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PRL (Guide No. 164)

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PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL)
USSR

(1 JANUARY — 30 APRIL 1959)

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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OCI/CIA
PRL (Guide No. 164)
USSR
January - April 1959

FOREWORD

1. CIA Periodic Requirements Lists (PRL's) are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, CIA. Coordination with the Department of State was initiated in 1958 and now includes the PRL's for the USSR, the European Satellites and Yugoslavia, Near East/Africa, Far East and Latin America. Coordination on these areas resulted in the inclusion of current intelligence requirements from the Intelligence and Regional Bureaus of the State Department along with those contributed by the CIA Offices of Current Intelligence, Research and Reports and Scientific Intelligence.

2. Every month a Periodic Requirements List is published on one or more of the major world areas: (a) Western Europe; (b) Latin America; (c) USSR; (d) European Satellites and Yugoslavia; (e) Far East; and (f) Near East/Africa. Each List is revised every four months.

3. Each Periodic Requirements List is designed to point up the information required for current intelligence coverage of significant developments during the time period covered by the PRL. For the benefit of certain collectors who may not have access to background information, explanatory paragraphs have been submitted with many of the requirements.

4. The PRL's are disseminated to the collection components of all USIB agencies. It is recognized that the Lists may, in total, present requirements beyond the mission and capabilities of any single collection facility. However, to the extent that the collector has a capability, it is hoped that these PRL's will provide effective guidance for current intelligence reporting.

5. To facilitate and possibly expand the use of the PRL all items contained herein have been classified separately and bear one of the following classifications: SECRET (S), SECRET/NOFORN (S/NOFORN), CONFIDENTIAL (C), CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN (C/NOFORN), OFFICIAL USE ONLY (OUO), and UNCLASSIFIED (U).

6. Comments on the PRL's are encouraged and should be directed to:

- a. Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI/CIA, Room 2019 Que Building, Code 143, Extension 2181;
- or b. Chief, Division of Intelligence Collection and Distribution (ICD), Department of State.

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[REDACTED]
Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI

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PRL (Guide No. 164)

January - April 1959

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>PAGE</u>
FOREWORD	
USSR	
I INTERNAL	1
II FOREIGN POLICY	9
III ECONOMIC	19
IV MILITARY	35
V SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL	41
SOVIET BLOC	
I POLITICAL	45
II ECONOMIC	51
III MILITARY	53

~~SECRET~~

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 January 1959 - 30 April 1959)

USSR

I. INTERNAL

A. Party and Government

1. A Party Congress has been called for January 1959. An obvious reason is to secure highest formal party approval for the new seven-year plan as early as possible in the plan period. Are there other reasons for calling a Congress a year earlier than required by party statutes? The Congress was designated "extraordinary" or "irregular." Is there any significance to this other than indicating a Congress with a restricted or special agenda? Why wasn't a "regular" Congress with a normal agenda to be held in the following year? Will the forthcoming Congress confine itself to its published agenda (discussion of the seven-year plan)? If not, what other questions will be discussed? Will the Congress elect a new Central Committee? Will any changes be made in the party Presidium or Secretariat? (U)

2. Are there currently any signs of discord or conflict within the Presidium and Secretariat of the CPSU? Who among the members of these bodies has the greatest influence with Khrushchev? Are any of Khrushchev's lieutenants attempting to build personal followings of friends and protegés to strengthen their political positions vis-a-vis their colleagues. (U)

3. Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee occur at irregular intervals and are seldom announced in advance. Report indications of forthcoming plenums, as well as all information about the business of such meetings and the role of the Central Committee in policy making? (U)

4. B. N. Ponomarev, Yu. V. Andropov, V. N. Malin, and A. L. Orlov have been identified as heads of departments in the Central Committee apparatus. What are the titles and functions of the departments they head? What are the responsibilities of the Administrative Department currently headed by A. S. Zheltov? Who are the organizational heads of the Machine Building, Transport and Communications and Trade, Finance and Planning Organs Departments? (U)

5. The November 1958 plenum of the CPSU Central Committee added former Premier Bulganin to the "anti-party group" of Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich. It has since been

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January 1959 - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

A. Party and Government (Continued)

reported that Bulganin has been removed from the Central Committee. Can this report be confirmed? What are the reasons for further steps against Bulganin at this time? (U)

6. Since December 1957 six of the nine industrial ministries which remained after the industrial reorganization have been transformed into state committees--the state committees for chemistry, shipbuilding, radio-technology, defense, aviation, and grain products. Information on their functions and responsibilities is desired. (C)

7. The 104 Regional Economic Councils (Sovnarkhozy) have now been in operation more than a year and their role in the Soviet System is beginning to take shape.

a. How serious are the various problems of "localism," i.e., failure to fulfill inter-regional deliveries, diversion of funds to projects of local interest, etc? (U)

b. What are the relationships between Gosplan and the Sovnarkhozy and the regional government and party organs? (U)

c. Are there indications of further steps to decentralize the operation of industry? (U)

8. A collective farm conference to revise the Kolkhoz statutes is scheduled to take place some time "early in 1959." When exactly will the conference take place and what changes in collective farm organization are to be enacted? (U)

9. A selected few collective farms are experimenting with a guaranteed annual wage for its members of lieu of the labor-day payment. Information is desired on the implementation of this system and reaction to it at official levels and among the peasantry. (U)

10. What is the Soviet view of the Chinese Communist commune movement? (U) Any information pertaining to discussion of this development within the USSR is desired. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January 1959 - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

A. Party and Government (Continued)

11. We are very interested in:

a. The exact nature of the "Party Instructions to the Soviet Army and Navy" issued in 1957 and of the recent revisions thereof; (U)

b. The reason (s) behind the change in title of the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense to Chief Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and whether this indicates a change in the subordination of the directorate. (U)

c. The organization of the political organs of the Soviet Army and Navy, first referred to in the Soviet military newspapers on November 5, 1958. (U)

d. The impact and significance of the recent policy that not only shall the military commander be politically trained, but that the political officer receive military training. (U)

B. SECURITY

1. Concerning the jurisdiction of the KGB and the MVD and their domestic and foreign activities, the following are of particular interest:

a. Indications of KGB coordination and/or control of satellite security services; (U)

b. KGB operations and responsibilities inside the USSR; (U)

c. Jurisdictional subordination and personnel strength of the civil police (militsiya) and the internal troops; personnel strength of the border troops; (U)

d. Evidence of involvement of the secret police in political machinations or top policy decisions; (U)

e. Indications that the KGB is being strengthened or weakened, whether numerically, in terms of operating potential, or in terms of jurisdiction and responsibility; (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January 1959 - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

B. Security (Continued)

1. f. The identities of top and second echelon officials assigned to the central KGB in Moscow; e.g., the names of deputy chairmen and other top officials. (U)

g. Evidence that the relative status of the MVD and KGB has changed in recent months. (U) Has a separate foreign intelligence organization, like the KI, been established? (S)

2. The system of controls which are exercised over the travel and movement of Soviet citizens is an important indicator of the internal situation in the USSR. Information of this nature would be of great value. (U)

3. The draft all-union "basic principles" of criminal law and of criminal procedure were published for "preliminary discussion" in June, 1958. Information is needed which indicates:

a. The issues being discussed;

b. The date of the consideration of these "basic principles" by the USSR Supreme Soviet;

c. The drafting and enactment of Union Republic Codes of criminal law and of criminal procedure.

4. A number of measures adopted recently are designed to reduce in various ways the incidence of social evils and petty crime, particularly drunkenness, "hooliganism," and speculation. Information is desired on the causes of such phenomena, their prevalence, and the effectiveness of the measures taken to overcome them. (U)

5. Opportunities to observe tensions between various national groups and mistreatment of minorities have grown as Soviet political controls have become somewhat loosened. There are continuing reports of nationalistic sentiments in various areas, discrimination against Jews, and anti-Semitic feelings. These subjects bear further watching to determine whether the regime is making any progress in its proposed efforts to correct violations of "Leninist" nationality policy committed under Stalin.

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January 1959 - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

B. Security (Continued)

5. a. Are any new measures being taken to reduce tensions between Russians and local inhabitants in minority areas? (U)

b. Is there any evidence of a change in the regime attitude towards manifestations of national sentiment among minority groups? (U)

c. A process of Russification of minority cultures has been taking place for many years, attested to by various economic as well as political factors. To what extent is coercion part of this process? (U)

6. The proposals for the reorganization of the educational system on 16 November 1958 include a provision that in minority areas, parents should be allowed to choose individually whether their children will attend Russian-language or minority-language schools. Study of the alternate language would then be undertaken voluntarily only by those children who felt they could carry the extra work load in their studies. (U)

a. How is this provision being received in the minority areas? (C)

b. Are parents concerned at having to choose for their children between knowledge of the mother tongue and future professional advantages in knowing Russian? (U)

7. Soviet domestic propaganda has paid increasing attention to antireligious themes in recent months, apparently because of signs of increased religious interest or influence among segments of the population. The propaganda has been directed mainly against Protestant denominations, such as Baptists and Seventh Day Adventists, but has also included attacks against the Moslem religions, the second largest in terms of believers in the USSR. At the same time, the regime portrays itself as granting complete religious freedom to believers. (U) Information is needed which indicates:

a. The extent and expansion of anti-religious propaganda; (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January 1959 - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

B. Security (Continued)

7. b. The social segments and geographical areas where religious interest may be increasing; (U)

c. The changes in religious doctrines introduced by church authorities to make more acceptable to Soviet citizens; (U)

8. A nationwide census will be taken in the USSR in January. Are there expressions of concern on the part of Jews on other minority groups regarding questions on nationality contained in the census form? (U)

C. Intellectual Expression and Education

1. Controls on literatures, art and other forms of intellectual expression have continued tight in 1958. There is evidence, however, that many intellectuals still oppose, if only passively, present controls. For example, the "big" names in Soviet literature were conspicuously silent during the public recriminations against Pasternak in October 1958. (U)

a. What are the attitudes of individual intellectual and cultural figures toward the Party's cultural policy? (U)

b. Is the opposition of intellectuals crystallized against specific elements of control such as freedom to travel or censorship of foreign literature? (U)

c. What are the regimes methods of reaching and persuading intellectuals to recant and reforms? (U)

d. In what social sectors did the Pasternak affair arouse interest and what were the reactions? (U)

e. What types of Soviet citizens have actually read Dr. Zhivago and what are their reactions? (U)

2. Although intellectual disaffection among university students has evidently abated considerably since the late 1956-early 1957 period, the increase in foreign students visiting the USSR under exchange agreements and the continued insistence on ideological conformity may combine to produce new manifestations of intransigence and rebellion. Information on the current state of mind among young Soviet intellectuals is desired. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January 1959 - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

C. Intellectual Expression and Education (Continued)

3. Under the proposed reorganization of the Soviet school system published 16 November 1958 and scheduled to take place over a period of four to five years beginning in the fall of 1959, the much publicized goal of universal education has been dropped in favor of universal 8-year education. The vast majority of 16 and 15 year olds will go into production work upon completion of the 8-year general school. Adolescents with the will and stamina can continue their education in evening or correspondence courses and those that last out the course can eventually go on to higher educational institutions. Special schools are planned for children "gifted" in the arts or sciences. Graduates of these schools will go straight into higher educational institutions without being detoured into production. Boarding schools will be retained on both an 8 and an 11-year basis but will include greatly increased polytechnical training. (U)

a. How are these proposals being received by the public? (U)

b. Is opposition or approval centered in any identifiable social sector? (U)

c. What changes in the social studies and humanities curricula are planned? (U)

d. At what age and by what methods will "gifted" students be selected for the proposed special schools? (U) Is there any indication of these special schools becoming the preserve of a special group or social sector? (U)

4. The regime cited as justification for the reorganization of education the distaste shown by many of the younger generation for manual labor and the "difficulties" experienced in finding jobs for secondary school graduates? (U) Information is needed which indicates:

a. Any additional concerns which prompted these changes. (U)

b. Amplification of the "difficulties" cited by the regime in finding jobs for secondary school graduates. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January 1959 - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

I. INTERNAL (Continued)

C. Intellectual Expression and Education (Continued)

4. c. Any further light on Soviet youth's attitude toward manual labor. (U)

5. There have been several references in the Soviet press in recent months to difficulties experienced in persuading management in industry to accept as workers minors whose right to special working conditions is protected by law. The proposed educational reorganization suggests that this problem will be complicated by additional provisions for time off from work for individuals who work and study, either in the form of a shorter work-day or of a three-day work week. (U)

a. What adjustments in industry are being made to absorb these minors? (U)

b. What is the reaction of industrial management to these problems? (U)

6. The educational reorganization proposals also include changes in higher educational institutions. Students are to combine work and study for the first two to three years of their courses, and it has been recommended that qualified professionals in industry and agriculture be released part-time from their jobs to teach while teachers are periodically to leave their teaching to work in the "national economy." (U)

a. What are the reactions of students and teachers to these proposals? (U)

b. What are the detailed arrangements for "combining work and study" by students and for the exchanges of personnel between industry and agriculture and higher educational institutions? (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

II. Foreign Policy

A. General

1. Any indication of Soviet intentions to take unilateral steps such as troop reductions in Europe. (U)
2. Soviet moves to extend assistance in the atomic energy field to non-Communist states, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the reactions and attitudes of prospective recipient countries. (U)
3. Behavior of Soviet and Eastern Europe personnel at the UN, particularly questions or remarks concerning disarmament, "atoms for peace," and the membership issue. (U)
4. Similarities or divergencies noted in Soviet and Communist China propaganda, behavior at international meetings, and general attitudes toward the US. (U)
5. Information that the USSR is seeking to establish diplomatic relations, negotiate trade agreements, or establish informational or permanent trade representation with additional countries. (U)
6. Soviet interest or activity of any type in the Arctic and Antarctic, particularly Soviet reaction to US proposals for an international administrative arrangement for Antarctica. (C)
7. Any amplification of the Soviet "peaceful economic competition" program or evidence of price cutting on capital goods, with special interest in evidence of intra-bloc competition or collaboration on bids for development projects in underdeveloped areas. (U)
8. Evidence of Soviet economic pressure upon Finland, Austria, the UAR, Afghanistan, or other countries with close ties to the USSR. (U)
9. Soviet approaches to Socialist parties abroad including proposals for contacts and invitations to Moscow. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

II. Foreign Policy (Continued)

B. Western Europe

1. Information on Soviet bloc security measures to strengthen the Warsaw Pact or carry out other measures threatened to counter West German rearmament including the building of missile bases in the satellites. (U)
2. Any reports of Soviet pressure on Poland to support Soviet foreign policy and to adopt more orthodox measures in domestic policy. (C)
3. Changes in Soviet terms for a German settlement and indications of changes in tactics on the German question, particularly revisions in Soviet relations with East Germany. (U)
4. All developments regarding the sealing off of West Berlin from East Berlin, closing the East-West German border, Soviet moves to alter the juridical position of the three Western powers in Berlin and harassments of Allied and West German rail, highway, or air access to West Berlin. (U)
5. Evidence of increasing Soviet efforts to draw Scandinavian countries away from their present Western orientation toward a more neutral course with closer ties with the USSR. Indications of Soviet attempts at a Baltic Neutrality (Security) Pact. (U)
6. Indications of continuing party contacts between the bloc countries and Yugoslavia. Any sign of a breakdown in state relations or economic boycotts between the bloc countries and Yugoslavia. Resumption of anti-Yugoslav broadcasts beamed to Yugoslavia. Reports of Soviet attempts to isolate Yugoslavia further from the satellites. Information on the previous history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the factors that led to the break. (U)
7. Evidence of Soviet approaches to the De Gaulle government for political agreements or economic arrangements (either trade or aid). Soviet offers to France for assistance in solving the Algerian problem. Soviet instructions to the French Communist Party concerning the latter's policy toward De Gaulle. (U)
8. Soviet proposals for European security schemes including the Rapacki plan and Soviet tactics in advancing these plans. (U)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

II. Foreign Policy (Continued)

B. Western Europe (Continued)

9. Reports of Soviet instructions to West European Communist parties and the latter's tactics in the campaign to prevent the building of missile bases there. (U)

10. Overtures to Italy, particularly proposals concerning Italy's inclusion in an "atom-free zone" or possible participation of Italy in any new summit conference. (U)

11. Soviet overtures to Spain, particularly proposals for trade expansion. (U)

C. Asia-Africa

1. Indications of modification of the "peaceful coexistence" policy toward Asian neutrals, or of Soviet disillusionment with the political results of the policy. (U)

2. Information on the status of relations between Moscow and Peiping, particularly with reference to the question of primacy of interest in Far Eastern Satellite matters. Material covering the relations of the USSR and Communist China with North Korea, Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Any evidence that the USSR does, or does not, desire to promote Communist China's relations with non-Communist Asian countries, and efforts to secure more widespread recognition of/and admission of Communist China to the United Nations. (C)

3. Indications that the USSR is discussing on a bilateral basis terms for an Arab-Israeli settlement with the countries concerned. (U)

4. Evidence of Soviet support for certain personalities or factions in Communist China. (U)

5. Japan -

a. Evidence of Sino-Soviet tactical or policy coordination to discredit the Kishi government on trade, nuclear or fishery issues--a campaign which began prior to the Japanese elections in May. (U)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

II. Foreign Policy (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa

5. b. Soviet-Japanese official negotiations for the second annual trade agreement now going on in Moscow. (U)

c. Efforts by Soviet officials to impress the Japanese with the possibility of extensive trade expansion and Japanese participation in the economic development of Siberia. (C)

d. Soviet proposals and expected negotiations for a cultural agreement with Japan. (U)

e. New or revised Soviet proposals for a civil air agreement which might be expected to meet previous Japanese objections. (U)

f. Evidence that the USSR might allow fishing rights to the Japanese in hitherto restricted areas of the Kurils, as hinted by a Soviet Far Eastern Service broadcast to Japan on 26 September. (C)

6. Indonesia -

a. Evidence of Soviet intentions to fulfill the economic and technical assistance agreement with Indonesia, or of new moves to counter recent improvements in US-Indonesian relations. (U)

b. Evidence of direct and/or increased Soviet contacts with the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) or of bloc propaganda or other moves calculated to discredit Sukarno or Indonesian military leaders. (U)

c. Expansion of Soviet scientific or cultural activities or exchanges. (C)

d. Evidence of additional arms supplies to Indonesia by any Communist state. (S)

7. Progress in the implementation of Soviet technical assistance program in Ceylon, projects under consideration, and any efforts of Soviet officials to influence Ceylonese long-range planning. (C)

8. Evidence of overt Soviet encouragement or political support for the CPI and particularly for the Communist Government of Kerala implying or stating criticism of the internal policies of the Indian Government. (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

II. Foreign Policy (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa

9. Progress in negotiations with Nepal to implement Soviet offers of economic assistance, especially in the field of civil aviation. (C)

10. Pakistan-

a. Soviet efforts to stimulate Soviet-Pakistani trade through direct overtures to private interests. (U)

b. Soviet efforts to develop economic and cultural contacts in East Pakistan. (C)

c. Soviet efforts designed to foment domestic opposition to Pakistani-US defense ties. (C)

11. Travel of Soviet personnel in Kashmir, and attempts to develop direct contact with Kashmiri groups and individuals. (S)

12. Afghanistan -

a. Progress in implementation of Soviet economic projects, particularly the Salang Pass road, improvement of the port of Qizil Qala, and oil exploitation around Sar-i-Pul. (U)

b. Details on the Soviet military assistance program: equipment supplied; role of Soviet military instructors and advisers; tactical exercises involving use of Soviet weapons. (S)

c. Information on the possible establishment of a second Afghan airline and the projected Soviet role therein. (S)

13. Iran -

a. Progress on surveys for joint Soviet-Iranian development of Araks, Atrek, and Tedzhen rivers. (U)

b. Developments in negotiations for a civil air agreement. (U)

c. Implementation of Soviet-Iranian transit agreement. (U)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR. (Continued)

II. Foreign Policy (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

d. Contacts of Soviet officials with private Iranian business interests designed to step up Soviet-Iranian trade. (U)

e. Details of Soviet economic pressure on Iran. (C)

14. Contracts of Soviet officials with private Turkish business interest designed to step up Soviet-Turkish trade or to sell Soviet factories and machinery. (U)

15. Contacts of Soviet officials with private Israeli businessmen pointed toward a resumption of trade. (U)

16. UAR -

a. Implementation of Soviet-UAR economic projects, including, in particular, details of negotiations on the first phase of the Aswan High Dam. (U)

b. Details concerning the establishment of regular commercial air service between Moscow and Cairo (U) and of negotiations to buy late model Soviet passenger aircraft for Misrair. (S)

c. Details of any evidence of Syrian Communist Party relations with Soviet officials. (S)

17. Greece -

a. Soviet approaches to Cypriot leaders. (U)

b. Soviet approaches to private Greek firms designed to push sales of Soviet goods in Greece. (U)

c. Attempts by Soviet officials to keep alive the nuclear scare in connection with NATO bases in Greece. (C)

18. Arabian Peninsula -

a. Any attempt by bloc officials to establish diplomatic, economic, or cultural contacts, either formally or informally, with Saudi Arabia. (U)

b. Developments in the implementation of bloc economic and military assistance programs in Yemen, and the movements of bloc personnel to and within Yemen. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (CONTINUED)

II. Foreign Policy (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

- c. Efforts to influence internal developments or Yemeni foreign policy on the part of Soviet officials or technicians (S)
- d. Attempts to develop Soviet-Yemeni cultural relations (U)

19. Efforts to develop regular Soviet-Sudanese economic relations, especially any Soviet effort to influence Sudanese policy through manipulation of its cotton purchases. (C)

20. Efforts of Soviet officials to establish direct contact with Libyan officials and commercial interests with a view toward establishing regular economic and cultural relations. (U)

21. Iraq -

- a. Soviet efforts to negotiate a civil air agreement with Iraq. (S)
- b. Special interest in Soviet efforts to establish commercial or cultural centers other than in Baghdad. (S)
- c. Evidence of Soviet equipment and military advisers in Iraq, and information on the relations of such personnel, as well as UAR military training advisory personnel, with Iraqi officials.
- d. Details of any evidence of Iraq Communist Party relations with Soviet officials. (S)
- e. Details of any evidence of Kurdish relations with Soviet officials. (S)

22. Morocco

- a. Any Soviet activities directed against the maintenance of US bases in Morocco. (S)
- b. Any bloc offers of economic aid, arms, etc, to Morocco. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. Foreign Policy (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

22. Morocco (Continued)

c. Any information on relations between USSR and Moroccan Communist parties and other parties and groups. (S)

23. Tunisia

Tunisia. (S) a. Any bloc offers of arms, economic aid, etc. to

regime. (S) b. Any Soviet or bloc activities to undermine Bourguiba's

c. Relations between USSR and Tunisian Communist party and other political parties and groupings. (C)

24. Algeria

a. Any Soviet or bloc activities to cooperate with and support the Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN) and its provisional government. (S)

b. Any evidence of bloc military support, arms, advisers, etc. to the FLN. (S)

c. Any Soviet or bloc activities connected with the Algerian CP or other groupings. (S)

25. Libya

a. Any bloc offers of arms and economic aid. (S)

base in Libya or the Libyan regime. (S) b. Any bloc activities directed against the US

26. Sudan

a. Soviet attitude toward the new regime: bloc offers of support and approval, or, conversely, any bloc activities to undermine the regime. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

II. Foreign Policy (Continued)

C. Asia-Africa (Continued)

27. Africa South of the Sahara

a. Bloc support of regimes in Ghana, Guinea and Liberia; including offers of arms and economic aid, and conversely any Soviet efforts to undermine any of these regimes. (S)

b. Soviet support, overt or covert, to movements for independence or 'national liberations' in British, French, Belgian, or Portuguese colonies, trusteeships; particularly Soviet attitude to Cameroon independence movement. (C)

c. Activities of Soviet or Bloc fishing vessels off West Africa, particularly the ports of call and shore activities of the personnel. (U)

28. Ethiopia, Somaliland, Eritrea

a. Soviet or bloc attitude and actions in regard to Ethiopian-Somali and Ethiopian-Eritrean relations. (S)

b. Offers of assistance to above countries or groups. (U)

c. Sign of increase in Soviet propaganda or subversive activity in area. (S)

D. Latin America

1. Any indications of Soviet efforts to promote neutralism in Latin America and any reference to the area as a possible "peace zone."

2. Any approaches to Latin American nations for establishment or reestablishment of diplomatic relations.

3. Any implementation of Soviet willingness to extend economic aid to the area.

4. Any evidence of Soviet contacts with or instructions to Latin American Communist Parties.

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. ECONOMIC

A. Policy, Planning, and Theory

1. Soviet General Economic Policy

The 21st Party Congress is scheduled to convene in late January 1959 primarily to discuss the Seven Year Plan for Economic Development (1959-65). Although the basic theses of the plan have been announced, further details may become available during the pre-Congress regional Party meetings scheduled for mid-January, during the Party Congress, or in later discussions following the Party Congress. Additional insight into Soviet agricultural policy may be gathered during this period, possibly as a result of discussions stemming from the Supreme Soviet meeting scheduled for 22 December 1958 to discuss agricultural matters. (U)

2. National Economic Planning :

Any information on changes in the technique of investment planning is desired in light of recent mention of possible changes and the census of fixed capital, scheduled for January 1959 by the Central Statistical Administration, which will involve the revaluation of installed plant and equipment throughout the Soviet economy. (U)

With the completion of the first full Soviet fiscal year of operation after the industrial reorganization, and with the start of the Seven Year Plan, some institutional realignments may be initiated. In addition, Soviet comments about the operation of the new organization should be reported. (U)

Recent Soviet criticisms of the functioning of the economy have centered about weaknesses in technical innovation. Any indications of attempts to encourage progress in this field should be reported. (U)

3. Economic Theory :

The recent revision of the Soviet Political Economy Textbook may induce renewed theoretical discussions on the role of prices, criteria of investment, and the use of value measures of economic performance and efficiency in the Soviet economy. Such discussions should be reported because they sometimes foreshadow changes in practice. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

B. Military Expenditures

With the announcement of the Soviet budget for 1959 and particularly the allocation for defense, close attention should be given to statements and discussions which will help to interpret what effect the defense allocation will have on military programs. Following are questions that require clarification.

a. Are these significant items of procurement, or military activities that are not covered by the defense allocation in the Soviet budget? Is military production financed by direct allocation to industry through other parts of the budget? (U)

b. Do the military procure at prices substantially lower than other sectors of the economy--ie., is military production subsidized from funds other than defense allocation? Is military procurement exempt from specific taxes or charges? (U)

C. Foreign Economic Aid

1. Soviet Aid to Bulgaria :

On 19 July 1958 the USSR extended to Bulgaria an industrial credit of unknown value. What are the value, repayment period, and interest rate of this credit? (OUO)

2. Soviet Aid to East Germany :

Recently the USSR extended to East Germany credits for the development of the East German chemical industry. Information from unofficial sources indicates that a Soviet credit of \$108 million was extended to East Germany on 25 December 1957. No official announcements of this credit have been received in this office to date. (OUO)

In February 1958 the USSR granted to East Germany a long-term loan valued at \$135 million for the development of the GDR's chemical industry. Collaboration between the USSR and East Germany on the development of the chemical industry was again reiterated in a communiqué announcing the conclusion of the GDR-USSR protocol, 7 July 1958, on reciprocal deliveries through 1965. Although no definite amount was given, the sum of "several hundred million rubles" was mentioned at the 5th SED Party Congress on 11 July 1958. In August 1958 it was reported that an additional Soviet credit valued at \$27.5 million had been extended to East Germany. (OUO)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

2. Soviet Aid to East Germany (continued)

a. Is there any evidence supporting the report of a Soviet credit to East Germany in December 1957? If so, what are the date, the utilization period, and repayment terms? (OUO)

b. Has the USSR agreed to a total amount to be invested in the East German chemical industry? If so, what are the total amount, utilization period, and repayment terms? (OUO)

c. Are the above mentioned credits an allocation of the total amount to be invested by the USSR in the East German chemical industry? (OUO)

d. What is the date of the agreement granting a \$27.5 million Soviet credit to East Germany? (OUO)

e. What are the utilization periods and repayment terms of both the \$135 million and \$27.5 million credits? (OUO)

3. Soviet Aid to Hungary :

In December 1957 the USSR extended an industrial credit valued at \$75 million to Hungary to be utilized during the period 1958-63. In 1958 two Soviet credits were granted to Hungary. The first one, reported in September 1958, amounted to \$5 million for the development of Hungary's aluminum industry; the second credit amounting to \$27.5 million for the development of a nitrogen artificial fertilizer plant was concluded on 5 November 1958. The November 1958 agreement contained two additional provisions relating to Soviet aid in Hungary. One was concerned with technical assistance in the construction and enlargement of a series of factories and the other was concerned with a credit for the development of the Hungarian oil industry. (OUO)

a. Are the Soviet credits valued at \$5 million and \$27.5 million an allocation of the December 1957 credit extended to Hungary? (OUO)

b. What is the date of the \$5 million credit extended to Hungary by the USSR? (OUO)

c. What are the utilization periods and repayment terms of both credits mentioned in paragraph (a) above? (OUO)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

3. Soviet Aid to Hungary (continued)

d. What are the amounts, utilization periods and re-payment terms of the technical assistance and credit for the Hun-garian oil industry contained in the November 1958 agreement? (OUO)

e. Are they an allocation of the December 1957 credit? (OUO)

4. Soviet Aid to Iraq:

Under the unsettled conditions prevailing in Iraq since the revolution, it is likely that the Soviets will follow their established pattern of economic penetration by making various offers of economic, technical, and military assistance.

a. Evidence is desired about any negotiations for arms shipment and technical assistance such as terms and conditions of payment, prices, and quantities.

b. Evidence is desired about the presence in the coun-try of Soviet personnel who might be technical advisors.

5. Soviet Aid to Tunisia:

There are indications that Tunisia is dissatisfied by US and British hesitance in concluding contracts for military aid, and may be considering acceptance of Soviet (or Czech) offers in this field.

a. Evidence is desired about the presence in the coun-try of Soviet personnel who might be technical advisors.

D. Wages and Labor

1. Since 1956 the USSR has been carrying out a major reform of the industrial wage and salary structure and a gradual re-duction of the work-week. These reforms have been proceeding in-dustry by industry and plant by plant. The new Seven Year Plan calls for the completion of the wage reform and the transition to a general 40-hour workweek by the end of 1962. Information is desired concern-ing: (1) the reaction of the workers to the wage reform (2) the ef-fects of the wage reform on average earnings, production, and pro-ductivity in individual plants and industries (3) the effects of the

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

D. Wages and Labor (continued)

reduction in hours on production, productivity, employment, and production costs in individual plants and industries (4) the extent to which additional housewives are being drawn into the labor force as a result of the shorter workweek. (U)

2. The press has recently reported the formation of a number of "Communist Youth Brigades" which seem to resemble the Stakhanovite brigades of the 1930's. Information is desired on the purposes and activities of these new brigades. (U)

3. During the past several years the USSR has been permitting various collective farms to experiment with a system of cash wages and guaranteed earnings for the kolkhozniki. Information is desired concerning the effects of the new system on production, productivity, labor requirements, and average earnings of workers on the experimenting farms. Is there evidence that the government is planning a general extension of the system? (U)

4. Is the reorganization in agriculture causing any surplus of agricultural labor which may become available for industry? Are there any recent changes in the policy of transferring workers between agriculture and industry? (C)

E. Aircraft Production and Deployment

1. Soviet Heavy Bombers:

(1) The BISON four-engine jet heavy bomber was first displayed in Moscow in 1954 and the BEAR turboprop heavy bomber in 1955. Combined production of the two aircraft is estimated to be only about 140-150 aircraft as of mid-1958. Production of the BEAR is believed to have ceased by early 1957 and production of the BISON currently appears virtually to have ceased. Information is needed on possible continued production, movements and introduction into units of these aircraft. (2) A number of reports of varying reliability indicate that the Soviets may be developing a new high-performance heavy bomber. Attention should be directed to unusual technical characteristics, especially the propulsion system. Information is needed on production, testing, movement and introduction into operational units. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

E. Aircraft Production and Deployment (continued)

2. Soviet Twin-engine Jet Medium Bomber:

BADGER - Still being introduced into operational units. Information is needed as to whether these BADGERS represent new or modified aircraft and, particularly, if they appear to be modified as tanker aircraft. Information also needed on introduction into units other than those of the Long Range Air Force. (S)

3. Light Bombers:

Information is needed on possible production and introduction into units of new-type light bombers including BLOWLAMP and BACKFIN.

4. All Weather Interceptor:

It is considered probable that the Soviets are engaged in some stage of production activity on a new all-weather interceptor. This aircraft, probably designated the YAK-27, has been reported since 1956 but has not been sighted by western observers. Information is needed on series or prototype production of this aircraft and its introduction into units. (S)

5. New Attack Aircraft:

Foreign visitors to the 1956 Air Show were also shown a static display of aircraft which included two new attack aircraft, both described as very crude in appearance. A twin-jet ground attack aircraft, since designated BRAUNY, was described as similar to but larger than the USAF B-26, with slightly swept wings and four-inch rockets mounted under each wing. (S)

6. New Supersonic Fighters:

Two new families of fighters, including both swept-wing and delta-wing aircraft were displayed in the 1956 Air Show. Since that date none of these aircraft have been sighted by western observers.

USSR (Continued)III. Economic (continued)E. Aircraft Production and Deployment (continued)6. New Supersonic Fighters (continued)

a. The smaller delta-wing with pointed wing tips was designated Fishbed A and the clipped wing version of the same aircraft, Fishbed B. These aircraft were characterized by extensive use of wing fences. The swept-wing version of this fighter, designated Faceplate, has no wing fences.

b. The larger, more advanced, delta-wing fighter, designated Fishpot had no wing fences visible. The swept-wing version of this aircraft, designated Fitter, has two wing fences on each wing.

c. There is no firm information concerning which of these aircraft the Soviets intend to mass produce. Information on Soviet production intentions, testing, actual production of these aircraft, and their introduction into units is needed. (S)

7. Other Fighters:

The first line Soviet fighters Fresco (MIG-17), and Farmer (MIG-19) are being phased out of production. Accurate information on the phase out of production of these jet fighters is needed.

8. New Transports:

(1) CAMP - A twin-turboprop assault transport, designated CAMP (AN-8), was displayed in the 1956 Air Show. Although it has not appeared in numbers since then, a model of an AN-8 with a different fuselage was on display at the Brussel's World Fair. Information is needed which will clarify which model may be going into production. Information also is needed on actual production and introduction into service. (2) CAMEL - the twin-jet CAMEL has been in service on Aeroflot lines since 1956 and also now flies on international routes. Information is needed on the number now in service with Aeroflot and with the military. Information also is needed on production of this aircraft. (3) CAT - at least three different versions of the CAT (AN-10) have been reported since this aircraft first was displayed at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957. The AN-10A reportedly is an 100 passenger version and the AN-16 is a 130 passenger version. Information is needed on production and introduction

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

E. Aircraft Production and Deployment (continued)

8. New Transports (continued)

into service. (4) COOKER (TU-110) - this four-engine jet transport has been derived from the older twin-engine jet CAMEL. Although first displayed to the public at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957, the aircraft has not been seen in numbers. Information is needed on possible production and introduction into service. (5) COOT (IL-18) - this four-engine turboprop transport was displayed for the first time at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957 and is believed currently to be in series production. Information is needed on possible variants of the aircraft, production, and introduction into service with Aeroflot or the military. (6) CLEAT - the existence of the CLEAT (TU-114) first was confirmed by photos in the Soviet press on 3 November 1957. The aircraft, a very large four-engine turboprop, apparently has been derived from the BEAR heavy bomber. Two versions, the TU-114 and the TU-114D, have been shown since November 1957. The latter aircraft in appearance is very similar to the BEAR and apparently has a small passenger capacity. The TU-114, although probably derived from the BEAR, has a larger fuselage and can carry from 120 to 220 passengers. Information is needed on possible production of one or more of these models and on introduction into service. (7) CLOD (AN-14) - this short haul, twin-engine piston transport completed its first test flight in March 1958 and is believed to be scheduled for series production. Information is needed on production and introduction into service. (S)

9. Helicopters:

Information is needed on the production site of the Hook (MI-6) helicopter which was first observed in late 1957. Information is also desired on the production site of the small KA-18 (HOG), which the Soviets have stated will enter mass production at an early date.

Intelligence concerning production of the Horse (YAK-25) remains obscure. Only a few of these helicopters have been observed since it was first sighted in the 1955 Air Show. Information concerning both production and the production site of these helicopters is needed. (C)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

E. Aircraft Production and Deployment (continued)

10. Aerial Refueling:

Information is needed on Soviet development of aerial refueling techniques and equipment, including the development of new tanker aircraft and/or the modification of known aircraft such as the BISON, BADGER, and the BEAR for tanker use. (S)

11. Unidentified Aircraft:

In June 1958 an unidentified aircraft of double delta configuration was seen flying near Ramenskoye Airfield. The aircraft was moving very rapidly and, although no engines were seen, the sound seemed to be that of a standard jet engine. The size of the aircraft was estimated tentatively to be slightly smaller than that of BACKFIN. Further description of the aircraft is needed. Information also is needed on testing, possible production, and introduction into units. (S)

F. Light Industries

Increase in Specific Commodities:

Khrushchev, in introducing the Seven Year Plan (1959-65), promised the people an increasing standard of living and called for expanded programs in production of a number of commodities. The Seven Year Plan for light industry requires that production increase at an annual rate of 6 percent. The increase over the past seven years, however, as claimed by Soviet officials, was 8.7 percent. Thus the output of light industry will increase at a slower rate through 1965. Commodities singled out for particular expansion are (1) artificial and synthetic fiber, (2) leather footwear, (3) knitwear, (4) children's clothing, and (5) furniture. Any evidence of the implementation of this policy is needed. In addition, information is desired on investment, labor force, and construction of new plants. (U)

G. Metalforming Industries

The Seven Year Plan (1959-65) reveals plan for the construction of 75 to 80 new major specialized shops and plants for the production of castings, forgings, and stampings. Location, capacity, and breakdown by speciality of these shops and plants are desired. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

H. Nonferrous Metals production

1. Aluminum

According to the Seven-Year Plan, Soviet production of aluminum in 1965 will be 2.8 times that of 1958. In the Sixth Five Year Plan it was stated that 20% of the planned increase for that period would accrue from better organization of production and more efficient utilization of existing production capacity, and that capacity for the production of crude aluminum would increase by approximately 2.7 times. Data of this type on the source of new supply for the Seven-Year Plan was not given. (C)

A breakdown of the sources of the planned increase in aluminum output during 1959-1965 is desired, i.e., what portion of the increase will be obtained through the expansion of existing facilities, from plants under construction, or from plants which are planned for construction during this period. (C)

2. Copper

According to the Seven-Year Plan, Soviet production of copper in 1956 will be 1.9 times that of 1958. It was stated in the Sixth Five-Year Plan that 42% of the planned increase for that period would be obtained from better organization of production and more efficient utilization of existing production capacity, and that capacity for the production of copper would increase by approximately 1.5 times. Data of this type on the source of new supply for the Seven-Year Plan was not given. (C)

A breakdown of the sources of the planned increase in aluminum output during 1959-1965 is desired, i.e., what portion of the increase will be obtained through the expansion of existing facilities, from plants now under construction, or from plants which are planned for construction during this period. (C)

I. Ferrous Metals and Alloys Production

1. Current information on Soviet planned and actual production and use of alloying materials and of alloy steels is increasingly important in view of their relationship to Soviet atomic energy, missile, and other weapons programs. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

I. Ferrous Metals and Alloys Production (Continued)

2. Information is desired concerning current production of nickel, molybdenum, tungsten, cobalt, chromite, vanadium, and ferroalloys. (U)

3. Information on the production and distribution of all alloy steels of the following types: low alloy constructional, ballbearing, tool, electrical, magnetic, stainless, and iron-based super alloys. The same information is desired for nickel, cobalt, molybdenum, chrome, or tungsten based super alloys for cermets and other hard alloys. (U)

J. Petroleum, Natural Gas Production

1. Petroleum:

a. Since September 1957 there have been reported plans to build an oil pipeline from the Ural-Volga area near Kuibyshev to the major Baltic Sea oil terminal at Klaipeda now under construction. Confirmation of such pipeline plans are desired and negotiations with Free World companies to build, or aid in building, such a pipeline should be reported.

2. Natural Gas:

a. In 1957 a new gas discovery was reported in Usbek near Bukhara. Announced plans for gas lines to be built from this area to areas of consumption indicate this may be a major natural gas discovery. Report the number and locations of wells drilled in this area and the results of production tests thereon. (U)

K. Power Production

Electric and Nuclear Plants:

1. At Geneva the Soviets reported a large nuclear power plant, with a projected capacity of 600,000 kilowatts, "somewhere in Siberia." What is the exact location of this power plant? At what thermal power levels is it operating? Describe the generating equipment and how it is planned to reach full capacity. Give any information on plutonium production from the reactors and on costs of construction or operation.

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

K. Power Production (Continued)

Electric and Nuclear Plants (Continued)

2. The US electric power delegation in the USSR in August was told that the nuclear power plant near Moscow was "a hole in the ground," yet Yermelyanov at Geneva at the same time did not mention the plant. Is the Moscow nuclear power plant really under construction? If so, where? Give details of construction, projected operation, and costs.

L. Materials for Atomic Energy and Missiles

1. Chemicals:

a. Information is desired relating to production, trade, shipment, and consumption of the following chemicals and chemical raw materials which have importance in the Soviet atomic energy and missile programs: fluorspar, hydrofluoric acid and fluorine, lithium ores and compounds, metallic calcium and calcium chloride, boron ores and compounds, hydrazine, and hydrogen peroxide.

b. Information is desired on the types of chemical fuels and oxidizers that are used in Soviet missiles - particularly in the Soviet ICBM and earth satellite type missiles.

2. Reactor Graphite:

Reactor grade graphite for use as moderator in atomic piles in the USSR is a commodity of active intelligence interest. Is there any evidence that this commodity is considered to be in critical or short supply, and is there any special emphasis apparent in regard to the manufacture of it? (S)

M. Agriculture

1. The 1958 agricultural production probably will be at a record level. (C) Information is desired concerning the production and utilization of these agricultural products. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

M. Agriculture (Continued)

2. As a follow-up of the MTS reorganization, the procurement and pricing system for agricultural products has been revised. (U) How is the new system functioning? (U) What are the prices being used this year and what effect has the bumper harvest had on the level of prices? (U) Are increased procurements of agricultural products in 1958 solely the result of good harvests, or has the change in the procurement - pricing system had an effect? (U)

3. The seven-year plan (1959-65) makes reference to a proposal "to make better use of highly fertile land in the zone of stable rainfall? in the European USSR (U). Does this imply the initiation of a specific program to accomplish this end (e.g. a program similar in scope to the new lands program), or is the proposal purposely only in vague, general terms with no particular large scale program being planned? (U)

4. The seven-year plan makes reference to the necessity of achieving increased labor productivity in agriculture (U). Do the Soviets expect to reduce the Soviet agricultural labor force substantially in the near future? (U)

5. The Order of Lenin award was presented to Lysenko on his 60th birthday in October. At a conference of geneticists in Montreal in August 1958 only pro-Lysenko scientists were in attendance. These events again raise questions concerning the status of Lysenko and his theories in the USSR at the present time. (U) What effect does Lysenko or his group have over (a) agricultural scientific research, (b) the application of scientific findings to general practice in Soviet agriculture? (U)

N. Construction Industry

1. New Rail Lines:

Recent information indicates 9,000 kilometers of new railroad lines will be built in the 1959-65 period. (U) Information is desired on plans for any new line construction not included in the original Sixth Five Year Plan. (U)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

2. Guided Missile Sites:

Any reports of the construction of guided missile launching installations or site descriptions would be of great value. Information needed includes: construction details, overall plans, construction organizations, and material inputs.

O. Telecommunications

One of the most current and promising telecommunications developments in the Soviet Union has been in the field of tropospheric and ionospheric scattering techniques. The perfection of such techniques, which permit the propagation of ultra-high frequency (UHF) radio waves between stations located from about 200 to 1,500 miles apart, would enable the Soviet Union to establish a much needed network of relatively secure, reliable, and, in the case of tropospheric scatter, high capacity facilities for either civil or military use. Open source materials report the establishment thus far of only two experimental circuits, one a tropospheric scatter circuit between Frunze and Prezheval'sk, and the other an ionospheric scatter circuit between Leningrad and Murmansk. Additional information, however, indicates that there are a number of other scatter circuits operational in the USSR. (S) Information is desired concerning the terminals and routes of ionospheric and tropospheric scatter circuits--experimental, operational, or planned--their capacities, and their civil or military organizational subordination. (S)

P. Guided Missile Production and Deployment

1. Recent information indicates that possibly a new-type surface-to-air missile is being phased into the Moscow SAM defense system. Any confirmatory evidence of the possible production and/or deployment of this new weapon is urgently needed.

2. Recently, information has become available indicating that there are 10 new assembly and/or storage type buildings at a Moscow SAM site (MINW-1) which are similar to two new buildings located at the Istra missile support area. This information is the first evidence of possible "on-site" storage or assembly of missile at any of the Moscow sites. Any information indicating completion or construction of similar storage or assembly areas at other Moscow SAM sites is urgently needed. (S)

~~S E C R E T~~

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

III. Economic (Continued)

Q. East-West Trade

1. The Soviet firm Ingosstrakh reportedly is expanding its insurance and reinsurance operations in Western Europe. Recent reports state that the premiums charged by Ingosstrakh and Ingosstrakh-backed Free World agencies are so low that they are believed to be non-profitable.

a. Provide the names of Free World firms backed by Ingosstrakh.

b. What rates are charged by Ingosstrakh and the Ingosstrakh-backed firms?

c. Provide information that may explain the motivation for charging rates considerably below established premiums.

d. Provide information that may confirm or deny the use of the insurance business for commercial or industrial espionage purposes.

e. Provide information linking these insurance activities with illicit East-West trade. (C)

S E C R E T

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

IV. Military

A. Missiles

(See also USSR - Military, Section C - Army, Tactical Missiles; USSR - Economic, Section P - Guided Missile Production; and USSR - Scientific, Section C - Guided Missiles)

1. Information is urgently needed on the production, testing, operational use, and technical characteristics of guided missiles in all categories: surface-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-surface and air-to-air. (S)

2. Surface-to-Air Types

a. Information on the air defense missile sites in the Moscow area including construction, training, and operational employment, and indications of alert. (S)

b. A more flexible type of SAM system is expected to be deployed at major target cities, possibly utilizing missiles of the type appearing in the Moscow 1957 parade. (S)
Existence of defensive missile sites have been reported since 1956 at Leningrad and Baku. Report any evidence of existing missile defense facilities or related construction at these, or other areas likely to be defended. (S)

d. Second generation surface-to-air missiles were observed in the 7 November 1957 Moscow parade. Report evidence of deployment of this missile into the Moscow SAM system. (S)

3. Air-to-Surface Types

a. The USSR is believed to be engaging in a comprehensive development program for air-to-surface missiles including cruise-types. Report evidence of testing, training and operational deployment of this category of missiles. (S)

4. Surface-to-Surface Types

a. Short-range surface-to-surface missiles. (S)

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PRL (Guide No. 164)
January - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

IV. Military (Continued)

A. Missiles (Continued)

b. Information on longer range surface-to-surface types is also a priority requirement. (S)

5. Air-to-Air Types

a. The USSR has a military requirement for air-to-air missiles, although little is known about their state of development. Information on the development, testing, training and operational use of such missiles is urgently needed. (S)

B. Air

(See also USSR-Economic, Section E - Aircraft Production and Deployment)

1. Soviet Space Research Program: (a) The Soviet Union is known to be engaged in a well-planned, high priority space flight program, although little is known about the locations of the development and test facilities engaged in this program or the experimental vehicles themselves. It is accepted that the USSR will soon attempt the launching and recovery of a large animal-bearing artificial earth satellite as a progressive step in the Soviet space research program. Any information regarding such preparations or intentions is very valuable. (b) Information concerning the research and development, testing and configuration of any Soviet manned high-altitude research vehicles is urgently needed. (S)

2. Automation in Air Defense: It is believed that the USSR has underway a program to develop an automatic air defense system similar in concept to portions of the US SAGE system. Any information on such operational facilities as control points, lines of communication, and equipment likely to be associated with such a system, together with any ideas on Soviet doctrine for its employment would be of value. (S)

3. Air Defense for Key Target Areas: The USSR has assigned a composite of conventional antiaircraft forces, fighter aircraft and in the case of at least Moscow, a surface-to-air missile complex to defend critical target areas. Continued surveillance of these areas for signs of exercising the equipment, or alerting personnel would be of value. Any information on how the Soviets intend to employ defensive weapons is of extreme importance. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January - April 1959)

USSR

IV. Military (Continued)

C. Army

1. Tactical missiles

a. There is a great need for any information on missile units. What are their size, organization, subordination, equipment, and role in the parent organization? (S)

b. Are surface-to-air missile units being assigned to tactical units? How are they integrated into the local air defense plan of the parent unit? Describe their organization and equipment. (S)

c. Are medium and long range rocket and missile units attached to forward armies during the offensive? How are these missile units grouped (by battalion, regiment, or division)? What tactical and/or strategic missions are assigned to this type unit? (S)

d. Have IRBM bases been established in satellite areas? Have plans been made and areas surveyed for the employment of mobile IRBM launchers in Satellite areas? (S)

2. Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O & E's)

a. How do current (T/O & E's) differ from previous tables for similar units? How many types of divisions are there in current T/O & E's? Do plans exist for additional types of divisions or will some of the current types of divisions be abolished? (S)

b. Is the tank regiment in the various divisions identical? Is the motorized rifle regiment in the various divisions identical in organization and equipment? (S)

c. What air units (both fixed and rotary wing) are organic to the various divisions? (S)

d. Has the breakthrough artillery division been abolished or replaced by rocket and missile units? (S)

3. Equipment

a. Tanks, assault guns, and tracked vehicles

(1) Has a new miniature or light tank been developed or placed in production? (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

IV. Military (Continued)

C. Army (Continued)

(2) Has the T-54 tank been redesigned with a new type turret and increased frontal armor? What modifications have been made to the original production model? How is the T-54 tank prepared for deep-water fording? Describe the infra-red equipment provided with this tank. (S)

(3) Has a larger gun been placed on the PT-76 tank? What other changes have been made in the basic amphibious tank? (S)

(4) What type assault guns are currently in production? Has the T-54 chassis been adapted as an assault gun carriage? Are assault guns being phased out in favor of heavy tanks? (S)

(5) Is there a new amphibious personnel and equipment carrier larger than the K-61? (S)

(6) To what extent have tracked prime-movers replaced wheeled vehicles? (S)

b. Artillery

(1) Has the new large self-propelled cannon (approx. 300 mm) been introduced into operation units? Describe the recoil mechanism and loading apparatus of each of these pieces. What is the range for the various types of shells for this weapon? (S)

(2) To what extent has the M-1955 203 mm gun-howitzer been introduced into operational units? (S)

(3) Has an anti-aircraft gun larger than the dual 57 mm been mounted on a tracked prime-mover? Describe the off-carriage radar for the self-propelled anti-aircraft weapons. (S)

c. Small arms

(1) Is a new family of small arms currently under development to replace the post-war weapons currently in the hands of troops? (S)

(2) Are new recoilless rifles currently being developed? (S)

USSR (Continued)

IV. Military (Continued)

C. Army (Continued)

4. Political training

a. Has the amount of political training for enlisted men and officers been increased in the past two years? How are these periods of training scheduled? Who conducts this training and who is required to attend? (S)

b. At what levels of organization is there a deputy commander for political affairs? What is his status relative to the commander? Are many former political deputies now commanding units? Are commanders attending special courses to qualify them as political deputies? (S)

c. At what levels of organization do military councils exist? What is their function and membership? (S)

d. Describe the party organization in units below division. What is the relationship between the political deputy and the party secretary? What is the relationship between the military party organization and the local civilian party organization? (S)

e. Is the Main Political Administration directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense? What is its relationship to the central committee? (S)

D. Navy

7. Submarine construction developments: The "Z" "W" and "Q"-class submarine construction programs have ended. A new class, the "F"-class, is now building in the Sudomekh Shipyard in Leningrad. It is probable that other new submarine construction programs are also underway in other areas of the USSR. (S)
Information on new submarine construction projects in the USSR is urgently required. This information should include details of numbers of units building, types of propulsion and weapons systems. (S)

8. Possible Guided Missile Cruisers: There are indications that the Sverdlov cruiser program has come to an end. Several of the last hulls built in this program have been maintained in an unfinished state in the Leningrad area. There is speculation that work on these ships has been suspended until suitable guided missile installations are available. Information concerning the future of these ships is desired. (S)

10. Naval weapons and ships to non-bloc nations: The USSR has transferred a number of warships and naval weapons to non-bloc nations. (S)

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

IV. Military (Continued)

D. Navy (Continued)

Information on further transfers of this nature are of interest. (S)

11. Scrapping or Mothballing of Warships: The USSR has scrapped some ships and apparently placed some small ships in mothballs. (S) Further information on this subject is desired. (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 January - 30 April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

V. Scientific and Technical

A. General

1. Russian scientists have made tremendous advances which are emphasized by their spectacular success in nuclear and space projects. These scientific and technical advances have provided Russia with definite scientific and technical advantages, and new arms and propaganda for advancing Russian international Communism. These tremendous efforts are representative of the Russian bid for supremacy in all fields of science and technology including the less spectacular basic science fields. (C)

a. Information on new Russian goals, progress, success and failure is desired. (U)

b. Specific information as to the intensity of political, economic and military support to basic and applied science in the USSR would be most useful, particularly when expressed in terms of organizations, funds, human and material resources, and success or failure of projects. (C)

c. Information is desired on the competence of scientific and technical manpower and assignments broken down by field of specialization in basic and applied science and for specific ministries and subordinate institutes. (U)

d. Specific or general information is desired on projects, planned or under study, and the success or failure of each undertaking. (U)

e. Any reference to changes in Soviet scientific and technical policies or plans is desired. (U)

f. Evidence of increased Soviet emphasis on the application of scientific and technical assets to develop new or unique methods of aggression, new or improved weapons and new or improved weapons and new or improved defensive measures. (C)

g. Evidence of increased efforts to raise scientific and technical standards within the USSR to provide capabilities for continued advances in the basic and applied sciences and thereby the potential for scientific and technical productivity. (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
January - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. Scientific and Technical(Continued)

A. General (Continued)

h. Data on increased scientific and technical spending above levels previously planned. (C)

i. Information is desired on major changes or advances (breakthrough) in fields of priority scientific interest. (C)

j. Details of changes in Soviet plans or current Soviet scientific and technical aid programs to Free World nations. (C)

k. Any details of specific scientific and technical projects of the new Seven Year Plan (1959-1965), particularly those assigned to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Medium Machine Building (AE ministry). (C)

B. Atoms for Peaceful Uses

1. The U.S., U.K. and USSR are meeting in Geneva to try to draw-up a treaty which would provide for a discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests and establish a control system to insure that members do not violate the agreement. (U)

a. Information is desired on the official Soviet position and attitude regarding the Discontinuance of the Nuclear Weapon Tests at Geneva, particularly indications of any rigidity or flexibility of their bargaining position and concessions or compromises they may be willing to make in the face of Western pressure. (S)

b. What are the Soviet popular attitude and sympathies toward the Soviet official position at the conference. (S)

C. Guided Missiles

1. Recent observation of a modified surface-to-air missile was reported during September-October 1958. (S)

a. Report any evidence of deployment concept of this missile in the USSR. (S)

b. What are its technical characteristics and associated equipment? (S)

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25X1X1

2. Evidence has been obtained indicating that [redacted] was engaged in the Soviet SAM ancilliary equipment production and research. (S) (NOFORN)

-42-
S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164
January - April 1959)

USSR (Continued)

V. Scientific and Technical (Continued)

C. Guided Missiles (Continued)

a. Has this Plant continued in the missile support equipment program? If so, what is their present contribution; who are the associated suppliers and consumers? (S) (NOFORN)

D. Scientific and Technical Assistance Program

1. There is considerable exchange of delegations and specialists of countries of the Middle and Far East and other underdeveloped areas in Africa and South America with those of the USSR.

a. What medical personnel from underdeveloped areas have currently visited the USSR: name, title or position, purpose of visit, date, length of stay? (C)

b. What Soviet personnel have recently visited non-Communist underdeveloped areas? Name, title or position, purpose of visit, date, length of stay? (C)

2. The USSR has in the past provided hospitals, equipment, medicinals, technical assistance and money for medical aid in underdeveloped areas. (C)

a. What kind of assistance is being currently provided or planned by the USSR and for which non-Communist countries? (C)

b. There have been occasional references in Meditsinskiy Rabotnik about Soviet aid. In what ways is Soviet medical aid to non-Communist areas publicized? Is there much publicity about this aid or is it soft-pedaled within the USSR.

3. The USSR is encouraging underdeveloped areas to send students for training in medical specialties. (U)

a. What countries are sending students to the USSR? Number known to be present? Course of study? (C)

b. Is there evidence that these students are being subjected to Communist indoctrination? (S)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164
January - April 1959

USSR (Continued)

V. Scientific and Technical (Continued)

E. Unconventional Warfare

1. It is a truism that the objectives of an international conflict should determine the conduct of that conflict. The Soviet objective in the "cold-war" is the imposition of their political philosophy upon the rest of the world, and this objective is determining their conduct of the conflict. Research and development in the science of eugenics is as vital to the conduct of a political war as research and development would be to an all out physical conflict. Failure to consider this factor may prove disastrous in that it is conceivable that the Soviet objective could be achieved without the employment of physical war. (U)

2. Since the 20th Party Congress it has been evident that the Soviets--satisfied with their standing in physical weaponry and geographic positioning but dubious about the reliability of Soviet and satellite populations - have launched upon a large-scale program in eugenics. All aspects of this science aimed at the improvement of Soviet society (and the disintegration of Western societies) are being exploited, including the social and biological sciences, behavioral science, cybernetics, ethology, pedagogy, etc. Khrushchev's speech at the 21st Party Congress probably will concretize this program. In order to anticipate Soviet actions at the sociopolitical level, elaboration on the following points of Khrushchev's speech is required: (U)

a. What are the "new questions of tremendous theoretical and practical significance" that the social scientists of the USSR are working on? (U)

b. What is the anticipated nature of the "generalized laws of social development" which are facing Soviet social scientists in the building of Communism? (U)

c. What is the nature of the "emergency new, hitherto unknown laws of social development and new forms of relations between people." How are they being elaborated? (U)

d. How does Khrushchev propose to bring about the transformation of society in which "man himself changes....forming the new man...of the new Soviet international society?" (U)

e. How specifically is the "boarding school" idea which by 1965 will embrace "not less than 2.5 million men..." linked with the upbringing of the new, communist man of tomorrow? Is a "Brave New World" type of society the desired end? (U)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOC

I. Political

A. Soviet-Satellite Relationship

The primary Soviet objectives stressed at the Moscow conference of world Communist leaders in November 1957 and reiterated by Khrushchev in speeches at the Bulgarian and East German party congresses in June and July 1958 were to reassert the USSR's leadership of the Communist Bloc and to reinforce bloc unity. Recent Soviet moves designed to achieve these objectives have included the formation of an international Communist theoretical journal which began publication in the fall of 1958, and a vigorous campaign against 'revisionism' as exemplified particularly by the program issued by the Yugoslav Party Congress in April 1958. The last few months have found the Chinese, Bulgarian, and Albanian Communists leading in the attack on Tito, although formal State relations are still maintained between the Yugoslav regime and all members of the Bloc. There are still some divergencies within the bloc, the most evident of which relate to the determination of Polish Party First Secretary Gomulka to maintain a degree of independence, especially in dealing with Polish internal policies. The formal State-Party visit of Gomulka to the Soviet Union culminated in a joint Polish-Soviet statement on November 10, 1958 which clearly allied Poland with Soviet foreign policy objectives but did not appear to have affected Polish internal autonomy. At the close of 1958 all of the European Satellites were firmly ranked behind the Soviet Union's proposal to alter the quadripartite status of Berlin.

1. Evidence that the USSR is implementing new policies permitting one or another of the Satellites greater responsibilities for internal policies. (U)
2. Evidence that Moscow, in order to regain firmer control over the direction of bloc affairs, is undertaking a more direct role in international Satellite affairs. (U)
3. Evidence of Soviet plans to further reduce its troops strength in the Satellites, or conversely, has no plans along this line whatsoever. (U)
4. Evidence that the number of Soviet officials in a given Satellite is increasing or decreasing, and why. (U)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

I. Political (continued)

A. Soviet-Satellite Relationship (continued)

5. Evidence that Satellite regimes, possibly encouraged by any new degree of freedom that lessens direct Soviet control, are reverting to the traditional hostilities that have long afflicted the area. (C)

6. Concerning such organizations as CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, what role is played by the Satellite representatives in these organizations? Are they rubber stamps or are they in fact permitted to take an active part in the organizations activities, particularly in the discussion and formulation of policies? (U)

7. What is the organizational structure of the new theoretical journal? What degree of influence do the various Satellite countries exercise on editorial policy and how? (U)

B. Communist Party Stability

1. Factionalism within the Satellite parties--brought into the open with the 20th congress of the CPSU and the de-Stalinization campaign--remains a serious problem for the Satellite leaders. We need evidence of the growth, or continuation, of this factionalism within Satellite parties or between parties. (U)

a. Report evidence of disaffection or reluctance among party leaders and members to go along with new party or bloc directives. Report evidence of moderate elements' efforts to force greater liberalization than the regime leaders and/or Moscow desire. (U)

b. Identify the leaders and groups and outline the arguments each side puts up to justify its position. (U)

c. Report evidence of Moscow's concurrence in or disapproval of specific Satellite changes in policy. (U)

d. What are the specific reasons for dismissal of Satellite officials? Is factionalism involved? (U)

2. What has been the effect on the Eastern European Communist Parties of the Soviet campaign against Yugoslavia? We are particularly interested in any evidence of a change in the leadership of the Satellite Parties as a result of too close connections with Tito.

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

I. Political (Continued)

B. Communist Party Stability (Continued)

Evidence of the existence of party ties and relations between the Yugoslav Party and the Satellite Communist Parties. Evidence of deliberate Satellite efforts to reduce Party contact with Yugoslavia to a minimum as well as evidence of efforts to reduce governmental (including economic) ties with Yugoslavia. (U)

3. What effect is Poland's national Communist government having on the other Satellites? Of particular interest would be any evidence of Satellite efforts to undermine or otherwise weaken the Gomulka regime. (U)

4. To what extent has Khrushchev's assumption of the Soviet premiership affected the doctrine of "collective leadership" in the Satellites? Is there collectivity in the leadership in reaching decisions, or is there one man rule? Is the method of decision-making a reversion to the pre-June 1953 period or was no change ever apparent? (U)

C. Communist Party Organization

There are great gaps in our knowledge of the setup within the central organization of Satellite Communist parties. Gaining a clear picture of the whole central structure and operations of the party is of obvious importance. (S)

1. What reorganizations and personnel shifts are planned in the central structure and why? What reorganizations have been carried out but not publicized? (U)

D. Government

All Satellites now operate on a government setup in which the premier and deputy premiers constitute an inner cabinet on the highest level of government. (C) To what degree do they actually operate as an inner cabinet and what is their effectiveness and jurisdiction? (U)

1. What are the given ministries controlled by each deputy premier? What is his relationship to the ministries under his jurisdiction? Report any concrete examples of policy control over ministries. (U)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

I. Political (Continued)

D. Government (Continued)

2. To what extent do the premier and his deputies constitute an actual organization (i.e., regular meetings, a secretariat, etc.)? (U)

3. Evidence of plans to decentralize government structure. Is reorganization proceeding along the lines recently adopted by the USSR? (U)

E. Security and Resistance

1. What are the existing relationships between and among Soviet and Satellite security services? Is there an overall inter-Satellite security organization? (U)

2. What overt and covert resistance is there evidence of? How is overt discontent manifested (i.e., strikes, spontaneous demonstrations, etc.)? Dates, places, and size of groups involved. (U)

3. As a result of the Hungarian and Polish developments the previous relaxation of security measures has been called to a halt and in some instances reversed. Report instances of relaxation or the adoption of reversion to previous hard internal security policies. (U)

F. Popular Attitudes

This type of information should be reported either on a national or regional basis. Listed below are general categories with some representative examples? (U)

1. Attitudes toward government economic policies - How have farmers reacted to softened delivery quotas? Workers to new norms, wage-scales, work-time, etc.? (U)

2. Attitude toward western powers and hopes of liberation. (U)

3. West German rearmament- Do the people accept the government line on the dangers of West German rearmament? What is the attitude toward Khrushchev's proposal to create an international free city of Berlin? Has fear of war among the population increased? What is the popular view of current negotiations for banning nuclear weapon tests?(U)

4. What is the present attitude of the former left social democrats and non-Communist collaborationists? How do they view their position as a result of the developments in Poland and Hungary and the campaign against revisionism? (U)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

I. Political (Continued)

F. Popular Attitudes (Continued)

5. What is the attitude toward the establishment of a military commune system in China? Is this regarded as a model for emulation by other Communist regimes? Does the popular attitude differ from the official attitude on this question? (U)

G. Treatment of Minorities

National minorities within the Satellites present the governments with continuing and insoluble problems. Policies toward them are of continuing interest. (U)

1. Report any observable changes in official policy toward national minorities since the Hungarian and Polish events. (U)

2. What is the present status of local Jewish Communities? What is the current opinion of government and party policies and their attitude toward Zionism, emigration, and Israel? (U)

3. Statistics on numbers of minority groups--particularly Jews--remaining in the Satellites. (U)

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST

(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOCII. EconomicA. Importing and Exporting1. Copper

In August 1958 COCOM removed the embargo against the export to the Soviet Bloc of copper in all forms. Prior to this, forms other than bare wire (6 mm and under) were embargoed. It is possible that the Bloc in general, and the USSR in particular, might shift purchases of copper from semimanufactured wire to the less expensive primary forms, e.g., cathodes, wirebars, ingots, etc. (C) Information is desired which might indicate any significant change in the form and volume of copper imported by the Bloc from the Free World. (U)

2. Tin

Sales of significant quantities of tin by the USSR to the Free World during the past three years have contributed to a growing surplus of tin on the world market. The International Tin Council has been attempting to reduce this surplus and to stabilize the world price. The USSR as a potential seller of large quantities of tin is capable of defeating--as indicated in recent months--these efforts, if not perhaps of actually disrupting the entire marketing structure. (U)

a. Soviet intentions to sell tin or not to sell tin should be reported. (U)

b. As much background information as possible, including Soviet tin output, imports of tin from Ghana, planned expansion, etc., should be reported. (U)

3. Coal and Coke

In 1958, the USSR increased its exports of coal and coke to the European Satellites to compensate for the decrease in Polish exports. There have been scattered reports of trade agreements between the USSR and Satellite countries in which the USSR has committed itself to supply substantial exports of coal and coke for periods of from 3 to 5 years. Details of these agreements are needed. (OUO)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

II. ECONOMIC (Continued)

B. Civil Defense Activities

The development of civil defense in the Soviet Bloc has been highlighted by city and area alerts in last two years. (C)

1. Report all civil air alerts or instructions. (C)
2. Identify fully organizations and personnel in operative roles. (C)
3. Describe or obtain photographs of all equipment used--personal, individual, tools, vehicles and communications. (C)
4. Ascertain whether population moved to shelter, was evacuated, or did not participate. (C)
5. Smoke, blackout or camouflage measures. (C)

C. Electronics Production

1. In connection with intra-Bloc coordination and specialization planning through CEMA, information is required on specific measures affecting the electronics industries. Information on coordination of electronic component production for intra-Bloc trade is desirable, as is information on specialization in the assembly of end items. (U)

2. Recent information indicates that within the Warsaw Pact structure, military production planning takes place, and decisions are made to allocate production of specific types of military electronic equipments to individual countries as primary Bloc producers. Further information is desired on these production allocations, with details on types and quantities of equipment involved. (S)

D. Agricultural Production

1. Agricultural production for 1958 varies from good in the northern Satellites (East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia) to poor in the southern Satellites (Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania). (C) Information is desired concerning the following for each Satellite with special emphasis on the southern areas:

a. What effect has the 1958 harvest had on government procurements? (C)

S E C R E T

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

II. Economic (Continued)

D. Agricultural Production (Continued)

- b. Any evidence that the USSR has refused to honor in full requests for foodstuffs by the Satellites. (C)
- c. Reports, including rumors, that a food shortage exists in any of the southern Satellites. (C)

2. The Satellites have indicated that they are developing fifteen year plans for agriculture--Poland has released some data. (C) Information is desired on the exact goals set up for individual crops, livestock products, investments, fertilizers, machinery, etc., for each Satellite. (C)

E. Petroleum Production

Plans have been mentioned concerning construction of a pipeline from the USSR (Baku region) to Poland, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany in order to supply large amounts of crude oil to these countries. Details are desired on the size and capacity of the pipeline, the proposed routes, the estimated dates of the completion to each country, and the suppliers of the pipe. (U)

F. Electric Power Systems

There are preliminary plans under the sponsorship of CEMA, to integrate the European Satellite countries with an interconnected electric power system. The possibility also exists for international exchange of power between Western European countries and Bloc areas. (C) Give details of current plans for the development of a new high voltage (over 200 kilovolts) transmission system in the European Satellites? (C) Describe CEMA efforts in this field. (C)

S E C R E T

PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOC

III. Military

A. Combined Soviet Bloc Military Activity

1. The Warsaw Pact

a. How is the headquarters of the Pact in Moscow organized? What are the staff sections of the headquarters? How many Satellite officers are assigned to the staff in Moscow? What are their positions?

b. Are there regional headquarters for the Pact? Where are they located? Who commands them?

c. Is combined air defense a function of the unified command? How is coordination accomplished in this field?

2. Training

a. Is combined training now being scheduled? On what scale are these maneuvers to be executed? What is the role of each participant? Were officers of other Satellites present as observers?

b. How frequently are combined command post exercises (CPX) held? What are the scale and scope of these exercises?

c. How many officers from each of the Satellites have been trained in the USSR? At what schools is this training given? How many are currently enrolled? Are special courses arranged for Satellite officers?

3. Advisory Groups

a. How many Soviet personnel are there in the Advisory Group in each of the Satellites? What function do they perform at the Ministry of Defense level?

b. At what levels in the chain of command are advisory personnel assigned? What is their relationship to local commanders?

PRL (Guide No. 164)
(1 January - 30 April 1959)

SOVIET BLOC (Continued)

III. Military (Continued)

A. Combined Soviet Bloc Military Activity (Continued)

4. Soviet Equipment in Satellites

a. What efforts have been made to coordinate armament production in the Bloc? What role is Czechoslovakia playing in armament development?

b. What post-war models of equipment are scheduled to be delivered to the Satellites? Does antiaircraft armament have priority over other types?

c. What naval vessels are scheduled to be turned over to the Satellites (particularly Poland and East Germany)?

d. What aircraft are scheduled to be turned over to the Satellites in the near future?

5. Reduction in Strengths:

Was the reduction of 119,000 announced on 27 May 1958 carried out? Which service (Army, Navy or Air Force) was most affected by the reduction?

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