platoon began to 

recover· eq'uipme~t and supplies from tho beach arca; 

the supp~y Platoon contlnucct to rocolvc issue aad 

'tAla,rehuuse supplies. All ·items of Engineer ~q~l~ 

mcnt both U. S.A;, and USlilC Bup~}llcs, including 

bridglng; vl.::re dlrect~d, to· the· Supply dump.' ".: 

TlJ-:nty-.tiPJO (22) truck loads of' 114..A2· floating , 

bridge "~lc;rc loaded and dcliv,:,rccl. to the 1st ~gin00r 

Battallon'·Command .Post at Zimpo A. lrfi01d'· 

during th~·h9urB.of darknoss. rh9'Platoan Lca~cr 

supply Platoo,nporsathl)1 dlrcct,(~0, and 'led the 

convoy undor" tho. most ac1vGr~c connl tionsto the "" 

Clest:tl1ation., . . -, .. 

19~2i·,·, S.cpt.0mbcT',: the' Supply Platoon collected 

rapId lay-ing, 'boach matting and cyclone '.fire fro.m 

all 6ourc.cBd~,livcring 1 t to tho 62nd Engln-c'~"r 

Battallon,lf.S.A. J constructing the ap~)roa.ch. to 

the Han ,River. 

~' 

Gross tonnago of tho mat involved amoun,tcd t.o 

200 tons. Tho }/icrr.intcne.nc0 Flatoon activated. 

ropairfacl11 t10S •. ~ , ..... 

22-23, Scptombo,r', supply operations:. continuod 

on at,; a tlr.Tenty four; hour be.sis. 'Tho 14p,intcnancc' 

Platoon prepared all organiC equipment for 'displaccmontto 

ABeom City. '. . 

23, S0ptQmb~r, the 11ie..intonance . Platoon displacod. 

to Ascom,City~~itho~t incident.· . 

24·_.30, Scptcmb(:I', EnintanC'..Bco Plu t9dn 9 stablish-' 

cd shops at bscorn' Cl"GY andbo[3.n op0rntion. Supply 

nci tvi ty in r~}sards tofio-ld' fortif~catlon equip.-; 

mont irJ.er..::ctscd, 

1-'0; . Oc tooo:c J Operations con tinucc1 £1.8 usual ~lith 

both the Sup:ply nnd. l.'iaintcnf'.nccPlatoons carrying 

out tho assi£n~d missions. ' 

7, Octo1 )Gr, Jl?l1ritolluncc·Platoon dlepl9,zod to 

CSG~,a.rba, In.chJn~ Korec:, t·o makO p'r0pnra t ions for 

embarkation fqr :.1e>nsan, Korea. The SU~Jply Platoon 

started r0':-'0xing, r':},1arklng' an(l other naco BSary 

preparations foroutloadlng. . 

No enomy o~countarcd. 

9. ESTli1AT::'D R:SULTS OF OPSRATION 

, . 

The E!1g1nc~r".Supply'and gaintcnancc Platoons 

provio.cq. the reg'uGsted sup';~lyand maintenance' ot . 

. cngin0crs material in the support of the 1st

~ision and X CO'rps.. Both platoons have 

proven thcir practicability, under most adverse· 

conditions, by the overallsc:;rv1cos rcndereo_ the 

supported un1 ts,. and 1 t Is' 'belley-ed . that ~ the . 

proficiency.of op'~ration 

ad. " . 

has "b.ecn . gre,atly. increas-· 

11 

aOi{i.r3NTS 'A-l® RSCOHll~'T!)ATIONS 

a., Maintcnance·Platoon., Th~.expcrience of this 

opera:tlon 'lndlcatod' thedeslrab11i ty of certain 

rev1 sions in TID'. .Tl-to of the Eleb tric l.fot·or 

Reparmen (1144) a~e con81de~ed, to be in excess 

of roquirments. Practically no. use was required 

of the six (6) Camera Repairmen as such. The 

need for an additional Diesel l·'iechanic (3511) 

\41aS also . Indica tad •... _ 

Certain def1:c lenelc's' in allol'rance s for tool 

kits were also noted. One kit, tool, motor 

repari was ·needed. The cle:ctric lIla-tor repairmen 

found a:~deflnite noed tor a 'standard field 

ki t of t,oots J Jigs and special materials for 

the repair, of motors nnd,€;onerator'a. ~h() Army 

.. has' such a ki t a. a 'a standard i tom I ,·,hlcn llTould 

mectthls' ·requ~rem~'ntadcq~c.ftelY •. 'It. is,',also 

recommonded that. the number of kits provIded for 

refrigoratormc.chanlcs, should be increased to 

four,' toal,lo't"J: one klt for 0c-,qh mCchnnIc:. 

Tho' distance bctyJ~~nthls unit and' 'thes'u.pport0d 

Englnci.-r, Battalion '\711S usually IS miloB through 

out the poriott of th1f3 opcrati'onj. This distance 

pro.yea to: be' a '~erlOl,1$ Ob.stacle ''to the adequate 

aceoin,p11shment p1' thef.faintenan¢Q'mi~aion. It 

. TriaS apparent that 9ither the Haintenanco Platoon 

should op~ra~o ·n:~arer. to the. s'upportc( unit, or 

ret i ro'1ver; equ'~pm.9nt .shoulo. be provid·cd.·It . 

1s roC!ommcn

"-"-"""' - 

'f 

-,;- 

;. ~~'-r~ ;~~ .~ ~ . 

: :~~. 

-, j . 

,~ 

" 

APPENDIX 2. to ANNSX·UNCL~· UNCLE. TO -1st 14arlnc. 

. :Dlvl'a1"on $po~1~1-;A~t16n fteport 

- ,~~ ".. \ 

- " . ,,". '. 

'Frol1l:: . Group OrdanceOfflccr 

To: Commanding . Officer 

. . Ordnance, In the Flcld,Korea 

" '18 Novcmb(p~i 1950 

Subj ~ 'Spe~l~l .Action ,Report :for pcr~od 27 . 

Augu~~ - 7~Octobcr, l~50 

··Rof: (a) Div1f?lon. Q-encral Order ~jumbGr 16. 

1 ~IN,TROJUCTION 

t 

t 

This special action: report, will cover the 

activities of the .Group Oronance Spocial. Staff 

Of"flcer, i1ajorSegp...l~ and tho.actlyltlq;S 'of the 

urai ts dlr'Gotly under .. tho OrOna-noe Spe9ia.l Staff 

Office, Orclrlance Secti.on, Hc[;.dquarte're Compeny; 

Ordnance Bhpply. PlatQon, Supply.Company;.Ordnanco 

Maintonnncq Platoon,' Mulnte11anCc .. O.q.mPSU1Y~' . 

'. . - - .,. 

Tho mlS~io-n·assignoc1:. this Group ,,,,a.~ tQ, provide 

OrdnD.nceLogistlcal. 6up-,l~··prt ·to.thclst Marine. 

D1vis..ion, (f\einrorocd);" af:td units of. th9 ~X·CorpB. 

Th'o" next highor,echol~n for this. Gr.oup uas .. , 

the 60thOrCi.nn.nco. Group X Corp;B, . U •. q •. Army .' .! ". 

2. LOADING ~ND Zl-ffiARKATION 

, , .; 

" Arriv8cl. KO'bc,' Jr.tpan aboard U. S.a. : Butnor, 28 

August, ,1950 .•. ~"~;GcncI'a.l unloiiQ.~ng commcnc.cdat 

1900 •. 4 ... 11 September, 1950 

" 

ships· were . combat· 

loadcq.. Various ships ~iqrc assif1lc(t to, cnch 

seotion 'or platoon., ,. . 

. 3'. 1

" 

~PENDIX 2 to Ai~N'r.x UNC~E UNCLE TO 1st Har.1'nc .. 

.;" ' ,Division Special Aotion Report ' 

.; , .,". 

bQ6.ta.bi"i,sti~d; ~ct m.ib.iaJ.ne.4~ .:. 'ibe~ "O'rdnanoe O~flcer 

Itpmedlai~e~1m

'!. 

,~~~. '. 't;."~:., 

"., ~ JI, ~ ,",:'.~ __ "_,. 

" . 

":'.'- .. 

f, 

aPPENDIJ( 2:' to AH1~ UNCLE UNCLE TO 1st Harino 

. Dlvison Special Action Report. 

. . .' 

.:'\ 

. ; .'..'\", 

SOIR~ . Tho. Ordnance l..falnt~nancc-: ',Flat,bon moved to: .. 

A's':c~OQ City and" was ongagod with the Army 82nd 

H.c~ vy l?ain:tonanQ c. ·OrCl.nanee Coopttny': to' prepare 

nnd establish it 1 s assigned shop~facilltics. 

During this parioc1 the TrackcCl. Vehicle. Scction 

of the Or.c1nancell.{a:1nt~nRncc. Platoon vias at, 

. ~ 

rcc:uC0{~ str~ngth due to having 14. technic inns 

asslgn(!d to tho 1st Porvisional 2:L-'!..rine:.:BrignCtc~ 

Tho rCL1aindcr of the Tre..ckod Vehiclo Section' 

werc. utilized in thcroc'ov,ery of trncKod 

vehicles fror:. the· fOrlr-fnI-c. ar.cas,· also the 

'removal i\Qd .serv~.plng o:f . resupply : t·r~ .. ckod ' 

vehicles· arr,iving 'a:t thc·.por,t of Inc,hon.'On 

oOr ·about., 6 October.,,: 1.9.50 ,oree-rs . were ,roc- ' 

elvod to prepare oq.tl()a~.ing of. ships for' 

furthc r .amphlblo:u~, . o.pe;rat ions ~ .. 

.. ' I . 

5. ::STIlIATZD RESULTS" OF OP=HATIONS 

Due to the short pcrloe:. of tho 'operation, 

ordnance maint.:3nance sho:pa 'could not':'bo pro-· 

perly 0stabl1shod for·the performa.nce of pro .... 

per field fLlaintenf::.nco ,hOl'1ev·crj " the -.,qr0~nnncie·. 

Supply Platoon ~·~as· able to' accomplish it I S 

m~,?sioA or supplying tho units. of tho'~X Corl6s .' , ',_ 

~Ii th" ~q}unl tion r..n'c1 ot.-supplying. the ,1st·; .. 

-:. '. ' 

rile.rinc D.i,vision (Rclnf0!'ccq.),· ,,11th· i ~CD8PG'Guliai'" 

to . thq .lvinrii'£p Corps. : . 

This oporo. tion has sho~n;l;. :th'c nO.Gessl ty:''':of i ~ ..: 

having' all. orc:nancc parsonnel 'in on9 cor:tpnny 

nnt';. tho special st-nft"offlccr '[!'ss-ignoclth'c 

t1.c:C:itlol1nl.(i.uty· of c.otlpany· c0f.:1m£':.n(1:cr·~ "Tliis 

cOIJpa.ny to.lncluc10 n', company .hbit(1o.utirtcrs; . 

orCLnntlC9 ',supply l)l[tto.on,· ore:n~nC0"Llnintenn.ncc 

pal toen · ahd. a· ar:lLluni tion pIp-toon. 

Tho strength" 

of thoso platoons to vF:.ry in accorl."nncc T:Tith tho 

size of tho force to bo log.1lit~cSlli sUP~Dortcc1~ 

:> ;' ../f:f'.u.;' ~ .. ~ ~. ~,:~_. 'i 

iIATEANS.:sG~~L i. .\{ . >~. 

·lfnj.or ,.U31.fC.~· 

, - 

'f

(:~eBs 

APP?NDIX ;3 to ANNEX UNCLE UNCLE to 1st Mc'lrine 

FraIn: 

to: 

. 

SUbJ! 

-;; 

Division Special Action Report 

Group Siganl,Otfioer 

Signal- 'Section 

HungnaJ;ll, Korea 


Commanding-Officer; let Combat8crvlce -Gro'up 

. ' 

S!>eCialAeti6n -Report 'for period 27 Aug 1950 

, to?: Oct 1~50,' . 

. . 

ftet: Ca) Division General Ory the Divls"lo~ Signal' Offic-er~. 

~. rAS1(.·ORQANtZATIOI'l 

1?o.o-s . ~o t. apply. - 

.~ -. 

i PrcliI:11nary pla.nn-j.ag Nns for Signal Sup:ply Platqon 

to abso'~b a11s1gnal supplies > 

5do.ys)· 

de~rrled by t'he D~vls1on Slgnal Quartermaster; sct . 

Up nstgnal c1urJp f1..nd make issues thcrefroo Test, 

t!.nd. repair taclli tics l'lere to be. furnishco. by 

Signal l~intenancc :PlatOon. .' 

4. TRA.INIHG AN::> REH~LS 

Trnlni~g spoclrlcallyfor the perioli being covered 

by this ropo+t .l!a.S . not accoopli snc,1 !lor ~·!Crc nny 

reher"sals,.rnp ."de., . Train1ng ot specialists Nasncc~ 

omplished ~hrough, ap:t">roprintc schools' of tho 1·1,:·~rlne 

0orps. . '. 

"T~cSigi.nl . SU~Jly Platoon cnor.rkcc1. aboD.:rd LST 

9?3 and LST '8~ on 10 Scpt~~b0r 1950." Beginning 

28 .August 1950" Llc.intcnancc cquiprJ>~n t ltTas. unloac. 

c(~J sepa.,tatcd in,to priori tygrou:~)s nnd loaded 

aboard the USS lfultcsldo, KA-go. Loading was -nccoop11shed 

by 9Septcmber 1950, and the Signal 

Main tcnance Platoon 1'l7US embnrkcd aboc:;.rd the USS 

Vfuitcsidoon 9$optcmbor 1950. . 

6. HOVEHtlJT To Ai\fJ ArtRIVAL AT O?J'-'CTIV: .ri.R-A 

The Sigc..nl Sup~)ly' Platoon c~lscml)arkcc;. on 15 

Scptcmb.er 1950. The Slgrtali·I~ntcnnncc Plato~n 

urrivcc1 at Incholl·) Korea on 15 w-otcmbcr 1950 nnd 

c'-iscr.lbarked 17 Scj:>tcmbcr '1950. -

. - .,.", .. & ..., .... .., -,;0- _ J ; 

. , 

. 

... 

APPEiIDlX 3':to·Al)}N:sJC, Ul~CL:: m,rCLE ~ to '1st ,Uarinc 

" ' : ,'Di~ision ~SpcCi~lAcitlon Report 

7. 01'~MTIOlfS 

• 

t 

a.' Assault Phase.', During tho assuo.lt yho.sc 

15-16 Scptetlbcr 1950, the: 'Signal Supply Platoon 

augmented the Fuel Section, Supnly Comp~nYJ First 

COLlbat Servico Group, .Servioe COI:,manf' J Fleet· 

MarinqForcc. During .~hc·p.s,saul t' pha8~ t1!~ Signal 

1l.1£l.intnne.nce Platoon 'rcn1£tincd abonrc1 ship. 

,- • '., ..... ••• J".J .. 

b. Exploitation. .During :the cxplolt.,~1on phase 

frol~ 1? Septemb~r '~g5Q: tnrough 26 'SeptcLloc-r 1950 J 

tho Signal Supply Platoon set U,? a signal tuop 

an(l~ made issues to all units (')oth USHC ~nd Array) 

as supplfes"bccame aV£'.ilablz. Frob 27 September 

1950 through 30Sel)tcr~lbcr 195.0 the Signal Supply 

Platoon turned. ovor to the :!.81st'Blgna1 Depot, 

U .8. ~rwy all slgno.l suppli...:: s ,.rL.j,":: ,.from 30 Scptcnbcr 

1950 to.? October 1950 tho Slgnn.l Supply Ple..toon 

augmented the leI st. Signal :cpot, U.S. Army. Upon 

eJ.iscmbarltutlon, the: Signt..l Ht'intcnancc Platoon 

pre:eecded .to .c'oDbt.t" Service Group c;.roc:.. Shop 

facill ties Here set up:' 18 .S6ptouocr. 1950 Qnc1 

..-"""ark on cqu1.ptlc"nt began'. Repair of ·Fton.;.'1 r :onoc1 

p.acLios . anct chcc~ on suppl106forp?s~i~1.o C'~[\magc 

byt

, • ; • " > '; ~ ~ \" • 

: ? -~f~&Dtx·· i ,t~~ M~ :V~CLE" U i.~p~' tb ~ t l lị LtirIn'e.' 

blv1s1~n· Spe~·al .&o'tlon Report ' . 

, . 

SupportComp&ny '. " ,_ .' 

1st Combat r Se~lceGr~'p. 

" . Se;rvi/oe 'OpllHIland:. fj,vJ.f,. ' ..,., . 

'I.' 

."~1;., F.PO ,·SW1Frane~.sco, Cc...11fornia. 

,:bBC/'~~ nw·· 

. ~ .. 

28; l'Jov 1950" 

· From: Commanding OfficeI' 

.. TQ:. .' QOIWs·nd,-ng·,9.t:ri:m,- J, first Copi';jQt' Service Group 

~.S·e.r.1t oe G()~~, ~iV1F'.··, '. 

: ~ ' . 

. SubJ·: Specl,ei .hctl'()n~epor.t ·fQ.r .pe,rlod· 27- t .. ~g 1950 

tC)? Oct 1960 .' '.' ','.: '. : ".': 

:~~f; .' '~ril'Gr9,up' ~l:l~f~~·;Orqe:r' No; . ~5:!.~ ~f 3' ~ov .1950 

~ .~ --~ ~.- ;. " ~ " , :'- ; ~.... ~ ~. 

1: •. ' 'INTRQDUCTioN' . 

· _ .1'b).~L\report. lsaublnltt~'d.fQ~ .the pUlpose. otpro:.. 

. _ vt4ill.8;~~:t, ',le cneJ:ons~:and.-6-ther·'inte·t'-ested . partie s 

'1dtdl.. p~\~~lt.1bnt .. ~l7.:ro:rmatl·on~ coilcernlng: theope.r at1on 

,·et"~l;l~"li.Ystl,qll:s.elr.f,up~t~: P:f' ~upport, yOIDiJ'any ,(tWing 

· ,t~;"pj"t~'~veredj, ,.1l}()1~4ing s'~t.Ubtl()ps ,e'·nG5)~nt~red I 

:":~f;l - ~ '~:~:~:~t'(t~tt i'" ~s~l t ~111~¥< -oT.. >.~h~~ xi-a t1 ng ~.~rgE.ni- 

'4 a§~·l,;. ,{ftt,£·'~ pe:~.rQrmfince' Qfas'S,igned ml,as~orts.~,.~-nd 

.{ ... ~. '~~~nd' '*fiJll 

;ea.~,:., 

M~'ss1Gtts':~t·t>1ie 

... ta~~onso~ :.e·qUipm,e~ t.pro:V1ded~ 

company ~re ·the:m:e~ntenanye· and'op~ration 

'()t .w.v.te:r1al;sHL,ndl-1ng equipment j the 'provision 

Of ~g~~ze~ depot labor details:_ L&undry ~1,c~, for 

,~~.Oj~~t &erV1 ce Group ~nd other org&ni~atlonsas ' 

. 4~r~,~·i.l.a. P-Y'l+1ther. 6.utlt6r,l,t,y ~ -E.tr!(~ tbe Bupply1,ng of.' 

.·'~~.~h::,!~~e~~~·.at'·tb~,:.r&~~·o~eight. :{aJoutfC!es,·per m~n 

.> ~~.:r.:.~f .·rpF ·,t;flS O~~bs.:t S~rv~ce,GroUP"61l9; otl?er un! ts 

'·~~;:q:l,~e'~:eA,~ ~ ~~he )n~~. ,hl ghe r' at:?r~el:on:o f -·thj.s orgQlllaat1jm 

l1:ft~hEi 'F'j;'rs t O'ombs' c' S~'rvi-oe: Gr'Oup.; - Servl ce 

C~a.nd., ~l~t l\1l&rine Fo.~oe, •. 

.... .;.. : _:._ }- ~~' \:_~. ~.' ~ .. L.", _." '. ~ '": ~ ,_.~ ,_ - . - , , 

. ~';''''·:Tbb,K 'tlRg#J*t".t-.T!·viV. C 

'.' .: 

;~;.'~.'!~'~ .. ~"'-.-.;' --,':-',

nPP£NDIX4 to .bJ1nex, UN-CL£ Ul~CL.s, 

Spt. ciE:l . r~6ti o"n: Repo.rt ~ 

to 1st J.VJ.arlne Df visior: 

.hll u.'1ii;c of' LhL; f):J;~ ,...: t CompEr:.y fanctioned 

under ex.isi;ing pt.;;l,-..tJ.:j _.I.s .p~.::.:r~? 5..no o!"':1t:.:rs 1ssusCl frOId 

h~~ ..dqu.:..r"t;2rSJ F:L:-'st GGIllP&tServicf; G:;.... oup, i::Jcrvice 

Conun[~d,' F~e0t ,··!j.;,rineF'.::r?8 0 

l~o opportunity for' training Ethel renearsa.ls v!E.S 

&ff'orded, other than on ths l.iol? trailll'ng for all uni ts 

Tnts·c functions viere effcct,sd _In ·acco!"'us.nce with 

load1n-g and embErk&.tion plW1S prcp&red &nd issued by 

lieadqu&rtbrs, First Combat Service Group, bervice 

Commc:.nd, Flv$·. 

,6. l\liOVi:1V.ll:,NTTO~;-+RN.v,'{; J+T, O~J£CTl\TE~~j~ 

The Bntlrb C~mpGny J ~m~f?r'k~d in €le~en (11) landing 

ships ,·t&aks ~less f9Ll..l' (4), bEy C1 ty -Cr&nes 

'~p(;r&tors :E:1:?oir~.,twq·' ~'~#~~!+g ships, u till ty J arri v6d 

E..t ,Red .c;ec,cn, Inchon, lbrea &t approx!ID9-tely 1830 on 

D Day, 15 Sep 1950. ,5..ay 'Gl 'yCraneopcI:Ei:tor$ &.nd 

. ,thei~ ,equipm0nt arri v~d ~t E..l.uc, peach' on D Day, 15 

Sap 1950. . ' 

? ;OP&thTIONb 

.h:SS au1 t PhasE: (10-16 u.JD '1900) - .. ,i.Jntire Corce:·. 

, employt;,;d' in unlo&Qing LST's and LSU' s i!J. Fil1c:. 

Lmb.E.rkJ3d.. und€;r c;nerr.y tire J in :'aug~ntE,tion 

of ,tl?:e FIrst, fjhor6 Pa'ty oattal'ion. 

b. ~xplol tat10n Phctse (l? 'bep -7 O~t '195'0) - 

Units of bupport COil.pe.ny reverted to control 

of' Cor.lb&t berv1ceGroup and Gst&D11shed 

f6.c111 tie s for the performc.nve of assigned 

missi

w PE1'.Jl.JIX A. to r.Ni.;EX UNCL,i. UNCLE tq Is~ l'larine 

Dl ViSiOn.bpeq~~4- ~~~ .. t~o'n. Rep·or.t~ 

04·. 

10. CO,h~·1~i·;T8 bl~l.J R.8COH,bEND&,.'I'IOL:S 

b.. .L".lateriE.l E&ndling Pl&toon 

.ri.~·1PLOYJ.I'~j:·~ T 

The ean&bill ties of this section. vJere 

not propE.:rly utilized throughout the 

operation due to th8i'f&ct th&t the requestihg 

units did not ~dherc to the SOP 

a.nd eb&.nnel their r~quests throut:,h the 

b-4. It is rt commended thc.t the ,(Jl.c terl&ls 

handling Pl:E.too.n h~'ve &n i~~CO. &ttE.ched to 

the S~4 fo'r liaison purPos~.s so thEt v-Th6n 

. &. call is received for J.\'lcct;;;;ri&.ls H&ndllng 

equipmt:;nt, hE.! c~n deterrI.ine ·the typ~ of 

equiollcnt th&tshould be sent out to p~rform 

.... , t he.. job. I t ~J&S found thCL t m&Uy 

SE; ctloQs' ~e questing Iffts h.F.-d no, concE:ption 

~st'b the c-&nablllt18s f,nc.lirrlitations 

of' the' equiprn£'nt ort-anie to' this plFtoon; 

thus'i.Thsn piece of c.qulpiii-2nt T;;&s.se~t . 

out It-vl£[S "Qu·nd.>thft it "'Jas oft~n imp 

r& c t i c-§:l 1" ~ itt a p;;: rforlrl the:.j 0 b. Thi s 

coulct b~ rc l. tf.lcd by h~v~nf.:'. tly. requesting 

'~r4it giVE; th\typE. :and1~elght of the- m&~er 

- 1~1 to b8 lit'~d to th~ .11~is6n.NCO Ettech 

. c'd; to' the 6-4.' TLc. liEiison:

't, 

bPPENDIX 4 t~ ~'nJ£x UNGi:i·«:ui.i'

4 to ANNEXUN'CLE UNCLE; to 1st ,Marine 

u.?ENJI;~ 

Division S~ecial ~ctl~n 

Rep0r~ 

ij]/iP LO YlVI H;NT 

(1) Except in;! tl~~ll:r, th.8 Dep.:tt Platoon 

we.s n:Jt f .;cmpl~0y'..-::I.for 1 tR. mif-! r:41'Jn. The 

p'rese,nc.-; )f ~uftlcient lncllgen )U8 labor 

inrc(:ly ,el1minHted the ne(~c1 f'::Jr' rn~·np)'t.yer. 

·T~e zmployment ~::f '1nd!vLiulas of the platJ)n 

aft 8uperv1sor8' ;;r. f )reme.n ,;ver srne.11 gr _;UpA 

~f ind1g8n)u~ IBo.)rs iNaEt th~ rn')f!tpr!:lctlcal 

epproacht~.the pr~blemt Th1p we~ lanA in the 

ammunltl:Jn dump8,. mi8cell~,n2"')uFt __ i.UmpA, ClaFf! 

II & IV. Dnd rntlon w~reh~uP~R at AFc~rn ~ltY4 

The later UF9'Jf thirty (30) men 0t·-,-"'~c·~im City 

~8' gtlLe,r~"s ~vap v,='ry mu,.ch needed rnd l,Tfl,~ c.)n-· 

slder,~d in ~lne 1,,11 th the r:4i tun tl·:1n. 

(2) It is hellev,~d theref)re, th,rtt 7 

~ 1 th.)lloh 

1 ts steve,l>ring mlssi:Jn 'Tve_t:=t not perfor:7l8d 

llully, 'having, a ,p:)O 1 of men f)v~11p.b 113 to .. 

he.n,ile other tflRk~ a~ they c&:.rle up T,fC.R ncrvaptagcO~R. 

(3) .'Had there. bBen nJ ind1Q en'.::u~'lryJ)-;r ~vHllable 

it i{3 b\:;118V8,l th::t the.' D':;p".jt .l?lp,t~-)Jn 

"r·.)ul:1 hnva been very useful but n,)t nearly 

suff1cient 1n ntimberR t·:; Ple ...;t th,~ mrrnp')'iNer 

'.' 

ORGANJ~A~I'IOH 

~ 

f 

Tll l'ht' org.~:.nlz.!' ti...ln -~f the p:~.t:) ',n 1n tr,i r ) (2) 

tltte.6Q. (16) m:

- ... :. > 

, 

.~ 

, '" ", ~ .. ~\ .. '. . 

APPENDn 

... - ~. ....:.. 

d. Bakery 8ction: 

-. \>'lI. 

. -. 

.: -... . ' 

,~' , 

.. _. .. _":-i, 

~ ~'.'":,,' .. ~ ... ' .: .... "' .... 

\ 

l 

":_ 

"~~ - "'.~.~.~~ 

, :~'~:.~ 

• t'- :' 

.. , 

"', :--. " Ii 

T,,,,- # 

'.... ... 

~ ...... ~. 

, . 

. 

'. ,. ., ... 

§. I' ~ .. I' •• ~ 

. .

APFENDIX 5 t·) lJ'lNEX VNCLE UNCLE TO 1st Mrlrln8 

Dlv18i.~n Sp~clrl Action R2port 

1st Air Delivery Pl'lt·)'n 

S.8rvlcc CJmM~n}, FMF ...... ·.: 

~ )nsiln~: 'KJr~q . 

13 NJV 1950 '. 

TJ: J 

C-:mmnntiI1g' Offl,c2r, lSit Air ·D&'l.lV..s::.I:'~ 

r:lll tJ n, ServIce C :ffifl'!On.:" FMF 1 

C ·)mmF,n·Jihg Offie er ,1st ~ inbr. t Barvi C8 

.Gr '~up, SerVice C:\mmf'~nl, Ff.fF ' .... 

SubJ! 

Specinl Actl,"1n Rap1rt f)r peri ;-127 August 

1950 .:t J. ,? pct.Jb~r 1950~ Inclusive .. 

'lfl- :. 

1. INTRODUCTION 

-. 

(l) . Thcg~n6ral DvcrFlll purp'lsd )f this r8- 

p')rt 1 R t·~ gl va Ft c.:;:rlprahcnsi VC SUr.1!!l~lry -;f the 18 t 

Air Delivery P1~~tj·J.ns I -=-~.:;rnti·)ns ;-:1uring the Inch)nllJ.npo 

an:l Se,)ul opernti :)n8 c,)vering. the perl-,(~ 27 

August 1950 t·] ? Octobar 1950, Inc1uslve~ 

, " 

'(1) The" mir:,sl.)n assigned tJ 1st _tr- DellY0ry 

P18.tojn by .the .,C;:>mI!lnn;llng. Officer, 1st' C)mbat S0rvica 

. GrJup, was the assembly nn ... : prcp.r:ratl~ n Df 8~pplles 

and. e,!ulr!1psr.lt ~cqulrlr>g air deli very I the d8velJpment 

anCL perfaatlbn "0f air delivery techniques an~;' 

e(:ulprnent~ ~nd aSRistlng .. 1n the iel1very I by f:ir 

fre~ht or air arop supplies nnl eqUipment requirei 

units. 

by au~p0rted 

c. Desig/na. tlan of next high8r echelJn 

'( 1) The next higher. schel -n t: this oIg,nnizntl~n 

is the 1st C~)1'!lbFt Service Gr-,up, ServiCe 

C () mmand, flIlF. 

2. ~ ORG;~~IZATION 

a. Ozg ani c Uni t 

(1) The 1st Air DeliVery Ple.t-;;n 18 C:~l1po8ed 

of two operatIng sect1 )ns nnc1)ne henjf!Un~ter8 sectl"n. 

Plflt.)on hea'quarters c JnSlstlrE)f :-ne Ofi'lc,,::r Hn -~. ten 

enlisted men oer!crms c')mrnand. Po.nJ n::1mlnlstrnti ve ;::lutles 

f;)r the platoon.TTtf-' op8rntirg sectl'JDS f)f twnty-six 

men ee.ch' with a Technionl Sergeant (AlrDellvc}ry Chi,·'f) 

in chnr(?;a performs the pnckaglng Qf supplies an,-~ 

ec:u1pment and the pa.cking ot parachutes. 

it; 16

" ., ~ . ' 

bPPENDIX ·5 t) ANNE4 . UNCLE.· UNCLE' ,tt)' lst-,Merina Dlv isl·.)n 

Spa clal Ac tion Repor t 

c. StrBu th PIn::' uni t;~c:-'TTIr:1anLcir 

. ~ 

, < 1) ,The: stren'-.1ht ·.Jf ·th0 l~ t Air Delivery Plat -:n 

d,urln~ the p;::rloj::f thls r-=~p Jrt wnA 1 -"f.flc\;.r. 611d 66 

enlls~eJ, nep •. Plat',n C:Jffir1F.nier. CnptA,ln Hersel D.C. 

BL.b.SING.clME,. U. 8. Mf\.rlne C ~rps" :. 

3. PRELIL.IN...ill.Y PL.~NI~G 

(1). 1st ... 

';..1r'·DelivBry .Pl£1t'J,.n woe !,)rep p re2 tt" 

effect the aerii::.l ~e11ve~i ':f 8u;>~Jlies Rn'.. er;ulpment by 

parachute fr'~!'!l tha ne~r'2st trien :'ly HirbD.Ae t·) units in 

ls~latal RreRS ·r in ~r~a8 cut ~ff rr:~ ~a1n f1rces arid 

T,lhen epee'l tins fl. vi t~l fact,.:,~ pn 1 cr1 ticf.:ll 1 tems 't"ere n It 

Jtherr",fse ~~·vallpble. . 

b.' Plannin,::, schdG.ule,. alterno.te 

{l} OperHtln....., sect! jn8· C .nB1stin~J ,jf 8.p~r()x-:- 

1ma:tely ten !!len en.ch W4~~1 JP,~rF!ta, fr'-lM" pircr-~ft 

'carrlcrs~ ut~~lz1n,; cFl,rrler base:-1 airer· ·tt Until such 

time as lanj basad tranBp~rt aircrrf~ an1 a~rflel~s 

become Lvnilable. ,,". ' . 

c. Directives un'~er whlchJper: . tin .... 

(I) The 1st Air Delivery Pl,~ .. t)'~i·n' JP~r:: te.: un ~cr 

direct1ves 1A8ue~ by COT!lm n ndln,_, Officer, .1st C')!!lb;1t 

Service Gr, up_ Durio u ' t.ha . perl·'",::' 19 ~e.pte~b2r 1950 tJ 

7 OctJbcr 1950 •. j;>-r'itl::nal~~lrectlve8 were. :issue..:":. by 

(]""'4" 1st IVlnrihe' Dl vlsiJn. 

,.:~. Enamy 

(l).Ncne 

" 

f. ~O;18tl~.Plnnnin~ 

. (1) The ltJ...,istlcal p19nnln~ f.)r 1st ·A'ir Dell~~ 

eryP.IJ1 t'J)n \",as perfJ rmed by Or ~nn1 C Supply., 1st· C jObD. t 

. Servic,e Gr ~ up . . 

A lZ'~"

A?PENDIX"s to ANNEX UNCLE' UN(ij.,E· t~ 1st Mnrlne 

'Dlvls!)n' Spac1al .Actl~n Report ,"" ' 

.~ 400uniulatlJn 'J! Intcllll~'nce 

. . ~. 

"1) The i~fl,)w"Jf" part~n~nt-in:f(;rm0.'~lJ.n. 

and intel11gence during the p~HnniDg l'hi>.se we,B ' 

excallent. p.nl th1s ·Jr,:;a.nlzntlJn "rlC 

~t dev~lopmant8 r.t 011 t1mes. 

4. TMININi AlJD ~HE.j.RS.AL....a 

.. S kept v~br·ef'.at 

('1) Prlo'r, t; ·arid ~lu.r.in",.' ·'the. p~rlJj :)t this 

·rqpor.,t· troy1nlng wQ.s~g1ven -tJnev pers!)ll;ne1; l.1Fh')· ,', 

~hfl.d. J:>lned. tl1e' ~:Jr ~e.n~.lzrt.t1-on pr.iJr t, le0V.1nl 

the West C()f}.st.' Th1'8 tr8.1nln~ ccnslste·1 pr1mrrl1y 

(If instructi'jns in packing ;-;:fCltr~/l ·pq.r{l,Oh~t_eB. 

supplies AnJdqulpment 0.n':.' rf)),Tlll1nrlz":t1';n of 

c9,erlal \!a11v~ry c0,}ltainers. Nel~persJhnel t:v:>rk"ec1 

with estpbllshed flight cr~ws. Bl this meth'')d it 

\f,rtS t(')~n..l"thD.tthe ef'f'iciclncYJt the :)rnflnlznt 1'')n 

"a"B pJt 1mp;l!r~d be

APPENDIX 

Sp.,cln1 Act1 In Report ~'. . ~ < ..' :." .' ,..,' '., '.' 

5 :to i ~NEX UN'CLE'uNOLE :tn 'l'st Mp'rlne'D1v1ei ln 

On the n10ht of 2i,:..S~1I.t.enige~'';1960·~~d:er.s·y.Te-re 'r2c~ive'': 

from the Jst 14arine Dlv1si:)n for 1st .b.tr Delivery l-'lntoon 

t-1'~r:i~:ve 1l.11·~·p~rsonnel [.:n:} .er~ulpI!1ent ·t'.rJM ·l;nc.h'·:n 

t·:> Klm~o A~:r\f'1·e~lo ~T'h1 ~ ... m~~e.'t~E1~ ac ~.:.mpllf:;he:l. 1r::T~I~ ~:-1- 

n telyo '. ,'.' .. " ....... -- .~. .;" . . .. 

7 .. :£EEJi~~JSLN.tI· :' 

:;.~,. .(]). Il'he 1st· Air J)'E'llv,-cry Plnt·.j,.)n ·,ell:1. n)t pr:.r- 

·tfcipf.1.tC,...)iil tn0' D.8130.ult o.r thE; Inohon op~rti:tlon' ot:qer 

thnn·Unlor~'i ti1e; ·p'.lpp;I.les r.n·~l ~qulp!'lent;f'r(~m ~hlp8 •. 

. 1·.. :> ;; . ~ . ", . . .... ~ r- • • 

.. , 

b··~r'Isz~~o.~'~?tiJn .. Phn,se:, - :.~ :"~: .. ,:: 

'( 1) [~t 14()O on 26' ge:;t;2Mb:8r~ . 19~," lRt -':"i'r 

Delivery Plo to)n ,,;~f:-. e :r;:~quepted by 0...:·4, . .18t~ Mf'rine ' 

Dlvisl')~ t:) perfGrm ano.erl·~l re~leni8hi:1.ent· miSAi)n. 

This I v ilselon ccn8~Atec1·.)f tY'J C-:·47 trpnspo;rt nircrnft 

l:)rti~ed 'T~Tl th Urhmunltion . n-:..:' bl");~,l plt~p·m0 .• Thase 8upplies 

were ,:lroppei by, pr:.rn.q1iute ':Jv'$r '.;e~~.~:}teC: tr-rget in--the 

Seoul C'.reD.- 0t 1600' h-:)urEf;- Wh~le ..:'r:::pplng these supplies 

in tene8 . enemy am;-ll' f1I;!!lB fir'e .lv·',s r?C8 1 ve·;l . bl bo tho :n.ircrnfte 

One ;, ir jeli veri '.mr~n. TITre :lr ·:tirt'~"..~l 1n the -~ight 

thigh by. s!1't.ll··('.rms ·fire. ·The· hy.~~r!, u1ic .systam', 'fArtl.S 

dt~mr;. ge:l c:tl ~;'ne' cf'-:the·1).irc.r:: ft 'f'Jrctp'g, 'i t . tc; filP.ke ,':: 

crr,sh ·1'~.n:11ng,· t!olYersonneT Auf~ere \ ·(tiJ.y .inJuries ;=lue 

to the'lrn'ling but. the· pl:-;ne:: 'tIme ·-~e8tr·').I.e~.• ·' . 

On 28: '" _.' iJ Cfe'~o-+- ;,;: vC1~;l..Jo';;;:_ 

.,,.,...11-;.-.... ,.., 1950 

" . 

't~h'·" d... i'el'i'l~e¥lo~r 

V J. -.;; 

-~'.p 'mmunltl-n' 

'.)'J,. ~.' .••'-.1 "",' .. 

nn~ rations wrs effectel to ~ unit ~hlch hrii ~u8hed 

;:.,ell .::ut fr')ffi' the norm!',l s )urc~ Jf 8;1pplle8~ Th.l.s.· _ 

delivery "r!1S effectel ';I,71th:)·ut, inci':-~errt'~:'·~, .. -,.., - . 

Or,iers WTA receive·.-:' fr'J!TI the X AriJl:t CGrpt3,~~'190C 

~n 6 03t;)ber 1850 to prF:pr-re fjr !':n' ;'.11" :~lrJP of fc:.>:: 

r-·nd TN'}ter t::; n; gr~up :Jf, men believ-::.~ to be .d.r.1erican 

prisoner's :Jf vnr: nbout··50.milElp .s·u'the 8t ::;f'l'ycn f1 :Y~:.n.. ·, 

Korea..: 36 C~Be8:)f IIClf.r,;.,tl':n~·'fri 20. Q 

{:.llJns Jf'l'.vnter 

~vere p(~,cked !),n -l l:;~~_·-ej r- b")f.').rd· r· TJ .8". Air FTrce. air-. 

crrftl .~~1ch t)~k of~ frJ~Kl~p0 Airti61d ~t.0700 hourR~ 

7 ·Jct···;b,-:r.' _.1950r.1sopars 'slnr,rl;;' 1i')pkln - .their ,~~Ttly 

scuth t,~)1:~rr"'r:.ls the 38th 'pp~nllpl T,rhen they were sl~hte:} 

they hr-,r:~ spe.lle;l. :')ut· the wJrk FOCD wi th f}rqntl J'Df! 'ot 

men. 

(I) Duet6 the ri~tur8 of :utle~ ·perfbr~~1.by.thi8 

·.Jrgrtnlz·! tl~·ri' t'h:;l'e ~~r~gno kno1rJ'n inf Jrr'lp tiGn concerning 

the enemy -~urlng ·the per13:i ,=,f this r,.:;pcrt.

~ .. r{7~- :':~~r .. :'l"t ~ .• ~ 

~ ~ "",!it'~ '1rovecl ·th2t the aerlf:ll :::e11 very of su:)plies 

Hc.cur9,tely rln:1'rnpl,lly 1;;n6 nn Importp.nt fr~ct·Jr 1n 

l·.)~lstlcD-l s.upport of· nn n~.~ressl va hr.r'l hi ttln~-.:. 

f':)rce,; ths t·' p.lr dell v·ery . cf _~upplle8 an.;" e1uipment 

can ·tfe pcccmpliehec1. TJlTith ~ood results by nn 

air }.ellYery'urllt. 

10 .QOO-18NTS ltoND R~O~\'IVIEtND~;.TI ONe 

" !'> 

n. COI!1!!lents 

( 1) ,,;'1 though the,' lr:nding J f tro ;p s n t 

Inch'Jn TI\T[lsmt'c_Le nt J600 on 15 Septenber 1950~ it 

w~s not until 22 CerLe~ber 1950 that the ~ir 

Delivery Pl .... J.tocD· 'h(~'6 M')ved' into an r:tre9.. '\\There it 

could render effective ~n~ eustnined plr del1~r~ 

cf' sup~11e8. Sh-:.ul. ::n, ;:;perf1tir:~ secti)n cf 10 

man h~ve been Rt,·ti·.:ne,'~ ·~bo~tr(".. ..Rn~.ircrf'ft cnrrier 

prior to [·,rri~··l· f~ t ."Inoh'-inj . they c"ul:·i. h{lve been 

qble to~urnish cri tl c!;l SUi.)J.Jlies stf'J.rtino .~ t I! E 

hour :)n :D dr~y!t, uti.llzing .:Jnly .Jne bcmb r~- ok (;f 

a fi~hter type 0ircrrft :flying !l nissiJn f 200 

to 400 p

. '''~:' •. .;. I .. !- • '" .' 

.~ _ 

i..pFEND;rZ~ 5 tiJ '~NE~' ,Y:t:i'SLE ,UNCLE' to '']:{jt ,~;r~ne, 

Dlvisi')n Speci01 i:'ct16n',~Rep\'r't .,,' ,,~, ..•. ~.. . 

t 

I . 

. '.' . ~c(>~'1I!1en;~lr .l~ 

; f 'b o,~· ~. " • .. .,... "'t"i' i 

... -" \." . ,..'" 

t's,. -I, tf.. . 

.-. '~l ItCis '~~cc~menleQ thnt the T. E. fJr 

vehicles ,.fur'r·Grr'~1r':Del1very Pl_,tJ 'on be chnn~e,::", fr8T1 

f·)ur i· ton trucks l"rl th trn..l1ers enl.,~ine 2~t~'·n,.E?X6 

truck t·:) t;ur 2,t t:1n 6X6 truQlt,s ,;;nJ"lne :i t,;n, t~u.ck 

with tr0.1'ler.'~'~neJperf-;t1~J!l's"c·)v~!e'l by this rep-rt 

has pr~-Jved. thr t ·1·t0n trucks ""ri th tr·-'.ilers nre 11!"11 t 

ed in utili ty ':'nd copnci ty in h,~JJ.l1n g nir 'leli v~ry 

,cJntnl'ners from the·, p:abk'aglD:G~ereil,·,·t·j',the Ftircf\[d't. 

1'he;1 t-.)n truck p.nJ trailer 1s us'eful 0nly f.r q!0np 

malntenan'G a fJl1 :1., hFtulirg ;lacked. pp.rp.ch~ te 6., :- ... 

(2) It is furthar rec:)mr!len'le·: that all pers.Jnnel 

in nn Air Delivery PInt,) ':n b~ CJ.rm·3J wi t;hn ", 

.45 Cp.l1ber pistol w'i th sh j.ulJ.e~, h~,4Jster.6 •. e...J·ri8,i~:rerble 

diffi cUl tybn.8·h~~n anc,'runt€re~: 1

""' 

'h .~r'r-~ ...... ':..~!j.~r>-"" 

" , 

h.P?ENDIX 6 t) ~NNEXUNCL~ .UNCLE .to 1st Mnrine 

D1vls1~)n Bpecl~ll ~1.ct1'.1n. Repcrt.t'" " 

.... 

Fr~m: CommRnJ1n~ Off1cer 

l-s't' FUMig [ltl In nn:1 B~. th 

.f>lpto'Jn, -'S.C, FMF 

In~the Fi~~l, ~ore2 

20 ~Nc:ve!!1ber,. 195.0 

) 

Tnl Cocrm~nilnS Orflcar.'lst Cambnt Service 

Gr·:up, Serv1c'e Commp..~d~ FMF. 

:8ubJ: . SpeoialActlon Report.,0r period 27 August 

7 Octc;.berI950. .: " 

Ret: (ti) D1vls10n Gen8rr'.1 Or~ler No. 16 ';f 200ct50 

1. . INTRODUCTION ~: 

, In ac'coriance wi th the instructl)ns c }nt'1ined 

:'1n reference (D..) J the subject nnmeI rel)..:rt 1s submitted. 

This unit W(lS nssieneJ. the miss1 :'n ',if b~,thing 

fln;l issuing cleen cl:;thBs. to. rr~)nt 11ne tr~:)',~'p8. 

The next -higher echelon '1s the 1st Cc·'mb;t S'ervlce 

Gr;::)up,"Servlce Commrnl 17Se~-70ct50. 

6. COMlviENTS A:in l~SJILi'·'-l:.\:')_:.~i:'I')NS 

Inslii'f1r "nB~;"n z-:~~;;--:::;~~"2e:7v~i"-th~ e'1Uipr'Y3nt end. 

8upplle,s. hR.,ve been "l-;'e'1u8.1;e f.)r the mls8i":n 

asaigna·'.i. howdver i'~ :1 s inpr

APPENDIX 7 tJ JiliNEX UNCLE; UNCLE tG 1st M!'·rine:D1iTisi i,n 

,S'p~~1~l,"ct1:,;n Repspt '., " 

·f 

Truck C'~:mpf"'nYt 1st :,CjI)b_~ t .. 

S -rvice Gr~'up "S'e"r'v"lc8 rr.-· ... 'n·· n' 

, 1-; . I J V J "., • , 

Fleet Mnrine: F'Olrce,' -, .. , 

% FPO, Srtn Fr'1ncisc·-: I C;.111' 

14 N~)VeMb~~, 1950 

Fr,.')l'!1: COrl!"!,!nnJtng Officar " ,"" 

T,),:.-. CO:!1~ "nding ,Officer. 1st CO.rr!b

~. -.. 

- ., . 

. :~ *.. ~ - ~- 

.H.PPENDIX ?·to ~NEX UNCLE UNOLE ·~t9 1st· Mnr.tne· -Dlv'lslon 

f?peclri.1 Actl;n Report 

~. .OPE·RATION§ • 

. . 

-15 Sept 

- 1~17 Sept 

18. Sept 

All ,tbe compopy l~.nded .'It ~b'Jut • 

1830 I . offlo~l.Iej .. the trucks 'lnc1 , 

Imme,-~.l~,ely begnnh'lullng op'er~ tiol'la 

tis 5.1rec terl by the ShorePrarty 

C,)!11M~n'ler. 4.1"1 veh1cles were off' 

loa,1ei nn'l pl::, eel. 1n h n u1.1ng oper- 

. ntlons .Jur1n~ the .night 15-1'6 ·S.0pt 

:1950. 

All trucks l~re,r€ us.e·:9: by 'Shore' l'qrty 

Batte.1ion In"'the bef?_ch ~refl. haultng 

frOM L.S •. T .• t;g to .1umpsln vicinity 

of beacp area. 

'Truck CI~np9.nY :reverte~ to. c:)ntrol 

of . the,l.I.o,JrimtinC.iri~'O:fficer, IBt· CJP.1-,.. 

bnt tiervloe ·Gl'oun. lie str'rtel hnulin:~ 

between the· beachiuI!!p~ ~:n'i the riew - 

:lump t'rens af the CO!!lbnt Service 

Group. 

19-'21S"ept .. Truok O,)!npany was used. by the Combr.,t 

>:~. 2~23 .. E?6P~. 

•. ,.. Se.rvlce GrJup ·"for :1riternnl' b .. ~ullng 

.. 

qnc:.tothe to the Service Battalion 

dumps. 

. : " ~ ~ " .,.#.... .. 

·'ntAenty""".flv~ (25) trucks were ti.s~l by 

the .7th Army Division·:to hrrul :r~·t10n8, 

W;:l tel', . 'nnC~ fuel, to _ Suwon, _ !).p~?,roxlm.ntel¥ 

thirty-ftve (36J .. miles . 8·)U.t~ of Ipch')nf; 

Koren.:' .,' - .~ 

. ,'24S,ept - 70ct 'Truck -Comptlfl.;y "con,tinu~;rl- t·) :)erf:)rm In 

8~' :ENEMY 

_ ternnl·.hHu~ln..; ·mls.~l)ns r'Te tIle Greu:), 

. the -mission ,for' 1~hlch it 18~eslgne(1. 

'Durlngtbe ,p.e.J;i,:)d15 September to ? 

October this..' compcny' t~l'r,snble ta keep 

t'tlrenty-flve(25)trucJ,,:s o-r the tJ:+lrtyane{ 

3l} ;')n ~he rOI1,3, t111Tenty-four (24) 

.. h ·~urs -.() jay-, 

N.o comments o ' ;Th1-s 1 ;,)'t1T,p:'1nynever C'·'!118 1n contact 

'tv! th the enem~..- '- 

9. ESTIl'I.LhTE.].F.~SUI~}:'>2 r~ ®2[:L7;~J:Qli§, 

. . 

It ~Tr s f,)pn~ tr.:.': (, '~he G. ~'( .. , C" 2; tonI 6X6, s t )ncl up 

~,vell on 1trJuP~l the c~(i·~k" 0.~)·.~;;.:c~tions"l.\Tlth Ilttle mech!'·nion,l 

~ttentl:-)n~ The :':.;Q f8rthe 'I'ruck C:)mp~lnyls ·not 

r:.::'equ,~t'e ,to ;lrGy1d.e f,:)}' prolon~e.:1 t-~'\Te.nty-f6u:r (24) 

hour "opern..tlcn yf 1 ts vehicll;;s. ." .. 

A. 24 

(

~"""'F' -, 

, 

APPENDIX 7 to ANN~' UNCLE UNCLE to 1st M~"rine 

, Di visi')n Special'·.~ctl 'In Report 

(See pnr!:L~)rn'ph 10) .. Th'-' t the tO~8 of n.11 c!1.bs ~nl 

fifty per cent (50%) of the truck t~r~oulin8 hrJ. 

rotted in 8tor~ge. The need far Q sectlonnl b~r 

thf 

.. t 1s permllnently .. ~ tt0.chel to the bo~t-y 'Jf· th·:; truck 

that .wouli allmlnnte the 10s8 due to brenknge of the 

'Wooden bO't,rs throu6h c:;nstnnt remov~, 1 t0mr~ke r1n.xlmum 

efficleney for h-:-:,.ullng. The nee·1 fer use ~)f .50 CfLllber 

m~chine un m0unts did not nrlse 1n either 

ph" se c>f the operf'l.tiolJ, hOWever they nre 'l cri ticnl 

8hortn~e in this unit. 

10. COMMENTS::N.£ ~CONlviEND.i~T,IONS 

Or0 

It is recomrneniel th~t the W2r time Tnble of 

nnizr..tiQn for this un1 t be incre'~se,l [18 ft~11:JW8: 

. 

fl. Thp t e2ch truck ·~u thor1zed in th~ TIE bc3 

~rnnei by two (2) dr1v~rs. 

b. Thn. t the nut r )nl')tl ve serviceman ft8s1gne'1 to 

ef).ch truck p1:1;o'~n be el,iminr1ted. nnd replo.oed by 

clrlvers . as notel 1n (nJ, nbove. 

c. Th0t fl ve (5) aut:motlve servicemen fr~)m the 

Compttny Hen· 

.. ·~C1u ... ':rter8 be aelete:l ~,S such nnd fl8Aigne1 

to plntoons as In tal ~b0ve. 

,~ccDm~llshment of the nbcve w::Jul2. effect fln over~.ll 

iricr.ense of f~)ur (4)- men (5-92). It 1 s rel t thn, t the 

n'umber of servicemen 1n theT/O Is excessive f~Jr the 

equ1pnent flvfL11nble .flnCt th!'-: t pro;>er Buperv~181on Qf 

:lrlv.er'.p maintenflll;ce will ctcconpl1snthe sf!me re- 

Bults. ' . 

It W\rna nuted durIng the ~erio.1 15 S e~tembar t,'j 7 

Octcber thnt !!lnny ·c!") seA _,f improper us~e ~nj, 118- 

pos1 tl:)n of Combnt Service GrJui=> vehicles occurred. 

It. is rec,)omendeJ. that acloeer: 11f"l.isol1 betTftrean the 

usl:q.g ncency ~\nJ. the ~~ispntchlng f'gency be Innu..;urnte:: 

In ftyr too i!lF.ny c.0seS 1 

.thev2hlcle lispnt

- • • 'r '" ~ 

~~"t.~ 

-' "_r4-o' -"7-~: .. " ....... :~. 

ANNEX vv to 1st Marine vivision SDecial Action Report. 

I" • 

From: 

To: 

?thXTBn, SC, Fl.fF, 

In the field, 

30 Nov 1950. 

Commanding Officer 

Commanding General, 1st Marine Division, FMF 

SubJ: Speoial Action Report for period 1 Sep - 7 Oat 1950 

Ref: (a) Division General Or-der '16 

1. The purpose of this re::.JoFt is to enaule higher authority to 

ootain a )lcture of the o))eratlons J 

planning, and training of 

this battalion during this period. -£he initial mission assigned 

the 7th Motor 'I'ransport DB. ttalion WetS to sue·port the 1st Marine 

Division. The battalion landed at Inchon, .Korea, on 15 September 

lQ50, and ~ent under the operational control (\t the 2d Engineer 

Special Brigade; U. S~ Army on 17 September 19.50, and was assigned 

the mission of Dort and oeach clearance. In addltlon, the battalion 

was called on to haul suplllles and troous directly to the 

forward areas s The oDerational control of the battalion changed. 

several times during the ueriod covered, out t~ administrative 

control remained with the 1st Marine Division • 

. 

2. The 7th Motor 'l'ran&port battalion consists of a Headquarters 

and Service Comnany and four truck' com1)anies. 'rhe task organization 

is as follows: 

f 

UNIT USMC USN US1'C USN UNIT COM!'ANDER 

Ofr Enl orr Enl TOTAL TOTAL 

7thl~TBn 31 393 0 6 424 6 Maj J. F. STEPKA 

H&SCo 11 57 6 68 6 lstLt R. T .. KING 

nAHGo 5 84 0 0 89 Capt I. ~'l. HAYES 

nBttCo 5 84 (J 0 89 Capt C. M. JONSS 

"CnCo 5 84 - I 0 89 Caut F. B. ROGERS 

ItDIICo 5 84 ,] 0 89 Capt J. L. BUNKER 

3.. Due to the ~ispersion of units of the battalion~ additional 

planning prior to arrival at the objective area was limited. 

Division Operation Order No. 2-50 \,;as received on 4 Septe.mber 

195Q ~hile the oattalion was at Kope, Japan, and cohferences were 

held oy the Eattalion Commander 'to determine the action to be 

taken upon landing. The decision was that upon landing all vehicles 

apd personnel would report to a designated assembly. area 

for further orders. It was estimated that upon landing tpe enemy 

situation 'Would oe such that all preloaded equiDment could be unloaded 

and vehicles made readily availaole for further a6signme.n~ .. 

~. The training for this operation consisted only of suoh tra1n- 

1ng as could be accom~lished aboard ship. This training consisted 

lIDstly of small arms train1ng, dissemination of ava1lable 

weaDons, and indoctrination of all uerson~1el in the, oper.atlons· 

and nrocedure of the batta.lion. There ",jas no rehearsal for the 

operation. 

5.' In nreuaratlon for the assault landinH this battalion was 

loaded aooard fourteen ships. Loading commence;1 on 5 Seutemoer 

1950 and was com~leted on 9 Septem~er 1950. 

6. The battalion sailed from Kobe, Japan on 10 Se"Otember \950 

and arrived at the objective area on 15 SeT)tember 1950. 

-1-

, " ' ~ , , 

\. • 

_~~,¥;,-~e/ 

) ~f{' t ."', 

~ 

~ 

.,,: ne~d ,unlo~.(iing· (lnd ~ , 

ger;.eral, r~orf~',8:p,~Ef~i9n;,'p~g;att at the ansemtly ait~a~', 

• ~ ~. '. - ,-' ~ r;:, ,. 

b.' 17 Bc't5temper i9'PO'!·" l\~orgar:lzatio'n aomp16t·ed,and bat 

>te .. 1:ibn' cOUlfilaJ~d post 6G,tp.o1.1shco. at, S04oL,' ".map,1(ol1ea;, J: 5J, oec; 

Kimpo 5hc2t·~Al1· avall,able,' vehic~c6 commenced: opG'ratiori£, j ~1 

po:rt a'nd beachJclfi~trance ",unde,r"theop.::r,?-ttonul 'co·ntr6T -of t~1e, 

2nd,', E~giil,€er:,/·Sp'e~~al ,Brlg~pie ;'.' JJ.S:,:"'Army.,,' ,',:_.' " ' , ': 

, " , ' ~ > , 

18~19 ~Ptemb~r 195C:, 'Continued: lJ:Jirt a.nd, be ac:h clear,ance wi th 

ind,ivl1ual' short "hauls ,fx'om ,rc;8.r t::.;, for\t,ct:-tr~ dumps. , Visibility 

\IIT[1.8 po?r due to, ex~reme.1Y d'J.8ty roads. "This: si tuation .ca,,;.sed 

sev6-ral; minor-ac·clo.ent's., . '., 

20- Se.n~\3mt.er..,:lQ·5C =,.' GO:1.tiJ;lU'~ci.-p.Qrt nni· o'ca:ch, cleararice' ·wl.tt .. 

in,li:v'illJtfi;l ?h81:·i,.~,hhU~~' tq, forua;ri d. 'I£r.P 3 ~ " El~ v ~n "truck 3 ~ ,t~re p.-ty~ 

• t\\fO,' '~Jk;;,!}n~'i ,~~~)4i~j ,6ffiG,¢t "fr'OT!, '11]3*, ,G0.rrip'~tny~wi;i'~,', ~8S ign2d t,o ~op.~" 

,for tb~~ls;th:;~1:r,intrf?/f0r, ~11:~' 'purp9,80'~r ~rr-;n8'00X'ting, tpQOpfi,flnd;: : 

8UD;Dlj..>;:l,$ !n.th~ forii\i~r:1 ~rq#~ S,lx:tCi~:~n,,:rD14' ti-iac'tors wi th?;they , 

trr.j.l :kers ,1f'E,'r,:;.,: be ing ,'U.tillzecl irL c.)rt" a;:1d. rca~fl' 61ear , ~ '. . - ' •• ~< ~ 

• ~ " ..; ~ '.~: " f~~ >., ,.: . : ~~. • • ~ -;.'~. _ .~~.. _: ~ ~~ rt"4-"' ; -'. -;., '. - ", " .' • 

21 SeDt0mD~r19bC~. Thi; -ti,at~a11'~L ~ar:t·iD.li'2,Q':b.j·':1t :RnQ beac!),':, , 

clet~X'-ancrC' a,r.a., ,\lnQrviju:ai·t.t~s:oat6he s' to'o'fo':[,vJ&~~' i areas ~' One: tru'c-k 

ra(l. '~9JJ.1tri~;,:;si\~!~~',: .6f /:LbrTq.-~e·into u. -G,t.r:2':J.tr:ar,':)~qxi;m[i t.ely. ~fif,te.;eI1 

feet tc.lo~, anti 'was \Jrt;j,'\.e·c-~ 06iOn:., 'cc·ot;.o:--::'cB:l.'re;cpair..,it ,In--1Q,;r~,n.,\~1;:JdJ;f'~·Yn'~t.e· p~rio~;. _CGr:;=;cq1.~,,-at~y ~t, w'B .. 8 ca.nniDalizel an.d.-. 

"surve:yea:.. ; ',,:,',,- .:," .. 

t', . {~ .;, _,,~ • ~ ;. 

22 S~p~~';,~er

".// 

r '~ 

~ ~ 

J 

25 SepteIDoar 1'950: Port ando.ea(}h clsaranc,e oontlnued. Th€ convo~ 

of thirty: vehicle 6 re·tuI'ned r:rom the 7th pi'vislon; U •. ~. Ar~y~, A ~ 

convoy of ~0i!sht;:~n vehicles lo¥ed with bridge parts 'was.'d:1spatched 

to work wlt,h t;hea:r.my, e~ln~er$ in the 'In;gtallatl.on of' the 

Han Rl ve r bl'1

" yo 11 

.. 

C 

10. It is r6c')mmend~d that in futur;3 operations this battalion 

be alluteJed to stock a, rc:asonaole supply of spare parts such as 

spurk plugs, distributors,' tire rGpair ki ts, bralte·, fluid, breaker 

points .fa;;n, belts, and. hydraulic brake hoses. There were several 

instances where the battalion was op~rating out of~.b of the 

normal supply line s. This proolem could pr·Jbably be eliminated 

by allotting one two wheel spare parts trailer to the battalion. 

It is further recommended that addi ti'Jnal personnel oe; assi§:.ned 

to the battalion to operate and maintain the twen~y TDl4 tractJrs 

assign£d~ This \'I1ould require an increase· in the presentT/O of 

three officers and 55 enlisted men. If the TIC ~an not be increased,. 

it is recommended that 'these tract')rs be taken off the 

present T/E~ 

Due to the ne£llgible maint~nance facilities of this battalion, 

it is. ·recommended that it not b.e c-:>mmi tted to support 

front line uni~s for period-s inexc?ss Dr seve~ ~aY.8 duration • 

. It is recc)mmende'd that in the Motor TranslJ0rtSchool CUl'-.. 

rlculum, .th::-t;t perGCTnnel be ~ven training in the defense ofa 

c~nv0y when attacked. 

CARL J. " CAGLE 

: : 

ANNZX VV to 1st lVlarinG D'ivision Special Actir)n" Re1)ort.

~ ~ .. 

, 

. i 

, / 

/ 

t :'~' ,: 

ANNEX l~~?hM,\~lLL~Ji ·TO lS~ ~1,il-~II.I~~ 

DIVISI9N;'~f:f!CL~ ,119TIQN 

llliFOR,1L ,/",:. '.:., ," "~'. ',· ... t. ' .. ',', ':. :,' . . , ',', " ; . 

,A ~_dirig',:drfi~e,:ii'~ r r:," ~': '.-: ,\_ ." 

,kiC~:,,£ndin~~,dener~,,:,~2.t lldt.;rine Div:fs~on 

. ,'VrID-6", " .' . ': 

Y~npl'o l~ir 'Bt_se;, . I(or~G..,.", : 

Z7 lilOV 1950 ~ 

- - ~ - ~~., ••.•, ~ - ~ I • ...: • : ,~ j '., 

'/;" . Speci~l ;lj,et~on .Report for 'per-icc "6 $epte2;Jer'195C).tc ;' 

7 ,J)~;tQeer, 1 S 50./ 

.. _.' '._.' ~ _ ~ _ :' " t.~ _ • • _, 

1. This r,eport is made to cover the activities of Vl~!O-6 in' 

i- ;,ti c.ssigned. mission of ren~"ering Leris.1 support :[.n~ o:!:?ser- .. 

""/ 

vc.tion tp the 1st Fr'O·.d..sion[~ j~l[.,rine Brig[./ ~ £.n:1 lL.ter to 

! the 1st Marine Division, ,,~urin€:, the period' 6 Se-ptember 1950 

/ to 7 October 1950. .L.. dministr~tive c.nd logieticul control 

/ wus mcintuine~ by rV£.hG-.3 3, 1st 'Mtu-ine ,l:..ir \~ing" :the c opero.- 

/ tiono.l" control was muintc.ineJ by the 1st ilik'.rine Division - 

,/1 fo~, t~e period covered,. .') ': ~ ,',,::~. " C' ."~_ 

• 

.. 

" ' •• 

l 

/1 2. v.:~ID~6,.',CoIIL~i.il'led bYMc.jor~ V'~ ,~., Gt.'rlSC~1·"uSMc;: hqi.,a, :', 

'strength ',of ,fifte~n "{1.5) orf~oEr!'s pnd t , n1nety;...riY:s' .(;95r'~w.is'ttld 

men.' In addition eigh-t .(8) ·&eric.l ,obserYet.~wer~,':t+"tta~h~d ,,:~'; , 

from the .lst l~c..rin.e' Divisi"n"with; lIJied6rM .• ~ ·F.~),oJICK,', us¥ii" 

us 'chief aii observer. . '., ":: ...',~ .. ':: .. ,: :~~ '." '~' ,:, ::~ ,;' ,'" . ,";~:'.; 

30 burliest use cf hel~c~ters and'Oy~f s' 'bO'Ct.:n~~',th~~~p~~"',':'"'' 

. consiJerE.;tion in plruming for the coming ;cpefLtlon ... ,Thie~ 'WL~S 

to be cccomplished by tr[nsportuting the helicoptors on en 

I.3T', ,from which thf;ly could opernte for Q linu ted 'time, ~.pc: by 

: ~pl2.cing oneOY en t.htl USS 'SICILY (CVE~118)t.n,: \,-ne oy c..n the 

·U~ BAE).~ENG $TY~-!f '.~( CVE;;"1.16) in.,u £lY4b1~' cori~}iti::>n: for flight . 

to'.the ber .. ch, upon ,cc.ll.' ' .. , . , ' :' ' ",. " ' ", ,';, 

- . .-. . 

4. D\i~": ,to ithc,'.l~~k, or' Sufficic~t'.~h~Ppi,~g· ~l?,~c'a"aV:~lichle, ?-t 

was heces~ury ,to di vila ·thesquu. 'r({m,

, 

on 20"'21'Septemoer T,he" "r.6cr,.'" ec,~, elch 1950 end $ui1cd for Pusun Hc.ruor on 

Septembcrt 195Q,' c.rr1ving. th,0r~ Lt 2000 the sr.m¢.'··dnj)o •. 

.. 10,L:~.,ed ,~bO.. c.r,d. 4>"'T.C l O, O~.' Lt ,.C~in.lh.' La '.:~or, 

q002 s[~2·1ed from Pu~untor' Inchon, Koren at 0;1:;0, 23 Sept_·~ .. ·, 

ber 1950. I' ". -. • 

6 •. LSI' Q079 sc.il.,d i'r

-- 

.. 

!QO 

," 

.- & 

\ 

f :Jr!~~p~\,~\, 

\ 

':', ' .~;.~~t;,~:~6:rU#~tt~~!e!,~~;·~ , 

«fto.'·_l.t;~

;~"'", 

-";.....". ..... ... --- dT? 

4 OC.t 1950 

Gon,rcl C. B. Cs~TES, CiiC, Vlns ug£:in fl~)i~n en [;. tour of 

the ~d ;ill. an 1103S~l, pi10ted by 7:stLtL. J. ENGELfLJJJr. : 

Fli rht·s 'c?ndu~tcd v;cr~ , roccn, .30 ut~lity, 1· 0V[~C c.nd 1 . 

resupply •.. 

5 Oct 1950. 

-": l¥tLt L.· J. ENGEL:LllYr r"l['~de D... SU9C~ssful rLSCUG' or c.. 

dow~ pilct neDX Siby,:.n-ni. -other flight o.perr.tions 

cc.·lltinu~d to ba Ii,: :ht. Flichts ccnductec WLcro lrec::.n, 25, 

utjlity, 1 cxty spot, end 1 rosc~oo .' . '. 

6 Oct· 19;O~ 

Tho squC;c::ron bcgLn to assist 01o!Jonts :~,r- the:D:1.v.is.i:c~n:· 

in their :.K.·vo· Quck t:) Inchon~ Plans r.nct p~ep6rD,tion werQ' 

[~IS0 

to CCC::l:1:X'.ny thb Divisicn 'In its r~\.;xt :::~}t;r:~ti"J_1~ ~ FliChts 

conducted weref~2 recon end 28 utility. 

st[.xtc:G for (;!·lbc.rkation of c. surfnco_:'cchelon 'cr: Vl'lJ;·6: ,'" 

~ -.. 

/ 

/ 

/ 

l 

7.0ct 1950 . 

" . 

.4ssist·£.Iloe rl;ndcrod t;: the Di vfsion i.o its' ~ove. bc.ck 

to Inchcn c:=:ntiriucd. Fli:"chts conduct~d v~ero 1 re.scuo, 2 

, .. 

l 

By cCMuctinf~ the c..:bcve Z7 fir~ {t.~sions :-nd: -28 di~t~' 

ad c.ir strikes" ~hc fo~owin€ Jama~g:;':~~~ inflictodj "\ 

El1emy trJops kiiled 

Maeh1he c\Ji:ls' dqstrcyed 

.40 MM ,iil~,~ ,dest,roycd 

?6·W:.f·~id~~i,·pieCe$, d.estroyed· 

Mcrto.r:s,: 'Jestr:>y~; > ,-.~ ", 

;lll~;~Dnk funs destroyed' 

m ...... 'ti.;.. (rn 'l4) rl '"" ' ~ 

:.k~~ +

7th Marines Special Action Report 17 August - 7 October 1950 Box 8-8

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