

DOTTORATO IN POLITICAL THEORY XXVIII CICLO



**PERSONAL VOTE IN SOUTHERN ITALY:
PARTICULARISM OR UNIVERSALISM?**

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ABSTRACT

In the South of Italy, the personal vote has represented a synonym for clientelism, understood as a political exchange between votes and particular benefits. The available literature traced the roots of clientelism, from the 1950s onward, to either cultural or structural social determinants, such as cynicism, disenchantment, fatalism or, on the other side, lagging or lacking economic development. Only recently, Political Science has tried new approaches to this phenomenon, by adopting rationalist frameworks to define the strategies underpinning the clientelist bargain. Such a perspective proposed new concepts, a “virtuous clientelism” resembling the Anglo-American constituency service: in this type of clientelism, both voters and candidates are inspired by the desire to provide universal benefits to their community, rather than being limited to egoistic gains. This research wants thus to uncover this type of clientelism through a qualitative research involving in-depth semi-structured interviews, performed with a sample of electors in four of the most important regions of the Italian Mezzogiorno: Calabria, Campania, Apulia and Sicily. This research also provides a map of the desires, expectations, hopes and disillusion of the southern Italian voters. Hence, this study does not limit itself to the research question and goes on to provide more insight on the private and public reasons underpinning political choices and to open further avenues for qualitative research on the topic.

Keywords: elections, clientelism, constituency service, personal vote, Mezzogiorno.

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INTRODUCTION

The reasons which inspire personal voting and the relationship it entails between voter and candidate have always been proved as fruitful research topics in Political Science, even though they are very difficult to flesh out in all their implications. Some of the features of this type of ballot often involve less than desirable practices such as clientelism and patronage. In other cases, however, personal voting can assume more appreciated forms, such as the constituency service, which is especially known and accepted in Anglo-American democracies. Many researchers focused, over the years, on Italy and, especially, on the South of the country: the southern regions of Italy, in fact, are considered especially informative for studies on the personal vote, both on quantitative and qualitative grounds. First, constituents in the South tend to use preferences (hence personal votes) much more frequently than in the rest of Italy ever since the first elections for the House of Deputies in 1948, with a propensity towards preferential ballots which cuts across parties and political orientations. Second, qualitatively, the personal vote has gained, over time, different meanings and traits, depending on the different regions, the social composition of the electorate, the relative strength or weakness of parties, and so forth.

Both these peculiarities, together with the chronic underdevelopment and the archaic social structures of peripheral territories in the South, triggered the interest of many scholars. Already in the 1950s and 1970s, structuralist and culturalist studies pointed at traditionalism, familism and clientelism of southern Italian politics. Subsequently, approaches more disciplinarily connected with Political Science, while still maintaining the focus firmly on the link between personal voting and clientelism. Many contributions on southern forms of clientelism, especially connected to the ruling parties in the different regions, have stressed time and again different typical elements of clientelism, which remain similar even in different contexts or in different times. First, the client-patron dichotomy that defines the clientelist bargain. Second, the object of said bargain, which is realized by casting votes for the patron in exchange for selective benefits. These two elements, which define clientelist essential features, are always accompanied with a negative appraisal of clientelism and, to some extent, of personal vote more in general as a vehicle for clientelism. This propensity for personal forms of relationship with candidates has been defined, with suspicion or outright disdain, as linked to several pernicious social determinants: amoral familism, lack of real free markets, lack of national unity and

the delegitimization of the state. Moreover, some have pinpointed other anthropological reasons such as cynicism, apathy and fatalism. Other authors share this adversity towards the personal vote, and they stress its detrimental consequences in the form of parochial policies and the explosion of selective benefits for few people, instead of the realization of universal benefits for the whole community, being it local, national or international. Even in the public discourse, the personal vote has been subjected to harsh critiques, which resulted in legislation such as the law no. 270/2005, which completely abolished the possibility to cast individual preferences. This law, in short, introduced a closed-list system which mirrored the regional legislation passed, in 2000, by Tuscany: that was the first Italian region ever to abolish preferences and to introduce closed lists for the election of the regional legislative council. The studies produced so far essentially concur in this definition of personal voting, and in its allegedly negative correlation with clientelism.

This project wants to turn this long-lasting evaluation onto its head, and it wants to assess *the existence, among southern Italian voters, of a type of personal voting driven by universal expected benefits. This research's starting point is a typology of voting behaviors which combines the type of vote (ideological vs. personal) with the nature of the expected benefits (particular vs. universal). It then proceeds to search for the existence and the defining feature of a personal and universalist voting behavior.* This project, while drawing upon a post-positivist epistemological stance, employs qualitative methods in the form of in-depth, semi-structured interviews, which have been realized during a long fieldwork. Almost 70 interviews have been performed with a reasoned sample of people coming from the four biggest regions in the South of Italy, i.e. Calabria, Apulia, Campania and Sicily. Before conducting fieldwork an in-depth review of the literature on the theme was necessary, to understand the different nuances of the personal vote, as well as the subtle distinctions between it and other political practices such as *clientelism* and *patronage*. The empirical research, moreover, entailed many organizational and methodological difficulties. Moreover, as the methodological chapter will elaborate, the interviews often unfolded intense personal stories, with interviewees often recounting themselves through their relationship with politics, and analyzing their socio-economic condition through their voting choices.

This research, while remaining focused on the research question, represented a true journey through the complex condition of the Italian Mezzogiorno, hence providing more insights than the leading question can synthesize. The interviews unfolded a depiction, or better multiple

depictions of the southern Italian society, and of the constant, contested and complicated relationship between politics and citizens, in diverse, although contiguous territories. For example, Sannio, in the province of Benevento, structurally and traditionally presents more direct and less mediated relationships between voters and their representatives than in the case of Naples. Another example lies outside territorial divides and concerns the degree of political sophistication of the voters, as will be further specified in chapter IV. The research showed that Sicilian voters show more political sophistication, regardless of their formal education or social background, hence they show a more complex reading of political and electoral phenomena than, for example, Calabrian voters. It is paramount, however, to avoid simplistic generalizations. The presentation of the results will follow the research question precisely, the aim of which is to empirically assess the existence, among the interviewed sample, of a personal vote inspired by universalist expectations.

The research, as we shall see in due course, is underpinned by more general considerations, namely that, in the absence of big parties and of ideological centers, the personal vote can potentially prompt virtuous practices such as the constituency service in the UK and USA, i.e. a right balance between the need of the local community and national interests. However, it is important not to get lost in the journey and to keep the research question firmly at the center of this thesis, which wants to recognize and charting something that only very few scholars have thus far even fathomed: a type of personal vote oriented towards universal benefits.

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CHAPTER 1

A personal vote beyond clientele?

1.1 Personal vote: an introduction.

One local politician is spending political capital and his own time to prevent a local car factory from closing. To win this battle, he will join forces with trade unions, interest groups, individual citizens and local institutions. He will fight both within and outside his party, which, for the time being, is the ruling national party. After a hard bargain, the national government commits itself to keep that factory open. A second politician, endowed with a widespread personal consensus, is getting ready for the parliamentary campaign: he will try to gather a team, and to receive as many votes as possible, regardless of the party he will be a candidate within, or the program he will endorse. This politician commits himself to provide staff members and their families with advantageous job positions. For example, he could convince a car factory to hire staff members or their relatives; civil service in local institutions also represents a valid alternative.

A third politician, more unscrupulous and without any party affiliation whatsoever, decides to run for office. Businesspeople, retailers and all those who may have an interest – either licit or illicit – in the constituency, back his campaign. Among the others, the owner of a car factory decides to endorse this third politician: he will need political support whenever the plant risks going bankrupt again in the future. This candidate splits the funds raised among highly trusted people: they will spread out to the poorest neighborhoods of the constituency to buy votes for as little as 50 euros per ballot. The payment will happen in full, in cash, outside the poll office.

Lastly, a fourth politician, who also runs for office, has solid roots in the local constituency but with national ambitions, but he uses a different strategy: from Rome, and thanks to his communication skills, he can run a pervasive marketing campaign based on TV and other mass media. He is highly capable in building his public image: in time, he will become the gathering point of some local interests more because of his celebrity than his actual work within the district.

Personal vote, such as in the above said examples, has always

been one paramount element of voters' behavior in every democratic country, even though it is called in different ways in different contexts. The examples above might look very similar to each other to us. In fact, they all follow a similar pattern: in each story, a politician balances interests, distributes benefits and improves the conditions of a given community. The motives behind candidates' choices are simple and linked to the desire for election or re-election in office (Downs 1958). This research, however, sheds light on the other side of the coin, i.e. the reasons behind voters' behaviors and choices. While local ties and personal consensus within one constituency seem the predominant forms of political relationship between one candidate and his constituents, the above said examples show differences and nuances. In the first case, the commitment of the candidate towards his constituency is clear and transparent. For sure, the priority goes to the wellbeing of the people living in the district, even to the detriment of a more general good and nation-wide analysis. However, the relationship of the first candidate with his community is still inspired by universalist benefits: safeguarding employment and growth, securing livelihoods to households and businesses, with no priority given to one particular interest group. On an institutional and formal ground, the first approach is based on apparently more clear institutional and intra-party relations. Thus, the first example represents the kind of candidate-constituency relationship which is most widespread and which describes, for instance in Anglo-American contexts, one of the most important qualities for a candidate to have, to be elected in office. In the second example, there are relevant differences in the function that the individual candidate performs. In particular, voters' motives are strongly different. While the first community is moved by universal motives, the second one is much more particularist. The first candidate clearly prioritizes his staff, and the potential voters want a personal benefit to derive from their support to a specific candidate. In conducting this operation, the second candidate secures only the particular interests of localized groups, which are closer to himself. These interest groups, in turn, will mobilize themselves for the candidate: relationship between candidates and constituents resembles a closed circuit based upon a recognized and acknowledged bargain. The stakes of the deal (Pasquino, Parisi, 1977), of course, are the votes. These ballots will go towards one specific candidate in exchange for selective and particular benefit: for example, one job position within the car factory. The bargain is patronizing in nature, which invests small portions of the overall community, and it is not limited to the voters-candidate relationship: the candidate might secure his influence by distributing

power resources among his staff and by appointing loyal people in the major positions of the local government. The third example is more morbid in nature: the candidate, in this case, creates a clientelist system with the vital economic interests, by promising fiscal benefits or ad hoc regulation, to favor the particular interests in his support. The strategy employed by the third candidate ceases to be clientelism and becomes outright corruption, in which votes are bought and sold, using raised money to obtain support and reputation. Finally, the fourth case describes a personal consensus dynamic, which is well known in media democracies, characterized by media leaders (Barisione 2007, Mazzoleni 2012). The support for the fourth originates from very different sources, and the relationship with the electors is different in nature from the third previous ones: reputation builds up through an emotional connection between the candidate and his supporters, through his image and appearance, and through mass media. The physical presence of the candidate in the district is not mandatory since it is sufficient for the candidate himself to be continuously present in the press. The image of the leader is created and secured through the mechanisms of political-electoral communication, in the context of a never-ending electoral campaign.

In synthesis, the proposed mental experiment tells us that personal vote may assume different shapes and features: while the relevant actors – voters and candidates – are the same, the object and nature of their mutual relationship changes all the time. Expected benefits always shape and direct voters' choices, but the particular or universal character of these anticipated benefits changes the relationship with candidates profoundly. It is never simple to draw lines between particular and universal personal votes: as we will see in the literature review provided by this thesis, this difficulty in operating distinction will emerge clearly. However, most of the reflection and academic debate around personal vote precisely stems from this difficulty in solving the particular/universal dichotomy of expected benefits. When turning attention towards the south of Italy, for example, scientific literature on the topic has thus far collapsed personal vote and clientelism, personal vote, and corruption, hence labelling personal vote itself as a pathologic and deviant political behavior.

1.2 Clientelism: a pathology of democracy?

The characterization of personal voting as deviant and connected

to clientelism is the predominant approach in the literature. Clientelism is a democratic pathology describes most of the contributions to the study of clientelist systems from WWII onwards. One of the aims of the next chapter will be to provide an overview of the debate about the compatibility between personal vote – broadly defined to comprehend *clientelism*, *patronage* and other phenomena – and democracy. However, it is unavoidable to describe the well-known assumption on the link between clientelism and the detriment of democracy.

First, the first studies on clientelist systems in Italy shared two approaches:

- The choice of southern Italy as the most suitable case study.
- These contributions were informed by structuralist and culturalist assumptions, hence neglecting strategic-rational approaches.

I will explain the choice of southern Italy as a case study in due course. For now, I will summarize some milestones in the scientific literature on personal vote and clientelism to date.

Wolf (1966) explained clientelism in micro-structural terms, by studying two small villages in the Non Valley (valle di Non) in Northeast of Italy. While the two communities seem similar, inhabitants pursue different strategies to create and distribute power. These strategies stem from different family structures and by various ways of passing down power from one generation to the next one within the same family. Wolf describes the first village as having rather rigid family structures, characterized by passing power down from the father to the firstborn son, leaving the other children with the alternative between serving their brother and emigrating. Families in this first model are self-sufficient worlds that interact with the external world as one unit, as when they interact commercial relationships (markets, fairs) or when they participate in the local culture (festivals, celebrations, music). Friendship ties, according to Wolf, are based on sentiments and affect, and family is more recognizable from prestige and lineage and breed rather than from the individual members of the family itself (Wolf 1966). Wolf's second case study, on the other hand, allows for more individual self-expression, and with looser hierarchical structures. Individual members of one family have ties with people other than relatives, and their network of acquaintances is free to expand horizontally beyond the borders of the family. Moreover, the involvement of people in their community is based on individual action and not on family interests, and "instrumental" friendship ties can develop. These ties are necessary conditions for the development of the patron-client relationship. More specifically, Wolf retrieves in "instrumental friendship" the balance between independent

subjects engaged in mutual exchange. This symmetrical relationship becomes clientelism when the client becomes subordinated to the patron, hence breaking the “instrumental friendship” tie. By focusing on micro-structural explanations of clientelism, Wolf attributes to family structures the tendency to develop forms of social clientelism, which, in turn, may pave the road for political clientelism as a widespread phenomenon.

Different, and more value-charged, is Banfield’s take on the subject (Banfield 1958). His explanation of clientelism is micro-cultural, and it derives from the study of a small village in the south of Italy. Montegrano’s society – Montegrano was the fantasy name given to the case study – was described, by Banfield as imbued with apathy and desperation. The author does not focus on the social and economic conditions of the village: his approach is more concerned with the cultural features that inform the community. While paying less thorough attention to collective dynamics than Wolf, Banfield focuses on the characters of the people inhabiting the town: he describes them as lacking self-help, and in most cases even unfit for establishing clientelist systems, precisely due to their inherent lack of initiative and individual autonomy. Banfield’s approach, then, is culturalist insofar as he studies clientelism from the vantage point of the “cultural, psychological and moral conditions of the political organizations, and of other forms of organizations” (Banfield 1958). Nevertheless, this is not the only point in which Banfield and Wolf’s part ways: Banfield is remarkably fiercer in his critique of clientelist systems, which are linked, in his view, to underdeveloped social and cultural contexts. His vision of clientelism as a less than desirable phenomenon is marked by his definition of “amoral familism” as instrumental for patronizing relations, and by the account, he gives of the Montegrane society as one in between tradition and modernity, hence anachronist in comparison to the rest of the western world.

The two proposed analyses tackle the problem of clientelism from the “demand” side of the client-patron bargain, i.e. from the vantage points of the clients, their collective and individual strategies. However, other approaches exist, which focus on the supply side and, hence, try to provide macro-structural and macro-cultural explanations. In particular, World System Theory-inspired scholarship is primarily interested in the macro-structural drivers of the clientelism relationship. Some authors relate personal vote with the degree of capitalist development reached by the country at hand. Some areas in southern Italy are semi-peripheral, hence not keen on modernization and more likely to develop patrimonial-absolutist forms of political structures (Arrighi

-Piselli 1987). Ertman (1997), similarly, underlines the role of national parliaments in transforming a patrimonial-absolutist state into a bureaucratic one, with an independent and advanced administrative apparatus. According to Ertman, some countries such as Great Britain effectively changed their regulatory structures thanks to the representative and elective institutions, which favored local governments and enabled a group of representatives to emerge, which heralded universal demands coming from their home communities. Conversely, Ertman considers the Italian case as informed by feudal structures, hence favoring the interests of local lordlings and nobles. This system, in Ertman view, seconded patrimonial political representations oriented towards obtaining particular benefits (Ertman 1997). Finally, when it comes to macro-cultural approaches, Putnam's contribution is noteworthy. His study focused on the lack of "civicness" as distinctive of southern Italian regions. Putnam's dates back the birth of civicness to the 12th century, and he identifies this virtue with the centralized government adopted by the Normans. The lack of civicness in southern Italy, hence, derived from the absence of a centralized government in this area. Naturally, different viewpoints on the origins of clientelism bring about different research results concerning personal vote, yet all the accounts provided in this section concur in defining personal vote as tantamount to political clientelism, and in assigning a derogatory meaning to personal vote itself. Personal vote, as clientelism, is considered by all the authors as a political and democratic pathology. Other strands of literature, which will be accounted for further on in this research, associate personal vote to corruption and organized crime, especially in southern Italy. However, scientific rigor suggests some degree of skepticism towards personalization of politics more in general, and towards clientelism in particular.

The unfavorable opinion about personal vote is echoed, in the Italian public discourse, by a widespread dismissal of preferential voting on the same grounding. Not only insiders and experts but also a substantial number of people interested in politics are very critical towards introducing personalist mechanisms of the vote (such as preferential voting) in electoral regulation. In general, the tendency is to collapse preferential voting with personal vote, clientelism, mafia and corruption, in particular concerning southern Italian regions. Many observers, moreover, link personalization of politics with growth in campaign spending, the end of the gate keeping function of parties and other organizations. These observers sometimes say that personalization might foreshadow politics as based solely on leaders, and not on ideas and ide-

ologies. Especially in Italy, many scandals backed the thesis according to which personal voting has inherent detrimental consequences, such as selective benefits, clientelism, corruption, and misbehavior more in general. People such as Sicily's former President, Salvatore Cuffaro, or – less recently – Achille Lauro in Naples, plastically demonstrated that personalism and clientelism offer less than inspirational examples of civil service and public virtues (Barisione 2007). Overall, from whichever vantage point one sees the issue, the identity between the personal vote, clientelism and political and electoral misbehavior appear inescapable. However, the purpose of this research is precisely to turn the question onto its head, by retrieving voting choices, which, though aimed at electing one specific person, are inspired by universal motives, hence not directly oriented towards obtaining specific, individual and exclusive benefits and gains. Hence, this research wants to show to what degree and extent there are personal voting strategies, which are not identifiable with clientelism and corruption.

This research will develop insights from some case studies from southern Italian regions. This not only because most of the literature on the topic has been produced in said regions, but also for the propensity towards expressing preferential and personal votes retrieved in these populations. One should notice that there are very few studies, which endorse a more “secular” approach to personal vote and clientelism. Moreover, most of these contributions have been written and published only recently. One piece of research, which is worth mentioning, is S. Piattoni's “Le virtù del clientelismo. Una critica non convenzionale”. The first reason for having a theoretical anchorage in the endeavor of identifying a form of clientelism oriented towards universal benefits and gains rests upon the strategic-rational approach that informs Piattoni's research. As underlined above, the studies of clientelism undertaken by Wolf and Banfield, despite pointing at different causes for the same phenomenon, concurred in ruling out as irrelevant both the individual and collective rational choices of the concerned actors. Piattoni, on the other hand, openly endorses a rational and strategic analysis of voters' behavior, and proposes a fourfold categorization of clientelism in four different Italian regions.

This is the summary of Piattoni's categorization:

- Vicious Clientelism (Sicily): Neither public nor private goods. Economic involution. Non-existing legitimacy.
- Ineffective Clientelism (Apulia): Private goods equal to public goods. Economic stagnation. Declining legitimacy.
- Challenged Clientelism (Campania): Either private or public

goods. Inconsistent economic development. Fluctuating legitimacy.

- Virtuous Clientelism (Abruzzo): Public goods equal to private goods. Consistent economic development. Growing legitimacy.

We will go back and analyze the typology in due course: for now, it is sufficient to point out the presence of a form of clientelism with positive economic and political outcomes, both for clients and for patrons.

The proposed analysis unveils evolutionary dynamics of the phenomenon of clientelism, from hindrance to asset regarding economic development and political representation. The positive case of Abruzzo is explained by the absence of intra-party competition within the Christian Democracy – which, in other regions, was marked by fierce internal struggles – and by the presence of a strong opposition and minority in the region. Both these drivers made local leaders (Christian Democrats) pursue public goods alongside private and exclusive benefits. In turn, particularist and patronizing behaviors, transformed into universalist ones, which are peculiar to the Anglo-American constituency service. One can easily retrieve the sources of positive clientelism within the social and political context, the institutional arrangements and regulation. Within this setting, actors can adopt rational strategies (Downs 1958) to diminish or removing negative outcomes produced by the pursuit of selective benefits, for universalist behaviors, in turn, able to produce universal benefits. One can easily understand that the field of inquiry expands tremendously by bringing positive clientelism into the picture. In some respects, the virtuous approach to clientelism brings back the discussion within the borders of physiological, social dynamics and gives great relevance to the capability of the actors of making independent and rational choices. In other words, this research gives up on the search for external causes of clientelism, such as culture or structures, and recognizes that institutional settings exert a significant amount of influence. It is paramount to specify that Piattoni's analysis is focused on the "supply" side of clientelism, hence on politicians and their behavior both within their parties and when acting as local administrators and civil servants. Conversely, this thesis wants to apply Piattoni's approach to voters and their choices, to investigate the relationship, which ties individual voters and individual candidates together. Moreover, the identification of only one case of virtuous clientelism (Abruzzo) in a specific span of time (1970-1992) is not enough to demonstrate a general tendency towards transformation of clientelist systems – both Italian and European more in general – into virtuous examples.

However, the path paved by Piattoni's work seems to be in line with

the main hypothesis of the present research, which aims to retrieve a virtuous clientelism by looking at voters' expectations – i.e. the clients – and within a peculiar configuration of the partisan conflict, which is strongly different from the one of the so-called First Republic.

1.3 Southern Italy as a case study

The choice of southern Italy as the case study for this research appears compelling. Wolf (1966), Banfield (1958), Putnam (1964), Tarrow (1956) and many others, each of whom with different approaches, chose this area of Italy as the preferred research field for clientelism or, more generally, for peculiar forms of relationships between elected officials and voters. The common finding of the above said research is that clientelism seems inherent to southern Italian voters' behavior. As the aim of this research is to uncover the presence of non-patronizing personal vote, the south of Italy represents a paramount case in which to demonstrate this phenomenon. The reasons behind this choice relate to the different approaches that, over time, characterized the study of clientelism and the personal nature of vote and political relations more in general. As said above, structuralist and culturalist approaches have traced the origins of clientelism, respectively, either in an outdated social and economic environment or traditionalist cultural conditions separated, to some extent, from modernity. These approaches all concurred in their critique both of clientelism itself, and of the causes that brought it into being. However, these contributions fall short regarding criteria for choosing the case studies, and in terms of generalizability of findings. For example, many scholars have questioned the representativeness of Banfield's case and sample, first because it does not depict the completely southern Italy, and because the Montegrane community is peculiarly isolated from the rest of the region and of the country.

Recent contributions offered more rational and less anecdotic explanations and expanded the range of case studies to the whole of Italy and not just the south. In these cases – most importantly, in the studies that focused on the fiscal and monetary outcomes of clientelism – the justification of the choice of Italy and the south as case studies were based on macroeconomic and institutional variables, and upon the way, democratic mechanisms worked in these contexts. For example, the extraordinary production of specific ad hoc laws and regulation and the abnormal production of legislation in Italy as a whole, are an inte-

resting point of departure for research, in particular if one focuses on the transition between the First and the Second Republic. Furthermore, some scholars studied clientelism as a dependent variable of income levels and other economic conditions: in this case, the weaknesses and backwardness of Italian capitalism and industrialization are two features that make Italy a compelling case study.

This thesis address itself to the question: Are there personal vote choices driven by universalist motives?

From this vantage point, the selection of the south of Italy becomes grounded in objective criteria. In fact, if voting is the behavior under investigation, then we can reasonably state that the south of Italy is the area which is most inclined to preferential voting. It suffices to observe some figures to have a clear depiction of the situation.

Table 1.1. Preferential voting rates (percentage of personal preferential votes of the total number of valid casted ballots) in 12 Italian regions between 1995 and 2010.

| | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 |
|-------------------------|------|------|--------------|------|
| PIEMONTE | 16,8 | 34,4 | 41,3 | 35 |
| LOMBARDIA | 11,6 | 23,9 | 26,6 | 23,3 |
| VENETO | 16,3 | 33,4 | 39,1 | 35,2 |
| LIGURIA | 26,3 | 41,6 | 46,2 | 42 |
| EMILIA ROMAGNA | 11,1 | 22,4 | 28,2 | 25,7 |
| TOSCANA | 15,4 | 28,6 | 0 | 0 |
| UMBRIA | 30,7 | 51,2 | 55,7 | 53 |
| MARCHE | 28,6 | 44,6 | 49,5 | 49,4 |
| LAZIO | 26,6 | 47 | 54,4 | 50,9 |
| CAMPANIA | 46,4 | 70,6 | 76,8 (90,6)* | |
| PUGLIA | 41 | 69,8 | 78,5 | 75,7 |
| BASILICATA | 63,4 | 85,8 | 89,6 | 85,9 |
| CALABRIA | 61,5 | 82,3 | 87,4 | 84,1 |
| Media 12 regioni | | | 56,1 | 54,2 |

Table 1.1. points out a strikingly apparent situation. Northern and central Italy witness a small or even negligible inclination to preferential votes. Conversely, it is evident that southerners strongly favor preferential voting. Moreover, we can observe an interesting diachronic pattern: Basilicata, Apulia, Calabria, and Campania, for example, saw their share of preferences grow over time, with a substantially higher growth in Apulia. The phenomenon of preferential voting has ancient roots in Italian electoral behavior and choices, which dates back to the first ge-

neral elections in 1948. The party that championed preferential voting was, of course, Christian Democracy: here personal votes worked as a means of conflict resolution among the different internal factions, and as a criterion for the distribution of power resources and for distributing offices. However, the data reveal a surprising fact about supporters of the second biggest party, i.e. the Communist Party. While this party has always been remarkably less inclined to use preferences to settle internal struggles and to distribute power, this propensity strongly varies across Italy.

Table 1.2.: preferential votes in 30 provinces in 1948 and 1953 (General Elections)
 (Source) *il voto di preferenza in Italia*, D'amato pp 35.




Table 1.2. has a double significance. First, it reaffirms the paradigmatic assumption according to which, in the north of Italy, communist voters were less inclined to express individual preferences. However, the same table shows that this lack of inclination was not equally distributed throughout the country. Preferential voting appears to be a rather complex and faceted phenomenon, and this complexity must be considered. In 1948, for example, preferential voting was homogeneously distributed across the country, with only negligible interregional variations. This consistency in figures can be explained as the product of rational choices of both, voters and candidates: in 1948, the Italian Communist Party and the Italian Socialist Party formed, together, the Popular Unity

Front, which was not very successful but which determined an unbalanced distribution of elected members of parliament. Precisely due to a careful use of preferential votes, the Communist Party won three times as many seats as the ones obtained by socialist candidates (Pasquino 1993). In subsequent elections, in the absence of intra-party competition (both the Communist and the Socialist Parties decided to break off their alliance, after the disappointing results of 1948 elections), northern provinces saw a remarkable decrease in the number of preferences as a share of the total in both Christian Democracy and the Communist Party. Southern regions, conversely, confirmed their inclination to preferential and personal voting, by maintaining the same or higher preference rates. Naturally, one could unpack and flesh out the phenomenon even further by constructing a broader number of variables and by crafting more precise depictions. The purpose of these few pages, however, is to back up with numbers the demonstration that there is almost no alternative to the choice of southern Italy as a case study. The personal vote has a long tradition in the south of Italy, and many time series are available, which show preference rates divided by region and, often, by province and city. If it true that personal vote is widespread all over the south of Italy, it is not diffused in all the southern regions in the same way. As Table 1.1. shows, there are profound differences between Calabria and Apulia, and even more intense ones between Sicily and Campania: in short, there is not one South, but “many Souths”, each of which with its specific variety of personal vote.

Beyond Clientelism: A Universalist Personal Vote?

Table 1.3 percentages of presidential candidate vote in regional elections 1995-2010.

| REGIONI | 1995 | 2000 | 2005 | 2010 |
|-----------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| PIEMONTE | 17,5 | 15,9 | 15,8 | 8,5 |
| LOMBARDIA | 14,3 | 15,6 | 17,2 | 7,2 |
| VENETO | 13,4 | 15,4 | 14,7 | 7,5 |
| LIGURIA | 8,6 | 6,8 | 13 | 4,8 |
| EMILIA ROMAGNA | 8,2 | 6,8 | 9,8 | 5,5 |
| TOSCANA | 9,8 | 6,7 | 12,6 | 8,2 |
| UMBRIA | 6,3 | 5,5 | 9,4 | 5,2 |
| MARCHE | 10,7 | 5,9 | 8,7 | 3,7 |
| LAZIO | 14,8 | 9,6 | 14 | 6,4 |
| CAMPANIA | 9,4 | 6,7 | 6,6 | 0 |
| PUGLIA | 9,2 | 7,9 | 8,5 | 4,3 |
| BASILICATA | 7,2 | 3,1 | 2,6 | 2,2 |
| CALABRIA | 10,3 | 3 | 3,1 | 1,9 |
| tot | 11,9 | 10,2 | 12 | 5,45 |

Overall, it is apparent that the study of personal vote and of clientelism has in the south of Italy its most suitable case study. However, data about regional elections from 1995 onwards show another no less important phenomenon connected to electoral competition

For regional elections, voters are allowed to express one vote for the President of the Regional Government, and one vote for one of the parties running for seats in the Regional Council – it is noteworthy that voters might vote a party for the Council, which does not support the chosen candidate as President. In other words, there are two distinct competitions: one for members of the Regional Council and one for the President. In particular, this second arena represents a peculiar variety of personal vote and one in which the normal behavioral patterns in the north and the south of Italy are inverted. In fact, voters in the center-north are more eager to express a preference for a candidate for President of the Regional Government, while southern constituents more often vote for individual candidates for the Regional Council. Hence, the north is more sensitive to the collective leadership of candidates for Presidents. In the south, individual candidates for the Council attract much of personalization of politics, while the President balances between different territorial interests expressed by the same candidates for the Council. Conversely, in the north the relative share of individual preferences for each candidate to the Council is remarkably smaller: the candidate President, hence, has a stronger role regarding exposure and authority. This, in turn, is reflected in a greater degree of freedom of the President in appointing members of the Regional Government, or in determining the contents of regional policies. In this second case, personalization of politics operates as a consequence of media dynamic and charismatic leadership, more than being a result of real ties with local communities and societal interests. This is the last side of personalization, i.e. personal vote connected to mass communication and media politics. The question is whether there is a personal vote linked to universalist motives, thus related to political and electoral communication in local contexts. If we go back to the four examples described in the first part of this chapter, we imagined different forms of bargains. In particular, the first three cases were different regarding legitimacy and respect of rules, yet they were all marked by evident do-ut-des dynamics. The motives for choosing one candidate, in the last case, seem to differ: apparently, they escape rational and strategic cost-benefit calculations (Downs 1958). This fourth variety of personal vote is not in contrast with the former three:

it is rather a deviation from the norm.

Going back to the example provided by regional elections, we could reasonably say that, while the first three types of voting behavior explain rather precisely the Regional Council arena, the last example is suitable to understand how competition for the President of the Region works. However, none of the cases excludes the others, and reality falls in a gray zone in which the different mechanisms overlap, combine and operate together. Candidates for the Council, who are not experienced but are well-known (celebrities in sports, media or other fields) or, conversely, candidates for President with little or no media coverage yet firmly tied with local communities might be both elected in the same region. This, in particular, applies to small regional, such as Basilicata and Molise. The power of image, hence, influences local dynamics and might, in turn, pave the way for the emergence of new leaders. The purpose of this research is not to craft new generic ideal-types, as other have done before (Barisione 2006. pp 113-120) to describe the features and skills that leaders might embody in the public space. Rather, it is of fundamental importance to reconstruct specific experiences through a thorough study of the peculiar Italian case.

We can draw some concrete experiences for each of the types above of personal vote. First, Illy's presidency of Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, in the northeast, is an example of an entrepreneur "borrowed" by politics, with strong ties with Trieste as a city, but with much looser connections with the rest of the regional territory. In 2005, thanks to an effective media campaign, and thanks to the support of a non-partisan list (Illy Presidente), the coffee mogul won the election in most of the region and not only in Trieste. A similar case is Penati's election to President of the Province of Milan: in that case, too, the bannerman of a center-left coalition could boast a long experience of mayor of Sesto San Giovanni, but he suffered from a lack of visibility in other parts of the Province. This experience as a "good administrator" became the brand of his campaign, which enabled him to win the elections in 2004. Lastly, the most striking example of this phenomenon is the election of Guazzaloca as mayor of Bologna in 1999. Also in this case, the process of constructing a public image within the local community was crucial to Guazzaloca's ability to win. Depicted as the "ordinary man", as a candidate beyond parties, as a civil society exponent and as a champion of "decency", Guazzaloca was able to win Bologna to the center-right for the first time after WWII. All these examples are of historical relevance: in all the three cases, the winning candidate

started as an underdog. Illy candidate as President for a region with a long-lasting center-right government; Penati was to lead the center-left in a conservative region. Lastly, Guazzaloca run for mayor within a center-right coalition in a historically “red” city (Barisione 2007). None of these candidates, to bargain for votes, could distribute either exclusive or universal benefits. Illy might have been the candidate who had more to offer since he was, at that time, a quite wealthy entrepreneur: his influence, however, was limited to Trieste. Penati, on the other hand, was able to develop some degree of clientelism over his community of Sesto San Giovanni, but this consensus was not nearly enough for him to win one of the biggest provinces in Italy regarding population, with Milan making up the vast majority of the votes. Guazzaloca represents the clearest example of how important the image and the public persona of the candidate is, regarding political and electoral communication, in particular in a local and bounded community. Voting choices in Bologna departed from rational calculations since Guazzaloca had little political and no administrative experience. Hence, the only relevant variable for Guazzaloca’s election in 1999 seems to be the effectiveness in harnessing mass media for building up consensus.

Personal vote is a phenomenon that goes beyond the relationship between patron and client: it is a strategic and rational choice, one that is often accounted for by universalist reasons, such as moral and ethical judgments about the candidate’s behavior and character, or on his reliability as a civil servant. The object of the bargain might mislead us: in the first three examples, the bargain between candidates and voters was evident (jobs, promises), and in some case quite substantial (a sum of money). In the last case, on the other hand, there is no tangible payoff as an exchange for the given vote, there is a sort of emotional and charismatic payoff. The candidate offers a “cognitive shortcut” to the voter when too much information and too many stimuli are in place. He thus provides a reference point for the aftermath of the vote, being a referent for future times. In light of this evidence, it seems necessary to investigate also this last side of the relation between candidates and voters, to understand whether, how and to what extent media influence the elected-voter relation. This forms one of the dimensions of the phenomenon under investigation: the existence of a personal vote driven by universalist motives.

Naturally, before answering the question, an analysis of the available literature on the topic.

CHAPTER II

Vote orientation and expected benefits: two dimensions of analysis.

2.1 Party- vs. candidate-oriented vote: a first dimension of analysis.

In the forthcoming pages, I will analyze the two dimensions upon which the different definitions of personal vote will be grounded. First, the difference between party-oriented vote and candidate-oriented vote will be provided. Then, I will divide expected benefits, which drive each voting behavior, in two categories: universalist benefits (which can be enjoyed by the whole community), and particularist benefits. This theoretical framework will pave the way for the subsequent empirical and field-based research, which is addressed to verifying the existence of a kind of personal vote oriented towards the achievement of universalist benefits. First, we have to provide a definition of personal vote and of ideological vote, so as to understand how and why they differ. Whilst the previous chapter reviewed several core concepts connected to personal voting, the difference between the former and ideological voting was, deliberately, left aside, and this definition will form the core of the present section of this research. Borrowing from Anglo-American literature, we can provide the two following definitions:

- *party-oriented vote*: It concerns an electoral process founded on party strength. Mass parties' age was closely related to this concept. Voters chose the party first because cleavages and ideological positions were what really mattered.
- *Candidate oriented vote*: It deals with the personalization of electoral competition. The candidate is the focus in this system (with his leadership, appeal, etc. etc.) and the party is just an electoral support.

Moreover, we can group *ideological vote* (see e.g. Fuchs and Klingemann 1989) together with *party-oriented vote* (Campbell et al 1960), insofar as they are both based on strictly political attitudes, which are deemed relevant for the voter in order to form his or her preferences and to cast a ballot. The “mass party” mentioned in the above cited definition of party-oriented vote strongly resembles the practice of ideological voting. Conversely, candidate-oriented vote can be defined as

personal vote (Wattenberg 1996, 73). In this case, as the definitions suggests, the relationship between a candidate and the party is completely reversed: the party is merely an instrument for several candidates who run for office. Before analyzing some historical examples of candidate-oriented voting behavior, we have to clarify one element of this specific phenomenon: from the provided definition of candidate-oriented vote, the role played by “leadership and appeal” is noteworthy. Grounded in literature on political and electoral communication, this definition of personal vote addresses itself to the role of the public image of the leader, as conveyed by the media (Barisione, 2006). This definition is especially suitable for contemporary democracies, which are characterized by the importance of mass media and, hence, of the need (for any politician or public figure more in general) to convey a reassuring, familiar, captivating and winner image of oneself in order to achieve good election results. In other words, this type of personal vote is based on the use of different instruments for communication, and on the construction of different types of leadership (Barisione 2006). While still being a type of personal vote, the candidate-oriented vote represents a different model of elector-candidate relation, articulated in the three subtypes of *constituency service*, *patronage* and *clientelism* (Cain 1987, Kopecky, Mair, Spirova 2012, Piattoni 2007). In this case, although mass media and communication still play a relevant role, voters choose among candidates according to more direct reasons. Voters in this second scenario rely on an almost direct and personal acquaintance with the chosen candidate, and they exercise a form of direct pressure on him by voting. This bond between elected and elector is very often active through time and in between elections, and it does not expire on election day alone: the candidate, more than being a media leader, is a local leader, who speaks for his community in the national parliament, and who always tries to maintain this direct relationship with his precinct and electoral district.

One should not, however, divide the two types of personal vote outlined above: rather than being mutually exclusive, the two definitions are complementary (Barisione 2006). Especially in the case of local leaders, the two dimensions (mass media and local community) tend to overlap and to spur a number of different behaviors and strategies, from the face-to-face direct relationship between voter and candidate, to the media exposure of the candidate. In the same way, one should not consider *party-oriented* and *candidate-oriented* vote as fully mutually exclusive, as both are at play in determining preferences and voting choices, while still remaining two different concepts. It is

unlikely, for example, that a candidate could attract votes independently from his or her party of affiliation and vice versa: it is logical, hence, that party reputation influences candidates' performances and, at the same time, candidate reputation plays a role in determining the performance of the party (Cain, Ferejohn e Fiorina 1987). With reference to the Italian case, the coexistence of both patterns of voting behavior has been widely verified by the use of preferential votes within a pre-set party list of candidates during the so called First Republic (D'Amato 1964). During this period of Italian history, the constituencies of both the Christian Democracy and the Communist Party were influenced by preferences either for one party, or for one or more specific candidates, or for both (Parisi and Pasquino 1977). That being said, the last needed clarification concerns the distinction between *personal* and *ideological vote*, which in turn is needed in order to fully understand the difference between *party-oriented* and *candidate-oriented vote* as applied in this research. Personal and ideological votes represent two types of approaches adopted by voters in determining their preferences and choices. An elector who is more or totally inclined to ideological vote will choose based on his or her allegiance (Parisi e Pasquino 1977), or on a program, or on the party's positioning on some specific issues and on more general social and political cleavages within one specific political context (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). Conversely, a candidate-oriented voter will decide based on either the candidate's charisma (Barisione 2006, Noelle-Neumann 2002) or, more functionally, on his ability to defend and prioritize specific interests (Lipset and Rokkan 1967).

2.2 Universal vs. particularist expected benefits: a second dimension of analysis.

While the former section of this chapter was focused on the "who" in the relation between electors and elected by distinguishing between candidate-oriented and party-oriented vote, in this section it is necessary to define the "what". In other words, if it is paramount to define who are the relevant actors in electoral competitions, it is correspondingly unavoidable for us to define what constitutes the object of the political bargain (Piattoni 2007) and, hence, what is the nature of the expected benefits which are either promised by candidates or desired by voters. As outlined in the first chapter, the main feature of the voter-candidate relationship is the rational and strategic way in whi-

ch both candidates and voters behave (March, 1978). The cornerstone of the political bargain is the rational strategy employed by who asks for support and votes (candidates) in exchange for “believable” promises and at least the attempt to deliver on some of them, to create and reinforce the bond between them and the electors. Likewise, on the supply side, electors will try to allocate their vote in a rational and efficient way, to maximize their utility (Wolf 1999). Promises and utility are cornerstones, as they define the political bargain which takes place between elected and electors – “bargain” is here used without any value judgement and wants to be only a descriptive term.

What has now to be defined is the object of said bargain, i.e. the expected benefits.

First, benefits are here defined as not only material goods, but also as immaterial results: the object of the bargain might be either an appointment of someone in the bureaucracy, or a public recognition which provides prestige and visibility to the beneficiary (Di Mascio, 2012). Other two aspects of expected benefits are relevant, and allow for a classification: benefits are characterized by being *exclusive* and *subtractable* – i.e. they are scarce and one unit of a good given to someone is automatically taken away from someone else. In this way, we can divide expected benefits in four categories: *private goods*, *club goods*, *common goods* and *public goods* (Ostrom, Gardner, Walker 1994). Exclusivity of a good stands for the ease or difficulty with which some individuals or groups can be excluded from the enjoyment of said good: a high exclusivity means that the cost of cutting someone off the enjoyment of the good is low, while a low exclusivity means that one has to pay a high price to exclude anyone from using the good. In the same way, a good is, or is not subtractable if the enjoyment of one unit of said good by someone hinders the capability by someone else to enjoy the same unit of the same good, either simultaneously or in different moments. A highly subtractable good deprives all those who do not have direct access to the good from the ability to enjoy it, while a non-subtractable good is not easily assigned to a few people to the detriment of others. This first clarification allows for a first definition of a typology of goods:

- *Private goods*: are highly subtractable and highly exclusive goods. These goods are scarce, and the enjoyment of them is easily delimited. In politics, this kind of goods is represented by tenders, contracts and concessions such as construction authorizations, public funding or job positions.

- *Club goods*: are highly exclusive, but scarcely subtractable, for entire categories can enjoy them. This kind of goods comprehends benefits accorded to specific categories of workers, especially those employed in strategic economic sectors.
- *Common goods*: are endowed with low exclusivity but are highly subtractable due to the fact that they can be used in ways which reduce the overall efficacy and efficiency of these resources. Unemployment benefits, social and invalidity pension schemes and other forms of social rights are comprehended in this category.
- *Public goods*: are constitutional rights as granted in all liberal democracies, such as protection against external enemies, political participation rights, freedom of expression, opinion and religion. They are inherently scarcely exclusive and scarcely subtractable.

Table 1.4 Universal and Particular benefits classification

Source: (Rules, Games and Common-Pool Resources Ostrom, Gardner, Walker, 1994, 7)

| | SUBTRACTABILITY | |
|-------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| Exclusivity | High | Low |
| High | <i>Private Goods</i> | <i>Club Goods</i> |
| Low | <i>Common Goods</i> | <i>Public Goods</i> |

The aforementioned four types of goods are ideal-types and are almost never encountered in reality in their pure form: most often, each good can be defined as in between two or more of the four categories, and at the same time the political bargain might involve several different goods at a time. Moreover, the population to which these benefits are addressed can be defined according to exclusivity and subtractability of the benefits: exclusivity is a barrier to citizenship insofar as it limits the interests that are represented, while subtractability is a distributional barrier as it operates by prioritizing consumption or enjoyment of a given good or benefit by a given group and neglecting others (Piattoni, 2001). Therefore, policies which are based on high exclusivity barriers and high subtractability are defined as elitist policies, the subsequent benefits are limited to a narrow group, and the goods are scarce and

highly rival. Low levels of subtractability combined with high levels of exclusivity define consociative policies: they are addressed to internally homogeneous social groups defined according to their productive function, ethnicity or religion. Third, low levels of exclusivity together with high levels of subtractability are associated with populist policies, which aim to represent broad social sectors (with particular attention paid to low income groups), but that in fact limits to a small group the actual enjoyment of the provided benefits. All in all, different policies and political strategies bring about different kinds of benefits and, in turn, this generates different types of voter-candidate interaction and relationship. Arguably, also the personal relationship plays an important role in this system, as it determines the nature of particular forms of personal vote as *patronage* and *clientelism*. By simplifying all the variable according to the nature of benefits, and by departing from the fourfold definition provided by Ostrom, Gardner e Walker (1997), *universal benefits* are defined as benefits which can be enjoyed by the vast majority of electors. Hence, these benefits are inherently difficult to make exclusive or subtractable: examples are maintenance of roads and infrastructures, public education or tax reduction. Conversely, *particularist benefits* are those who can be enjoyed by a narrow group of people, despite being funded thanks to public expenditure and collective tax revenue. Example of this latter kind of benefits are ad-hoc financial emoluments (Golden 2003) or bureaucratic advantages to a few, such as changing the kind of use someone can make of a given allotment of land – from agricultural to residential zoning. While all goods can be defined according to the four categories provided above, both the field work and the results of the research have shown that it is sufficient to divide benefits based on their either universalist or particularist nature.

Coming back to clientelism, and using this concept as an example, another variable that enters the picture, one that closely resembles political sophistication, i.e. political mobilization. Some authors describe the sort of social relations which provide the basis for clientelar politics: relations among people within the same family network (Banfield, 1958), relations grounded on **comparaggio** (Arrighi and Piselli 1985) or among people within the same community. These networks of primary relations are distinguished in *formal* and *informal* networks, and they grant a sufficient degree of political mobilization sufficient to involve

a sizable number of people with a fairly limited organizational investment and effort.

Tab 1.5 Source “Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative organization” (Martin, S., 2011, 353).

The proposed figure summarizes what said until now. It is important to bear in mind that this typology has been specifically devised and applied to the case of *clientelism* (which will be defined in due course in

| | | Informalità delle strutture organizzative (sottraibilità) | | |
|---|--------------|---|--|---------------------------|
| | | <i>Alta</i> | <i>Media</i> | <i>Bassa</i> |
| Concretezza della mobilitazione politica (escludibilità) | <i>Alta</i> | Reti di relazioni primarie | Gruppi di interesse | Chiese, associazioni |
| | <i>Media</i> | Reti di relazioni secondarie | Movimenti sociali Gruppi di pressione | Organizzazioni funzionali |
| | <i>Bassa</i> | Adunanze | | Scuole, esercito |

* L'area grigia denota il campo di possibile variazione del clientelismo.

this chapter) and not to the complex universe of practices which is the *personal vote*. What remains relevant of Piattoni’s typology, however, is the complexity of the connection between the benefits which form the object of the bargain, on one side, and electors and candidates, on the other, which, in turn, influences policy supply strategies. The outcomes of these policies influence society at large in electoral terms.

Another crucial element is the impact that these voter-candidate patterns have on political mobilization processes, especially in countries which are in democratic transition, or that are new-born democracies. For example, democratic regimes which are not fully or scarcely mobilized are prone to generate informal and family-based relational networks, while highly mobilized regime also show a high degree of formalization of social and political structures. Finally, if political mobilization refers to collective processes, political sophistication understood as either political awareness (Sniderman et al 1991) or political involvement (De Sio 2006) represents the necessary condition for the individual to act (or desist to act, or to subdue) in collective processes of political mobilization.

2.3 *The role of political sophistication.*

Coming back the first variable, the dialectics between party-oriented and candidate-oriented vote, however, reveals more than just different types of voting behaviors: this differentiation provides a measure of voters' sophistication and abstraction. To define these two concepts, a short disciplinary digression is due: if one studies sophistication as an individual cognitive process, hence disembedded from collective dynamics, cognitive psychology becomes a necessary vantage point from which to study voting choices. While a full-fledged analysis of the literature in political psychology is beyond the scope of this research, we can assess how sophistication and abstraction are studied in different ways, and with different assumptions, in political psychology and in political science.

Sniderman's conceptualizes political sophistication as "*differences between people in their level of political awareness that systematically affect their reasoning about political choices*" (Sniderman et al., 1991). According to this definition, political awareness influences political assessments and, in the end, voting choices. Moreover, political sophistication provides a set of cognitive shortcuts that help deciding based on available information (Sniderman, 1989). The role of cognitive shortcuts in defining voting choices is known in political science, specifically in political marketing and communication (Mazzoleni, 2012). A cognitive shortcut is considered as an alternative mental route which is followed by the elector to synthesize overabundant information or, to the contrary, to compensate for a lack of information. The degree of one's political sophistication determines the type of cognitive shortcut which will be chosen: high levels of sophistication allow for more complex – hence better – shortcuts, while a low degree of sophistication will constrain cognitive shortcuts to more simple routes, and the resulting choice will be based often on feelings and emotions rather than on rational calculations.

How should we consider and define political sophistication to explain better the difference between ideological and personal voting choices? Many authors have proposed different indicators to assess the degree of sophistication, education being one of the most widely used. Stimson (1975) made a fundamental contribution to research in this field: he was the first scholar to discover a correlation between educational achievements and the formation of political opinions. Subsequently, other studies privileged the relation between *education*, *political sophistication* and *political information* and their role in determining behaviors and choices (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1991). On the other

side, other approaches studied the interaction between political sophistication and awareness (Zaller 1992). Lastly, political sophistication has been studied as either a filter to synthesize relevant information or as a tool to escape one's social context by new social contexts (Simmel, 1890). Political sophistication influences voting choices not only as a rational tool for making sense of information, but also as a motivational tool: political sophistication determines how a voter reacts to emotional triggers. This motivational side of sophistication is important as it often works in combination to the rational side in determining voting choices (Eagly and Chaiken 1993).

In sum, we can define sophistication as the degree and depth of one's knowledge of political facts (Zaller 1992): sophistication, thus, is an estimator of electors' degree of access to information about the political process. In other cases, political sophistication has been defined as the set of competences and skills with which the electors are endowed, and which help them navigate the political process (Sniderman, Brody, e Tetlock 1991), or as the magnitude of an elector's psychological involvement in politics, and political involvement more broadly (De Sio, 2006).

Is it possible to associate different degrees of political sophistication to different voting patterns? Departing from the Italian example and the distinction between allegiance vote, opinion vote and vote-selling (Parisi and Pasquino 1976, 170-176) it is possible for us to define these three voting behaviors according to (a) the level of integration of the elector in the system, (b) the degree of trust in the possibilities for change and (c) the capability to make electoral choices which are consistent with the aims to achieve and the interests to protect. Allegiance vote, during the Italian First Republic, was understood as a testimony to individual and collective interests, but this testimony was not limited and concluded by voting itself: voters' integration was conflictual, trust in rules and institutions was scarce. Opinion vote, conversely, represents a choice based on the supply of political propositions coming from political parties and on the idea that personal interests and collective interests were somehow linked: integration in the system is strong, as is trust in norms. Finally, vote selling is merely a service provided by the elector in exchange for a payment and, clearly, it involves only an immediate and individual interest: voters who sell their vote perceive themselves as complete outsiders from the political system and its rules and norms. From the vantage point of political sophistication, we can define opinion vote as a vote characterized by a high level of sophistication, while the allegiance vote is medium-range and vote-selling represents choices made with scarce or absent sophistication.

During the Italian First Republic, the three aforementioned

types of voting choices could easily be associated with discrete social segments: allegiance vote was common among urban and rural working class, associated with either the communist or the catholic sub-culture; opinion vote, was characteristic of middle class and more affluent social strata, and vote-selling was common to urban and rural workers, as well as middle-income electors, in the South of Italy (Parisi e Pasquino 1976). It is important, again, to acknowledge the three voting choices as complementary and, despite being apparently incompatible with one another, they have coexisted in several elections throughout the First Republic. Indeed, it is unrealistic to think that the Christian Democracy and the Communist Party did not rely, to various degrees, on all three of the above said types of voting choices, since they had such a widespread consensus (Parisi, Pasquino 1976). These caveats will be reassessed at the end of the chapter, where the final typology will be proposed to simplify the endeavor of addressing the research question of this thesis. It is important to underline, however, that choice-making patterns associated with ideological and programmatic considerations are connected to medium to high levels of sophistications, while choices based on individual interests are endowed with low or absent sophistication.

2.4 *Rationality in voters' actions and interactions*

The first two paragraphs attempted to define the protagonists which animate the processes associated with personal vote, and which will come back in the methodological discussion and in the analysis of the interviews. In synthesis, the last pages provided a definition of the “who”, the “what” and the “how” of the political bargain: in other words, the interaction of the two former elements it is possible for us to define different types of personal vote, thus shaping definitions of *patronage*, *clientelism* and *constituency service*. Before we delve into these definitions, however, it is necessary to clarify important aspects regarding the relationships that intervene between candidates, electors and the benefits which form the object of the political bargain (Parisi and Pasquino 1977). It is indeed apparent that the interactions between these three elements, as well as the study of the outputs of said interactions, ought to be interpreted following a clear approach. As outline in the first chapter, the rationality of electoral choices (Downs 1957) is the central point of this thesis. According to Downs (1957, 1998) a voter follows a rational behavioral pattern when: i) he or she is always able to make a choice, ii) when he or she is able to name and order his/her preferences, iii) the ordering of said preferences is transitive, iv) among alternative options,

he or she will always choose the preference that is placed higher in the list, v) when put different times in the same conditions, the rational voter will always make the same decisions. This kind of rationality is defined as action-oriented rationality, as opposed to aim-oriented rationality (Downs 1998 pp 34-40): while the latter stands for the attempt to find out the most rationally desirable aim, the former indicates the most efficient action to achieve a given goal. Downs's approach is rooted in a description of the voter as *a homo oeconomicus*: voters act as consumers who, with a given budget, have to allocate resources to maximize their utility. It is beyond the scope of this research to outline the several critiques which were addressed at this approach ever since its first inception: the *homo oeconomicus* has been, from time to time, opposed to *homo politicus* (Veblen 1924), or to the "foolish rationality" (Sen 1998) that has been attributed to the voter. Within the limits of rational choice approach, however, it is natural to ask to which of the actors one can attribute rational behavioral patterns. Until now, the focus has been given on the "demand" side of the political market, hence to the constituency of voters. However, the rational logics informs and characterizes also the behavior of political parties, interest groups and middlemen (Downs 1957), i.e. the heterogeneous group of actors which operate to secure their power, to condition politics and government, and to orient policies towards specific and delimited sectors of the constituency. All in all, if the rational model works for electors (demand), this is because also elites (supply) act in a rational way, and the overall result will be probabilistically foreseeable (Downs 1958). This research, by focusing on voters' expectations concerning the benefits offered by candidates, inherently favors a demand-oriented analysis, i.e. an analysis which is focused on voters. As outlined above, however, rational logics also inform the choices on the supply side of the equation: aims and means employed by parties, leaders or both are of great importance. In between supply and demand, we retrieve other actors such as committees, interest groups and other kinds of intermediaries which act as brokers both in terms of consensus (Fenno 1978, Cain 1987) and in terms of policy-making and advice (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova 2012).

Having outlined all the protagonists, we can try to point out the possible rational strategies that each actor puts in place. Parties and candidates may decide to adopt different strategies to gain consensus, the first of which is to make themselves recognizable (Mayhew 1974). Visibility is the first and foremost aim that a candidate wants to achieve during electoral competitions, in which the boundaries of a given constituency are clear and unchangeable. Visibility is achievable, for example, by sending letters and e-mails about policy propositions or past political experience. Another form of visibility-building can be the

so called “door-to-door” system or more classical media coverage such as ads and interviews on radio, press, cable channels and the Internet. However, it is important to distinguish between *reputation* and *visibility* (Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina 1987, Webb 2004, Venturino 2005, Pizzorno 2007): the former differs from the latter in that reputation is concerned with how the public image of one candidate is judged by electors (Barisione 2007). In some respect, visibility reveals the level of popularity and, in quantitative terms, the level of media exposure, while reputation asks for voters and public opinion to form a more complex and articulated qualitative judgement, which can change over time (Habermas 1977, Noelle-Neumann 2002). Moreover, a candidate’s reputation depends on party’s reputation and it often varies regardless from the qualities of the candidates or of his/her political behavior, as we will see when analyzing the Anglo-American concept of *constituency service*. Arguably, visibility is not the only resource that candidate can draw upon in order to gain support: *position voting* (Mayhew 1974), which is a tool for evaluating a candidate, is undoubtedly relevant for voters in evaluating a candidate, insofar as it allows voters to form a precise electoral identity through evaluation of how the given candidate has voted on each policy and piece of regulation. Constituents, hence, will judge politicians based on the actual output of their political activity, synthesized in the acts and policies which are made effective. At the same time, candidates will use their voting choices in representative bodies in the political discourse in order to differentiate themselves from other candidates and reaffirming their political identity. Position voting can naturally take a broader meaning and significance: a given candidate may position himself in a specific way in the political spectrum, regardless of the actual behavior assumed within representative institutions. For example, said candidate may connote himself as *moderate* to maximize electoral support (Arrow 1951, Mayhew 1974). Position voting, in short, defines the capacity of a candidate of defining himself regarding specific and socially relevant policy issues, and especially to do so during the electoral campaign. Finally, position voting, understood as a voting choice formed depending on politicians’ behavior in elected bodies, becomes relevant for the re-election of a politician through *credit claiming*, i.e. “acting so as to generate a belief in a relevant political actor (or actors) that one is personally responsible for causing the government, or some unit thereof, to do something that the actor (or actors) considers desirable” (Mayhew 1986 pp 373). It is fundamental to notice that this definition depicts a relationship between a) the candidate, who must engender the expectation that he actually can turn promises into policies, and b) voter who are asked, in individual or collective form, to form expectations and requests, and to be able to recognize the candi-

date who is most capable of delivering on them. Moreover, there is an implicit middle ground between supply and demand, made up by interest groups that mediates – especially in large constituencies – between voters and politicians and, in so doing, may influence the orientation of choices and preferences of both voters and candidates (Snyder Jr, Ting, 2004). Interest groups and committees are crucial for rallying votes, for maintaining support within a precinct and, in turn, consolidating and stabilizing this support over time (Cox, McCubbins 1984). Policy choices are made to gather support: this means that a candidate will need to take inputs coming from committees, interest groups and voters into account to be re-elected. In doing so, said candidate can and will employ the political resources that come from the institutional role he assumes (Olson, 1971). Specifically, the candidate has an incentive to protect and prioritize his support groups' interests through *patronage* (Cox, McCubbins 1984), understood as a redistributive strategy in favor of the interests represented by the elected candidate. Overall, it is evident that there are several means, and for each means there are several ways in which the interaction between politicians, electors and interest groups can be articulated and structured, both before and after elections.

2.5 *The context: electoral systems, forms of government and other elements.*

In depicting the different types of voting choices, and in describing the benefits connected to each of them, this research stressed the relationship between candidates, electors, and intermediaries such as interest groups and committees. These interactions play a paramount role not only in building up support but also in maintaining an electoral coalition around candidates (Cox, M.D. McCubbins 1984). This thesis also positioned the types of action and choices within an overarching rational choice framework that stresses action-oriented rationality (Downs 1957). Most important, we emphasized that all the actors involved in the political process are capable of rational choices and strategies. The interaction between voters and candidate might be simple or more complex, according to the range of intermediaries (interest groups, committees) that enter the picture. Moreover, some institutional variables intervene in different forms: the form of government, the electoral system, the relationship between center and periphery and the relationship between a party and its candidates. All these elements play a role in shaping actors' behavior and, hence, they concur in determining the overall

result. For example, parties play a paramount role in determining the political career of their candidates, and vice versa. First, a party confers visibility (Mayhew 1974) and reputation (Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina 1983) to its candidates: it is decisive for a candidate to be part of a popular party with a capillary territorial articulation. It is also important that this party does not “embarrass” its candidate by supporting undesired regulation or, worse if the party is the object of bad press and scandals (in particular financial scandals). The party strength, thus, enormously influences both the possibilities of rallying support by the candidate and the political activity of the elected candidate regarding the distribution of benefits. In some cases, e.g. States in the US system, this relationship is more intense. In these cases, the strength of a party is correlated with the supply of public goods: the stronger the party strength, the weaker the need for *s* and, in turn, the bigger provision of pure *public goods* (Primo, Snyder Jr 2010). In other words, the American context reveals that strong, capillary and structured parties cause government spending to orient itself towards national and universal interests, due to the absence of centrifugal forces coming from individual candidates. Conversely, where parties are mere “containers” of diverse and heterogeneous interests, the action of individual representatives becomes more and more often oriented towards providing direct answers to their constituencies’ requests, hence giving way to *s* which very often (yet not always) are at odds with national interests. When the driving force pulls towards public goods, spending is lower and targeted to a bigger number of beneficiaries (disregarding the individual constituencies and precincts). On the contrary, *s* bring about higher sums of taxpayers’ money, addressed to fewer people, located in each congressman’s district. Moreover, one has to bear in mind the peculiar power structure between center and periphery to understand how party strength influences public spending. Again, if one considers the example of the United States, which are characterized by a multilevel governance system, one notices that the transfer of resources from the federal government towards states and local authorities, with the presence of strong and cohesive local parties are lower (Rodden 2005). Influential parties imply lower expenditures and higher savings for local governments, in turn making them less in need for federal funding. Hence, the overall result will be a generalized reduction of public spending, both at the local and at the federal/national level (Mayhew 1986, Primo, Snyder Jr 2010). Conversely, in the absence of strong candidates committed to the distribution of *single-district benefits*, there will be no pressure either on the local or on the national government to increase spending, and this will prevent public funding to soar. While most of the evidence of this process come from the American case (Mayhew 1986, Rodden 2005, Primo, Snyder

Jr 2010), similar results have been retrieved in contexts in which parties are more pervasive at all institutional levels (Keefer, Khemani 2009). However, if public expenditure and distribution of benefits are fundamental in defining personal vote, other variables are also at play in the voter-candidate interaction, and they are worth mentioning here. One of these intervening variables is electoral legislation and regulation, not only in its narrow sense of electoral model and algorithm for assigning seats in elective bodies (proportional, single transferable vote, plurality and so forth), but also as “the complex of norms which regulate the entire electoral process” (D’Alimonte, Fusaro 2008). Winner-takes-all electoral systems (such as the one established in the UK) tend to be less efficient than proportional systems if the expected policies are desirable by the electorate, while the latter is less effective than the former when policies are not beneficial (Lizzeri, Persico 2001). In other terms, winner-takes-all systems engender a kind of competition among candidates which is based on the willingness to satisfy particularistic desires within the constituency, to the advantage of the few and the detriment of the efficiency of public spending. Conversely, nation-wide districts within proportional elections determine a post-electoral bargaining which involves all candidates that diminish the tendency to distribute public goods to narrow sectors of society (a distributional policy choice that is less desirable because it produces widespread, and not isolated, gains), thus providing a more efficient allocation of resources.

Moving away from the economic dimensions of personal vote, and adopting a political science perspective, we can correlate the effect deriving from specific electoral systems with higher or lower levels of personalization of political competition. While proportional and winner-takes-all systems are often considered to be opposed to one another, they both show, in different ways, personalist mechanisms which influence the practical use of personal vote. There is widespread evidence of a correlation between the incentives towards personal vote and the various electoral systems. More precisely, by dividing electoral systems according to some independent variables which interact with personal vote, it is possible to register the effects produced by each electoral model on the incentives towards maximization of personal reputation. Let us consider ballot, pool and votes as characteristics through which one can define a given electoral system and, thus, the relative importance of rallying personal votes (Carey, Shugart 1993).

- *Ballot*: the control that the party’s ruling class exerts in determining the composition of the list of candidates for the elections.
- *Pool*: whether one expressed vote contributes first to the

product of the list and, only after, to the result of a given candidate.

- *Voters*: how many ballots one elector can cast (whether one to the list, one for a candidate or both).

Finally, let us consider the most important variable, which is crucial for the strategic coordination of voters in their choices (Cox 1997): the magnitude of the electoral districts, as a result of a given electoral system. By cross-checking these variables, J.M Carey and M.S. Shugart (1993) classified electoral systems according to their capacity to incentivize or hinder personal vote. The result of that research was that closed-list systems with one round, for example, have very weak or absent incentives towards personal vote (ballot=0, pool=0, voters=0 with M=1) and, therefore, candidates will be less concerned about their personal reputation, and more concerned about their party's reputation. Open-list formulas with multiple votes, conversely, produce a balance between incentives towards personal vote and party influence (ballot=0, pool=0, votes=0 with M higher than 1).

Tab 1.6: An ordinal scoring system of electoral system according to the incentive to cultivate a personal reputation. (Carey and, Shugart 1995, p 425).

TABLE 1. An ordinal scoring system of electoral systems according to the incentive to cultivate a personal reputation

| Rank | BALLOT | POOL | VOTES | Type of system if $M = 1$ | Examples | Type of system if $M > 1$ | Examples |
|------|--------|------|-------|---|---|--|---|
| a | 0 | 0 | 0 | SMD plurality with party endorsement | Britain, Canada | Closed-list PR Closed-list plurality | Israel, Spain U.S. Electoral College, most states |
| b | 0 | 0 | 1 | SMD majority | Imperial Germany | MMD majority list | Mali |
| c | 1 | 0 | 1 | Majority-plurality Open-list with approval vote | France None | Open-list, multiple votes | Italy (pre-1993), Switzerland |
| d | 1 | 1 | 1 | Alternative vote with party endorsement | Australia House | Single transferable vote, with party endorsement | Australia Senate, Ireland, Malta |
| e | 1 | 0 | 2 | Double simultaneous vote with party endorsement | Uruguay president | Open-list, single vote Multiple-list, single vote with party endorsement | Chile, Poland Uruguay |
| f | 1 | 2 | 1 | Approval voting with party endorsement | None | MMD plurality MMD limited vote Cumulative voting (party endorsement) | Poland senate Spain senate |
| g | 2 | 0 | 1 | Open-list with approval vote, open endorsement | None | Open list, multiple votes, open endorsement | None |
| h | 2 | 1 | 1 | Alternative vote, open endorsement | None? | Single transferable vote, open endorsement | New York City School Boards |
| i | 2 | 0 | 2 | Double simultaneous vote with open endorsement | None | Open list, single vote, open endorsement Multiple-list, single vote, open endorsement | Brazil, Finland (post-1955) Finland (pre-1955) |
| j | 2 | 2 | 1 | Primary system Open-endorsement runoff Approval voting (open endorsement) | United States Congress Louisiana None | MMD plurality MMD limited vote Cumulative voting (open endorsement) | Philippine Senate Alabama (some localities) Illinois (pre-1969) |
| k | 1 | 2 | 2 | Not logically possible | | Single non-transferable vote, party endorsement | Japan (pre-1993), Taiwan |
| l | 2 | 1 | 2 | Not logically possible | | Personal-list PR | Colombia |
| m | 2 | 2 | 2 | SMD plurality, open endorsement, no primary | Philippines | Single non-transferable vote, open endorsement | Alabama (some localities) |


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In short, the different combinations of values assumed by the variables and the magnitude of the precinct (M higher than, or equal to 1) produce different effects on the personal vote depending on the chosen electoral system. This same result has also been confirmed in countries with mixed electoral systems such as Germany. Here, MPs who are elected with the plurality system are more attentive to their individual precincts' needs and interests than the MPs elected with the

proportional system (Lancaster and Baur 2002). In Ireland, the Single Transferable Vote (STV) actively pushes towards taking care of personal votes, despite Ireland being a political system characterized by active and influential parties. This kind of incentive towards personal vote, however, only applies to inter-party competition, and it is absent among candidates within the same party (Martin 2010). As was noted above, committees are crucial players in electoral dynamics, and they are of particular importance in the correlation between personal vote and benefit (re)distribution. The case of Germany, besides the already mentioned contradictory incentives for MPs elected with either plurality or proportional systems, also shows a differentiated role of committees. In plurality, electoral districts, committees are well-considered by candidates. On the other hand, they are less relevant in proportional precincts (Stratman Baur 2002). Another fundamental theme within the political bargain is the possibility for an MP or a party to propose advantageous pieces of legislation. A parliament which allows candidates to produce fiscal advantages for their supporting committees, will, in turn, reinforce personal vote dynamics (Meccanismi di Cura del Personal Vote – MCPV). On the contrary, MCPV will be weaker in institutional systems which prohibit such type of legislation to be passed (S. Martin 2011). To assess the intensity of personal vote dynamics in each country, we need to combine the different types of legislative organizations with the electoral systems, i.e. ballot, pool and votes (Carey and Shugart 1993). Then, we need to measure the effects of these variables on MCPV (Martin 2011).

Fig in “Electoral Institutions, the Personal Vote, and Legislative organization” (Martin, S., 2011, 353).

FIGURE 3
Relationship between Personal Vote and Committee Strength
Dependent on Mechanism to Cultivate Personal Votes



Note: Legislative particularism is not a significant feature of legislative life in countries in group zero (left side), whereas legislative particularism is a significant feature of legislative life in countries in group one (right side).

TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics

| Variable | Obs. | Median | Mean | Std. Dev. | Min | Max |
|-------------------------------------|------|--------|------|-----------|-----|-----|
| Committee Strength | 39 | 5 | 4.36 | 1.69 | 0 | 7 |
| Ballot Structure (Personal Vote) | 39 | 2.28 | 2.64 | 1.62 | 0 | 5 |
| MCPV (Fiscal Particularism) | 39 | 0 | 0.15 | 0.37 | 0 | 1 |
| Cameral Structure | 39 | 1 | 0.51 | 0.51 | 0 | 1 |
| Presidential | 39 | 0 | 0.18 | 0.39 | 0 | 1 |
| Propensity for Legislative Minority | 39 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 0 | 1 |

The figure offers a brief overview of the results of this model, as applied to several country-specific case studies, and clearly underlines that, where the legislative organization allows for “orientable” legislation, i.e. legislation that can be targeted on specific social sectors, this reinforces personalization and personal vote. This is the case of Italy, where the possibility of ad-hoc legislation to the advantage of individual electoral districts (so called *leggine*), produced strong incentives towards MCPV (Golden 2003). In conclusion, one ought not to overlook the correlation between personal vote and the territorial dimension of voting, or local vote. We can define local vote as “the degree to which district-level factors affect voter’s decision” (Morgenstern, Swindle 2005, 145). The authors tried to measure the importance of local vote in twenty-three democracies, and thereby produced a model which tests the influence of some variables on local vote. In particular, Morgenstern

and Swindle concentrated upon three institutional variables, two spatial variables, and two political-institutional variables:

The first three variables identify the institutional features of a given system which orient towards, or aside from personal vote. They are:

- *Presidentialism vs parliamentarism*
- *Electoral system*
- *Campaign finance*

Two more variables then describe the spatial articulation of the political competition:

- *Number of electoral districts*
- *Federalism and characteristics of the communities*

Lastly, two variables represent how a political system is articulated within one country.

- *Party organization*
- *Ideology and cohesion*
- This categorization resembles the measurement of personal vote according to the feature of the electoral system (Carey e Shugart 1993), and draws upon Stokes' (1965, 1967) conceptualization, which decomposes party vote's variables into i) *District heterogeneity*, ii) *Volatility*, iii) *local votes*. By analyzing the results from Morgenstern and Swindle's study of twenty-three countries mentioned above, it is possible to produce a multivariate regression, having local votes as a dependent variable:

Tab 1.7 Regression Results (dependent variable: local vote).

Source (Morgenstern, S., Swindle, SM., (2005)

Are politics local? An analysis of voting patterns in 23 democracies, pp. 162

Table 2
Regression Results (dependent variable: local vote)

| | Regression 1: All Systems | Regression 2: Parliamentary Only | Regression 3: Presidential Only | Regression 4: One Observation/ Country |
|--|---------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| Parliamentarism | -16.16** | | | -18.47** |
| Semipresidentialism | -7.61 | | | -14.83 |
| Federalism | 3.01 | 0.99 | 9.00 | -4.94 |
| Electoral system incentives for personal vote | 0.47 | 4.86** | -1.40 | 0.94 |
| Ln number of districts | -2.26 | -3.80** | -15.67* | -2.07 |
| Average vote | 0.67** | 0.38** | 1.22 | 0.92** |
| Extremism (position on left-right scale) | 3.80 | 1.75 | 2.00 | |
| Cohesion (<i>SD</i> of left- right scale) | 19.41** | 5.08 | 32.98 | 24.01** |
| Ethnic homogeneity (Krain index) | -11.61 | -27.53 | -30.11 | -20.66 |
| Ethnic Homogeneity × Federalism | 62.04** | 87.55** | 101.75* | 72.82** |
| Constant | -13.65 | -6.82 | 15.60 | -13.86 |
| Adjusted <i>R</i> ² | .53 | .81 | .25 | .64 |
| Number of observations | 55 ^a | 32 | 19 | 27 |

a. Same data as in previous tables, less one case (the Democratic Party of Japan) that was dropped because of missing data on the ideological variables.

p* < .10. *p* < .05.

In short, this regression suggests a higher propensity to local vote in presidential than in parliamentary systems. Furthermore, in contrast with some analyses which propose a strong correlation between electoral systems and personal vote (Carey e Shugart 1993, Martin 2011), this regression shows no evidence of a paramount role of electoral systems in reinforcing local vote mechanisms. In conclusion, before defining *patronage*, *clientelism* and *constituency service*, it is important to underline that the voter-candidate interaction – and, thus, also personal vote – is complex and influenced by several variables and mechanisms. In some cases, institutional and electoral factors are determinant in defining the degree of personalism in electoral competitions (Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina 1983, Carey e Shugart 1993, Martin 2011). In other contexts, one retrieves a stronger influence of material factors such as the control of economic resources during campaigns, or the possibility for MPs to propose and pass legislation with localized beneficial effects for their constituents (Lizzeri, Persico 2001, Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005, Primo, Snyder Jr 2010). In other systems, finally, the ideological characterization of the candidate and its position towards specific issues (Mayhew 1974), or the position, cohesion and ideological consistency

of one party (Morgenstern and Potthoff 2005) play a pivotal role. All these nuances show how the interactions between elected, electors and intermediaries (interest groups and committees) are complex in nature. In the last lines, we stressed the crucial role of the one of the two main variables: party/candidate vote. But, after this section we explored other important features that have a big influence on the electoral relationship between voters and candidate. Especially the last part is fundamental in order to considerer personal vote as a phenomenon “involved in society” and strictly related to electoral system, form of government and other contextual elements. In the next chapter, we introduce the second main variable considered in the research: universal/particular benefits.

CHAPTER III

Disentangling the personal vote: particularism vs. universalism

3.1 *The relationship between patronage and clientelism.*

As outlined at the beginning of the second chapter, the personal vs. partisan dimension of voting, and the universalistic vs. particularistic nature of the expected benefits are two critical aspects, through which I will elaborate a typology of personal vote patterns. This classification will combine the type of vote and the kind of expected benefits, and it will include clientelism, constituency service, patronage and the ideological vote. Due to the scope of this research, most of the attention will be devoted to clientelism and constituency service, as they represent two extreme versions of the personal vote. They differ on the nature of the expected benefits: while, in the former case, anticipated benefits are particularistic; universalistic ones characterize the latter. Once again, the aim of the present research is to demonstrate the existence, among voters in the South of Italy, of forms of personal vote motivated by universalistic benefits, i.e. *constituency service* (or “virtuous clientelism”).

TAB 1.8: Expected benefits and types of vote.

| | PARTICULARISTIC BENEFITS | UNIVERSALISTIC BENEFITS |
|--|---|---|
| PERSONAL VOTE Candidate-oriented vote | a) Clientelism: personal particularistic vote | b) Constituency service: personal universalistic vote |
| IDEOLOGICAL VOTE Party-oriented vote | c) Patronage | d) Allegiance/ideological vote |

First, we have to define clientelism, since this concept and patronage are often used as synonyms in the literature (Piattoni 2011, p 81-83). This uncertainty is not unexpected since both clientelism and patronage share a dyadic relationship between a patron and a client (Foster 1961, 1963, Scott 1972, Landè, 1961): hence, it is natural to consider these two concepts as proximate to one another, even as complementary concepts. The second premise of this analysis concerns the approaches to the study of patronage. Despite acknowledging the paramount importance of rationalist framework, it is important to account for other approaches, such as the micro-structural one. As said above, this latter

approach found that family structures, “instrumental” and “unbalanced friendships” between the client and the patron the defining features of patronage (Wolf 1966, Pitt-Rivers 1971). Other scholars identify the micro-cultural dimension, and in the presence of “apathy and despair” the defining cultural features of patronage, especially in Latin cultures (Banfield 1958). This latter set of contributions, together with others that will be re-examined when defining clientelism, are concerned with exogenous determinants of patronage – hence not directly related to the institutional and legal electoral environment – while they overlook the rational-strategic dimension of the personal vote (Piattoni 2006).

3.2 Patronage

First, it is important to distinguish between the study of patronage defined as a study of political parties and machines, on the one side, and morally and ethically charged definitions of patronage as a political “evil” (Berafield 2009, p 66). The contributions which share this latter approach describe patronage as an inherently unproductive and destructive (evil) activity that cannot contribute to the progress or improvement of society (Mosher 1982, Van Riper 1958). Moreover, patronage is considered a “bureaupathology,” i.e. the vehicle through which, by the necessary interaction between patronage and civil service, bureaucracy becomes affected by “vices, maladies, and sickness” (Caid, 1991, 490). This approach might unfortunately end up in biased, self-fulfilling analysis: in fact, researchers tend to study the phenomenon of patronage only where it assumes deviated and degenerated forms (Berafield 2009), thus obscuring a broader view of the process. This approach overlooks “*the examination not only of any potential positive benefits that may result from the patron-client relationship but also of analysis of the very concept of patronage*” (Powell, 1970, 412).

Moreover, one needs to differentiate between an anthropological study of patronage and one based on political science and policy studies theories and methods. The former focuses on “*how persons of unequal authority yet linked through ties of interests and friendship manipulate their relationships in order to attain their ends*” (Weingrod 1968, 379). Conversely, political science studies patronage as the phenomenon in which politics distributes public jobs or special favors in exchange for electoral support (Weingrod 1968). It is important to specify that the two approaches are not against each other: rather, the anthropological definition of patronage forms the pre-condition to the development of political forms of patronage. This link between anthropological deter-

minants and political manifestations helps political science not to separate patronage from its social and context-specific determinants. Quite the opposite, anthropological studies have provided solid groundings on which to unfold social and political investigations in places where this phenomenon is especially present such as the south of Italy (Arrighi and Piselli 1985). Kaufman provides the first definition of patronage which focuses on the dyadic relationship between patron and client. He defined this interaction as:

“i) the relationship occurs between actors of unequal power and status; ii) based on the principle of reciprocity; that is, it is a self-regulating from interpersonal exchange, the maintenance of which depends on the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and services to the other and which ceases once the expected rewards fail to materialize; iii) the relationship is particularistic and private, anchored only loosely in public law or community norms” (Kaufman 1974, 285).

In Kaufman’s definition, one retrieves all the elements mentioned above, both concerning patronage in its anthropological dimension and its political manifestation. However, there is no reference to the “functional” role of patronage, i.e. the distinction between different forms of patronage, each of which characterized by various aims and expected benefits. Berafield added this further dimension to the definition of patronage and applied it to the American case:

- *Organizational patronage* is used to strengthen or create political organizations.
- *Democratic patronage* seeks to achieve democratic or egalitarian goals using patronage.
- *Tactical patronage* uses the distribution of public offices to bridge political divisions or cleavages as a means of achieving political or policy goals.
- *Reform patronage* emerges when those committed to reforming the existing patronage system themselves engage in practice as the ways of replacing the corrupt political regime that preceded them. (2009, 69-72).

These four patronage styles uncover the different functions that political patronage can perform: in fact, patronage can assume various forms concerning the aims, and it may become an organizational resource to be drawn upon to maintain and reinforce power (Wilson 1961) as well as for the maintenance of a party apparatus. In other cases, the “reward” dimension prevails, hence patronage may become characterized by the distribution of public offices as a means of stren-

ngthening loyalty bonds, and for securing political support. All in all, a functional analysis of (political) patronage produces, as a first result, a simple distinction between patronage as either an electoral or an organizational resource (Kopecký, Mair, Spirova, 2012, 5-9). While the electoral function of patronage will be fleshed out later in this work, it is important here to define the organizational role of this phenomenon: patronage serves parties and politicians as a means for control and management of power, and it manifests itself through the control of civil service and state bureaucracy. Moreover, patronage as an organizational resource explains parties' effort to maintain direct ties with the state and its bureaucratic articulations, often regardless of their actual electoral performance (hence of parties' rootedness in society), with the principal aim of political survival through the occupation of public offices. In this case, patronage is a party-state linkage (Van Biezen, Kopecky, 2007) which mainly acts within institutions and seconds the control of the state by parties. The occupation of the state by parties and politicians occurs through the appointment of people in public sector jobs such as state-owned enterprises, governing boards, universities, advisory committees and commissions (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012, p 7; Sorauf, 1959; Wilson, 1973; Muller 1989; Berafield 2009). Di Mascio provides the most suitable definition of patronage in public policy studies: "patronage is the justified use of discretionary power by political actors, which control the appointment of offices in the public sector to obtain the support of those who are appointed" (Di Mascio, 2012, 23). The power to appoint is hence the qualifying feature of patronage as an administrative practice, and it overlaps with the concept of "top-down politicization", by which political criteria are employed to select people for public jobs, and for deciding upon their career progressions. In this definition of patronage, it is the object of the bargain to be narrowed down to the mere assignment of jobs and positions in exchange for loyalty and support. Hence, more general, immaterial and indirect benefits are excluded from this analysis.

We can conceptualize patronage not only as an electoral resource but also as an organizational one. As Kopecky, Mair and Spirova have it: "patronage here represents a form of linkage politics - a mechanism through which individual politicians or parties obtain electoral support in exchange for selectively distributing (mostly material) benefits through state institutions" (2012, 3). The central feature of this definition is the electoral bargain, besides the prevalently material nature of the expected benefits. Electoral patronage is a party-society linkage (Van Biezen, Kopecky, 2007), and it inevitably resembles clientelism: this resemblance is even more apparent if we analyze in detail the different definitions of this phenomenon. As a matter of fact, most of the definitions of patro-

nage and clientelism are focused on a dyadic relation between a patron who asks for votes, and clients who ask for benefits. However, the similarity between the two concepts does not hinder the possibility to operate fine-grained distinctions. In particular, clientelism is preferred over patronage as it describes face-to-face interactions between a candidate and his constituency, especially in forms of local landlordship in poor and rural contexts (Gibbon and Higgins, 1974). Conversely, the party is the central actor in more modern forms of clientelism, especially when it comes to the distribution of benefits (Weingrod 1968, Caciagli 2006). It is important to remark that patronage and clientelism do not establish a complete picture of the different forms of interactions between electors and elected officials: aside from patronage and clientelism, brokerage also plays an important role. This way of exchanging and managing political resources consists of a mere intermediation between voters and candidates, performed by committees, opinion leaders or interest groups in support for a candidate, which are not able to directly control said resources. In some cases, this ability to manage political capital derives from proximity to power, or from particular knowledge of the bureaucratic apparatus. Brokers, in turn, can draw upon their know-how more than upon friendship and connections (Komito 1984, 174).

TAB 1.9 Source (Kopecký,P.,Mair P., Spirova, M., (2012), Party patronage and party government in European democracies, pp 8)

| | Patronage | Clientelism | Corruption |
|------------------|---|---|---------------------------|
| State resource | Jobs in state institutions | Subsidies, loans, medicines, food, public sector jobs | Public decisions |
| Party goal | Control of institutions; reward of (organizational) loyalty | Electoral support | Financial resources |
| Recipients | Anybody | Party voters | Companies, entrepreneurs |
| Legal status | Legal or illegal | Legal or illegal | Illegal |
| Crucial question | Will you work for me? | Will you vote for me? | Will you give me a bribe? |

Source: adapted from Kopecký, Spirova, and Scherlis (2008) and Scherlis (2010)

The proposed scheme provides an efficient synthesis of the defining features of patronage and clientelism. In particular, the last row of the table opens a critical reflection on the criteria on which to distinguish between patronage and clientelism, as defined both by Kopecky and Spirova (2008) and by Scherlis (2010). As most of the literature does, the two authors leave corruption aside from the rest of the analysis. The authors individuate the nature of the political bargain as the pri-

mary distinction between patronage and clientelism: while the former is longer-lasting and more based on loyalty, the latter is more contingent (typical of electoral campaigns), and more strongly oriented towards achieving an advantageous exchange of (material) benefits. Patronage understood as an electoral resource, hence, becomes closer to clientelism, because in both cases the reward prevails in the dyadic relationship (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012): many contributions deal with the definition of patronage in a similar vein. In some cases, “patronage” defines the object of the bargain as “a selective benefit which politicians distribute to individual voters, activists or donors in exchange for political support” (Shefter 1994, 283). Similarly, Blondel defines patronage as “the distribution of favors to individuals in exchange for achieved or expected advantages for political actors” (Blondel 2002, 241). However, the two most relevant definitions of patronage are Mainwaring’s and Muller’s. The former defines patronage as “the use or distribution of public resources based on non-meritocratic criteria in order to achieve political advantages” (Mainwaring 1999, 177). Muller (2006) concurs with Stokes (2009) in focusing on the direct and particularistic nature of the exchange. However, Stokes does not speak generically about “political support”, and he rather mentions the vote as the predominant form of support given by clients to patrons. These last two definitions are of importance not only because they are the most widely employed in comparative analyses of patronage, but also because they are also definitions used in many studies of clientelism: hence, they lie somehow at the crossroad between the two phenomena. Moreover, the interchangeable use of patronage and clientelism reveals that, in some respects, party-directed patronage might be acknowledged as a direct evolution of *landlord clientelism* (Graziano 1968, Tarrow 1972), which was widespread in the south of Italy in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. The evolution from landlordship to clientelism comprehends patronage as a “social unifier which binds clientelist networks together” (Mainwaring 1999, 180). In this view, patronage is an umbrella concept which comprehends the definition of clientelism *as a peculiar variant* (Kopecky, Mair, Spirova, 2012). Moreover, patronage represents a systematic way of organizing social relations by individual candidates on the ground, which allows the different parties to manage power in a more orderly way, to prevent internal conflicts, especially during the distribution of benefits.

3.3 *Clientelism*

We have thus far shown that, based on the definitions retrieved in the scientific literature on the matter, patronage and clientelism are difficult to distinguish from one another. This difficulty, however, does not debunk the idea that clientelism is the clearest example of a *particularistic personal vote*. The connection between patronage and clientelism shows that “*patronage is both one of the objects of the clientelist bargain, and the tool for perfecting other clientelist exchanges*” (Piattoni, 2007, p 34). According to Gingerich (2004) and Sotiropoulos (2004), one could define the patron-client bargain in two ways. On the one hand, “job patronage” or “clientelism at the bottom” defines, for example, the barter of administrative positions in exchange for votes. *On the other hand, “resource patronage” or “clientelism at the top”* synthesize the loyalty that binds civil servants to the parties and politicians which appointed them in the first place.

Political clientelism has an independent social dimension: the analysis of the social side of political clientelism comprehends eminent contributions, such as the one made by Scott (1972, 128) which sets aside the “clientelist relations” from other models of social interaction, such as the class-based model, or the primary solidarity ties. Scott defines *clientelism* as “a particular dyadic relation (between two people), which implies a mainly instrumental friendship, and by virtue of which and individual of higher status and wealthier background (patron) uses his influence and resources to procure protection, benefits or both, to a lower-status individual (client), who in turn repays by offering support and assistance to the patron, comprehending also personal services” (Scott 1972, p 128). Graziano’s contribution is similar, though more complex and more sociological in nature. Graziano defines clientelism as a social phenomenon which is:

- *Dyadic, and which does not engender any super-personal entity.*
- *Connoted by direct exchanges and bargains, i.e. the barter of immediate, and mostly material benefits.*
- *The exchange generates benefits which are external to the bargain itself, hence not elements such as personal satisfactions or sense of belonging.*
- *The bargain is social in nature, and does not imply the exchange of undefined services.*
- *The exchange takes place between subjects with asymmetrical access to resources.*

In synthesis, the clientelist association can be defined as a social and political exchange of external benefits, which is dyadic, direct and asymmetrical in nature. Also, Eisenstadt's and Roniger's (1980; 1984) definitions comprehend many elements of Graziano's: clientelism is i) the simultaneous exchange of various resources, ii) the relations are not legally binding, in fact, they are often against the law, iii) these relationships are mostly vertical. What is most striking about these definitions is the concurring reference to generalized and specific exchanges which characterize the clientelist association between patron and client: the former are bargains which tantamount to the opening of unqualified and long-term credit, while specific transactions constitute punctual and symmetrical bargains (Eisenstadt and Roniger, 1980; p 51). Piattoni's conveniently synthesizes the different analyses and definitions of clientelism according to their chosen theoretical approaches (culturalist, structuralist, and rationalist) and the relevant level of analysis (micro-, macro- and meso-level analyses) (Piattoni 2007, 53). The final scheme is here briefly outlined:

- *Micro-structuralist approach* provides a study of the mono- and bilateral relation, and of its effects (e.g. Wolf 1962, Roniger 1994).
- *Micro-rationalist approach*: analyzes restrictions and incentives deriving from individual propensity to risk, and describes the outcome of such constraints and incentives on individual behavior (e.g. J. Boiessevain 1974, S. Silverman 1965)
- *The micro-culturalist approach* analyzes the moral values which inform individual choices, and the effects thereof. (Banfield, 1958)
- Among the macro-level studies, we can distinguish between:
 - *The macro-structuralist approach* is concerned with the study of the geopolitical collocation of the democracy under scrutiny, and the effect of this structural positioning on local institutions (e.g. Arrighi 1985, Eisenstadt 1981)
 - *The macro-rationalist approach* provides a study of the restrictions and incentives deriving from critical junctures in the making of a state and their effects on the supply of political options.
 - *The macro-culturalist approach* constitutes the analysis of broad cultural and religious ensembles within a given social system (e.g. Pitt-Rivers, Putnam 1985).

- The Meso-level studies constitute the bulk and the vast majority of empirical studies of clientelism. These studies divide themselves into:
- *Meso-structuralist approaches*, which explore the role of economic and social marginality, and their consequences regarding power relations (e.g. Graziano 1984, Piselli 1987).
- *Meso-rationalist approaches* that unpack the restrictions and the incentives deriving from networks of social relations, and their effects on clientelist networks (e.g. Golden 2003, Zuckerman 1979)
- *Meso-culturalist approaches*, which provide an analysis of shared values of their effects on political machines such as parties and other organizations (e.g. Caciagli 1977, Tarrow 1972).

Different methods tend to prioritize different levels of analysis (Piattoni 2007, 52): micro-level studies tend to focus on the demand-driven conditions for the existence of clientelism, while macro-level studies prioritize supply over demand. Macro- and micro-level studies “delimit” both level of analysis and the chosen theoretical approach. Meso-level analyses, however, are prone to confusion, since they make different mechanisms indistinguishable from others. For example, strategic approaches help to focus actors’ behavior, hence providing a more dynamic depiction of clientelism (e.g. the study of strategic choices at a meso-level concentrates on collective choices of groups or individuals, and how these choices may influence the macro-level), as opposed to the more deterministic undertone of culturalist and structuralist approaches (Piattoni, 2007). It is important, hence, not to confuse and blur boundaries between theoretical approaches, if one wants to preserve the meaningfulness of categories and the validity of the results. To clarify the stakes of the different approaches, and to further remark the centrality of the rationalist approach, let us draw upon some examples retrieved in the literature, which describes clientelism, at both the macro- and micro-level as a strategic phenomenon. Silverman’s studies (1966, 1970, 1975, 1977) focused on clientelism in extensive agricultural estates in Umbria during the 1950s and 60s: here, we retrieve an attentive depiction of the interactions between the landlord (patron) and sharecroppers (clients). The author highlights the existence of a direct relationship between the patron (who often would live in the estate where the sharecroppers worked) and clients. This relationship was a mix of both affective and instrumental friendship ties, but still, this was a “genuine” relationship. Moreover, Silverman underlines how patrons not only cultivated clientelist relations within their territory (i.e. only with their

tenants and sharecroppers): they also funded public initiatives ranging between the local band to charities, hence producing a further, parallel track for clientelism. Silverman, hence, points on *selective clientelism*, which is centered on people who are close to the patron, which does not prevent the patron himself from cultivating a more *public clientelism* and *public patronage*.

Still within the rationalist approach, on the macro-level, the most fruitful contribution is Shefter's (1994), who, criticizing the neoclassical approach to clientelism (Banfield 1958, Wilson 1961), focused on the strategic choices made by political leaders, hence adopting a supply-oriented analysis of clientelism. Shefter focuses on party leaders who occupy powerful positions (internally mobilized) who face external pressure coming from parties which are excluded from power (externally mobilized). The possible strategic choices employed by elected politicians follow the ensuing scheme:

- *Collusion*: when internally mobilized leaders co-opt excluded leaders, hence resisting external pressure by attenuating conflict.
- *Counter-mobilization*: when politicians in power try, by rallying support, to push back external attacks.
- *Coercion*: when one tries to repress the external impulses (an option which is not feasible very often in modern democracies).

If none of the above-listed choices is practicable, then clientelism remains, in Shefter's view, the last resource of elites. Shefter conveniently focuses on context variables which determine the development of a political system into a clientelist system, which are: i) *party genesis*, i.e. the orientation of party leaders to act according to either collective or immaterial incentives (programmatic incentives), or according to selective and material interests (clientelist incentives). Another important element is ii) *bureaucracy's degree of autonomy*, which means that the more permeable civil service is to political demands (hence scarcely autonomous), the more frequently clientelism will be employed to legitimize and strengthen power relations. These contributions (and Shefter's in particular) are of fundamental importance because they read through rationalist lenses paramount political mechanisms such as majority-opposition dynamics in managing power (Shefter 1994). In turn, this rationalist takes on clientelism might unveil whether it is possible to have, alongside selective clientelism and patronage, also a form of public clientelism and public patronage (Silverman). Hence, disregarding the level of analysis, the rationalist approach tends to be

the most suitable one to study the phenomenon of clientelism, also and especially in cases in which clientelist associations are widespread, such as in the south of Italy. Precisely the Italian case provides an example of how the typical phenomena occurring during the First Republic could be interpreted differently, according to either the rationalist, culturalist or structuralist approaches. One should be careful, before studying the south of Italy, not to overlap very different phenomena which are too often conflated into the concept of clientelism. First, corruption, despite resembling clientelism, differs from it regarding the object of the bargain: while corruption has money as the means of payment, clientelist exchanges trade votes. Hence, corruption consists of “obtaining, through a payment in cash to public officials or party members, of public decisions in favor of specific individuals or firms” (Piattoni, 2007, 43).

Mafia differs from clientelism on the nature of the privatized goods. Criminal organizations own the monopoly of violence, i.e. they trade in protection from violence (Piattoni 2007, Gambetta 1993); hence they privatize force, which is one of the paramount resources of public power and State power. Naturally, mafias also privatize and distribute other goods and assets. Moreover, there is widespread evidence of multiple ties and relations between mafia-men and politicians, due to the capacity of the former to rally votes, to be delivered to the latter, among other assets subjected to bargain. In any case, one should keep mafia and clientelism distinct: if the relation between mafia and clientelism exists, it is also true that clientelism is born and also develops in places which are not characterized by organized crime and mafia. As said above, the historical phase of the First Republic in Italy, and, in particular, the internal dynamics within the Christian Democracy may represent a suitable case study for a rationalist analysis of clientelism. Indeed, the Italian case represents one of the most fruitful sources of case studies ever since the end of the Second World War, and it attracted significant scholarly attention over time. In synthesis, post-war Italian political system was based on the ideological rupture between communists and anti-communists. Among the latter, the leading party was the Christian Democracy that, through an extensive and capillary power network (especially in the south), was able to deploy a deep and rooted clientelist network, hence making the Italian political system the most intensely clientelist among western democracies. Naturally, also context-specific conditions influenced the outcome: a purely proportional electoral system without any threshold to representation; the possibility, for the voter, to express up to three preferences among the candidates in a given party list; the consociative nature of the political system. All these variables concurred in bringing about a system with a substantial stress on personalist mobilization, despite the unmistakable presence,

within Italian society, of an intense ideological mobilization. The only notable dynamic and modern element in the Italian political system was the transformation, of clientelist relations, from landlord-based ones to mass-based (Caciagli 1977) and party-based ones (Graziano, 1974). As said above, the chosen approach has grave implications for the interpretation of the observed phenomenon: if one observe the Italian First Republic through structural lenses, as in Caciagli's (1982) and Fantozzi's (1993) studies, the (structural) causes of clientelism are retrieved in i) the partial or distorted modernization of the Italian political system (Graziano 1980), ii) in the lack of regionalist parties and iii) in the absence of an actual middle-class, bourgeois party, so that the Italian bourgeoisie has not been able to differentiate itself from the aristocratic classes and to perform a dynamic and propulsive social role. These approaches, hence, are concerned with the overly particularist nature of party power, thus defining clientelism as the product of the incomplete rationalization of southern economy. Culturalist studies by Allum (1973) and Tarrow (1967), on the other side, stress the morally charged of people in the south and their interpersonal relations. Beside the well-known contribute made by Banfield (1958), who singles out apathy and amorality as the peculiar defining features of interpersonal ties in the Mezzogiorno, Tarrow's research (1967) results useful in defining not only the cultural values, but also the strategic behaviors which define clientelist relations:

“The cultural values in the Mezzogiorno are maybe the most exotic aspect of the social configuration in the area. Generations of writers have noticed the prevalence of violence and of the awareness of death, the modest position of women in society, and the almost occult role of corruption in economy and in politics. First, values seem to be formed, and loyalties seem to coalesce around primary centers, parochial places of social life. Second, modern values inherent to industrial societies, such as rationality, entrepreneurship and efficiency were not able to penetrate social life as they did in most of the western world. Third, cynicism and disaffection pervade the whole of Italian society”.

Hence, according to Tarrow, the roots of Christian Democracy's clientelist network are to be found in the nature and in the culture of Southern society. Yet, at the same time, individual citizens operate strategically through clientelist channels. Thus, clientelism cannot be explained merely by recurring to character or culture: a strategic analy-

sis is needed. If we turn to this strategic-rational analysis, the development of clientelism in the Christian Democracy after the Second World War, and the interpretations thereof, different considerations emerge. First, the process of constitution of the Christian Democracy as a party was influenced by CD's failed attempt to disengage itself from local landlordship ties: conversely, local landlords were coopted at a national level by virtue of their electoral support. Moreover, the presence of preferential voting in the Italian electoral legislation allowed to i) "subvert" the order of the candidates in the list, hence to subvert the party's choice over the priority given to each candidate. This, in turn, ii) caused that the attribution of bureaucratic, administrative and governmental positions followed the individual endowment of votes and preferences for each candidate. Consequently, the political debate within the Christian Democracy became articulated in party factions, with the sole objective, on the side of clientelist politicians, of preserving political survival and power. Clientelist networks, hence, became "modes of promoting leaders' careers and of controlling governmental positions" (Zuckerman 1975, 14). Through the strategic-rationalist approach, clientelism is finally analyzed as national in nature, hence losing the hitherto unquestioned meridional nature. All the factions within the Christian Democracy are involved in the clientelist game, as Zuckerman shows when he turns to the study of inter-faction competition between Colombo, CD's leader in Potenza; and Rumor, leader in Vicenza. As Zuckerman has it, "As Rumor and Colombo, Gava (Naples) and Bisaglia (Rovigo) dominated political life in their respective districts, and they rallied a massive amount of votes and preferences, both within and outside the party. [...] They controlled appointments and elections within the party, and they had the last word on local party decisions. The rise to leadership of all of them depended on the control they had over public offices: they all began their rise towards leading positions in the regional and national hierarchy after having served in different governments and having had access to national patronage resources" (Angeli) Through these examples, it seems that clientelism has farther-reaching boundaries, being it a national phenomenon, and it appears as a paramount power resource and means of regulation and settlement of intra-party conflicts. However, it is important not to consider clientelism as the *single* available strategy for political actors. The struggle among factions within the Christian Democracy moved around leaders who, besides the construction and the strengthening of a wide net of clientelism, differentiated themselves from other factional leaders on a programmatic and ideological basis (i.e. through position voting and credit claiming). This behavior, as noted by some had the objective of widening the electoral basis: on one side, local clientelism represented

the core of the electoral basis upon which a national career was built; on the other, personal commitment to more “general” battles, and the individual positioning on the right-left axis with respect to economic and social policies represented a valid and useful strategy to broaden one’s support and, in turn, one’s political survival and permanence in office in the medium and long run. Important personalities such as De Mita perfectly depicted the dimensions of this phenomenon: the well-known politician from Campania, in fact, often adopted clientelist strategy in the province of Avellino by distributing public assets in a semi-private way (in this respect, it is interesting to read some of the interviews realized for this thesis); yet, the same person was committed to national left-oriented social policies, consistently with De Mita’s membership of the “progressive” faction called “La Base” (“The Basis”) (Piattoni 2007, 134).

Even clearer is Golden’s (2003) example:

“From 1954 to 1959 he (Rota, the local party boss) was [...] town councilor in charge of public works and urban planning. [...] A second crucial resource was also available to Rota for political patronage. At the beginning of the fifties, three of four tobacco factories of the town were bought by a state-controlled agency. The Party Boss [...] knew most of the directories of the factories and it was, therefore, easy for him to influence the placement policy of the industry; he claims that between 1954 and 1959 he placed more than 600 workers in these factories.

Rota could finally have recourse to a third fundamental resource, namely his Rome party connections [...] He claims, for instance, that he obtained the funds for a new elementary school directly from Emilio Colombo (Dc national leader). In general, his connections allowed him to intervene in all sorts of informal arrangements whereby local people could obtain through his mediation the intervention of influential political figures in Rome for the solution of their personal problems” (L. Graziano, 1977, 360-378).

However, the importance of Golden’s work goes far beyond this quote: he underlined how politicians produced “bad government” on purpose, to simplify the deployment of clientelist strategies. As the author has it “legislators have an interest in generating excessive bureaucracy rather than reining in expansionary ambitions on the part of agen-

cies; secondly, voters act to reward rather than punish this behavior” (Golden 2003, 192). In short, Golden criticizes culturalist and structuralist accounts of clientelism in they identify only endogenous drivers of clientelism (especially in the Mezzogiorno). Conversely, Golden shifts the focus on strategies that politicians and electors deploy to satisfy their respective ambitions. Besides the results, Golden’s viewpoint is critical for at least two reasons: on one side, the battleground where clientelist networks are born and grow is rightfully identified in the public sector and the bureaucracy. On the other hand, Golden’s research describes how lawmakers deliberately cause bad government by acting on legislation with the objective of producing overly detailed and often incomprehensible laws. Starting from the questions: “Through which methods of public law infringement do the politicians act so as to create a malfunction in the state’s administrative apparatus?”, and by using Key’s (1935) classification, Golden produces the subsequent typology:

- Limiting the scope of merit laws: *i) spoils system where civil service procedures were not required, ii) ordinary ministerial departments, by legally bypassing the normal appointment procedures, iii) by appointing public servant selected by partisan criteria.*
- Appointing the “right guys”: *i) by appointing people to nominally elected positions, for instance in the local or national administrative councils responsible for overseeing public agencies.*
- Manipulating the selection process: *within ordinary ministerial departments by fixing examination results.*
- Shaping the movement and promotion of personnel: *i) within ministerial departments by promoting persons by political, not professional, merits.*

According to Golden (2003), lawmakers create the conditions for clientelism by sabotaging the relationship between a citizen and public administration, so that the voter will turn to the politician to obtain intermediation with bureaucracy. Clientelism is not limited to this set of practices: for examples, ad-hoc pieces of legislation are passed with the sole purpose of satisfying the needs and interests of one precinct and one constituency. The function performed by the so-called “leggine” (laws oriented towards specific needs) in Italian politics, for example, is well documented by Golden (2003, 206). He focuses on the “decreto milleproroghe”, which is passed each year by the Italian Parliament and which funds policies as diverse as the wages of forest and wilderness police in Calabria, to the incentives for renewable energy production,

to the funding of community service jobs employed in Sicilian schools. Such a decree is often an omnibus, a collector of individual requests coming from deputies and senators, hence, indirectly, from their constituencies. Considering these practices, Golden's approach avoids the pitfalls of culturalist and structuralist approaches. These studies could have been valid to understand the first forms of clientelism, which was typical for the few years which immediately followed the end of the Second World War. However, they lose their explanatory potential if one studies the period from the 1990s onwards, with the emergence of a modern clientelism, more refined and capillary than the early manifestations of clientelism.

In contrast with culturalist and structuralist approaches, a broad literature has been rising (e.g. Golden's, 2003; Kopecky, Mair, and Spirova, 2012; Piattoni, 2007; Di Mascio, 2012) which has the merit of reinstating the role of rationality in electoral choices. This literature, while focusing on diverse time periods and different territorial case studies, makes the study of clientelism and constituency service less deterministic and more scientifically manageable.

3.4 *Constituency Service.*

We defined patronage and clientelism as forms of personal vote oriented towards selective benefits. Clientelism represents the most direct form of the personalist personal vote because it concerns individuals and it disregards the party hierarchy and structure. In short, it is more personalist and more focused on selective and immediate benefits. Conversely, patronage is more connected to the party, its structure, its diffusion and its network of relations and support. Clientelism is common in recently formed democracies and some consolidated western democracies such as Italy, while constituency service – i.e. a kind of personal vote motivated by universalist objectives – seems rarer in these countries, although not absent altogether. Piattoni first introduced the definition of “virtuous clientelist” to describe the Italian region of Abruzzi, and she isolated the following core elements of such a clientelist association: i) public goods and private goods are equally distributed among voters ii) economic development, iii) waxing legitimacy (Piattoni 2007, 158-166). In other words, the provided depiction of Italian clientelism (or patronage) represents no less than the Italian example of the Anglo-American *constituency service* (Piattoni 2007, 138). Likewise, Golden offers a definition of constituency service (or virtuous clientelism) through the distinction between this concept and

clientelism itself:

“Instead of a factory that enlarges employment opportunities, patronage offers a job to specific individual; instead of a road improving transport, it offers rides to the polls to party members; instead of a school, it offers a party member’s teenage child entry to a specific educational establishment; instead of a harbor whose ships all firms can use for moving their goods elsewhere, it gives only some firms authorization to export goods.” (2003, p 200)

This significant distinction between patronage and constituency service helps better to define and apprehend this latter concept. As in other cases of personal vote, constituency service is set by i) a dyadic relation; ii) a political exchange in which votes are the means of payment. Constituency service differentiates itself from other forms of personal votes on iii) the nature of expected benefits: in this case, personal vote is motivated by anticipated universalist benefits. Hence, constituency service represents a particular type of relation between voters and candidates, in which actors orient their strategies towards public or semi-public goods, albeit these goods being located and concentrated in a specific territorial unit (the electoral precinct). Candidates, motivated by voters, behave in a way that can be called *district service*, i.e. their actions are driven by the needs of the district where they have been elected and, in so doing, candidates act as intermediaries between their precincts and the national government.

Fenno defines the manifold activities which can be labeled as district/constituency service, and he concludes by saying: “*but the core activity (of the constituency service) is providing help to individuals, groups, and localities in coping with the federal government*” (Fenno, 1982, 101). As derived from Fenno’s definition, a politician tries to aid the people and groups within his precinct, i.e. the candidate will not directly barter votes in exchange for benefits. Rather, he will make himself known and respectable. Hence, he will try to build public reputation among the people inhabiting his electoral district. Cain, Ferejhon and Fiorina (1987, 50-51) studied *constituency* service in countries (such as the US and the UK) in which this phenomenon is most common, and provided the following sequence of mechanisms within a constituency service relation:

- *The demand of service*: this phase stands for the capacity of politicians to mediate with bureaucracy by influencing the decisions of the latter and making them more profitable for the constituents. Examples of this phase are *social security*

and *veterans' benefits* in the US; and *pensions, health care* and military problems in the UK.

- *Solicitation of Cases*: in this phase, congressmen or MPs activate themselves in their constituencies to make the demands from their communities to emerge, thus intercepting the growing demand for district/constituency service.
- *Resolution and Publicity of casework*: during this phase, the elected official must solve problems to be perceived as useful.

Moreover, the candidate has to show the capacity to disclose results to build up reputation (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 1987, 60-79). Constituency service is more diffused in Anglo-American democracies; hence most of the literature is focused on the United States and the United Kingdom. Cain, Ferejhon and Fiorina (1987) started precisely from the different ways of performing constituency service in the two countries, and the result is one of the most full-fledged contributions on the theme. Beyond the aforementioned mechanics of constituency service, authors shed light on some crucial aspects of the phenomenon, which in turn might draw useful insights on the other forms of personal vote. When it comes to benefits, it has already been said that, as Fenno has it, the nature of expected benefits which are traded in constituency service differs from the kind of advantages bartered in patronage and clientelism. However, it remains to be understood how said benefits are evaluated and understood by electors. For instance, Cain, Ferejhon and Fiorina illustrate that the form of government and the electoral formula are important in determining how a candidate is judged and evaluated, for example where a *plurality* electoral system is in place, in contrast to other electoral systems. Departing from the US case study, the authors underline how, in presidential countries, congressmen can differentiate themselves from the actions and agenda of the President in charge, even when the President and the Congressman are in the same party. A similar strategy can be employed, for example, by Democratic congressmen even when the Congress has a Democratic majority (the same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for Republicans). In all cases, the need for congressmen is to acquire a distinct and discrete profile, an individual reputation and visibility, even if this means to be perceived as against one's party and its pro-tempore policy positions (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 1987, 198-199). In the UK, this kind of strategies is less effective and desirable, for a number of reasons. First, Great Britain's parliamentary system is articulated in clear, often mono-party majority in the Parliament, which in turn supports a cabinet. The strong ties between the legislative and the executive branches of government make it more difficult for MPs

to differentiate themselves from the policy choices of their party and of their Prime Minister. At the same time, MPs have to see to their constituencies and take care of them: the margin for maneuver, however, is strongly conditioned by whether the party supports or opposed the Prime Minister. In case the party is in government, it will be harder for MPs to acquire an independent visibility and to position themselves in clear contrast with their party's directives (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 1987 200-204).

In short, the form of government and the nature of the political system have a strong influence on the way in which constituency service is carried out. In the American case, the distinction between the legislative and executive branch allows elected representatives a higher degree of freedom, together with a weak structuration of the American political parties. Conversely, in the UK the party system is considerably older and more structured, hence the strength of the tie between a candidate and his party becomes central also for voters. Arguably, the identity between parliamentary majority and the governments significantly hinders the possibility, for majority MPs to differentiate themselves. In some respects, this attempt for differentiation may not be desired by electors: loyal constituents might punish the lack of party discipline by voting other candidates. Cain, Ferejhon and Fiorina synthesize the differences between the American and the British case of constituency service as follows:

“1) Congressmen adopt a less personal staff-oriented style of constituency service, while MPs adopt a more personal, time-intensive style. 2) Congressional offices are small bureaucracies whereas MPs are “mom and pop” operations. 3) The American party and electoral system lead to greater payoffs for constituency service for congressmen than the corresponding British system allow for MPs. 4) Not surprisingly, party affiliations affect representatives’ reputation more in Britain than in the USA and 5) the evaluations of national leaders affect British voting behavior much more than American”. (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 1987, pp 214).

Hence, legislation, norms and rules (such as the procedures adopted to examine and pass laws) influence constituency service and thereby shapes candidates' choices and behavior, especially regarding legislative and electoral independence from one's party of affiliation. In general, a higher degree of autonomy (as in the US) fosters constituency service. Conversely, in the UK, the MPs might be able to “conquer” some room for electoral independence by dissenting from the official party policy strategy: for example, the current Secretary General of the Labour Party Jeremy Corbyn voted against his party's decisions more than 200 times

when he was just an MP. However, regarding legislative independence, British MPs have little room for legislative differentiation from their parties, especially MPs within the party that is in government at that time (Cain, Ferejhon e Fiorina, 1987, 217). The primary explanation for this phenomenon is that MPs have little access to public political resources and, when making use of said resources, they are less independent from their party. This differentiated access to resources is a peculiar difference from other systems and the American one, where the party has a very loose influence on congressmen's behavior, especially concerning their constituencies.

Finally, it is worth mentioning the impact of the electoral formula and its role in incentivizing and discouraging constituency service. As Cain, Ferejhon and Fiorina rightfully remind us:

“There is an inherent tendency for single-member district, plurality rule system to move in the direction of greater decentralization and independence electoral standing [while] the proportional representation system, especially those with large districts, have low levels of constituency service.” (Cain, Ferejhon and Fiorina 1987, 219).

If this tendency remains valid in general terms, it is necessary to clarify that the proportional system has led to a greater, not weaker, personalization of vote and politics as a whole – in this respect, the Italian case is illuminating. Here, the number of preferences that each elector could cast – up to four in the biggest precincts - distorted the system as a whole. This observation might seem trivial, but it shows that the “*proportional system*” label is far from satisfactory in describing the influence of electoral regulation over personal vote. Pasquino effectively showed that the number of available preferences can affect the degree of personalization of votes deeply: for example, the abrogation of multi-preferential voting in 1993, as it limited the number of preferences to only one, determined an overall *majoritarization* of the Italia political system (Pasquino, 1993). In synthesis, constituency service represents a variety of personal vote which is most common in the Anglo-American world. This concept is often analyzed in contrast with patronage and clientelism: while constituency service is considered a virtuous or neutral political behavior, the latter two concepts are judged detrimental and pathologic. Piattoni (2007), on the other side, tries to describe constituency service through a lexicon which is more common and comprehensible for continental Europe and Italy (Piattoni 2007, 158).

In conclusion, we have thus far reviewed the literature on patronage, clientelism and constituency service. We noted how difficult it might be to separate patronage from clientelism and, at the same time,

we tried to define a less known concept, i.e. constituency service. How does this differentiation aid us in answering the leading research question of this thesis – which is to demonstrate the existence of a personal vote oriented towards universal benefits? The answer will come through semi-structured interviews in some urban and rural areas, in all the southern regions of Italy. The distinction of personal vote according to the two axes of ideological vs. personal vote, and of selective vs. universal benefits leaves aside some nuances which, as we noted before, are crucial to define patronage and clientelism. Let us consider, for example, a vote oriented towards a party and towards universal benefits: this vote, as described in the former chapter, was labeled as allegiance vote, i.e. the satisfaction of individual aspirations and preferences through the realization of collective ones (Pasquino, Parisi 1977). From this perspective, allegiance vote should be very different from patronage and clientelism. To the opposite, some authors define “ideological patronage” as a network of relations which ties groups and individuals with a specific party on ideological basis (Van Bienen, 1958).

Rather than seeing the above-said strategies as discrete and self-exclusive, actors often deploy mixed strategies, which achieve mixed results. The several concepts are more the extremes in a continuum than fixed and unchangeable categories. Now, we just have to offer a synthetic outline of the definitions of the different types of personal vote hitherto described. First, the relevant actors in clientelist organization are candidates and elected officials, who distribute selective benefits, money and services in exchange for electoral support. Patronage, conversely, is more centered on parties, which search electoral and financial support in return for their intermediation with the national government, to distribute selective benefits and ad-hoc legislation – the so-called “legging” (Golden 2003). Lastly, constituency service is mainly carried out by elected officials, citizens, and lobbies. In this case, the object of the exchange is electoral support and public endorsement in exchange for territorial benefits and support and aid for individual constituents living in the precinct.

3.5 *Charismatic personal vote*

The last stage of this literature review will be used to describe a type of personal vote which, in contrast with constituency service, patronage, and clientelism, is less often found in this thesis. In this case, a candidate is voted according to his personal charisma and his competence and expertise. While this type of personal vote can be found both at the local

and at the national level, leadership operates in different ways in each level. The national leader is appreciated because of his communicative skills, for his capacity to connect with public opinion (Noelle-Neumann 2002), while local leaders are chosen mainly on the ground of their competencies and expertise, and the evaluation of a given candidate is more often based on failed or achieved results. The proposed distinction is not clear-cut because the two types of leaders can merge and overlap, thereby producing charismatic national leaders and competent local leaders. However, this distinction can still provide some insight into the different mechanisms at play in determining charismatic leadership. Weber (1922) provided the first noteworthy definition of a charismatic leader: he is the one who perceives, and is perceived as having a “mission,” a “high task” to perform, unknown to anyone but the leader himself. Cavalli (1996) focused, instead, on the “certainty” that the leader produces on his constituency: the belief of being the only one capable of changing reality for the better. This belief on the side of electors is mirrored by the “internal” certainty of the leader about his capacities: he is confident and ready for the battle because he is the first to believe in his unicity. Charisma, hence, is the first feature of a leader with a double certainty (Cavalli 1996). This belief, in turn, allows the charismatic leader to establish a connection with different social strata by touching various, often irrational strings. However, charisma seems to be much more complicated than how it has been described so far: it involves i) the communicative and relational capacity of the leader; ii) the performative capability of the leader (Barisione 2006); iii) the symbolic role that the leader might assume by assembling values and political stances (Barisione, 2006 104-109). In turn, these elements allow the leader to engender a sense of belonging and mobilization of supporters.

The literature on charismatic leaders, especially since TV and mass media entered the political scene, has always been concerned with populism and its connection with charisma. In Italy, for example, a new breed of strong populist leaders emerged principally in the 1990s, alongside with parties having a strong personal connotation in their leaders, such as Italia dei Valori (Di Pietro), Lega Nord (Bossi) and others (Tarchi 2015). While a full-fledged analysis of the concept of charisma is beyond the scope of this research, it is important to remark that a charisma-based personal vote exists and that this type of personal vote is more based on emotional, rather than rational evaluation. Rather than on expected benefits, the charismatic personal vote is due to different assessments of the candidate himself and his virtues. As said before, the charismatic talents of a leader can be only one among many drivers of personal vote: especially in local elections, where popularity and visibility are measured in narrow and small contexts, other elements may

very likely become decisive. Local elections show that, very often, the public image of a leader regarding competencies and personal virtues (hence not concerning charisma) might be the single most important variable to decide an election. Barisione (2006) provided a ten-fold typology of leaders based on the characteristics upon which each type of leader builds his public image: i) the Manager is the ideal-type of the leader that addresses a demand for efficiency coming from his constituency, hence constituting a less ideological and a more administrative type of leader. Also, ii) the Outsider is characterized by the performativity of his figure, in contrast with candidates coming from the establishment. The iii) Post-identitary leader, moreover, goes beyond the right-left axis and positions himself as a mere problem-solver, who is fit for every situation and evaluates action each time in an unbiased way (Barisione, 2006, 113-118). One can often find empirical examples which fit into the ideal-types of leaders who are characterized by their competencies and virtues and not by their charisma. First, Guazzaloca in the “red” city of Bologna, tried to depict himself as the independent, non-partisan leader who could change the city, despite him being the candidate of a center-right coalition and not having a particularly widespread reputation or visibility in Bologna. Besides this well-known case, there are many other examples in Italian local politics, where the competencies and skills of the candidates played a stronger role than charisma and emotional reactions, notably where problems of mismanagement are particularly acute.

This section has pointed out charisma and competencies of leaders as defining features of, respectively, national and local politics. However, boundaries are always difficult to draw: quite often the local/national and the charisma/competence dyads intertwine and overlap. Nicola Vendola, for example, spent years to establish a public image of himself as a radical leader, a man “against” the status quo. Moreover, the former Communist Re-foundation MP employed a baroque, almost poetic discourse which made himself recognizable, to the left. However, the charisma deriving from the “first” Vendola provided the foundation upon which to build “another” Vendola, especially during the 2010 campaign for re-election: this new figure relied more on his capacity to deliver higher levels of growth than the rest of southern Italy (Barisione 2006). Vendola’s second campaign, hence, was more concerned with policies and results – such as the maintenance of the aqueduct network, or encouraging people from Apulia, who studied outside the region to come back to work. This transformation from a charismatic leader of the left to a competent and skilled administrator is opposite from the conversion performed by Matteo Renzi. The current President of the Council, in fact, launched his public image as a confident, efficient man, belon-

ging to the “class” of mayors, i.e. of that breed of politicians and civil servants who “get their hands dirty” to deliver immediate answers to their constituency’s urgent needs. The founding element of his campaign to “wreck” old politics and old Democratic Party’s leaders was this commitment to be the “Mayor of Italy”. Guazzaloca’s, Vendola’s and Renzi’s stories show that the meaning of concepts such as charismatic and competent leaders might fluctuate over time and space. However, the examples of Guazzaloca, Vendola and Penati are not sufficient to reconstruct the true dimension of the role that personalization of politics and leadership played in the last years in terms of voting choices. These three examples, in fact, are almost isolated cases and symptoms of a shift in the electors’ and candidates’ choices. Yet, they do not suffice to describe a more general tendency in voting behaviors.

Especially in the last years, many authors devoted attention to the role that leaders perform on their parties, and on their electoral performance (Shugart 2000). A common theme across western democracies is the role that individual leaders play in i) strengthening the executive; ii) exerting authority over their party, and iii) achieving electoral results (Poguntke and Webb 2005). This phenomenon is most intense in presidential systems, where personalism plays a crucial role. Karvonen (2010) specifically focused on the influence of leaders on the electoral performance of their parties. He studies the effects of the party-leader relationship in 25 democracies, obtaining unexpected results: first, despite an overall growth in the importance of leaders in voters’ choices, it is not possible to retrieve an unambiguous trend in this respect (Karvonen, 2010, pp 98-105). Second, it is easy to foresee that the leadership plays different roles in different settings. Hence, while in the UK and Sweden there is a clear growth in personalization over time (especially through an analysis of mass media), in other cases this trend is much weaker, if not absent altogether (Karvonen 2010). Italy shows some similarities with UK and Sweden: through an analysis of the last few decades, it is evident that the salience of leadership in terms of electoral performance has grown significantly throughout the Second Republic, after the collapse of the old political system and the birth of new, strongly personalist parties such as Forza Italia – PDL (Garzia 2011). However, this trend does not seem to have completely supplanted the traditional identification of voters with a party, based on its platform and its stance on specific issues. Overall, while the Italian case seems to point towards a waxing importance of leaders in achieving electoral results, it is important to notice that this tendency does not seem to be predominant in orienting voting choices, especially when it comes to national leaders.

CHAPTER IV

Structure and method of the research

In the following pages, the methodological choices which underpin the present thesis, will be explained and motivated as thoroughly as possible. This elucidation will ameliorate the internal consistency of the results and make the outline of said results clearer. This study is informed by a qualitative methodological framework, and by the choice of semi-structured interviews as the primary tool for inquiry. The qualitative approach, which will be further explained later in this chapter, is especially suitable to unpack ambiguous and elusive determinants of personal vote. For example, the motives that encourage voters to cast personal votes: as this project aims to show, these considerations can be directed towards expected universalist benefits. The complexity of the purpose and object of the present research hampers the capability of quantitative methods to flesh out the determinants of the personal vote. Semi-structured interviews, conversely, are particularly fit to the current research, due to the little standardization of questions and answers, and to the low directivity: they allow for a flexible list of questions and for follow-ups, hence allowing one to navigate diverse interview settings. These preliminary considerations solidly grounded the other choices about the geographical delimitation of the case study and the selection of the interviewees. This chapter will tackle these and other methodological problems in due course, and for each of them, a research diary will be provided with extracts from both real-time notes and subsequent reflections. Both the two groups of methodological issues equally influenced strategies and choices and, in turn, the results and their interpretation. As a matter of fact, the sampling strategy and the geographical delimitation of the case studies were both planned well in advance. In this way, interview strategies were better organized and, in the end, more efficient. Alternatives have been put in place in case one or more interviews were made unfeasible due to lack of time, problems in interviewee-interviewer communication, or due to logistical challenges such as uncomfortable or unfit locations. For instance, most of the 64 interviews were programmed in advance, through either direct or indirect connections with the interviewees, and that the unfolding of the conversations was “imagined” in advance before setting up the

interviews. Conversely, if we consider obstacles in fieri, most of the times the researcher had to respond to them in real time. A substantial share of all successful interviews (around 20%) was organized on site, with various degrees of “improvisation”, even though they always adhered to the rigor and quality standards which informed the other interviews. To conclude, the present chapter will mainly focus on the *a priori* methodological criteria, while treating the other issues in a less systematic, though still deep way.

4.1 *A qualitative research method: semi-structured interviews*

It is now important to outline the research tools and the strategies employed in conducting the interviews and to justify the choice of semi-structured interviews as the leading research method. Semi-structured interviews are loosely standardized when it comes to the list of questions, and this enhances the non-directivity of this method in a beneficial way (Demaziere 1997, Bichi 2002). While conducting semi-structured interviews, the interviewer will have a loosely defined set of open questions, each of which supported by follow-up questions. The list of questions employed in this study is somewhat a “classical”, handbook version of a qualitative semi-structured interview. The three chosen questions follow a “funnel” design: each of the items aims to be more detailed and accurate than the previous one. Follow-up questions are placed in between questions, to bring back the conversation to relevant topics, to stimulate the discussion, to encourage the interviewee to flesh out some of the points and so forth. However, semi-structured interviews can only be justified by demonstrating their suitability to tackle the chosen research question, as compared to other possible methods. The question that animates this research is to prove the existence, in southern Italian voters, of a kind of personal vote driven by universalist motives. The small degree of standardization of semi-structured interviews allows the interviewer to follow logical pathways during the meeting, in turn, avoiding repetition if a given question was already answered, and allowing the researcher to perform more in-depth follow-ups than “hence,” “thus”, and so forth (Demaziere 1997). More in specific, interviewees were encouraged by using stories and narrations (Marradi 2005), i.e. by referring to news and events connected to the local political system (some neighboring cities, for example, were about to elect their local councils). While citing this news and events, one

need constantly beware of adopting a value-free approach, so as not to alter in any way the interviewees' accounts of their voting choices. These and other "expedients" are necessary due to the various and diverse interview settings and the different patterns followed by the different conversations. In any case, while drawing upon different theoretical and methodological refinements of the semi-structured interview, the nature of the list of questions used here is traditional: it conceded the researcher a substantial degree of freedom while preserving a minimum necessary level of standardization, to make interviews comparable with each other.

All in all, semi-structured interviews are the most suitable research method to address the central research question from the vantage point of the interviewees, of their perceptions of reality and their take on the proposed topic. While analyzing the answers in search for the presence of a personal vote oriented towards universalist benefits, the questions were never phrased in a probing way (which is typical of surveys), and the questions did not intend to confirm a given hypothesis. In line with the guiding principles of a qualitative study and of semi-structured interviews, participants were free to explain their point of view. Most importantly, their accounts were not conflated with objective facts: rather, these accounts are performative determinants of subjective realities, which constitute but one of many ways in which the same phenomenon can be interpreted and described.

As outlined before, semi-structured interviews are a knowledge route based on trust between the interviewer and the interviewee. The nature of semi-structured interviews provides freedom and flexibility in writing the list of questions and in the ways in which questions are asked. Moreover, and in relation to other forms of interviews such as participant observation, semi-structured interviews carry several beneficial features and may be an extraordinary research method, for it entails i) a high level of rapport between interviewer and interviewee; ii) a high degree of reciprocity on the part of interviewer; iii) a non-hierarchical relationship (Bryman, 2008, 495-496). The lack of hierarchy between interviewer and interviewee was especially necessary for the success of most of the interviews.

4.2 *One or many Souths? Dimensions of heterogeneity and the City-Periphery Divide.*

To study a type of personal vote driven by universalist benefits, the South of Italy was a compelling choice due to the widespread diffusion of personal voting in this geographical region. However, the South ought not to be considered monolithically (regardless of the theoretical stance of the researcher such as the structuralist and culturalist ones, as noted in previous chapters). Already in the 1970s and 80s, research has shown that political choices differ across provinces concerning ethical issues (such as abortion), or gendered preferential and personal voting. Turnout in 1981 general elections, as compared with 1979 general elections, was 21% lower in Crotona, Reggio Calabria, and Naples. On the other side, between 16% and 20%, fewer people voted in Avellino, Benevento, Cosenza, Palermo, Trapani, Bari, and Lecce. Lastly, the number of voters turning out decreased less than 16% in Enna, Siracusa and Taranto (Cartocci 1987, 493). It is interesting to see the data above in couple with the number of personal preferences as a share of all votes received by the Christian Democracy in 1979. Said share was higher than 41% in Reggio Calabria, Palermo, Messina, Trapani, Crotona, Cosenza, Catanzaro, Agrigento, Lecce, Bari, Foggia, Napoli and Avellino. Conversely, Christian Democrats in Enna, Siracusa, Caserta and Taranto voted for individual candidates in 40% of the cases or less. Hence, there are “many Souths”, and many different electoral environments within the area commonly labeled as “South” or “Mezzogiorno”. After all, the geographical and demographic size of the areas involved suggests some healthy skepticism when using just one label to describe a complex territory: for example, Campania and Sicily are, respectively, the 3rd and 4th biggest regions by population and 11th and 1st regions by surface, while Apulia and Calabria might not embrace as many people (Apulia is 8th nation-wide, while Calabria is 10th), or being as vast (Apulia is 7th, Calabria is 10th). However useful these data might be, they ought to be read together with data on fluxes, i.e. the ones which show intra-country migrations, especially the ones from the South to the North of Italy. For example, let us examine the diachronic analysis of the variations in population in the four regions under analysis (Apulia, Campania, Calabria and Sicily) during the last ten years:

TAB 2 local population in Campania, Calabria, Apulia and Sicily 2005-2015.
Source (ISTAT 2015)

| REGIONI | POPOLAZIONE RESIDENTE 2005 | POPOLAZIONE RESIDENTE 2015 |
|----------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| CAMPANIA | 5790929 | 5861529 |
| PUGLIA | 4071518 | 4090105 |
| CALABRIA | 2004415 | 1976631 |
| SICILIA | 5017212 | 5092080 |

The overall demographic trend is not uniform across regions, despite being downwards for the whole of Mezzogiorno. The two biggest regions kept constant or incremented their population up to 7,000 units per year, and Apulia grows in terms of, especially in the last seven years. Conversely, Calabria is most intensively affected by a decrease in its residents which is big in size and constant through time: it is hard to imagine that this trend can be inverted in the near future.

While demographic and socio-economic data are unique to each region and contribute differentiating among them, these indicators are not the only ones that depict Mezzogiorno's complexity. Indeed, after having decided that at least the four biggest regions of Mezzogiorno should be included in the study, the subsequent methodological problem was to choose which territories within each of the four regions to select for conducting fieldwork and for performing interviews. The difference between urban centers and provinces was especially important: as Lipset and Rokkan have widely demonstrated, the dialectics between cities and countryside constitutes a significant political cleavage in determining party and political systems (Lipset e Rokkan 1967). More in general, the conflict between the center as a focal point for policies and resources, and the periphery understood as a neglected space in the policy making process, has always been a well-studied topic in political science literature. Hence, the most rational choice was to include, within the sample of interviewees, people from both big urban agglomerations – such as region and province capitals – and the countryside around said conurbations.

TAB 2 interview local area

| LUOGO | NUMERO INTERVISTE |
|--|--------------------------|
| BENEVENTO (CAMPANIA) | 8 |
| REINO, CIRCELLO (BENEVENTO) | 6 |
| NAPOLI (CAMPANIA) | 9 |
| GIUGLIANO, FRATTAMAGGIORE (NA) | 7 |
| BARI (PUGLIA) | 5 |
| MASSAFRA (Taranto) | 6 |
| SIRACUSA (SICILIA) | 7 |
| PALERMO (SICILIA) | 7 |
| LOCRI, SIDERNO, GIOISA, GIRIFALCO (CALABRIA) | 10 |

Arguably, both the reach and the population density of a given territory has paramount implications for the relationship between electors and elected officials, both during the electoral campaign and, most importantly, in the aftermath of an election and between two elections. The interviews, in fact, show a profoundly different approach towards public offices by electors:

“Yes ... after the elections I follow the doings of the politicians, but through informal channels ... yes, such as the assessor’s staff or in public meetings, in my case in particular the urbanistic and infrastructures assessor”¹ (I 43).

“Daniele? Yes ... that is a boy, we voted for him, but I don’t think he’s that good, he’s too strongly influenced by his father, when I meet him on the street, I tell him ‘Daniè, take care of your city’”² (I 37).

The two fragments tell two different stories about how politicians are approached and confronted, which are influenced by territorial-specific dimensions and determinants. I 43, on one side, utilizes informal meetings to get in touch with the portion of civil service which interests her the most (urbanistic, since Anna studies Architecture) or, at most, she employs “informal” channels with the staff of the relevant assessor. Antonietta, on the other side, lives in the outskirts of Naples, and she uses more direct, informal and personal channels to get in touch with local politicians (Daniele is the Mayor of Frattamaggiore), thereby constructing a direct approach which influences and conditions a personal acquaintance in electoral and other terms. These are obviously only some of the many ways in which local communities differ from each other: an exhaustive depiction of all the differences is beyond the scope of this thesis, as it would involve an elaborate account of the present and historical social, economic and cultural condition of the Italian Mezzogiorno. For example, by excluding “objective” dimensions and including more sophisticated nuances, it is possible to discover profound differences within the social fabric of each region and each province in the South of Italy. For example, the concept of social capital, as defined by several indicators, it is possible to delve deeper and navigate the archipelago of the “many Souths”. The starting point will be a system of four indicators proposed by Cartocci (2012, 6) and calculated for the 103 Italian provinces.

Tab 2.1 : provinces with maximum, minimum and median levels of social capital index, and of the single independent indicators (Index numbers: Italy=100). All the indicators were measured between 1999 and 2001 Source (Cartocci, R. 200) *Mappe del tesoro: atlante del capitale sociale in Italia*)

Tabella 1 Le province con i valori massimi, minimi e mediani sull'indice di capitale sociale e sui singoli indicatori (Numeri indice: Italia=100). Tutti gli indicatori rilevati tra il 1999 e il 2001

| | Diffusione dei giornali | Partecipazione elettorale | Società sportive | Donazioni sangue | Indice finale di capitale sociale |
|---------------------|--|---|---|---|--|
| Massimo | Trieste 225 Bolzano 210 Parma 208 Genova 202 Piacenza 201 | Bologna 127 Reggio Em. 126 Modena 125 Ferrara 124 Ravenna 121 | Aosta 172 Cuneo 169 Pisa 164 Livorno 162 Pistoia 162 | Ravenna 208 Ragusa 191 Siena 169 Mantova 166 Parma 165 | Parma 151 Mantova 144 Piacenza 142 Trieste 142 Bologna 140 |
| 1° quartile | Cagliari 130 | Ancona 109 | Parma 119 | Belluno 123 | Trento 116 |
| Mediana | Biella 99 | Varese 102 | Trento 102 | Aosta 97 | Pavia 104 |
| 3° quartile | Catania 60 | Sondrio 91 | Siracusa 82 | Caltanissetta 74 | Isernia 79 |
| Minimo | Campobasso 33 Potenza 29 Agrigento 28 Foggia 25 Crotone 23 | Crotone 75 Enna 73 Caltanissetta 73 Reggio 71 Agrigento 69 | Taranto 47 Caserta 47 Bari 38 Vibo Valentia 3 Napoli 31 | Benevento 45 Vibo Valentia 43 Caserta 42 Enna 35 Potenza 34 | Crotone 55 Caserta 53 Napoli 53 Enna 51 Vibo Valentia 50 |
| Campo di variazione | 202 | 58 | 141 | 174 | 101 |

The indicators employed by Cartocci (2007) should be considered as forming two couples. First, the diffusion of newspapers and levels of electoral participation together show the degree of connection and involvement between ordinary people and politics. Second, the diffusion of sports clubs and blood donors provide the *oblativ* dimension of solidarity, i.e. the propensity to bear costs for others. It is apparent that the provinces of the South crowd into the last quartile in all the indicators, while center-north regions completely fill the uppermost quartile. However, quite substantial differences in scores both between and within regions remind us not to treat the whole of the South as a uniform body, but rather as a complex universe with striking internal differences which, in turn, arguably condition politics and the relationship between electors and elected.

4.3 *Sampling and contacting interviewees*

After the geographical delimitation of the case studies, another significant problem was the size and internal composition of the sample, and how to meet the interviewees. The final choice was for a purpose sample, composed of 64 participants, divided according to some variables and all predisposed towards personal voting. The socio-demo-

graphic variables which led the selection of the interviewees were:

- Gender: male or female.
- Age: 19-30; 30-60; 60+.
- Education: Middle school, high school, degree.
- Political orientation: self-assessed positioning on the left-right spectrum.

By observing the final sample outlined at the end of this sub-chapter, it is apparent that the way in which the sample is structured, for reasons inherent to the research purpose, only partially resembles the list above of variables, even though the need to produce a purpose sample was mainly respected. For some of these dimensions such as gender and age, it was not difficult to obtain the necessary data, for said pieces of information are relatively “cheap” to attain and, for the interviewee, to give. The other two data, i.e. the highest education received to date and the self-positioning in the political spectrum, were considerably harder to obtain. In particular, it was hard for the intermediaries to evaluate effectively the interviewees’ propensity to personal vote: it is arduous to obtain that information without disclosing the purpose, aim, and focus of the research, the questions, and other elements which could influence the responses. For this reason, no question was asked about whether the interviewee liked personal vote or not. Rather, this propensity was indirectly evaluated during the interview itself, while bearing in mind that the vast majority of the voters in the South regularly make use of personal preferences to cast ballots. This strategy allowed performing more in-depth conversations, in which personal voting emerged as an “unaware,” subconscious electoral behavior. Some dialogues, for example, stressed an unintended personalization of the vote, such as in the case of Apulia, where boys and girls (mostly to the left of the spectrum) evidenced a double phenomenon. On the one side, they provided a narration of politics as a collective movement, grounded in the importance of structured political parties, with constant references to the Communist Party and, more in general, to an “old world” where the party community was the elective place for politics and activism. Vis-à-vis this “idealist” depiction, most of the transcripts show a complementary reference to individual politicians, disembedded from parties and structures, where the name of Vendola (who, after the Communist Refoundation Party never had an actual partisan allegiance), Grillo, and Berlusconi were cited often, while Left and Freedom, the 5 Stars Movement or Forza Italy were never directly mentioned. Concerning the highest education received by interviewees, there clearly was a veil of pride and shame to overcome, especially in the cases where respondents only achieved middle school grades or lower. In these cases, the rule of thumb was not to insist and to try to obtain this information through

other channels, so as not to compromise the trust between interviewer and interviewee and, hence, the success of the interview itself. Similarly, the self-collocation on the left to right spectrum was obtained in unobtrusive ways by giving complete freedom to the interviewee to collocate themselves as center-left, center-right, left, right, or center. Also, in this case, there were problems to overcome because many respondents, especially less intensely politicized, who struggled to position themselves, and this for two reasons. First, of all due to their high propensity to vote, specific candidates, regardless of their individual partisan and coalition allegiance. Also, in this case, the proposed solution was to desist from asking. Second, politics is currently understood in “liquid,” fluid terms, which make some say that “left and right... matter no more”, hence making people less eager to collocate themselves to the right, center or left of the political battleground. Unobtrusive approaches were always preferred to invasive ones, with the downturn of interviewing more people than initially planned and subsequently discarding unsuccessful ones, rather than risking to break the trust bond with the respondent. In fact, asking someone their political orientation, the education and, sometimes, even their age brought about diffidence, with the interviewees perceiving themselves more like a test subject in a lab than as an active agent in the scientific research process. This discretion in both the conduct of the interviews and in the selection of the participants significantly helped to delve deeper into the relevant topics and to approach more smoothly some sensitive issues such as the relationship of the partakers with candidates and elected officials. Moreover, most of the interviews were conducted straight after the very first meeting with the interviewer: hence, most of the participants were naturally suspicious. Only the youngest interviewees were more open also due to the age proximity with the interviewer. In some cases, some degree of reticence was necessary for the interviewee not to foresee the type of questions that were about to be asked and, in turn, not to hinder the sincerity of the answers. This approach from the interviewer, especially towards the most suspicious participants, generated a distance which was bridged by biding time and “breaking the ice” with more personal interactions at the beginning of the conversation, with no direct references to the questions or the purpose of the study (having a coffee and a walk, or discussing about the territory). Trust was crucial from the start, especially to avoid evasive or listless answers. Results, however, have been erratic: sometimes the wall of mistrust was not broken, especially with people with lower levels of political sophistication. More in general, the process of building trust with the interviewees was influenced by the types of contacts employed: the sample was created out of the suggestions of thirteen intermediaries who contacted

the prospective interviewees and organized them, to facilitate the interviewer's tasks.

4.4 *Intermediaries and their role*

The construction of the sample, as said in the introduction, was a wearying task both scientifically (the process of identification of the participants in the different territories) and organizationally. Considering the vast reach of the area under investigation, and the need to differentiate between subjects coming from urban or rural contexts, it was necessary a collaboration and a joint effort with a network of intermediaries on the field. These people were a constant reference point for the interviewer: thanks to them, it was possible to differentiate the sample internally, hence avoiding biases concerning, for example, political orientation and education. Even more important, the paramount role these intermediaries played was to convey and transfer trust in the interviewer to the interviewees, thus facilitating the task of the former and, indeed, making the research possible. Arguably, said intermediaries were not a research team, nor were they qualified to conduct social science research: for this reason, the interviewer did not share with them all the information concerning the scope, aim, and focus of the research. Confidentiality was, of course, more or less stringent according to specific needs: in some cases, one intermediary needed more information to convince a prospective participant. Hence, the process was divided into two phases: first, intermediaries were contacted through telephone. Subsequently, a draft of the interview was formulated for each territory, and appointments were arranged. Then, during fieldwork, the intermediaries either accompanied the interviewer or, in some cases, the researcher made directly contact with the interviewee. After the first contact, the interviewer asked for other people who could be willing to participate in the research, following a "snowball sampling method" (Bryman 2015). As said above, the presence of a direct contact on the field made many interviews more straightforward. Often the intermediary had i) a strong influence on the participant(s), which made the latter more relaxed and willing to speak with the interviewer. In other cases, ii) the intermediary and the participant were acquainted with each other so that the friendship tie was to some degree "transferred" from the intermediary to the interviewer. Lastly, iii) intermediaries have sometimes asked coworkers or relatives to participate, which made the study benefit from the informal and affective nature of family bonds and their effectiveness in conveying trust. Despite the constant usefulness of the

intermediaries, some situations did not happen to be successful, maybe due to a dearth in the interviewer’s handling of the interview. In other cases, the interviewee might have decided to participate in order not to disappoint the intermediary, while still preserving a skeptical attitude towards the interviewer.

Finally, and before presenting the sample of participants, it is worth mentioning that the intermediaries were not involved in the interviews themselves, even when this engendered clear disappointment in the intermediaries. This precaution was necessary in order not to involve interviewees in the research process too much, for fear of insincerity in their answer, with an overall detriment of the results.

TAB 2.3 Synthetic Scheme of the contacts on the field employed during the interviewing process

| PLACE | INTERMEDIARIES |
|--|---|
| BENEVENTO (CAMPANIA) | Antonio (C1) |
| REINO, CIRCELLO (BENEVENTO) | Antonio (C1) |
| NAPLES (CAMPANIA) | Antonio C. (C2), Andrea P (C3) |
| GIUGLIANO, FRATTAMAGGIORE (NAPLES) | Antonio C. (C2), Antonietta (C4) |
| BARI (APULIA) | Alessandro (C5) |
| MASSAFRA (TARANTO, APULIA) | Barbara (C6) |
| SIRACUSA (SICILY) | Damiano (C7), Silvia (C8), Alessio (C9) |
| PALERMO (SICILY) | Pina (C10) |
| LOCRI, SIDERNO, GIOISA, GIRIFALCO (CALABRIA) | Rosa (C11), Vito (C12), Giuseppe (C13) |

Lastly, here the synthesis of the whole sample is provided, with a letter and a number assigned to each interviewee that identifies them throughout the text. In the Appendices, moreover, the diary kept during the fieldwork will be provided, with considerations and reflections taken down right after the interviews. Especially when reading the transcription of the interviews again, this diary has proved itself useful in bringing back hints and observations which are “fresh” right after a conversation, but which get lost in a very short span of time afterward.

TAB 2.4 Respondents involved in research path.

| Name | Area | Gender | Age | Political orientation | Education |
|-----------------|----------|--------|-----|-----------------------|------------------|
| BRUNO (I 1) | SIRACUSA | M | 46 | M5S | MEDIA SUPE-RIORE |
| GIOVANNI I (2) | SIRACUSA | M | 42 | CS | LAUREA |
| DONATELLO I (3) | SIRACUSA | M | 53 | CS | MEDIA INFERIORE |
| | | | | | |

| | | | | | |
|------------------|----------------------------|---|----|----|----------------------|
| FORTUNATO I (4) | PALERMO | M | 48 | D | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| DON FEMIA I (5) | LOCRI (RC) | M | 76 | C | SEMINARIO |
| GIANCARLO I (6) | BARI | M | 23 | CD | STUD. UNIVERS. |
| CHIARA I (7) | BENEVENTO | F | 21 | | STUD. UNIVERS. |
| GIANNI I (8) | SIRACUSA | M | 61 | CS | MEDIA SUPERIORE |
| CARMELA I (9) | FRATTAMAG- GIORE (NA) | F | 48 | CS | MEDIA INFERIORE |
| GIOVANNI I (10) | MASSAFRA (TA) | M | 31 | CD | MEDIA SUPERIORE |
| CARLA (I 11) | MASSAFRA (TA) | F | 65 | CS | LAUREA |
| ING SESSA I (12) | SIRACUSA | M | 73 | CD | LAUREA |
| FRANCESCO I (13) | GIOIOSA (RC) | M | 61 | CS | ELEMENTARI |
| IRENE I (14) | ROCCELLA JONICA (RC) | F | 47 | CS | LAUREA |
| FRANCESCA (I 15) | PALERMO | F | 46 | | LAUREA |
| GABRIELE I (16) | CIRCELLI (BE- NEVENTO) | M | 32 | | LAUREA |
| EMANUELE I (17) | MASSAFRA (TA) | M | 74 | C | MEDIA SUPERIORE |
| MARIOLINA I (18) | PALERMO | F | 57 | CS | MEDIA SUPERIORE |
| DORA I (19) | ROCCELLA JONICA (RC) | F | 71 | C | LAUREA |
| MASSIMO I (20) | MASSAFRA (TA) | M | 42 | CD | LAUREA |
| MARIA I (21) | REINO (BENEVENTO) | F | 31 | CD | MEDIA SUPERIORE |
| MARISA I (22) | GIOIOSA (RC) | F | 62 | | MEDIA INFERIORE |
| MICHELE I (23) | BARI | M | 21 | S | STUD. UNIVERS. |
| LOREDANA I (24) | SIRACUSA | F | 64 | CD | MEDIA SUPERIORE |
| MINO (I 25) | MASSAFRA (TA) | M | 53 | | MEDIA INDERIORE |
| GERARDO (I 26) | BENEVENTO | M | 62 | | ELEMENTARI |
| PATRIZIA (I 27) | GIOIOSA SUPE- RORE (RC) | F | 56 | CS | MEDIA SUPERIORE |
| ANTONIO 2 (I 28) | GIUGLIANO (NA) | M | 21 | CS | STUD. |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------|------------------------------|---|----|----|----------------------|
| ROSANNA (I 29) | GIRIFALCO (CZ) | F | 28 | S | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| ANTONELLA (I 30) | MISILMENI (PA) | F | 34 | | MEDIA INFE- RIORE |
| PROF ALLOTTA (I 31) | PALERMO | F | 53 | CD | LAUREA |
| ORNELLA (I 32) | BENEVENTO | F | 48 | | MEDIA INFE- RIORE |
| SALVATORE (I 33) | SIRACUSA | M | 61 | | MEDIA INFE- RIORE |
| ANGELO (I 34) | SIRACUSA | M | 71 | C | MEDIA SUPE- RIORI |
| ANNARITA (I 35) | NAPOLI | F | 27 | CS | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| DOMENICO (I 36) | FRATTAMAG- GIORE (NA) | M | 53 | CS | LAUREA |
| ANTONIETTA (I 37) | FRATTAMAG- GIORE (NA) | F | 47 | | MEDIA INFE- RIORE |
| ANGELO (I 38) | BENEVENTO | M | 51 | C | MEDIA INFE- RIORE |
| ANNA (I 39) | MASSAFRA (TA) | F | 42 | | LAUREA |
| ANTONIO (I 40) | GIUGLIANO (NA) | M | 21 | CS | STUD. UNI- VERS. |
| ALESSANDRO (41) | SIRACUSA | M | 37 | CS | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| ALESSANDRA -42 | BARI | F | 27 | S | LAUREA |
| ANNA (I 43) | NAPOLI | F | 23 | | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| ENRICO (I 44) | NAPOLI | M | 33 | S | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| GIOVANNI (I 45) | REINO (BENE- VENTO) | M | 32 | | LAUREA |
| VINCENZO (I 46) | GIOIA TAURO (REGGIO C.) | M | 51 | CD | MEDIA INFE- RIORE |
| BRUNO (I 47) | GIOIOSA (REG- GIO C.) | M | 34 | | MEDIA INFE- RIORE |
| CAMILLA (I 48) | CORATO (BARI) | F | 20 | CS | STUD |
| TOMMASO (I 49) | FRATTAMAG- GIORE (NAPOLI) | M | 52 | CS | MEDIA |
| GIUSEPPE (I 50) | ROCCELLA J. (REGGIO C.) | M | 56 | | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| ALBERTO (I 51) | BENEVENTO | M | 23 | | STUD. UNI- VERS. |
| ANTONIO (I 52) | BENEVENTO | M | 30 | D | LAUREA |
| EMANUELA (I 53) | CIRCELLO (BE- NEVENTO) | F | 27 | CS | LAUREA |

| | | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------------------------|---|----|----|----------------------|
| LUCIA (I 54) | SIRACUSA | F | 64 | D | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| GIUSEPPE (I 55) | PALERMO | M | 61 | | ELEMENTARI |
| BEATRICE (I 56) | MASSAFRA (TA) | F | 35 | CD | LAUREA |
| MARIA LUCE (I 57) | SIRACUSA | F | 67 | S | LAUREA |
| MARIA GIOR- GIA (I 58) | BARI | F | 26 | S | STUD. UNI- VERS. |
| REMO (I 59) | REINO (BENE- VENTO) | M | 52 | | MEDIA INFE- RIORE |
| SARA (I 60) | BARI | F | 21 | S | STUD. UNI- VERS. |
| SALVATORE (I 61) | PIETRALCINA (BENEVENTO) | M | 34 | C | STUD-PRECA- RIO |
| TINA -62 | MASSAFRA (TA) | F | 57 | CS | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| STEFANIA (I 63) | MASSAFRA (TA) | F | 35 | | LAUREA |
| AGOSTINO (I 64) | ROCCELLA J. (RC) | M | 54 | D | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |
| IVANO (I 65) | MASSAFRA (TA) | M | 38 | S | MEDIA SUPE- RIORE |

4.5 *The interview guide.*

Once having defined the sampling criteria, it is also important to determine the tools of inquiry and, hence, the strategies adopted in conducting the interviews. As said above, the method utilized here was the semi-structured interview. As it is known, semi-structured interviews are characterized by a low level of standardization and the marginally directive nature of the questions (Bichi 2002). Said otherwise, the interviewer used a scheme of open-ended questions, with some follow-ups to delve deeper into the matter when it is considered important. This project favored a “traditional” approach to semi-structured interviews, as the list of questions comprised three open questioned organized as a “funnel”: each question goes deeper than the previous into the subject matter. Several follow-up questions were asked between the main items of the interview: some of which had the aim of keeping the focus when the conversation went off-topic, while others have the purpose of stimulating the discussion. However, to justify the adoption of semi-structured interviews as the prominent research method, one should weight up the capacity of this approach to deliver a satisfactory answer to the research question at hand. The interrogative which inspires this investigation, in fact, concerns the existence of personal vote choices,

among southern voters, which are driven by universalist benefits. The purpose of semi-structured interviews, hence, has been the one to test this hypothesis through open-ended questions. The low level of standardization of the semi-structured interview allowed the interviewer to follow logical paths during the conversation while avoiding repetition when the interviewee had already answered, and providing the interviewer with more articulated references to other topics than the normal “thus,” “hence” and so forth. In some cases, interviewees were stimulated, e.g. by referring to fragments of news and anecdotes connected to the local community and territory, such as in some towns and cities where local elections had just been held. This reference to narrative structures was used to stimulate the interviewees’ responsiveness, while always keeping a value-free approach to the matter, in order not to engender in the interviewee a fear of judgment. These and other expedients afforded by the semi-structured interview method were employed to tackle diverse and variegated types of setting where the meetings took place. While drawing upon other types of interviews, the nature of the proposed question grid is a “traditional” version of the semi-structured interview. While remaining elastic and non-directive, the questions kept some degree of standardization, to make results comparable with each other and to provide useful insights to address the central research question. All in all, the semi-structured interview was evaluated according to the viewpoint of the interviewee, his/her perceptions of reality and the proposed topic. While still searching for clues of the existence of a universalist personal vote in the accounts provided by respondents, the interviews were never probing (such as in surveys), and they were not directly aimed at confirming a pre-set hypothesis. Rather, in line with the characteristics of the semi-structured (and non-directive) interview, the interviewee was free to tell his/her story, without checking the truth in his/her statements. Moreover, the utterances of the participants were not treated as a primary source of an objective reality, but rather as performative elements of a subjective reality which constitute only one of many ways of interpreting the same phenomenon. As outlined above, the semi-structured interview is understood, first of all, as a knowledge path grounded in trust between participants and the interviewer. Let us outline, then, the questions the interviewer asked the participants:

Question 1: “What is the function of politics, in your view? And what should it deal with?”

Follow-up: Do you keep yourself informed about politics? How? Through which media?

Question 2: “Which feature of a political leader does attract you? Which relations do you have with politics?”

Follow-up: What inspires you? Do you have personal examples of your relation with politics?

Question 3: “What do you expect from politics, concerning your condition and the one of your community?”

Follow-up: if elections were held now, what would you expect from, and ask a candidate? Do you check what has been done by representatives since the last elections? Do you have any anecdote to tell?

The first question is generic and introductory, and it aims at scrutinizing the degree of political sophistication of the participant which, as said in previous chapters, is a paramount determinant of personal voting and its motives. This first question and its open-ended nature, proved to be extremely fruitful, as many participants started long dissertations from the suggestions given by the question, and they often answered several of the key points of the subsequent questions without being asked. In some respect, especially in the successful interviews, the first query was a sort of an “ice-breaker”, often providing participants with an excuse to let off steam and pressure and to be sincere. On the other side, follow-ups served the purpose to bring the conversation back on its original track. In other cases, due to the lack of willingness to talk to some participants, or due to their little political sophistication, follow-ups were crucial to trigger the conversation, to keep it going or to establish the trust bond between interviewee and interviewer.

The second question, in line with the “funnel” structure of the interview, unpacks the personal and individual relation between a voter and a politician, weighs the intensity and the strength of it, and assesses the influence that this connection plays in determining the viewpoint of the interviewee. This question tried to confirm the hypothesis that personal voting is a widespread habit among the southern electorate. As we shall see in due course, there is plenty of evidence that personal voting is a peculiarly “Southern” political behavior. Especially the second question facilitated the distinction between different types of personalism diffused among voters especially in combination with the follow-up questions about personal anecdotes and examples.

Lastly, the third item clearly focused on discovering the existence of a personal vote driven by universalist expectations. Naturally, this question relies on the others, and once again the limited directive nature of the semi-structured interview permits to get closer and closer to the final question in a dialogical way. Also in this last case, follow-up questions were paramount in that they helped the participant to organi-

ze their ideas and exposition. Sometimes even silence helped the free expression of concepts, especially since the last question, more than the other two, relied on the subjective narrative and discourse provided by the interviewee. Among all the questions, the third is the most personal in nature, since it guides the respondent towards more critical reflections on the surrounding social context but, at the same time, this question demands a more constructive answer, which is not always easy to provide. More in specific, one cannot fail to take the different social realities which characterize the lived experiences of each of the participants into account. These social realities manifest themselves through their answers: problems such as youth unemployment, widespread wrongdoings, and lags in achieving economic development are but three of the many flaws of the territories under study. Asking about expectations towards politics and individual politicians also meant inquiring into ideas about the future: it is no coincidence that the answers differed widely depending on the individual participant, focusing on issues as diverse as, on the one side, a generic crave for honesty and, on the other, the refurbishing of the streets.

All the questions in the interview are, to some extent, open: some are more open than others, and this is apparent from the answers provided. Indeed, if one considers the first question, the answers given to it are strikingly homogeneous with each other: close to all participants envision politics as a “high,” “noble,” “collective” activity.

Interviewee 3 “Politics deals with the well-being of the polis”;

Interviewee 19 “Politics has to care about people...common and poor people, which are the majority”;

Interviewee 56 “Well, if we consider its etymology, politics means to govern the polis, the public good”.

On the contrary, and despite similarities in which they are phrased, answers to the third question are remarkably heterogeneous:

Interviewee 15 “I just wish for fewer taxes”.

Interviewee 60 “For example I pay taxes... I would like to have my street remade, so I don’t need to bring my car to the mechanic every month”.

Interviewee 45 “I would like to see vision in politicians... politics must be about a vision, an idea. Not just streets”.

The sequence of questions was another factor which influenced the answers. For example, asking about expectations after the trust-bu-

ilding path paved by the previous questions helped participants to feel free and a part of a strong trust bond, hence allowing more freedom and assertiveness in the last stage, when the path of knowledge and interpersonal relation was set and paved. However, said path was influenced not only by the sequence of the questions, but also by the way the interview was carried out, and this event-specific variation need to be accounted for.

4.6 *Directing the interview*

Along with the structure of the interview and the content of the individual questions, the way in which the interview was carried out, and hence the disposition of the interviewer towards it were paramount in establishing that connection with the participants that, as said above, is crucial to the success of each interview. All the interviews were realized by the same interviewer, so all the following consideration applies to the same person. First, concerning the circumstances and the unfolding of the research activity, it is worth mentioning again that an invaluable aid has been provided by the contacts on the field who acted as intermediaries with the participants. Moreover, concerning the theme of the personal vote, the researcher had the chance to immerse himself in the literature and to draw upon past studies on the electoral behavior of electors in the South of Italy.

The interviewer, thanks to its southern origin and his previous knowledge of local social and political phenomena typical to the South of Italy, was able to connect with the participants, hence making the conversation easier and offering a common, equal ground for dialogue to the informants. These elements which determined proximity with the interviewees allowed, in most of the cases, a sharing of the same social world and, in turn, deeper and more fruitful answers. In many cases, this exchange assumed the form of belonging to the same *categoria di situazione* (Bertaux 1999) because the interviewer shares not only a common geographical origin, but also a knowledge of the logics of action, transformative processes and social models typical to the southern society in Italy. This pre-knowledge has been critical to the success of the most delicate interviews, where the questions triggered personal reflections, references to real facts or to well-known local persons. Naturally, the sharing of a *categoria di situazione* requested a value-free approach by the interviewer, because the weight of his judgment on the reflections made by the participants would have hindered the achievement of profound and fruitful answers, alongside with a betrayal of the trust bond

with the participants themselves. In some interviews the respondent felt free to recount close-to-illegal events when the microphone was off or the meeting was ending. For example, some people told of illicit ways in which private houses were connected to the electricity power grid, of local politicians (giving names and surnames) who hired workers in cooperative companies to employ the same workers in their campaign, or of long queues of people awaiting the distribution of pasta in front of the house of a local politician in a working-class neighborhood in a famous southern city. The unfolding of the interviews, however, requested also to reassure the participant about the trustworthiness of the researcher and the rigor of the research: the allegiance to an academic institution encouraged the interviewees in this sense, but the greatest reassurance was the preservation of the anonymity of the participant. In many cases, in fact, several respondents asked for reassurance about the secret character of the research before delving deeper or providing more examples about sensitive topics, especially if referred to specific individuals. Finally, this fieldwork challenged the interviewer to face unforeseeable relational problems, which required immediate countermeasures and adaptation. Some of these issues derive from the day, place and personal disposition of the participants. Another variable is the time of the day: lunchtime is not as efficient as the late afternoon. Moreover, organizational needs required a tight schedule of interviews and a high degree of flexibility on the side of the interviewer, so that many of the conversations took place in private offices and houses, bars, clubs, trade union headquarters or hotel rooms. Despite the real difficulty in carrying out the interviews in such diverse settings, the interviewer always adopted a set of standards and behaviors apt to produce successful interviews. First, the interviews were always conducted without other people around, if compatible with the organizational needs. Second, the length of the interview was never smaller than 40 minutes. Third, when unforeseen events happened which hindered the connection between interviewer and participant (such as a phone call), the choice was always to stop and postpone the conversation. Fourth, whenever this was not in conflict with the intention to keep the aim and the purpose of the study confidential, the interviewer was always available and open to interactions, e.g. by using the breaks to discuss non-related topics, or by talking in the local dialect to facilitate the communication. As so described, the conduction of the interview resembles an ethno-sociological interview, and in some respects this claim is true: the attempt of the researcher to immerse himself in the world of each and every interview situation, the interaction with the contacts on the field, and more in general the connection established with the participants during the research process are all elements which allowed to go

beyond stereotypes and to enrich this research with new and additional questions. However, it is important to bear in mind that, despite a strong resemblance with an ethno-sociological research, this project remains clearly grounded in political science, and the focus is kept on the research question at all time throughout the research process. Arguably, many of the interviews prompted many reflections for additional avenues of research, e.g. about the paternalistic role that many voters assign to politics, the influence of widespread illegality or other insights emerged during the interviews which might be interesting, but not central to the project at hand. In conclusion, the extraordinary flexibility provided by semi-structured interviews and the open nature of the answers undoubtedly facilitated the establishment of a trust bond with the participants. On the other hand, the selection of this method also influenced the research and its findings, and were crucial in addressing the central research question: “Is there a kind of personal vote which is driven by universalist expectations?”

4.7 *Testing a prediction.*

A qualitative method for a post-positivist, perspective

Finally, some words are needed on the types of vote and the general aim of the research. This thesis focuses on the motives and expectations which drive and shape political behavior: for this reason, the question is ill-suited to be tackled through qualitative methods such as surveys. Qualitative methods, moreover, are not only useful to unpack ambiguous elements such as individual motives and expectations: these methods are also effective because of the interpretative approach towards social phenomena. This thesis, for example, could have proposed a typology of personal election behaviors, based on different types of vote emerged during the fieldwork (Demaziere 1997, Corbetta 2003). However, the choice adopted in this case, despite being qualitative, presents some elements in ostensible contradiction with each other. Most importantly, more than constructing a new typology of personal vote through the results of the interview, this paper recognized different types of electors according to their electoral choices, and then “placed” them within the typological matrix proposed in Tab 1.8. Hence, this research is not a case of a qualitative research oriented towards the inductive construction of types. Rather, this thesis is a post-positivist research which aims to test, more than a full-fledged theory, and the existence of one of the types of vote identified in the theoretical discussion and, in specific, the existence of a personal vote driven by universalist motives.

CHAPTER V

Vote orientation and expected benefits: the accounts of Southern voters.

5.1 Parties and leaders

In the following pages, I will outline the answer to the research question inspiring this thesis, i.e. whether there is a type of personal vote, which aims to obtain universal benefits. In specific, two couples of variables will be cross-analyzed: on the one side, the candidate-oriented vs. party-oriented vote and, on the other hand, the selective vs. universal character of the expected benefits. Each of the four intersections between different values of the two dichotomic variables will define one ideal-type of voting behavior. The depth and the breadth of the interviews cover various facets of the system of connections between politicians and voters, beyond the interval between one election and the other. The respondents point to the nature of the public space, i.e. the place where individual and collective opinions take form (Habermas 1964, Noelle-Neumann, 2002). Moreover, the transcripts of the conversations told us more about hope and despair, difficulties, and ambitions of the collection of communities which is the Mezzogiorno, which is often chronically poorer than the rest of the country. This research does not aim to go beyond its original purpose, but it would be impossible to tackle the proposed research question without considering what happens around and on the background of the political phenomena under direct study. This social milieu keeps on emerging in the words of the interviewees, and it becomes a qualifying element of the research, and the end of the Chapter will devote some words to that. Conversely, the primary target now is to describe and define the types of voting strategy emerged from the data collection and analysis, and their definition through the informants' words and accounts. This work is made more straightforward by the fourfold typology of voting behavior described in the theoretical Chapter. This typology will be the conceptual compass to navigate the research results and to make sense of them. First, the proposed typology differentiates among various degrees of personalization in voting. Personal vote and party vote may represent two poles on a conceptual continuum in which different voting behavior represent "shades" of both the two extremes. This section will cover the spectrum from party oriented vote-candidate oriented voted, and it will be enriched with further nuances, with references to scientific literature

if necessary

5.1.1 The party

The concept of party-oriented is set apart by the farthest distance from the ideal-type of the personal vote. Here are some fragments which testify the existence among the sample of respondent, of party-oriented voters:

I 2 (M, 48, civil servant): *“He (politician) should be animated not only by the purpose of representing the ones who supported it but also by the ambition of educating voters, I mean that if one receives some votes, he should not weigh them, because votes can also be the result of a sense of belonging, then I feel I belong to the ideals of one specific party, a movement, etc... Voting, for me, is the outcome of sharing the same ideals [...] the person should, more than anything, take his party’s heritage, and upholding it.”*

I 4 (M, 46, policeman): *“What was not lacking (in the 60s) was the sense of belonging to a movement, a political party, in which the leaders mirrored the historical phase, they embodied that feeling of belonging and they provided clear ideas and, after that, they could rule.”*

I 6 (M, 28, small entrepreneur) *“In the last 40 years, how often did we say this? The leader is the one who matters, always the leader and nothing good came from that. Let’s go back to ideas, to the political debate, center-right and center-left, and let’s stop talking names, Alessandro, etc., etc...”*

I 16 (M, 34, barman and news vendor): *“I speak honestly with you, no point in babbling about, at the end of the day nowadays you do not vote the person, it is almost impossible to me, you vote the party, the faction within that party, I mean in a town with 30-40 thousand inhabitants maybe you develop a face-to-face connection, you might end up trusting somebody, but if you go beyond a certain threshold in population, or at the national or regional level, it is impossible to trust someone 100%. Then you must choose the faction, not the person.”*

I 23 (M, 21, student): *“Maybe you expect that that person shares your view because you belong to the same party [...] he upholds everyone’s ideas, all in all, it does not matter as a person, then you only rely on him as a party member; you may make big mistakes if you just rely on him as a person, everything may turn out as it did in the European Parliament with Barbara Spinelli.”*

I 31 (F, 51, teacher): *“Of course, I decided to challenge myself, and I did it for what is right for the party because there still are some values which tell parties apart, even among center-right parties.”*

I 40 (M, 20, student): *“A politician matters in his day-to-day institutional activity insofar as he is the expression of his ideas and his party’s [...] the person acquires a weight of his own insofar as he manages to impose himself and his view within his party.”*

I 42 (F, 26, student): *“And look, the thought is important to me. In the sense that sure, the person helps, but people come after thoughts, after the common interest.”*

I 43 (F, 31, student-worker): *“Yes, at a national level I read the platform. First, I am more attentive to platforms and what ... let’s say the rationality of the party, the ideas of the party, but this holds up at the national level, the local level is different.”*

I 57 (F, 62, psychologist): *“It should be a means for high and noble aims and ideals, to transform dreams into reality, hence to have humanity at heart. [...] I mean not only thinking about technicalities but also to go beyond, to the future, to younger generations, to what we give them, to the environment, to the world where we live.”*

I 58 (F, 26, apprentice lawyer): *“When I enrolled in Communist Re-foundation, I was told that the party comes first and that the apparatus matters, then there are the cadres and leaders, and then people. Sure, people like Vendola contributed to the Apulia Spring to a tremendous extent, but I believe in collective processes, hence in parties and*

movements, not in individual processes.”

Respondents pointed out at least two important details: first, as it was foreseeable, the personal dimension, even in party-oriented voters, never entirely fades away, it rather seems less critical in determining electoral choices. On the other hand, the party-oriented vote ii) materializes through a vote to a person, who in turn plays the role of a “tool” for the aim of satisfying his party’s requests and proposals, its platform, and its ideas. The party-oriented vote, as emerged in the quoted conversations, is always different from the sense of belonging entailed by mass-membership parties typical of the XX century (Kirchheimer, 1966), despite some older interviewees mentioning the past generically, and the ideological and programmatic role of first-republic parties in Italy. Another paramount feature distinguishes between more or less “experienced” electors due to their age, and this is the constant reference to old ideas of political parties. Here are some examples:

I 3 (M, 53, community service): *“At that time there was Continuous Struggle (left-wing oriented party), now I do not recognize politics any longer. We distributed pamphlets, we volunteered for ideas, and I never accepted the logic ‘they skim money, but at least we all profit from that’, I’ve always been sick of that [...] I only wavered when Orlando run for Mayor [...] he was Christian Democracy, he was evil to me [...] but I wavered.”*

I 4 (M, 46, policeman): *“People matter within a system of ideas that represented their thoughts, and what was not lacking was the sense of belonging to a movement, those years were full of passion and celebrated people, Berlinguer for the Communist Party, Almirante for us (the Italian Social Movement, right-wing oriented party)) they were this, they embodied ideas.”*

All in all, those who have memories of the XX century make constant reference to lived experiences concerning the party as a structure, and hence the party-oriented and allegiance-oriented vote. Conversely, younger electors (aged 19-30), especially those more clearly oriented towards ideological vote, point out at something peculiar:

I 23 (M, 21, student): *“Sure people count, but only concerning the ideas upheld by the party ... as an expression of a platform ... Vendola, his personal use of poetry in politics,*

what he represents, all these things come before narrowly leaderist elements.”

I 44 (M, 35, unemployed): *“Sure parties mattered once ... they were places for education and personal growth, at this point one can do only so much, leaders are short-lived, and they cannot do much, they cannot put forth different ideas, I do not believe in the power of a single person [...] De Magistris for example can be a sound exception because he did something good, he created a movement.”*

I 42 (F, 26, student): *“Yes, I gave preferences among the candidates within the party list, but only for people who I knew shared my views, views which are the same as the party’s...parties are in a pitiful condition, Grillo is a false answer, Renzi’s Democratic Party is a right-leaning party nowadays, and even Vendola and his entourage damaged the left badly.”*

What strikes the eye most openly is the almost perfect identification between the pro-tempore leader of the party and the party itself: the 5 Star Movement “becomes” Grillo, Renzi “becomes” the Democratic Party, and so on. Less experienced voters, in short, seem “ideally” attached to an “old” idea of parties, of which they have but indirect memories, with no lived experiences, so that they collapsed parties with their leaders. Moreover, despite the strong “idealist” connotation of party-oriented voters, the individual dimension of leadership remains important even for more radical voters:

I 29 (F, 32, social worker): *“Philosophically, I am a communist, but more as a philosophy and as an ideology, meaning that I am a leftist, leaning towards Berlinguer’s communism; but if the party candidates an idiot I won’t vote for him [...] and then we decided to support that guy who was member of the Left Democrats ... because he seemed different ... So, I’m not as big a communist as Antonella ...”*

I 4 (M, 46, policeman): *“To me, who represents a party has at least to be competent and educated, we always searched for candidates with these characteristics, who could be distinguished because they were well-educated ... sometimes we didn’t like them, and I did not support them, even though it wasn’t an easy thing to do.”*

Once again, more ideology-oriented voters clearly show a strong sense of kinship with the party as a political community, but this attachment never disregards the role of the leader who upholds expectations when running for office. It is worth mentioning a seemingly marginal detail: the association between a system of ideas and a party is not direct but rather mediated by the candidate. It is the candidate who needs to live up to the values and ideas both when running for office and while working in representative assemblies, and the reputation of both the candidate and the party are closely linked (Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina 1987). This nuance is recounted by some transcripts, such as the following:

I 52 (M, 29, engineer and teacher): *“I have clear beliefs ...values mean everything to me, and they must be stable, non-negotiable values”* .

I 53 (F, 30, unemployed): *“Maybe we’re wrong because we lost track of those founding values, perhaps we want to do a lot of things but at the first time something stops working, we suddenly lose faith. We should go beyond many generations who shared this mode of thought based on compromise; we should bring back some values.”*

In summary, we could state that the idealist dimension of voting, as described in the words of southerner voters, has a cornerstone in the party as a synthesis of ideas and political beliefs, the party that satisfies the need for a rationality oriented towards action (Dawns 1957). Such ideas are more important for candidate-oriented voters who do not overlook the ideal and ethical dimension of voting, but who consider individual candidates as the appropriate answer for a synthesis. The ideological, party-oriented vote sometimes entails shades of personalism, in line with the territorial dimension which is so massively relevant in the Mezzogiorno. In turn, this personalism intensifies the propensity for personal voting, even in the presence of institutionalized and structured parties (D’Amato 1964, Cartocci 2012).

5.1.2 Party and Leader.

After the almost ideal-typical case of a party-oriented ideological vote, it is possible to distinguish an equilibrium where personalism and ideo-

logical basis of voting balance each other.

I 1 (M, 47, regional civil servant): *“For example, I speak about the 5 Star Movement, many people talk about it without knowing much, without knowing the extraordinary job that Grillo and his guys did, and since I read the platform and the internal by-laws, and since I look first-hand what they do, the money they invested in micro-entrepreneurship ... all in all, they’re not bad”*.

I 9 (F, 58, community service): *“D.B. I voted for him ...you know he is in the Democratic Party, and he’s young [...] and then, in the regional elections, who was that girl? Wait a moment ... oh yes Teresa, a good girl, they told us that she was in the Democratic Party, that she was supporting De Luca, so I voted for her”*.

I 11 (F, 60, retired): *“I have always been a socialist because I believed in freedom, tolerance, there was a lot of talking about Proudhon, and I arrived at less extreme, less Marxist positions ... then there was Craxi who was a real leader, I liked it, regardless of how everything turned out”*.

I 13 (M, 61, school janitor): *“So in my family we’ve always been communist ... as my father taught us ...in 1970 no less, we went in Reggio during the riots ... because we belonged to that lot [...] Ingrao represented equality and the rights and the duties, and we always followed him up to the point when he became President of the House, always supported him”*.

I 17 (M, 72, retired): *“I am a Christian Democrat, of the Morotean (nickname used for the party members very close to Aldo Moro) faction and even now I like defining myself in this way, I had this strong faith in the youth branch of the Cristian Democracy, we were driven by Moro’s idea of reconciling ourselves with what was on our left, to the center-left, since in the Christian Democracy Moro was undoubtedly more left-leaning than Fanfani.”*

I 20 (M, 43, lawyer): *“Yes, in 1994 I enrolled in Forza Italia because in the territory there was a good movement, and Berlusconi fascinated me as a man and as he presented*

himself, so I fell for the Italian miracle, and just picture yourself that we just came out of the ashes of Tangentopoli, Berlusconi represented something new, I was young to tell that he was Craxi's lieutenant, and yes, this, and there were some friends I knew in Forza Italia, and yes, in the end this was it."

I 26 (M, 67, retailer): *"No, I hardly go to vote, so sick of all these folks, these armchairs, these politicians ... maybe this year I will vote again, for the 5 Stars Movement, they do many good things, they give back money, in Benevento they bought the computers for the boys in the school, and that guy elected in Acerra, C.A. I think he's called ... he doesn't keep his salary; they're good lads and all."*

I 31 (F, 51, teacher): *"I believed and I volunteered for Fratelli D'Italia, especially for Giorgia Meloni, who I believe is competent and skilled, and she is close to my positions regarding platforms (...).*

I 46 (M, 51, school janitor): *"We in the family were always (Christian) Democrats, always voted for F.M. who did so many good things for the Plain (Gioia Tauro Valley), starting from hospitals and all the wards he brought to the Plain... nowadays no, I would struggle to tell you which parties there are, maybe the leaders yes ... but it's difficult ... compared with the past, I want to say when you went to the socialist and the communist sections."*

I 53 (F, 30, unemployed) *"I've always been to the center-left, yes I mean Democratic Party ... well but Bersani, I didn't like him that much, Renzi is better ... seems like he's doing more things, that he's more active for us young people, in fact despite being center-left, I betrayed the Democratic Party, but it was Bersani's fault, I didn't like him at all."*

Some specific elements tie all these quotes together. First, all the participants explicitly mention parties and leaders (both national and local), hence showing that both the party and the person can play an equal role when people cast their ballots. This result is not trivial because this kind of symmetry between allegiance vote and personal vote is not recounted either among party-oriented or candidate-oriented voters, as we shall

see shortly. Second, the relation between a party and its elected officials concerns all the parties, regardless of their left-to-right positioning on the political spectrum. More indirectly, one can spot both a quantitative increase in the frequency with which the party-candidate couple appears in each fragment of an interview and the qualitative change in the party-candidate nexus. Manifestly, all the answers underline the mutual correlation between the party's and the candidate's reputation, so that one affects the other and vice versa (Cain, Ferejhon, Fiorina 1987). This dynamic, in turn, changes shape and character through time (old and new parties) and space (national and local leaders). The First Republic is mentioned for its parties and leaders, when political parties were significantly more influential and structured, both in the institutions and in society at large. Especially, those respondents who mention these political dynamics of the First Republic underscore between personal vote and allegiance vote is more important, accepted and desirable. Moreover, the overlapping between ideals and strong leaders able to uphold them recurs in many conversations. This particular group of voters belongs to a former political system, which is still clearly depicted in the experience of older electors, in which the role of the party together with the function of the candidate are both essential, especially during election season (Fenno 1978). Having said this, the party maintains a strong central position in the participants' word. In other cases, the link between a leader and his party is weaker or bland. Thus, the head of the party becomes stronger compared to the political community of the members. In this scenario, the party appears as a direct derivation from the leader. For example, in one of the fragments, the Democratic Party is indeed depicted as two different organizations, respectively Bersani's and Renzi's varieties of the Democratic Party. Conversely, the 5 Stars Movement is named as "Grillo and his guys". The narratives contained in the interviews show a substantial shift in the way in which individual candidates relate to their parties, and how electors respond to this interaction (Mayhew 1974). As parties weaken and crumble, personalism grows stronger. More in detail, one easily notices that most of the mentioned leaders are national, well-known figures, whose names become more and more known, as these leaders become part of the spectacularization of politics. This process of increasing relevance of mass media invested Italian politics from the 1980s onwards (Barisione 2007, Mazzoleni 2012), hence making party leaders media leaders more than pure politicians. Lastly, let us consider the balance between opposite orientations of the electors, i.e. either towards a party or individual candidates. The causal nexus between the former and the latter is not univocal: there is no obvious answer as to whether the candidate or the party are paramount in determining the final voting choice, despite

some respondent trying to provide a reply.

I 37 (F, 57, lsu) *“No, I won’t ever vote for a center-right candidate, even if he’s great, I’d rather have both my hand chopped off.”*

I 29 (F, 32, social worker) *“But I give you an example ... I wouldn’t vote for the right even if the candidate is completely respectable.”*

I 29 (F, 32, social worker) *“sure ... what do I do, do I vote for the first idiot just because he’s leftist? No, people matter.”*

Despite some interviewees mentioning a loose list of priorities, there is no apparent general “rule”. Probably the ideological dimension, even when combined with a central candidate, is more important than the rest, but the fieldwork did not confirm this claim.

5.1.3 *Leader*

Personal vote attitude was significantly higher among the respondents who, throughout the interview, positioned the person at the center of their voting choices. It is apparent that this group of individuals is the clear majority of the selected sample. On the other hand, southern voters always had a strong predisposition towards personal electoral relations and, in fact, this is the reason why the existence of a universalist personal vote is tested precisely among southern electors. The first feature of the respondents within this subset is related too electoral personalism: in fact, while most of the electors are attentive towards individual candidates throughout the electoral campaign, it is also true that this candidate-oriented vote assumes different shapes in different contexts, as widely showed by several transcripts. However, in this section the relevant distinction is the one between:

- Personalization of competencies.
- Personalization of leadership.

The first group refers to the candidate according to his/her skills and competencies. Hence these voters consider themselves as capable of evaluating the specific abilities necessary to be a good policymaker. Personalization of competencies, hence, stands for a personal relation with a candidate which is grounded on the capability to achieve spe-

cific aims and objectives, and the candidate here resembles a manager more than a representative: he or she will be assessed on efficiency and effectiveness. (Barisione 2006). Conversely, personalization of leadership is different and, in some respects, opposite: voters, in this latter case, stress and underline charisma and leadership (Barisione 2006, Calise 2016) while overpassing skills. The second element concerns where to position the two voting choices on the party-oriented/candidate-oriented conceptual continuum. This thesis proposes to consider the influence of the personalization of competencies as weaker than the personalization of leadership, simply because the former is more concerned with results and less with communicative effects attached to the candidate's image (Barisione 2006). Here are some fragments which represent the typical response of voters oriented towards leaders' skills and capabilities.

I 4 (M, 46, policeman) *“A politician must be modest and skilled ... because you must earn the voters' trust ... so you politician must show that you are capable of pursuing and achieving results”*.

I 8 (M, 61, clerk) *“(the politician) ... must have competencies, must be knowledgeable, must show to be able to fight in the council, to know the mechanisms and the institutional machine ... maybe even then you cannot achieve anything ... because then you know the ones around you ... what they make you do ... but as a basis, you have to be competent”*.

I 12 (M, 70, entrepreneur) *“No ... I look for competent people, who stand up for their community, who know their community ... who make things, someone must show what he does for his neighborhood, who is concerned about the city's wellbeing, and a person who knows the territory and its problems”*.

I 14 (F, 48, teacher) *“Sure, I look at his CV, his experience, whether he is a politician or a manager, I'm interested to know what he can do, if he has already done anything ... also self-employed, I mean it's better not to pick an inexperienced boy who is then manipulated by someone stronger, someone above him”*.

I 17 (M, 72, retired) *“Surely the Honorable Moro, beyond chatter, brought ILVA to bring economic development and*

growth, because this was a troubled region ... it is not about talking; it is about solving problems ... I laugh when I hear talking about closing the ILVA ... in the 60s in Taranto there was 40% unemployment, people working in mines in France, in Belgium, and what did Moro do? He only solved the employment problem in a land on its knees, and then we had 40 years of welfare, and it was not predictable, my friend” .

I 20 (M, 41, lawyer) *“Yes, I’m not ashamed of telling it, Berlusconi in 1994 ... yeah I liked him, I thought that if he were a smart entrepreneur, then he would have done what was right for Italy, because clearly, he had skills, managerial skills” .*

I 24 (F, 64, clerk) *“Listen, the only person who I remember as a decent person is the regional assessor S. ... very knowledgeable, capable, with brilliant ideas, who created an artistic and cultural path on the value of myths, something fantastic, very helpful ... then he was rumored, but it’s better to have someone who is controversial but capable, then someone motionless and useless like Crocetta” .*

I 25 (M, 51, tourist operator) *“Sure I want to know what he did ... and then you see if he has failed in his mandate if he didn’t do anything for his constituency, who didn’t give any meaningful contribution and, all in all, if he showed to be, or be not capable of doing anything” .*

I 29 (F, 32, social worker) *“For example, a person who was available ... To tell some crap, someone who goes into a bar and lends a hand to those in need ... someone who sees the problem and tries to sort it out; in short someone grounded, who lives in reality” .*

I 35 (F, 27, student) *“I choose the less of two evils ... but in short I prefer the most grounded, concrete one, the one I know is not bullshitting me and can deliver on his promise, they taught me this in general, that the capable people, those who are competent do not just shout promises ... that then you cannot check if they delivered or not” .*

I 39 (F, 38, doctor in a public venue) *“No, sure people mat-*

ter ... but I like to judge them on what they do and for the staff they hire...with time I figured that this is imperative, I mean I used to be carried away by emotions, yes by the person but someone advised me, and I learnt to look at who the politician hires to run his campaign and his office, and based on that...yes you can understand a lot of things from staff” .

I 41 (M, 44, unemployed) *“[the candidate] should be able to be grounded in reality ... understand and sort out the problems of citizens’ everyday life, [candidates] should listen to these guys who have ideas, be attentive to them, be competent about their problems, giving them hints, I don’t know like ‘what you’re saying makes no sense’ or ‘this is a good idea’ ... but because you have the skills to do it, yes to tell it” .;*

I 50 (M, 54, entrepreneur) *“No no, no doubt the person who I think is capable, I evaluate all his life as far as I know about it, I don’t choose the party, because I want first and foremost a moderate and parties not always do these choices, I don’t have problems in naming the people who helped R.” .*

I 54 (F, 36, unemployed) *“To be able to solve ... I mean of living in reality and being capable of solving problems, they should perceive themselves as part of a community, more than senators, deputies of an institution called Parliament and then make laws for the common interest ... solving ordinary people’s problems” .*

The common elements in the provided answers all center on the theme of one candidate’s efficiency at problem-solving. Arguably, charisma and fascination in the leader’s persona leave room for more objective evaluations of a candidate’s skills as a problem solver (at least in the interviewees’ accounts, but we shall see in due course that there is quite a gap between words and deeds). The candidates described in the responses resemble managers with post-ideological features because problem-solving, and the capability to get things done ignore the ideological affiliation of one specific candidate (Barisione 2006, 114-117). Personalization of skills is, hence, focused on the qualities which are necessary for a candidate in performing his function, since he will be held accountable more for what he has done than for what he is. Mo-

reover, even when the applicant's personality matters, this is because of the personal history and biography of the candidate work as proofs of the necessary skills, or the lack thereof. The functional approach in choosing a candidate seems to derive from by a resent towards a political class which for many southerner voters, failed first and foremost as a ruling class, thereby producing a lag in economic development which, in some parts of the Mezzogiorno, looks unbridgeable. Older people tend to choose on the basis of the competences of an individual leader as a need for keeping candidates accountable, and as a response to a political system seems old and distant. In some respects, this phenomenon concurs in a broader process of "unfreezing" of electoral blocks which were typical of the First and Second Republic (D'Alimonte 2013). However, leafing through the interviews, one can also recognize the way in which younger voters assess capabilities, especially when well educated. In this case, the search for competent leaders seems to be more a general inclination than a consequence of the perceived inefficiency of the political system. While it is problematic to extrapolate general motives which orient votes according to the competencies of a candidate, the next chapter will delve deep into the expectations which accompany the act of voting. However, all the interviews show a shared need for capable leaders, to face up to a troublesome economic phase and a recent past of misgovernment. Moreover, voters who are more attentive to skills and competencies lack the desire for sympathy with the candidates, to find common ground with them, in short, to find shared values and beliefs such as justice, equality or honesty. The biggest difference between this latter group of respondents and the ones oriented by the personalization of leadership might be this: trust, humanity, and charisma are precisely the defining features of an appealing leader.

I 1 (M, 47, public employee in the Region) *"I mean Rita (Borsellino) made many mistakes but she never compromised herself, but she is left aside ...Salvo climbed higher, but for me, it's a disappointment, I mean surely I'll always be grateful to him for what he's done, but ... (Crocetta) no ...he is just wrong; he was not consistent"*

I 4 (M, 46, policeman) *"One that we voted for eagerly, and who is no longer with us, we supported him ...a good boy M.T., a person with bright ideas ... strong personality, he was too the child of an old manager of the Italian Social Movement, sadly a disgrace deprived us of his presence, but as long as he has been alive, we supported him"* .

I 9 (F, 58, LSU) *“We got to know her in the Union, and they introduced this girl to us ...sincerely I did not know anyone, and I said ‘OK, no problem’ and I voted for her frankly ... you know a very well-behaved girl, she made an excellent impression”* .

I 11 (F, 60, retired) *“Yes, all in all ...has to be a decent person, one you can trust, an honest, clean person, which is not very common in politics now, a clean person who then should administer a local community so, for example the healthcare assessor has to manage, I mean everyone has his role to play”* .

I 12 (M 70, entrepreneur) *“I remember Lombardi ... a young leader ... at the student dormitory he was able to impress, to inspire ... to exalt masses, I liked him, he gave speeches, back then there was also Emma Bonino, and she too was appreciated when I was a boy”* .

I 13 (M, 61, janitor) *“He was a good mayor and a good teacher ... I have wonderful memories of an outgoing person...as far as I remember, the mayor was not paid for his job back then, he did it for the good of the town, so he used to be a teacher in the morning and working in city hall in the afternoon, for example”* .

I 14 (F, 48, teacher) *“Craxi...they got rid of him ... because maybe he wanted to move too many things... but he was a leader, a strong leader, I liked him as a person, his ideas, I mean he was ... he left an impression on me, maybe because I was younger, so that was what I thought about the most”* .

I 15 (F 46, doctor) *“I repeat it, what takes me in is the contact, the direct knowledge of the person, I want to see whether he has a strong personality ... you might take me for a silly person, but for example, the Pope is a leader ... yes, the Pope, but not as the chief of the church, I mean as a leader ... in society ... I mean he talks to people”* .

I 19 (F 69, retired) *“I remember when we went to assemblies, we saw them (Christian Democracy’s MPs from our territory) a model. They told us things that fascinated us, and that impersonated our desires such as having a house,*

a family, our ideals, and we saw in them a warranty ... of reliability, of future, that warranty that is not provided today anymore” .

I 21 (F 26, teacher) *“I mean especially if he is from my same town ... also if he is in the Democratic Party ... but let’s say that, as I told, you, he has to convey a certain idea of justice, of equity and that he will do good things, I don’t care about the party, it’s enough that you will do good things for the people, for the area, then I don’t care about your color” .*

I 24 (F 64, clerk) *“That Di Maio ...he seems pretentious, and the Tuscan guy who always shows off ... instead, the President of the Republic is such a fantastic figure ... I like him, reliable, silent, serious, he inspires me with severity and professionalism, for sure he is not a braggart, the opposite of the Tuscan who always brags about” .*

I 25 (M, 51, tourist operator) *“Look, first comes trust and honesty, a candidate has to inspire me this, and I want to know as much as I can on his life ... because facts prove more than words, that he lives up to the challenge and he can be a guide for the community” .*

I 31 (F, 51, teacher) *“A leader that fascinates me ... who can captivate me, such as Meloni, I like her because she has this style, frank, fresh and young, and a good communication technique and yes ... the rhetoric, speaking in public, regardless if you deliver on what your promise, that is another matter, but rhetoric, damn it, counts a lot” .*

I 34 (M 74, retired) *“Let’s put it clear, in this time leadership is also important ... without strong leaders, even a bit authoritarian, it doesn’t work ... I mean you don’t go anywhere without it” .*

I 37 (F, 57 LSU) *“He has to be a simple, straightforward person ... how can I put it ... he has to move me, this is why I think that the old public speeches still need to be made nowadays, keeping contact with people, you need to look into their eyes, not on TV ... people like Enrico (Berlin-*

guer), such a great person, he was never angry, but he taught us things CRY INTERRUPTION” .

I 39 (F, 38, doctor in a public venue) *“Sure...Vendola I mean I understood his charisma, his linguistic style ... I would have kept on listening to him for hours ... yes I mean I was fascinated, I thought and I hoped that he would have become the leader of the Democratic Party, on the other side I like Renzi ... yes his dynamism and his immediateness of his communication style” .*

I 49 (M 57, unemployed) *“Mmmh ... how to say, a person has to be ... how to define ... has to inspire trust, meaning he has to be the honesty, an upright person, present in the territory as an active commitment no? As a duty, so consistent with what he actually says” .*

I 52 (M, 29 teacher) *“Honesty is a fundamental first step, but the candidate also has to have ideas, he needs to be capable and to have some honesty and personal dignity that allows him to present himself, I think with my mind, and I see him as a person to respect but who should never crush voters' dignity ... and then he also needs to have some charisma and knowing how to use it, a bit of sentiment, he has to warm hearts” .*

These fragments convey a strong predisposition towards personalism in politics, especially based on personal, character features of a leader's personality. The voter considers as indispensable some emotional elements such as trust, honesty, humanity and other features which, in some respects, transcend the skills proper to a politician, understood as an administrator of the public goods or as representing the interests of a given constituency. However, also, in this case, it is possible to point out different orientations towards personalization of the leader. As a matter of fact, in some accounts, the relationship between the leader and the voter is based on the former's capability to be a guide, an influential chief. This image of the chief is more “performing” (Barisione 2016, 116), meaning that the leader projects a solid image in the public space, that he can be a guide and to attract voters who are very sensitive to the image of a strong leader. Moreover, the interviewees are willing to delegate to this type of political leaders because voters recognize his outstanding leadership, his capacity to move and trigger emotions in voters, also thanks to an extraordinary ability to use mass media to

convey his message. In other interviews, the leader emerges as a rather different figure: his role is that of providing an example, a testimony of his being distinct from the very community he represents (Weber 1922, Barisione 2006). In this case, trust, honesty, uprightness and cleanliness are often referred to, and the relationship with the leader is less that of a super-delegation to a super-man, and more of identification of the voters with the leader, by finding common ground with him. In some respects, this kind of leadership seems to be less thought-through and more emotional, while still searching for identification between the qualities, values, and beliefs of the candidate and the ones of the individual voter. It is important to define what one believes to be his/her set of values and beliefs because some interviewees show a variable discrepancy between what said and what done.

I 26 (M, 67, retailer) *“What do I want? Honesty ... people who go there have, to be honest!!!” – “We won the allocation of a contract for the school canteen...but I only did it to help my brother ...I know that it was screwed up...you pay a bribe there, a gift here and to make money out of it, we needed to add milk and minced bread to the hamburgers, to increase the weight without adding too much meat” .*

I 51 (M 25, unemployed) *“Sure I mean they should be honest, come on I grew up with the myth of Borsellino” – “I think that M. and D.M. never created what is wrong in this territory...then sure what should you do? You have to cope with these people... and then, at most, if you make a mistake you’ll pay the price” .*

The purpose of this section is not to fact-check the honesty of the responses, but it is important to underline that the accounts unveil also the contradictions and discrepancies which are not surprising. What matters, however, is that these discrepancies between wishes and practices in real life, ought to be taken into consideration because they emerge from the very words and minds of the voters. The two sub-groups also differentiate for the orientation towards the elections, and for how they behave after the elections. Those voters who prioritize personalization of skills, on one side, and personalization of leadership, on the other, are differentiated on one more aspect:

I 39 (F, 38, doctor in a public venue) *“If I keep myself informed after the vote? ...mmmmh yes sure I follow in particular what happens to the problems...yes I mean if the*

situation improves” .

I 54 (F, 36, unemployed) “*Yes, sure I check them, especially on structural issues ... maybe not the very next day, I mean complex things do not ...*”

Voters who are more attentive to skills and competencies were also more sensitive to the actual deeds of a representative. Hence it was necessary for them to fact-check their actions after the elections. Naturally, one cannot infer a general rule that associates the “ex-post control” to the competence-oriented personal vote. However, it is still important to notice that the latter group of participants never refers to a need for a check on the behavior of the leader in office, not even after elections. If the first cluster of interviews showed a more rational relationship between the elector and the representative and considered the facts, in the second one the link seems to be exhausted in the emotional transport and charge that the leader can exert on the constituency.

5.2 *Universal and Selective Benefits in the Interviews*

In the first part of this chapter, we focused on the several different types of personalism. In this section, on the other side, the stress will be put on the nature of the benefits which are expected to come out from different voting choices, and which in turn orient voters towards one candidate or the other. While the first part of the chapter treated the various types of personalism as ideal-typical poles in a continuum, this section will take a different stance, for several reasons. First, the expected benefits are very diverse and vary between universal and high aims such as justice and equity, and much more particular objectives, such as a job or the remaking of a street. Second, interviews refer more often to universal benefits than to specific ones, and this gives a first tentative answer to the research question, i.e. the existence of a personal vote motivated by universal benefits. While a complete and ordered reply to the research question will emerge in due course, the next pages will focus on describing the types of benefits. This typology will entail a higher degree of abstraction, especially when question solicits the respondent to provide more detail to their account. As said before, the literature classifies expected benefits according to who can profit from them, and how much, i.e. based on the exclusiveness and subtractability of the gains. However, the responses do not follow this scheme, and it would be difficult to classify the answers according to the typology presented by the available literature (Ostrom, Gardner, Walker 1994,

Golden 2003). For this reason, we will proceed in a clear-cut way, by sharply differentiating between particular and universal benefits.

5.2.1 *Particularistic Benefits*

In this first group of interviews, we can recognize some of the characteristic elements of clientelism and, in some respects, also the principal features of the object of the political bargain between a candidate and a voter, as expected (and, in some cases, as obtained) by some voters:

I 33 (M, 62, redundant non-retired) *“Initially, I dealt with S.M., Christian Democrat, and during the worst period for me, because back then I used to work for a private company and I was in a great situation ... then I lost my job, and he came to me to give me my outstanding job ... I searched after every politician, to the left or the right. First, for myself, because I was unemployed and he used to say let’s meet in 15 days, and he used to help comrades for his career, yes him, Christian Democrat, gave jobs to comrades, it is true, I can sign that! He gave jobs to comrades. Hence we were his electors because we went to him because we needed a job”* .

I 45 (M, 34, unemployed) *“It is not the methods that I like, also because I know people who have been helped ... a little help, not an open-ended job contract. I was never offered this kind of job, something small after graduation if you want to give a consultancy for two or three months, something small eh, nothing significant...I know a friend of mine who worked a bit in the public office for mountain-care, a part-time job for 200/300 € a month eh...but no, I wasn’t offered crap”* .

I 51 (M, 21 student) *“I’m not surprised at all that someone from Benevento comes here and asks for a job, I’m not upset at all...”*

R: *“Really?”*

I 51 *“M. just responded to need. M. did not invent clien-*

telism in this city, whenever he created it. M. responded to need, a necessity; he reacted to poverty, D.M. did the same, N. did the same, arguably with different tools and in various ways” .

I 52 (M, 29 engineer and teacher) *“The former mayor, I did not ask for a job, he came to me. Now, I don’t know why he chose me, maybe because I supported him...I don’t know, but I didn’t beg for anything” .*

I 30 (F, 38, janitor) *“I would do it as well; I would ask if he can do anything for my husband ...yes and then I wonder ‘and the others?’ Because it is wrong, because my husband is not the only one...but meanwhile, I think ... than now we are in the save-yourself-if-you-can mood” .*

All the fragments would deserve a deep analysis since each response should be contextualized within their specific setting, to comprehend reality as depicted in each conversation. The most often recurring feature seems to be jobs and income, hence not a direct, monetary, *una tantum* benefit, but rather the search for a stable career. For sure jobs understood as particular benefits do not rule out other expected benefits: in fact, it is not uncommon to retrieve, in the words of the participants, lucid accounts of electoral bargains based on gasoline or pasta. Jobs, however, remains central because even in those voters who are motivated by universal benefits, jobs are central. When it comes to the individual career of one specific voter, two elements are crucial. First, the mechanism which connects a politician to a job opportunity is widely acknowledged and accepted by voters. What might change is the level of awareness of this connection so that, for example, I 33 has always had a clientelist relation, while for I 34 the need for a job derives from a protracted situation of unemployment, dating back from graduation. Second, jobs represent an answer to a no-way-out situation, and they are the last hope for many voters. It is very complex to convey the expressions, pauses, emphasis and all who comes into play in an interview. However, it is easy to spot how economic unrest, precarious life conditions and frustrated expectations for the future emerged, not always in an expressed way, throughout the interview, such as with informants 30, 45 and 33. Especially this last consideration might lead this research astray: it is the nature of particular benefits that is of interest here, and not the specific situations in which these needs emerge. However, it is impossible not to account for the specific, fine-grained differences between each interview situation. In many cases, the eco-

conomic hardship which is typical for many areas of the Mezzogiorno is called forth by interviewees, with some digressions about Equitalia, mortgages, and other everyday-life financial problems. The internal dynamics of the realities experienced by voters are beyond the scope of this research, yet it is impossible not to describe the context within which these phenomena unravel. The desperate search for a stable job precisely answers to the chronic lack of opportunities and to the severe economic conditions which characterized entire generations of southern voters.

5.2.2 *Universal Benefits*

As outlined above, universal benefits are the protagonist of electoral expectations of the clear majority of voters. Among the 64 interviews, at least 44 respondents provided universalist motives for their electoral choices. Also, in this case, we will concentrate on the nature of the universal benefits while leaving to the next chapter the considerations on the existence of a personal vote motivated by universal expected benefits. However, it is important to provide some premises to clarify the forthcoming concepts. First, the abundance of electors who seems to be motivated by universal aims might be artificially inflated by the social desirability of answering the questions for universal benefits (Corbetta 2003, Bryman 2008). In other words, some contradictions emerged in some interviews, yet for now we can only say that despite the potential social desirability bias in the answers, they seem to be mostly consistent and non-contrived. It is no coincidence, then, that jobs are a common theme for electors sensitive to particular and universal benefits alike. The second element concerns the classification of the different types of universal benefits, as described in the interviews or, as it would be more correct to say, the lack of said classification. In the next pages, it will become apparent that any definition of the benefits, e.g. based on a qualitative criterion – such as more or less universal benefits. For this reason, this work does not provide a sub-set of categories within the umbrella term of universal benefit. Instead, to facilitate the interpretation of the interviews, an analytical distinction will be proposed between programmatic universal benefits and ideal universal benefits, to distinguish between more concrete requests such as jobs (for everyone, for the youth, and so forth), and more idealist and value-charged expectations.

I 1(M, 47, clerk in the regional administration) “*For a start,*

a politician has to bring jobs, because I got interested in the study of the labor market, processes of globalization which concern everyone, to make a fridge...today they are made by robots” .

I 2 (M, 48, civil servant) *“Tourism, I would like that politicians of S. invested in tourism, also as an opportunity for cultural and educational exchanges. If we think about the Silicon Valley in the US, who’s there? People from all over the world, the globalization of culture” .*

I 3 (M 53, LSU) *“Bringing back labor rights, those rights that have been canceled, reinvesting in education that is now crumbling, from 2008 onwards, but it got even worse since Renzi is the President...that was worse, he destroyed everything in the few years he has been in office” .*

I 4 (M, 46, policeman) *“Considering that in the country, in this region, in this city the biggest problem is work, this being said the priority is to create jobs, even though I realize it’s hard, because here in Sicily there is this ‘permanent job’ culture, and this is something that penalized us a lot ... and then healthcare, because this is also a very sensitive topic, because my father in law was in Padova and was treated, and there is an abyss between their standards and the Sicilian standards” .*

I 5 (M, 73 priest) *“I would expect that (he) knew how to involve all the creative and active energies, such as universities, technical and scientific institutions, to write down the zone project, I mean now we are talking again about typicality, how do I figure out which are the starting points for new wealth if there is no one that tells me ‘this is the way’?” .*

I 6 (M, 28, small entrepreneur) *“An expediting of bureaucracy is needed, and all in all Apulia is the region in Italy that, in some respects, favored and caused the crisis, because in some way we fooled ourselves” .*

I 11 (F, 60, retired) *“First thing for me is jobs, then healthcare. Hospitals that work, the right to a healthy life, regardless of the latitude where you live and where you get*

sick” .

I 13 (M, 61, school janitor) *“First, creating jobs for young people, who do not know what to cling on to, and it isn’t right that our children, my children included, went away, with three kids I don’t have even one close to my house” .*

I 14 (F, 48, teacher) *“(Bringing back) services to the territory, that do not work anymore jobs for the youth, because otherwise all the negative things follow, such as crime and so on” .*

I 15 (F, 46, doctor) *“I’m interested in infrastructure; to make us all work better, that would already be an excellent aim. Without going into detail, I’m not talking about rubbish, we could make a lot of examples, but trying to change the image of the city. I say ok with creating jobs, but I think that we also have to invent jobs” .*

I 17 (M, 72, retired) *“Any initiative which favors employment, any initiative which creates jobs, any at all because the South and Taranto are dying because of this ...maybe the excessive propensity towards industrial development of Taranto has to be thought again, made compatible with other needs, but it’s not possible to see that every day someone arrives and makes up a new idea” .*

I 18 (F, 56, retail representative) *“It can be trivial, but jobs can give hope to young people, for example, I firmly believe in young people, young people who are starting again to love agriculture but with machinery and technology, so helping these youngsters who believe in organic agriculture” .*

I 19 (F, 69, retired) *“I would like that politicians were more attentive to the territory, because it looks very neglected, and there are no jobs, and those few jobs are so temporary and precarious that they don’t help society in living better, so there is a lot of crime because there are no jobs ... but tourism ... I mean at least a train that goes to Milan and to Turin and to Rome ...we’re cut out from the rest of the world” .*

I 20 (M, 43, lawyer) *“Yes, a different politics and to start*

now ... looking a bit to my job, considering the fiscal system, it has to be thrown away because the policy of raising the fiscal pressure is suicidal. We cannot fight against tax evasion I mean no shit, sorry for my French, if you increase fiscal pressure it's obvious” .

I 22 (F, 59, small retailer) *“They should do more practical things and help entrepreneurs, let's say in the construction industry because this sector is now stuck and there are too many taxes to pay, even for people who construct buildings for a living, there is the need for these people to get back to work” .*

I 23 (M, 21, student) *“I believe that the battle to fight should be the one for a universal basic income, but not of the kind proposed by Emiliano, which is a familist, insufficient policy, I mean a truly universal income” .*

I 24 (F 64, clerk) *“They should cut useless expenditures. They must get rid of them. Expenditures ... but this anyone can say it, any reasonable person, I'm just saying what everyone says” .*

I 26 (M, 67, retailer) *“The labor market has to work, jobs who are not nepotistic or based on connections, because of all the people with connections they just sit down and don't do shit. They just go there and waste their time ... streets are dirty, trash is not collected, they don't do anything because they avoid job. Order, reliability, professionalism, it's like family: if the head of the household does not provide a positive example, the whole family falls apart” .*

I 29 (F, 32, social worker) *“If we think about the Region I would like to be more vigilant about European Funds, which are divided among the regions and then invested, and Calabria did not participate because the MPs or the Regional Councilors ...for example if someone deals with social issues, for instance, social policy, has to look into it and see whether there is a fund for that, I mean really caring about the territory, about the region and the only thing I expect from any party is to think about citizens, using anything we have, instead of putting money in your pocket” .*

I 31(F, 51, teacher) *“First, prioritizing young people, so I think employment is a real plague, a new financial policy to provide new jobs because I think society depends on the jobs young people do”* .

I 35 (F, 27 student) *“Jobs are the top priority because it’s normal that when I, from Naples, I cannot find a job but I have to provide for my family. I will make do with the worst things (crimes), also because there are those who say I’d rather scrape by than surrender myself to dodgy things ... and then the quality of life, now I talk to you about Naples because I know it, and I assure you that going out at night ... it isn’t nice to go out at night and to see the military patrolling in front of the squares”* .

I 36 (M 52, doctor) *“The first thing that politicians have to do is to cut taxes, because of the fiscal pressure they say it’s at the same level, but inflation ate it up ... this is something that back in the 80s ... how did they call it? Oh yes, depreciation”* .

I 39 (F, 38, doctor in a public venue) *“I would like more attention towards the territory since our land is currently suffering from environmental problems, both at the local and the district level, because the town I live in, I mean now there is this issue to sort out (ILVA)”* .

I 40 (M, 20, student) *“For a start, I’d ask the Prime Minister to raise public expenditure. First and foremost, education, healthcare, infrastructure, since our country is lagging behind, especially in some areas like Calabria, Apulia, Sicily, the railroad for example”* .

I 41 (M, 44, unemployed) *“Things to do? For example, let’s get real ...on a hot issue, don’t go in circles, and the hot issue is always the same because people have to provide for their family, bring bread to the table, and the rest gets sorted out slowly, one step at a time ... when people work and provide, they also start to smile”* .

I 42 (F, 26, student) *“From my own experience, let’s say that culture is at the center of everything, let’s say in particular in this territory, and then culture as all-encompassing, so*

also thought as education, as access to culture events like movies, theaters, books and so on, for example in Barletta they have a good experiment on an education basic income” .

I 43 (F, 31, student-worker) *“From the top of my head... more incentives for youngsters, anything that helps me defining my life project, so opening a business, inventing something, producing something, and that they give me the opportunity of using public spaces, I mean like in Naples something I’d like is to have a list of the public areas at disposal and that the city hall makes them available” .*

I 44 (M, 35, unemployed) *“For example, I appreciated De Magistris because he improved tourism in Naples, and that was a huge improvement...there are friends of mine who settled down thanks to Airbnb” .*

I 46 (M, 51, school janitor) *“Top priorities are improving people’s quality of life, so sport, stadiums, bike lanes, pedestrian zones, parks and this kind of stuff” .*

I 47 (M 35, school janitor) *“In a civil country, there should be services, first thing...Streets, hospitals, schools and so. Then after that other things like the football stadium, as a stupid example, can wait” .*

I 50 (M, 54, entrepreneur) *“Two facilities...since there is an evolution of the environment, and Roccella obtained a lot of mentions for the investment on environment what? There is a purification facility? There is waste recycling, we do not have to throw away wet waste” .*

I 53 (F 30, unemployed) *“Maybe even a few connections with the city, we have very few connections, only a coach which passes by and makes a long journey, one is forced to use cars like to go to Naples because a two hours’ bus ride is huge ...politicians should focus on this” .*

I 55 (M 57, clochard) *“Having a better future...for a start, are you from Palermo? Ok then start doing things for Palermo, if he has this mentality, then he can do good things for these people” .*

I 56 (F 36, dentist) *“The other day I was talking to two friends of mine, both lesbian, about a problem I mean that now it is a national issue we were talking about the fact that they want a baby ...indeed politicians should sort these problems out ...because heterosexual people think this does not concern me, what do I care, but many suffer for this, and this is not fair”* .

I 57 (F, 62, psychologist) *“You politician have to tell me, before ‘I want to do this’, great dreams, great utopias, but then they organize the practice to achieve that aim, then they cannot think about the here and now, the emergency, not watch at anything else, because then you lose all the passion, politics becomes crisis, money, the mayor becomes a mere administrator ...and that’s not good”* .

I 60 (F 23, student) *“OK, for example, the first thing of the reallocation of seized Mafia properties or unused buildings, which in Bari are quite frequent, to give them to people who use them for habitation, but also to associations, cooperatives, institutions which can put them to the benefit of everyone”* .

What stands out from these quotes, as already said at the beginning of this section, is the heterogeneous nature of the expected universal benefits. Healthcare, jobs, cuts on taxes, and services like public transportation, hygiene, recreational, cultural centers: they all are the protagonists of the interviews, since they represent examples of common resources and public goods (Ostrom, Gardner, Walker 1994). Moreover the interviews revolve around two macro-themes: on the one side, the omnipresent theme of labor, which characterizes much of the responses and, on the other hand, the need for public services. Before going deeper into these topics, it is necessary to contextualize the answers. Jobs and services are the problems of the Mezzogiorno, and this should not surprise us very much, also considering the data presented in several studies on the South of Italy, which shed light on the chronic unemployment, especially the growing youth lack of occupation, as described by the latest official statistics.

5.2.3 *Labor*

Both universal and particular benefits revolve around the central role played by jobs and employment. The main difference is that labor understood as a public policy is considered, in general, hence not targeted on a specific person or family, which, conversely, was the case for the voters interested in achieving particular benefits. This distinction is paramount because it draws a line between reaching personal satisfaction, on one side and achieving common benefits on the other. This differentiation is even more necessary for employment, which is defined either as irreplaceable to avoid social marginalization, or as the principal way to conduct a decent life. Obviously, the request for jobs addressed at politicians takes different forms and shades. Jobs can be understood either as easy and quick to fulfill, or as more vague expectations of labor known as the consequence of a set of suitable conditions for employment. In this latter case, politicians are but one set of actors out of many which can ease the unemployment choke. Moreover, many interviews spend some time in defining priorities and pointing out industrial sectors (culture, green economy and so on), which should form the priorities for active policies for employment.

Last, it is important to define labor as the object of a political bargain between voters and candidates. We will take up this topic again in the last chapter but, for now, it is important to mention that labor and employment are considered, by the clear majority of interviewees, as only possible thanks to the conduct and choices of politicians. This inherently disempowering view concerning job creation reveals the complex nature of universal benefits which, in some cases might assume a parasitic nature, and in none of the transcriptions one gets the willingness to create a job or an opportunity without waiting for some help from above.

5.2.4 *Services and Healthcare*

Another set of themes revolves around the territory in which the services which insist. First and foremost, healthcare and the difficulty in accessing medications are often-recurring topics. More important still, the inadequate healthcare, or its lack altogether, are always put in comparison with the situation in the Center-North of Italy, where better services are in place, or at least this is conveyed by the accounts provided in the interviews. Besides the healthcare theme, many uni-

versal benefits expected by southerner voters concern transportation, specifically for those who live in the outskirts or the countryside around the major cities. Conversely, in big conurbations, the emphasis is often placed upon solid waste and its disposal, the lack of recreational spaces, especially for the youth. Many other cases explicitly mention territorial and environmental care, especially in some specific communities. For example, in Taranto, the ILVA theme recurs very often not only in the interviewees' words, but also as an omnipresent issue in the city. The alarming pollution indexes, tumors and cancers diffusion, and the dramatic sanitary conditions make the local population very sensitive to environmental complications since they form an integral part of the everyday life. All participants share the willingness to enjoy services on a collective basis, i.e. they are understood as universal rights and not exclusive privileges. Hence, politicians are requested to take charge of their management also because all citizens are also taxpayers. Also in the case of public transportation and services to individuals, there is a clear nexus between the lack of said services and the consequent need for them. In fact, even without a mention of the data concerning the infrastructural lag of the South, this is an all too well known issue for those who live in this part of Italy. Also in this case, different voters are endowed with different orientations on the matter: if elder voters trust politicians completely, meaning that they uncritically delegate to politicians the responsibility for success or failure of infrastructures such as a street or a highway, among younger electors there is a stronger need for proposing specific project, often connected to European funds (such as the FAS funds), which are seen as a particular opportunity which lawmakers should consider, and which they too often do not. In substance, the universal character of the expected benefits is connoted by some key elements which deeply shape the very universality of the benefit: first, jobs and services are primary needs in modern society, which in turn determine the degree of legitimacy of any democratic order. Arguably, constituents who are more sensitive to rights than to privileges tend to focus on personal realization (jobs) and wellbeing (services), and they ask for this when deciding which politician, understood as a policy maker, they will vote for. Moreover, universality of benefits is strongly linked to a sense of redemption from the subordinate position of the South vis-à-vis the North of Italy. The request for better services, notably healthcare, is strongly linked with a sense of "envy" towards northern regions. Many interviews stress the unacceptable discrepancy between the efficient hospitals in Veneto, Tuscany and Piedmont and the decrepit, useless and obsolete of the South. The underlying question is often "Why there and not here?" "Why are we not in Italy?" This aspect is paramount because it tells us about the need, perceived by

this set of participants, for a leap in the quality of life in the South as a whole, to produce a collective, universal emancipation.

Lastly, the universal character of some of the expected benefits assumes a more abstract nature. What is often asked, in fact, is an abstract sense of vision and strategy, the capacity of leading the way and not just the response to everyday material needs. These benefits, which we can define as idealist universal benefits, are considered as irreplaceable to solve the enormous problems of the southern territories, because the social context is often considered as irreparably corrupted, hence not amendable with limited and aimed interventions. In these cases, values such as legality and honesty are often referred to. In some respects, the voter-candidate relation is not grounded on tangible goods such as jobs and services, but rather on a narrative, an idea which can improve the conditions of an entire community, rather than its individual members. It is important to underline this feature of universal benefits because it outlines the diverse nature that universal benefits can assume. To expect a politician to be an efficient and effective problem solver, in fact, it is strikingly different from wanting an all-encompassing redemption of one's community and describing it as arid and lifeless.

CHAPTER VI

In their own words: three types of voters, and...

6.1 *Clientelism*

The former chapter unpacked the two dimensions outlined in Table (NUMBER)'s typology of voting behavior in relation to *universal vs. particular benefits* and *ideological vs. personal vote*. The interviewees' words corroborated said typology, in they described different degrees of personalism and the peculiarities of the several different types of personalism. Then, the chapter proceeded to analyze the nature of the expected benefits and to describe either their particularist or universalist nature. In this chapter, conversely, the aim will be to analyze the interviews through the above said typology. The words of the participants, hence, will be interpreted and pigeon-holed in accordance with the four types of voting behavior. In so doing, I will try to address the research question by showing the presence of a universalist personal vote. While a direct answer to the research question will emerge in the seventh chapter, in this part of the dissertation I will describe the other three types of votes, i.e. *clientelism*, *party-oriented vote*, and *patronage*. The first group under scrutiny regards voters in quadrant a) of the table. Among this group of the electorate, one or more sets of choices attached to voting were undoubtedly endowed with typical features of the clientelist bargain, as abundantly described in the literature (Caciagli 2006, Piattoni 2007, Golden 2003). Hence, personal relations are the cornerstone of the political bargain, whereby the client gives a vote in exchange for a particular and immediate benefit from the patron. However, each interview and interview situation comprehended unique features which deserve deeper unpacking.

6.1.1 Clientelism as a system

The following interview outlines a systemic clientelism, deeply embedded in the social context and, especially, with the labor market. From the words of the interviewee, it emerges a full consent to the universe of practices and behaviors in the social context, hence to the clientelist system as a useful instrument for both voters and candidates.

I 33 (M, 62, income-deprived early retiree): *“I dealt with, can I say the name?”*

R: *“Sure.”*

I 33: *“With S.M., Christian Democrat, elected president of Sicily, then charged for a dodgy deal over the industrial district, and in all my dark period, because I was fired. [...] I was working for a private company, and I was doing just fine, and he came for the famous position, and I saw how he thought, a rightist, then I also got to know other people to the left, and the last one to the right was once our assessor, F.G., who maybe was one to the left of the right so to say, because he did something always with his personal interest in mind.”*

R: *“Meaning?”*

I 33: *“Meaning, I don’t know, that he provided me some public funding for tourist structures, but then he indirectly imposed me the people I needed to hire. I am aware that this is a strong accusation.”*

R: *“What did you not like?”*

I 33: *“This discourse of imposing people in my company, it sounded like ‘I provided you with money, but now you have to give me a job.’ It’s a vicious circle, self-funding so to speak. I give money to you; you give them back to me. I don’t know; there was another politician I was on friendly terms with, because I am friend with everyone here, and everyone called him ‘Mr. 5%’.”*

R: “*Why?*”

I 33: “*Because he kept for himself 5% of every funding he provided.*”

The scenario which emerges from these words, is clearly a complex relational universe, which seems to work in a very natural and spontaneous way. The elements which deserve attention are several, but the clientelist nature of the electoral bargain is the most important one. The implicit bargain is between support from the client in exchange for job opportunities from the politician. Especially striking is the naturalness of said mechanism, which transforms the individual clientelist relationship into a systemic dynamic. Second, clientelism appears as systemic because of its closed nature, a “vicious circle,” as described by the interviewee, whereby the voter, after having secured the funding, has to share it with the other clients of the same politician. In other words, the interviewee does not describe a simple one-to-one relation between the voter and the candidate, but rather a multifold, multilayered system of connections where clients are forced to interact and divide a selective benefit, hence particularist in nature. In short, the clientelist system appears to be extraordinarily rooted, recognized and socially accepted from the interviewee: apart from some isolated passages of the interview, there are not critical remarks towards this system and, when they emerge, they are more connected to the wrong way of functioning of the system.

I 33 “*I chased after various politicians, left and right, for a job for me because I was unemployed. He would mock me and tell me ‘we’ll see each other in 15 days’, and for his career helped comrades, yes he, Christian Democrat, gave jobs to comrades, it is all true I can testify it, he gave jobs to comrades, but us, his electors so to speak, no [...] he thought these people with the hope of a job they’ll vote me, the others no.*”

Once again, the critique of this system is more concerned with the lousy way the system works. The evaluation of politicians is negative only regarding how jobs are distributed, where some choices are deemed to be unjust and unfair. This account, hence, strongly resembles the one testified by several studies on clientelism, and it shows how

such a system, when deeply rooted, becomes a long-term condition and not only connected to elections.

6.1.2 *Clientelism as authority over a territory*

The following interview is striking for two reasons: first, the clientelist phenomenon is widely acknowledged by the interviewee. Moreover, this phenomenon is not just merely accepted, but rather there is a more comprehensive positive evaluation of clientelism as a useful tool for governing a territory. In this interview, several elements are worth emphasis, but maybe the most proper comparison can be made with De Filippo's play "The Mayor of Rione Sanità."

I 51 *"I make an example from theatre plays because I see these people, there is this play by Eduardo De Filippo called "The Mayor of Rione Sanità," there is this guy in the neighborhood, Rione Sanità, who as a child committed some petty crimes [...] then one day he kills the chief who would always humiliate him, and through false witnesses manages to save himself, despite having killed in response to an injustice, and after that moment he keeps sorting out the problems in his neighborhood. What does this "Mayor" do? His home works as the stadium of a psychologist, a lawyer, a politician: he welcomes those in need, the victims of shark creditors, and thanks to his power he can sort out their problems. One needs to analyze this better, I see D.M., M. in my view is like the Mayor of Rione Sanità. I mean they are part of a corrupt system, even wrong, but thanks to their corrupt and wicked system, problems are solved."*

These last extracts describe clientelism as authority over a territory because they synthetically depict the fundamental of this complex relational universe. First, the patrons, hence the politicians, as the Mayor of Rione Sanità, ground their power on non-legal basis and this is acknowledged and accepted (Weber) first and foremost because this system allows regulating everyday life, solve problems and distribute wealth: all in all, the clientelist politician substitute himself to the State, while still representing it in his functions of an elected officer. This

system, while not based on a legal or legitimate basis, still seems to be working somehow, i.e. to answer to demands and expectations of the community, and it even appears to be following some meritocratic criteria.

I 51: "They answered to need."

R: "need."

I 51: "They gave answers to a district which was starving. I mean a southern city which suffers, always shadowed by Naples, by Avellino, by Salerno, which for all these years remained a peaceful oasis because of the simple fact that no one considered us, but at the same time, they were always peeking. They gave answers to need, I mean it's normal that a father, who has not a job, the head of the family, it's normal that he expresses this concern to a politician."

R: "Jobs are a sensitive issue, what does one do in these cases?"

I 51: "The state is very different from the private sector ... because in the first instance, you are an intermediary, in the second instance you're an entrepreneur ... I mean I call my friend in Ferrari and tell 'there's this engineer, do you want him?' I know perfectly well that he's a badass entrepreneur, he doesn't hire unworthy people ... they asked me a professional figure, and I individuated him, you knew him, and I said this is yours if you like, otherwise nothing, no hard feelings ... do you get what I mean?"

In substance, the capability of providing jobs is the instrument through which a clientelist system becomes active. Hence, the patron needs deliver on the promises of jobs; to be attentive to the needs of the highest possible number of clients, not only those – politically or personally – closer to the candidate. It is highly unlikely that such a system will be meritocratic because, no matter the moral considerations, the judgment of a politician on the skills and experiences of a person may always be faulty, even when inspired by noble aims. This power of the politician to choose who to hire, more than promoting meritocracy, seems to be a stratagem to justify a profoundly rooted system. This system seems to be the sole way to govern processes, as it is repeated

more than once throughout the interview, in particular when comparing different situations.

I 51: *“I mean, politics as an instrument to augment one’s professional power is wrong. Doing politics for these reasons is also wrong, but doing it to promote the wellbeing of your community is right. I don’t know what they’re doing, if they did it right or wrong, I only know that they influenced the processes, and this made Avellino stronger than us. They had a Prime Minister and a good local ruling class and everyone felt involved and empowered.”*

This competition with Avellino, who had in Ciriaco De Mita a strong local and national leader. In these abstracts, clientelism is a tool for the care of the territory and, hence, of the constituents who live in it. A detailed account of De Mita’s influence and authority in the Avellinese territory, and of the relative weakness of Sannio are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, this interviewee seems very impressed by the results obtained in Avellino, and he regrets not the system itself, but rather the fact that his district never had such vigorous and capable leaders. In some respects, the interviewee ascribes to clientelism not only illegal behaviors but also a beneficial care for the territory and its community, which would be missing if clientelism weren’t in place. Marginal areas like Sannio, where clientelism is not diffused, tend to become even more peripheral, to the advantage of more sizable communities like Naples or Salerno. Clientelism, hence, is here characterized as a systematic political structure which, despite not being based on traditional patterns of democratic legitimacy and legitimation, is still able to make the public administration work for a territory, protect it, especially in contexts where the state seems to be missing. As in De Filippo’s comedy, various local leaders are like many Mayors of Rione Sanità, and they are evaluated and appreciated for their capacity to deliver advantages and benefits to the territory and the people who work there.

I 51: *“I don’t know if De Mita stole anything if the money was flowing in Camorra’s direction ... I just know ...think about the highway Naples-Bari, which passes by Avellino through the mountains of Parteggio; going from Benevento to Naples, you used to spend half an hour doing that, now*

it's one hour and a half ... this means determining processes, meaning that you create two gateways in Avellino – East and West Avellino, between Tirreno and Adriatico seas – and then you buy gasoline in Avellino, you pay fees in Avellino, you give jobs to people in Avellino, and so on.”

The absence of a universal vision by a politician, in this interview, seems to be a genuinely alternative system. The local politician manages in a clientelist way the relationships with its constituency; then he tries to deliver benefits at the national level for his territory, by summing up two particularisms. First, voters are particularist in they do not aim for universal benefits, but rather they want to maximize their utility. On the other hand, politicians also seek for results, because they will bargain with the national government to favor their constituencies, even though this implies a disadvantage to the rest of the country. These two aspects reinforce clientelism in they legitimize it, and make it even preferable to other forms of authority over the territory. Moreover, voters have a direct connection with a candidate, and they can evaluate policy outcome in a very simple way.

Finally, some considerations on the age and features of the interviewee are necessary. In the case of systemic clientelism outlined above, the participant had a rather low level of education (middle school) and experimented clientelism for a long time (he was 68). Conversely, the second interviewee (and the next one) was 24, with only little political experience, and enrolled in a study program which forced him to be away from Sannio for long periods. This difference is significant because the legitimacy of clientelism is deeply diffused, even in people who experienced it only rarely and for short periods of time. Moreover, clientelism does not seem to be fought against by young people.

6.1.3 “Desperate” Clientelism

The last interview outlined here – which describe the presence of clientelist behavior – is somehow the most difficult to unpack. The interviewee is 34, a former student in a big city outside the region of provenience, and he is not very satisfied with having come back in the province of Benevento. The main difficulty in the interpretation of the interview is that clientelism was absent in most of the conversation. Rather, it seemed that the participant was deeply concerned with legality,

the formal correctness of political processes and, more in general, with a stress on justice as essential for the redemption of society.

I 45 (M, 34, unemployed): *“I think that ... for the community there is the need to do ...in some sense a connection with the other mayors in the area, with the several Councils, in order to create something which can be useful to our communities, like typical products, IGT, preserving the environment, for there is nothing here so...making oil refineries now they want to drill here in Sannio, searching for oil, and this kind of stuff damage and bring no benefit.”*

R: *“Is this an important theme for you?”*

I 45: *“Sure is. I give you an example: here in the area, but I think that also about the national government, one only thinks about contracts, infrastructure and that’s it, nothing more, there isn’t any different idea of progress, ecologic, investing in culture and arts. And then the consortia for olive tree and grapevine cultivation should be publicized, because our oil is just as good as the one produced in Tuscany, for example.”*

The most recurring theme is, hence, a need for a “clean society,” in strong opposition with the past, and the outline of an alternative model, something new that should be brought to the territory to make development sustainable and constant through time. Conversely, the methods used in the past are judged as flawed, especially concerning the environmental outcomes, which are an imperative theme for this interviewee. But the critique goes further than that.

I 45: *“I mean in Italy there has always been the push.”*

R: *“What?”*

I: *“The push, the little help, to place people in different jobs. Here, to have a job, one need a push, I know that this is dialect, but here we say it in this way.”*

R: *“And what do you think about it, sincerely?”*

I 45: *“Absolutely nothing. For sure there are many worthy*

people who have been placed in important places and they do their job well and all, but there are also a lot of individuals who do not deserve anything, and maybe a worthier person is unemployed. Then if there are individuals who need help and are in real distress ... if there are two jobs in the forest police and the mayor must choose, it's normal that the position goes to the one with two children, it's normal."

Here, shady practices are condemned since they damaged the territory and did not reward talent and merit. However, there is an indirect admission of politics as a response to those more in need, and from this moment on, the interview assumes an entirely different tone. It seems as if social desirability, which apparently informed the first part of the interview and influenced the first responses, fades away and gives room to personal condition and more serious answers. As abundantly said before, in many interviews the discussion delved deep until they reached the strictly personal history of the interviewee. In this case, it is the tale of a 34-year-old man who is not finding a job and has little hope of finding one, both because of an unappealing degree (Sociology) and because of his age. All in all, after a very clear – almost too bright – first part of the interview, which focused on the public dimension of politics, the second part revolved around the personal relationship of the interviewee with politics.

I 45: *"Yes it's true, it's not the method I dislike, also because I know a lot of people who have been helped...a little help, not a permanent job. I was never offered, not even a two or three-month consultancy after my graduation; I don't mean something huge...I know a friend of mine who worked a bit in the Mountain Community, part-time, for 200/300 euro a month. I was never offered that opportunity."*

R: *"And this upset you."*

I 45: *"Yes because why them and not me? Then this made me realize that apparently if the others obtained that it's because at the next election you want the vote of those people. I instead I already told you, I'm entitled to nothing."*

The distance between what said and what felt is rather blatant. It is not incoherence because this distance between sincere principles and everyday life recurred many times throughout the interview. The subject recognizes the distortion inherent to the clientelist system; he perceives its limits, and he condemns it. Then, he has to face a difficult personal and professional situation: personal evaluations have the best over principles and a part-time job at 200/300 euro per month for some months is an excellent opportunity or at least something better than unemployment. In comparison with the other two examples, where clientelism was inherent to the interviewees' lives from birth, or a way of performing authority over a territory, "desperate" clientelism reveals itself a controversial mechanism. The subject never fully endorses clientelism, but still, it is sometimes acknowledged as the only available path to escape, even for a few months, from an objectively static condition.

I 45: *"I have never had anything, and I don't want anything because I want to be a free man."*

R: *"What do you mean?"*

I 45: *"A free man...meaning that what I do is the product of my job and I don't have to thank anyone for my results."*

The interview is a sort of self-analysis for the interviewee: as he speaks, he also speaks to himself to express the conflict, the tension between the possible and what ought to be. This clientelism is desperate, meaning that there is no true allegiance of the subject to the clientelist system, which is conversely despised and discharged. However, despite this dismissive approach, the participant recognizes the power of politics to generate and distribute jobs. In this context, a personal "push" in a particular position could be desirable.

Some considerations are now due. First, the purpose of this part was not to produce a new typology of clientelism, because the outlined case cannot be understood as ideal-types of some clientelist networks. Rather, this part wanted to highlight differences within cases that fall within the same category, to distinguish nuances and minor variation which diversify the different types of clientelism from one another. It is evident that in the first case clientelism was almost a lifestyle, influencing one's career and, therefore, the social relations in which a person is embedded. Clientelism as a system, hence, lives because its legitimacy is taken for granted. On the other hand, the second (and partially the

third) case, are conditioned by the young age of the participant, and this influences the answers. Let us consider, for example, the positive ex-post evaluation of politicians like De Mita and Mastella, and of clientelism overall as a resource for the territory, while considering that the interviewee has not experienced the historical period he talks about. On top of a general appreciation of local leaders who are “very attentive” to the territory and its needs, it emerges also a need for justice, not only of the South vis-à-vis the North, but also of the peripheral areas of the South versus the central ones, like Sannio versus Naples.

Lastly, the third interview is harder to situate, in that it summarizes contradictory tendencies. Most of the interview condemns clientelism through moral and ethical judgment, but the assessment changes as soon as the private life of the interviewee is concerned. The subject, in fact, gives in to the desire for a little help to earn some money, even for a few months and going out of unemployment. Desperate clientelism, hence, represents the simplest form of clientelism, and it involves even young, well-educated people who share a common precarious working condition – or of outright unemployment – and a scarce trust in future. Clientelism understood in this way, hence becomes a forced choice, regardless of education and political conviction, and precisely this “generic” form deserves more attention because it denotes clientelism as a forced more than a chosen condition.

6.2 *Party oriented vote*

The second type of vote emerged throughout the empirical research was the party-oriented vote, i.e. those electors who align their choices towards the party and identify themselves with the political and ideal platform of a party and aiming for universal benefits. In this chapter, there will not be any classification of the different sub-types of the party-oriented vote, unlike what done for clientelism. This mainly because the empirical material did not show the same degree of internal variety which may have allowed for such an internal classification. The first example of the party-oriented vote comes from a young student who, from the very beginning, tried to identify his political orientation as first and foremost connected to a party.

I 23 (M, 21, student): *“Well, I’m not a utopist, I mean I don’t expect that the platform that is spread out is realized; but I search a convergence in some crucial point which*

characterizes my needs, my ideas. For example, if someone comes and speaks about universal basic income and I see that effectively there is a project, that he wants to deliver on that promise, it's normal that I will give him attention, to this candidate and to that party, so yes I watch at platforms, if platforms mean anything anymore ...but it's normal that in the program or at least the general orientation of the program, yes I mean one could say that left and right are outdated distinctions, I'm not of that idea because sadly this idea that has been given to us has allowed narrowing more and more the difference between the center-left and the center-right and the birth of different forms of populism, which are actually void; I think that the program or the ideas in it have still a weight, meaning that one has to choose realistically and without illusions, but still with an eye on platforms and the campaign.”

R: “*And one thing that you expect, that you want?*”

I 23: “*I think that a campaign to be upheld is the universal basic income, I mean truly universal and not the one with so many flaws proposed by Emiliano, which is all in all a familist, insufficient policy, which can actually enhance the informal economy, I mean within 12 months, in order to have the income renewed, you are in a blackmail because you are given 130/140 euros per person in a family of 5 people, and to have it confirmed you have basically to walk around and do nothing, and with that sum of money you cannot afford anything, but you can't work otherwise you lose the benefit. Even the word dignity is humiliated, you are at risk of working in the informal economy, with community service, some administrative bargain so that if you don't pay a bill, the consequences are paid by your child who won't be able to eat in the school's canteen. In this way you just throw away the article of the Constitution which says that the state has the duty to remove the barriers, I think that the primary battle is on income, a genuinely inclusive and non-paternalistic income, that can give that extra oomph, reduce problems, reduce parasitism, which is the problem they tell you about, maybe by accompanying it with real employment projects, not just apprenticeships or other forms of legalized exploitation, in exchange for job*

offers which are truly worthy.”

In these two moments within the interview, one can easily spot two defining elements of the party-oriented vote: i) a big importance attached to ideal and programmatic elements, which in turn orients and characterizes voting choices, and ii) a strong expectation of universal benefits. There are blatant contradictions, such as the ones outlined in the V Chapter, because the conformity between what is wanted and what is practiced is never fully achieved. For example, the interviewee regularly cites Grillo, Vendola, and Renzi without naming their respective parties, hence implicitly reinforcing a strong personalization of politics, which has characterized Italy in the last decades. However, as said before, the interviewee’s words do not describe an objective reality: rather, they show a piece of reality as experienced and interpreted by the respondent. Therefore, the voter’s perception is crucial through his account: in this case, this perception is focused on types of party, collective dynamics, and universal aims, such as welfare state policies and the universal basic income. The following informant was also a young student, very sensitive to politics, and strongly informed by party allegiance in making his voting choices.

R: *“And what should he do?”*

I 40 (M, 20, student): *“For me a politician should bring the country forward, in one way or another, the collective together with his party, of which he’s an emanation, and which represents a part of the country that voted, in a parliamentary democracy [...] but now people of my age are much more disillusioned, unlike people of the same age in the 70s and 80s, when all of them mobilized as one to try and transform the status quo radically, so there was a spirit of community and of coming together, starting from the universities.”*

As in the former example, there is a strong belief that politics is a collective moment, which is necessarily performed in groups. In this description of an “ancient” world, community and collective actions are the defining traits, and this despite the interviewee not being old enough to have experienced the “ancient world” he talks about. Naturally, also, in this case, such an idealized and programmatic vision of politics is firmly connected to the expectation for universal benefits.

R: *“Which kind of political measures?”*

I 40 (M, 20, Student): *“So for once I would ask for a public spending expansion: first, education, healthcare, infrastructure, since our country is lagging behind especially in some regions like Calabria, Apulia, Sicily, for example in the railway system. I would ask to adopt some radical policies of debt cutting and renegotiating its conditions [...] then I would want a revision of the international treaties we signed, I mean we should oppose all the interference from other states which condition us profoundly, for example on the military.”*

Once again, we retrieve an active ideal-programmatic approach to politics, which goes together with a universalist vision of the benefits that politics must provide. The imagination that feeds this conception of politics, once again, is connected to the past that none of the interviewees experienced directly. In other words, these voters have rather clear ideas about what politics ought to be, yet they lack real examples because the model they are inspired by is relegated to the past. This represents a fundamental cleavage between these interviews and the last two transcripts which, no wonder, come from people who received their “political education” in other years.

The following interview comes from a policeman who has a rather detailed knowledge of politics, especially in his local community.

I 4 (M, 46, policeman): *“As far as I’m concerned, we come from 50-60 of mismanagement and bad government, but back then, as compared with today, I think we didn’t lack a sense of belonging to a movement, to a party. Leaders mirrored this phase, which had its distinct mentality, they reflected this feeling of belonging with bright ideas, then you govern [...] For what I can remember, if a politician belonged to a faction within a party, there was no reason why he should have moved his position across factions and parties [...] today one goes out of a party only to enroll in another and keep his seat, so they give up on their ideas and concepts, they don’t exist anymore.”*

R: *“Did you have personal experiences on this?”*

I 4: *“I followed the historic ‘Fiuggi Turn’ of the Italian Social Movement, which then transformed into National Alliance. Gianfranco Fini at that moment showed continuity with tradition, but then he got lost as well.”*

The passion and attraction of the voter towards a party (and towards the ideas embodied by that party) are evident and rooted in the historical reality and the everyday life of the interviewee, as compared with the other testimonies. Reference to values and ideas represented by the Italian Social Movement are not abstract, but salient elements of a real universe, materially experienced by the participant. Moreover, other fragments account for the personal passage from the age of commitment to the disenchantment. Hence, the informant turned from an idea of parties as formative places in which to spend time, to a more cynical “taking note” of what happens in parties, without attention or zeal. Naturally, also this example shows a clear nexus between the party-oriented vote and universal benefits.

I 4: *“Let me start by saying that the fundamental problem of this country, this region, this city is labor. The priority is to create jobs, even though I realize it might be extremely hard because you see also here in Sicily there’s this idea of the permanent job, and this is something that penalizes us dearly [...] and then healthcare, this is a sore spot too. My father-in-law went to Padua for medical reasons; there is an abyss between their benchmarks and ours. [...] And then the environment, cleanliness [...] it still happens now, in 2016, something that for me is outside civilization, I still meet people who at some point open their car’s window, and they throw their rubbish from there onto the road. This, at a municipal level, is one of the worst things because it means you don’t give a damn.”*

Once again, with extraordinary efficacy, the interviewee lists universal benefits as the ones expected from politics. These universal benefits are always concrete in nature. What emerges is a complete idea of society, which was plainly formed in a moment in which parties were central.

The last interview cited here was a 62-year-old woman, very

involved in politics, and very attentive to the local political dynamics. As for interviewee 4, also in this case the accounts are grounded in the real life of the participant.

R “*So you didn’t find yourself at home there?*”

I 57 (F, 62, psychologist): “*The Olive (party before Democratic Party) was already an error; I did not vote for it because we cannot go together with the Christian Democracy, we struggled a lifetime against the Christian Democracy, and then we went together. This has destroyed the left, secular values: the Christian Democracy, the Pope, the Vatican try to keep everyone quiet, and this is not good [...] I remember the times of Continuous Struggle, so the meetings we had, the demonstration, feminism, the fight for women’s rights, I remember mostly this.*”

In an elegant way, this fragment shows the salience of parties in the life of the participant (and more in general, of the collective dimension of politics.) As in the case of subject 4, it is disenchantment which defines the member’s current view of politics and parties, with the acknowledgment that the current political system is very different from the one in place during the 60s and 70s.

I 57: “*Politics must serve the realization of high ideal projects, make it possible for ideals and utopias to become a reality, hence to have at heart the good of humanity, it shouldn’t be self-referential [...] But already after the 70s, politics changed face: before it was dream and utopia, the youth was protagonist, while today they are just spectators of their lives.*”

Obviously, also in this case, and maybe here more than elsewhere, expectations are idealized, while the previous interview had a more concrete undertone.

I 57 “*First; one should tell me ‘I want to realize this,’ big dreams, great utopias. Then, I organize the practice to get that objective done ... one cannot think only about emergency and money, let’s say because a roof fell and the mayor becomes the administrator and nothing changes in the city; we only think about cases of emergency.*”

R “*Anything else?*”

I 57: “*Yes, sure, then create jobs, because it’s vital. The unease that one feels in the family is profoundly enhanced by the lack of employment...the children suffer a lot...politicians who beat themselves over family and values, and then they ignore the obvious, they’re just ridiculous ...Families who are hungry.*”

In conclusion, the last two interviews depict lived experiences very close to the party, understood not only as a symbol but as a practical community in which politics is performed in ways that had to be attentive to the collective right. Naturally, the age of the interviewees matters: despite their membership of two “extreme” parties on the opposite sides of politics such as the Italian Social Movement and Continuous Struggle, their reciprocal distance is smaller than the one separating them together from the first couple of younger participants. This, probably, is determined by the young age of the first two informants: the political education of respondents n° 23 and 40 are not rooted in any concrete and lived experience of active and organized parties. A celebration of parties unites all the four accounts but, while the first two fragments are inspired by an indirect and idealized idea, the two latter informants base their views on real experiences.

6.3 *Patronage: The Missing Type*

Following the fourfold typology, and before examining constituency service as the last manifestation of personal voting, we should spend some time here defining patronage. As one might guess from the title of this section, the empirical research showed a lack of accounts of votes given to a specific party, but which is driven by particularist expectations. Hence, patronage cannot be tackled in the same way as the other types of voting behavior. Traditionally, patronage is depicted as an organizational resource, since patronage understood as an electoral asset is very close to clientelism (Kopecký, Mair, Spirova, 2012). The distinction between the different functions of patronage has been described in Chapters II and III, hence here it will suffice to recall that patronage as an electoral resource, and the defining feature of the political bargain is represented by the voter’s allegiance – understood as

loyalty, i.e. long-lasting devotion. In exchange, patronage secures the appointment of loyal people in government, bureaucracy, and civil service positions, at both national and local levels. Conversely, patronage as an organizational resource unfolds within administrations. It is based on fidelity of the bureaucratic personnel towards the elected officials, who need “collaborative” public bureaucracies to implement public policies, especially if they need to distribute resources for particular aims (for example, obtaining consensus through clientelist policies.) Lastly, patronage can manifest as either an electoral or as an organizational resource about the different stages of its development. For example, a party in its first experience in elected offices will make use of patronage as an electoral resource in the first phase and, subsequently, will use patronage as an organizational resource to secure itself as party-in-government, maybe through such tools as spoil systems in civil service. In so doing, this party will ensure a more efficient distribution of clientelist benefits within a given constituency and, in the long run, it can guarantee its permanence in power.

The reasons why patronage does not emerge from the interviewees can be different. First: the scarce organizational sophistication of parties in the constituencies under investigation, which is something that has always denoted southern Italian politics. Even during the First Republic, despite the presence of mass parties like the Christian Democracy and the Communist Party, in southern regions, the *electoral* manifestation of *patronage* has always been preponderant over the organizational one, also in determining parties’ internal vicissitudes. Thus, local parties and politicians leveraged their personal support within their parties in the inter-faction struggle, which was defining of the First Republic (Lotti, 1997). Naturally, it is easy to hypothesize that parties that were continuously in government, such as the Christian Democracy, patronage as an organizational resource was abundantly used, to position loyal people in the branches of the State. The interviews, however, did not reveal the presence of this phenomenon but, through interpretation, one can retrieve some elements of patronage, even though disconnected from the participants’ concrete experiences.

I 63 (F, 34, employee): “*Sure, where I work, politics matter. Politicians matter.*”

R: “*Meaning what?*”

I 63: *“Meaning, first of all, that at my boss’s wedding there were V. and G., and at my wedding I think they wouldn’t have come ...then one has to understand what ‘recommendation’ means: if I am kicked out because E. decided to substitute 40 people with 40 of his men, I think it is an injustice, even though you can do it in the public sector, unlike the private one.”*

This short fragment picture a situation which is very close to patronage as an organizational resource, even though the context of the interview should be specified further. The informant has a job in the regional department in one of the Regions under investigation, and she describes the transition between the incumbent and the newly elected Presidents and the movements and the flows of people from one office to another, which in fact precede the reshuffle in the Regional government. This description is corroborated by passages of another interview, which was discarded as it was not successful.

I 68 (M, 42, educator): *“I don’t think he was the owner of a logo and for me it’s wrong.”*

R: *“So he disappointed you?”*

I 68: *“Yes, he disappointed me and other people in my zone because ... I mean, N., in the regional offices, in the new offices created by him such as the Tourist Promotion Office, he placed only his people, those from his territory and in the area, and N.F. was his reference ...many in this area, after having supported him and helped with his campaign, many were left outside after the election”*

R *“Left out of what?”*

I 68: *“Out of the place in the administration, out of the connected offices ...all in all, especially after the first term in office he wasn’t bad, V. had to guarantee and his folks, the most loyal ones, starting from N.F. all came from that territory, and this engendered a lot of discontent in our province.”*

Even though these fragments do not depict a full-fledged example of patronage vote, the management of the administration seems inspired

by patronage as an organizational resource, i.e. as a way of arranging public jobs once elected in office. There is no mention, for example, of political exchanges grounded on pre-electoral phases, thus ascribable to proper clientelist phenomena. Rather, spoil system is used by elected officers to change (or confirm) trusted figures in the major positions within the administration, and this is a consolidated and well-known practice, at least by informants. It is worth mentioning, however, that in both the interviews, when a party is cited as a “container” within which patronage unfolds, the meaning is twofold. The informant n°68 recounts the climb of a well-known local politician to power, who performed his agenda through a network of acquaintances, committees, and activists in support of his candidacy, hence without the formal support of a formal partisan structure. Conversely, interview n° 63 mentions after-election dynamics whereby a structured and well-networked party (both in the local and in the national political arena) in support of an already strong candidacy. This difference, though apparently trivial, is not a minor one, because it allows to shed light on one of the paramount traits of patronage, i.e. the role of the party, and this influences the division and distribution of departmental offices and other administrative positions.

Lastly, patronage as a management strategy in the hands of the leader or leaders of one party; which answers to territorial dynamics with the twofold aim of i) maintaining an electoral connection which secures re-election, and, at the same time, ii) relying on trust of loyal people in managing national dynamics within the party or the government (either national or local). The following interview reveals the inner workings of patronage. The informant comes from an entirely different territory from the one subjects n° 63 and 68 belong to. Moreover, within the interview, there is a similitude between the various ways of interpreting patronage in De Mita, De Luca, and Renzi.

I 51 (M, 25, student): *“Avellino is now trying to create a territorial brand, a public image and to take care of it and defend it, and they had quite a political class besides De Mita.”*

R *“What do you mean?”*

I 51: *“I say that our Irpinian cousins are one step ahead of us, probably thanks to that ruling class, since they had a Prime Minister, great entrepreneurs, and probably, by*

being protagonists, every one of them felt like another De Mita. And it's as simple as that: Avellino was for Italy, in De Mita's time, what Florence is now for Italy with Renzi."

R "What do you mean?"

I 51: *"Because Renzi, do you see? All the important people appointed in offices come from Tuscany; De Luca and his heads of departments, they all come from Salerno and nearby. In Irpinia the Christian Democracy delivered a lot to Irpinia from the national government, and that's right ...I mean I find it perfectly reasonable, natural that what is geographically closer ... one like De Luca I mean, appoints people who come from Salerno because I think that those nominations are connected to trust, because if I have been the mayor of Salerno, I worked with executives, assessors who were in Salerno, and hence I consider them as capable, I bring them with me in office ...like what happens in Florence and Tuscany."*

In substance, from these words, which were already mentioned in the section about clientelism, the capability of a leader in nominating and appointing trusted people within institutions is considered as natural, legitimate and, to some extent, unavoidable. In the De Mita example, Irpinia is mentioned as a territory represented by a famous politician from Avellino within the power system of Christian Democracy which served, for half a century, the quintessential example of party-state power. Moreover, this interview mentions examples of patronage also in two contemporary politicians like Renzi and the President of Campania De Luca. In both the cases, though to a different extent, De Luca and Renzi are cited for their capability of appointing trusted people in central positions, Palazzo Chigi in the latter case, and in the Regional Government in the former. Hence, it is possible to detect two elements which, in the story told by the interviewee, are paramount in understanding the functioning of patronage, i.e. territoriality, whereby a candidate has a firm anchorage in the local community and harnesses it for achieving local or national objectives. Second, trust is fundamental to a way of selecting staff member and close collaborators.

However, as said in the introduction, patronage does not emerge as a diffused type of voting behavior in the sample of informants. Hence, it is not possible to draw general conclusions from this investigation, for

at least two reasons: i) first, because of the small number of interviews in which patronage is mentioned, and ii) second, because, on those rare occasions in which patronage is mentioned, the references are almost always indirect, put in more general discourses, if not in parenthesis and deviations from the actual question list of the interview. Probably, most of the difficulty in investigating this type of voting choices stems from the close relationship between patronage and clientelism which we have already dealt with at length in Chapters II and III. In more practical terms, the biggest challenge during the fieldwork was connected to the particular features of politics as experienced in the South. In fact, patronage as an instrument for assessing the power of faction leaders is mostly well known and practiced, especially by elder voters. Unlike these, younger voters lack the idea of a party as a collective instrument, as a container and, hence, one of the paramount differences between clientelism and patronage is missing. While in party-oriented voters it was hard for young voters to identify ideas with specific parties (hence falling back to the leader as the physical representation of a party), at the same time younger voter who are more sensitive to particular benefits it seems impossible to separate the role of a candidate from the one of the parties, because the latter does not exist at least in the informants' accounts.

To summarize, in these last pages the analysis lingered over three types of voting behavior, as well as over the ostensive lack of clear examples of patronage. However, the most interesting and well-defined form of balloting was clientelism which, as it is possible to see the interviews, is diffused and rooted among some polled voters. Clientelism, hence, will be the starting point for the next chapter, because the personal vote represents the “another half” of the personal vote. In the following interviews, it will become apparent how universalist expectations can direct the personal vote. Hence, we will report plenty of testimonies by voters who are very sensitive to the personal vote, while, at the same time, witnessing how, unlike the previous examples of clientelism, expectations are directed towards universal benefits. In the following pages, we will try to answer the research question, i.e. the existence of a personal/universal vote.

CHAPTER VII

The fourth type exists. Evidence of Constituency Service in the South.

7.1 *Different types of universal benefits*

In this last chapter, we will deal with the most important of the four voting behavior patterns presented in the typology we constructed by cross-analyzing the two dichotomous variable universal vs. particular benefits, on one side, and personal vs. party-oriented vote. The type described in this chapter will be a kind of personal vote aligned with universal expectations. Chapter V provided oriented towards universal benefits, especially by privileging some virtues of the candidates. From here onwards, the focus will be on the type of vote defined as personal/universal, which will be labeled as constituency service. Before delving into the analysis of the responses given to the questions on this matter, a possible interference in the soundness of results must be made explicit. In fact, the enormous amount of answers which reveal an expectation for universal benefit is by no means a guarantee of the respondents' sincerity, even when in the presence of a strong orientation towards voting for individual candidates. Many responses thus can be deeply biased by social desirability, which is inherent to the interview process. During the conversations, naturally, the attempt was to control this pitfall through control questions and by analyzing the transcriptions, to assess the overall consistency and sincerity of the interviewee's account. However, a complete and sound assessment is impossible regarding vis-à-vis the external reality. Rather, this attempt must focus on the status of the words of the interviewees (Bichi 2012). This research was never aimed to achieve a rigorous knowledge of some objective, external reality, but rather to produce a sound analysis of the informants' subjective realities. The interviews provided in this last part are less in number, and the analysis is limited to the successful ones, i.e. the clearer and more consistent ones (which are nonetheless copious.) Before giving the floor to the interviewees, one last premise is due: in the previous chapter, we underlined the presence of rather vague, idealized universal expectations, which are detached from reality (values, ideas and so forth.) In other occasions, conversely, universal benefits assume a more concrete form by touching upon material conditions such as em-

ployment or services. In presenting this part, hence, we will follow the above-mentioned typology.

7.1.1 *Idealized universal benefits*

Among the most detailed accounts, we can start this discussion of the results by focusing on those participants who stressed a universalist orientation by enunciating principles and values, rather than practical aspirations. One of these interviews concerns a priest in a small parish with several chronic problems such as unemployment, poverty, as well as a widespread presence of mafia. This respondent provides a significant account of the level of abstraction that many electors project in forming universal expectations when casting a ballot.

R: *“So you’re telling me that the backwardness of this area is not a matter of money?”*

I 5 (M, 73, parish priest): *“Absolutely not ... of course back in time, despite its limits, the Cassa del Mezzogiorno created some opportunities for development, but also a lot of stealing of public money. But development is a more general condition ... a condition of the place.”*

R: *“A condition of the place?”*

I 5: *“Indeed ... if the whole level is slow, then we are all driven to familist behaviors. If there were employment for everyone, there wouldn’t be intercession and nepotism. If there were a mentality of service, I wouldn’t need to call my friend every time I go to the hospital to be admitted or to book a place, like when I have a right I always must call someone to do me a favor for it to be respected. Rather, we must do away with this logic, starting from the educational agencies such as school and family, which should be places of personal growth ... otherwise, the cultural poverty which is born of economic poverty is not stopped. I want to say, we ... we are so ignorant that we don’t know our specificities ... a person from Trentino had to come and explain them to us.”*

R: *“Someone from Trentino?”*

I 5: *“Yes, the Bishop B., the one that was here before ... I heard him, from Trentino, speaking about specificity. We don't know our unique traits, we don't appreciate and promote them, and we don't even know what they are, while he understood them.”*

R: *“And who candidates here, which expectations do you have in him? What should he do?”*

I 5: *“I'd expect that he could involve all the active forces, like University, institutions, technical and scientific institutions which can contribute to projects ... Now, let's go back to specificities, how can I understand how to promote certain assets if there isn't someone who tells me 'this is the way' ... someone with a vision, an idea of where to go and where to conduct this community.”*

In this conversation, which is also compelling for the role that the priest plays in his community, there is a plenty of references to universal expectations. First, there is no mention of spiritual elements such as “Providence,” rather the words of the parish priest are replete with references to concrete actions, aimed to enhance the value of local products and to create jobs. However, also these practical elements are left aside for a more general view, which is succinctly expressed in the sentence “someone should point a direction,” concerning the expectation that the informant place on the candidate. Everything comes from bitter considerations about the territory, the underdevelopment and the solid tie between economic and cultural poverty, on the backdrop of a universalism inspired by the need for a general vision, a complex project, and its practical implementation. The interviewee says time and again that the personal vote is “the most democratic form of voting.” Furthermore, he ascribes to politicians not only the role of problem-solvers, but rather the most general one of guides, capable of tracing an idea of sustainable development for an area which, in his words, seems to be doomed.

On the same wavelength of the priest is a student in Architecture in Naples, 31 years old, who expresses herself in concrete terms regarding some universal benefits, while she changes register when talking about her generation.

R: *“So what would you like from a candidate, which expectations?”*

I 43 (F, student, and worker, 31): *“So let’s speak freely: I’d start with the youth and their condition... I’d want more incentives for who has ideas, like hubs or something that favors a project, for example, if I want to start a business ... maybe finding some physical spaces ... mapping the empty spaces that the Council has, even if they don’t even know which spaces are available (giggles). So, all this, plus a bit of support for those with talent.”*

R: *“Some help for young people, so.”*

I 43: *“No, I don’t believe so, I think that help is a bad word, something patronizing and paternalistic, something Catholic, I don’t like it. Help is something ... that you give me and you don’t have anything in exchange, investing is more suitable, investing in youth.”*

R: *“In which sense?”*

I 43: *“Investing is different: investing in something is different from helping because it’s a gamble, and you don’t know if you will be successful or not; while helping is something that finishes. Investments have a return for the investor and for those who produce something, it’s exchanged, and I think we need that. A politician has to believe in innovation and invest in it.”*

R: *“And who does politics, should he take care of this? Should he...”*

I 43: *“Yes, which is what I said should be realized everywhere, and I think this is the task of politics, of those who practice it: asking oneself where this Country will look like in twenty years, beyond the length of a term in office. This is something I’ve always hated in politics: not having a long-term vision. I mean, you program some stuff that is not just immediate, but is projected in the future. I think that this is the responsibility of politics and politicians, thinking long-*

term and beyond consensus, because the most visible things create support in the present, but they are all smoke and mirrors.”

A 31-year-old, who has still a great deal to see and to do, but who already knows her community and area quite well, has quite similar expectations to the parish priest encountered before. There is a clear vision of the future, the youth and of the capability to trust young people. Those are not vague principles: from the whole interview, there is a pressing urgency of change, not only regarding what to ask politicians but rather regarding what to expect from politics. First, there is a need for a long-term strategy and of the need for consensus-oriented policies, to create an encompassing horizon of what one want to see in the Country “in twenty years.” The informant, who reveals a good degree of political sophistication, do not rule out the social value of small projects such as calls for interests for youth employment. However, she focuses more on the need to systematize these projects to create a universal and collective action which can transform the material conditions of ordinary people. Each social policy in isolation is insufficient and, for this reason, she claims for a more comprehensive intervention of politics on society, and politics is expected to be informed by long-term visions, not bound to here-and-here-and-know restraints regarding consensus, but rather capable of creating longer-lasting conditions of development. In both the interviews, the standard feature is the anticipation of universal benefits and goods, not only as concrete measures, but also, and most importantly, as long-term projects, comprehensive visions and time-consuming plans, and politicians, and politics more in general, ought to be able to deliver. It would appear as though the approach towards universal goods is top-down, i.e. which starts with a vision from above, within which to collocate the proper concrete solutions to isolated problems such as employment, services and so on. In both cases, the informants are rather well-educated, with a good degree of political sophistication, yet it is striking to notice that, despite the age gap and the difference between their territorial backgrounds, there is a shared need for forward-looking politicians, able to deliver comprehensive, rather than piecemeal answers to the problems.

7.1.2 Material and universal benefits

In a similar vein, but more focused on material and universal features is the second group of respondents underlined in the next paragraph. In the next answers, it is possible to recognize a strong attention for universal benefits by the voters, but expected universal benefits are less general and more related to health and public services.

R: *“And what would you be impressed to see on a platform of a candidate?”*

I 7 (F, 19, student): *“Personally, innovative ideas, original ones. I mean, I am a girl, so I speak for my age, something that can be appealing to young, like courses, something to promote education, some connection between University and the labor market, something that can captivate you, not the usual things you say in a campaign ... then again, it depends if I’m voting for the mayor.”*

R: *“For example?”*

I 7: *“Something concerning the environment. I think that Italy has a stunning cultural heritage, which is undervalued and there is a lot of dirt ... even recycling doesn’t work, so something that can improve the environment and can draw young people nearer to the environment, something that will make them understand that the environment has to be taken care of, and then something on the connection between University and the labor market.”*

R: *“Anything else?”*

I 7: *“In Benevento, we have the Arco di Traiano, the church of Santa Sofia, and many other monuments which are completely ignored by tourism. I would like to see something that can improve tourism in Benevento, also because it’s absurd that we don’t know how to promote what we have. And then securing the city, after the last flood we understood that we are not safe, there were damages, of course, because the things were not done in the proper time when they should have been done.”*

R: *“So what would you expect?”*

I 11 (F, 60, retired): *“The priorities, for the south, are jobs and health care. Functioning hospitals. The right to health regardless of the latitude where you live and of the place where you fall ill; we tend to die more often in the south also because we don’t have the right hospitals, you arrive at the Emergency Unit, and you don’t know where you’ll be brought because here it’s full, there it’s full. The right to health, the right to work, the right to study, because here people must go to Florence or Milan to study, why shouldn’t they have an opportunity here, and why do they have to go out to study? Infrastructures, the south and jobs. This is the list for me.”*

R: *“And what would you want from a candidate?”*

I 12 (M, 70, entrepreneur): *“Well...solving the problem of youth unemployment, because I think that we are not giving any hope in the future to younger generations, so we have to provide them with a perspective. Let’s all do something, giving jobs to 2-3000 people, and the people behind them, families...we must improve schools: education is not provided in the same way as before. Nowadays, school is also made by teachers who are afraid of the students, of being bullied by them, of crime. Back then, these things didn’t exist; when I used to go to school, we stood up when the teacher entered the room, not nowadays, no. I mean: one must motivate young people, spur them, and let them know that no one gives you anything for free and that you must compete at a global level, and then you need to roll up your sleeves and start working.”*

R: *“So the problem is education, right?”*

I 12: *“Yes, because we must create the preconditions, integrate young people into the labor force, I mean creating connections between the school and the labor market. Nowadays these two worlds are completely disconnected, so you get people at job interviews who don’t understand a damn. I would create this synergy with the professional schools, not humanist or scientific high school; I mean*

the professional ones. Create a direct connection between school and labor, to make them understand what they will find after education, while now there is a cleavage, what they teach you is useless for real life, you must add more training, whereas the school itself might provide this training in the first place. This should be the task of politics and politicians!!!”

R: *“And you, what would you like? What do you need?”*

I 28 (M, 21, student): *“I believe in universal basic income which, in my view, would solve a lot of problems. This because if you give me 80 euros a week, and I received 600 euros without working, then I would refuse to work for you for 80 euros a week, so you must raise your salary to a living wage. And this is the way to cultivate professional dignity and to defeat the kind of illegal jobs which are a real problem.”*

R: *“Meaning?”*

I 28: *“Meaning that a boy who works ten hours a day for five days a week does that to make ends meet, and he doesn't have the possibility to choose, and how should you intervene in these cases? By offering people the chance to refuse and reject this kind of exploitation, and who offers you something adequate, so you fight it in this way. And then the basic income contributes to placement.”*

R: *“What do you mean?”*

I 28: *“I say that if I were the state, I wouldn't like to spend these 600 euros a month, so I will be incentivized to find a job for you so that I don't have to give you money. It's as simple as that.”*

R: *“What do you expect? What should the candidate do?”*

I 32 (F, 46, caregiver): *“Well, dealing with Benevento's problems ...unemployment, health, laws against gender violence, yeah maybe I'm biased on this because I'm a woman (giggles).”*

R: *“What do you mean?”*

I 32: *“No no, I mean that I am outraged when I think about all those women who are not considered even by the people who swear to love them, and the state doesn't do anything, and then we see the data ... how many of them are killed ... I mean there should be the strength to counteract in this situation...”*

R *“Is this an important thing for you?”*

I 32: *“Yes, I think that. I know that there are several cases like this one in Benevento. Maybe it's not talked about very often, but assistance should also be provided in rural towns ... I mean I would like for us to fight for this ...and then ... Well the environment, for sure the environment. Of course, there still are a lot of uncivilized people who throw the garbage on the street. Hence, we must teach people how to behave ... this is their home, and they should respect it. I know that it's not simple to do it when you candidate, but I would like to remind you that they decided to run for office (laughs).”*

R *“So if there were elections, what would you expect from a candidate? Which priorities?”*

I 34 (M, 74, retired): *“It is a tough question ... because in Italy is very difficult for citizens to individuate responsibilities ... it is hard to understand who is in charge for some situations, so ... for example, in Syracuse, there is this crisis of garbage right? And people search for politics ...If I were to think about justice I would start by thinking about the last ones, so to speak, I mean those who, while not having any voice, are not able to make themselves heard by those in charge because this voice does not have many arms to collect signatures and vote. Is it clear? But there are disabled people in this city, a lot of them. Those who live in heavy housing conditions.”*

R: *“Clear.”*

I 34: *“Then, on a more general level, you receive educa-*

tion in Italy, but what does it prepare you for? It prepares everybody to be a philosopher ... these are cumbersome mechanisms, on which one should intervene quickly, and then a plan that touches everyone, and in which we all have a responsibility, which is the quality of our democracy, because now in which there isn't participation, there is no democracy, and now this is a serious problem for Italy."

R *"And what would you like it to do?"*

I 47 (M, 35, school janitor): *"In a civilized country there should be services, they are the first thing. When there are services there is development, because without services development never comes; and then if they did something like it, then we could talk about priorities. School, streets, hospitals, this kind of stuff. Then, all can I give you an example? Just a little thing: a football field, that one, can come later."*

R *"So services."*

I 47: *"Yes, I experienced it first-hand, I have been there (Bergamo) without a car; I didn't have preoccupations, I used to take the train to the station, the bus which went wherever the fuck I wanted to go, and I didn't feel like going back here because as soon as you arrive in Lamezia you are dead. Either you have someone who picks you up or nothing ... and if tourists come, what do you tell them? Either you rent a car or if you have some relative who picks you up...you realize why I am annoyed by this."*

R: *"So what would you want from the next mayor?"*

I 50 (M, 54, entrepreneur): *"Listen, besides improving recycling, maybe using wet waste to make compost ... I would say tourism. I think about a Roccella Slowfood with a headquarter in the Castle and tasting paths ...the discourse though is that you need to know the local products and make them known to a wider audience, citrus, seafood, oregano, and it's all interrelated. It's important to build a network because nowadays tourism goes in that direction, people want to have a different vacation."*

R *“And what would you like from this candidate? What do you expect?”*

I 53 (F, 30, unemployed) *“Theater (laughs)”*

R *“(laughs) Sure, the theater, and then?”*

I 53: *“I mean seriously ... I don't know priorities for younger people. There are also these things that the State provides, small jobs, voluntary community service, which maybe are stupid things, but for 20-year-old people are without anything to do here, because there is no job, and maybe they find some opportunities from these projects, even intermittent jobs. And then there are other things missing, like connections with bigger cities, we have very few links, there's just one coach that drives around and one is forced to use the car to go to Naples, and you waste two hours in that journey by bus because the trip is enormous just to get there.”*

R *“And what would expect from candidates? Which expectations?”*

I 62 (F, 51, civil servant): *“Well if we talk priorities, there are the needs of the citizens. I mean not just of the Citizen in general, like jobs which cannot be given by a candidate, but I would ask a mayor, for example, a cleaner town, I'm not shocked by papers on the street, but one should promote a better environmental culture, give attention to the youth.”*

R *“What do you mean?”*

I 62: *“Young people, in the clear majority of cases, they spend their time in the pub, and it's right to be so in some respects, but maybe you should give them more opportunities, like free sports facilities, bike lanes. I mean I don't say that because I want to be a health freak, but just because many people would like to do sport, but they can't afford it. Also, one should promote what we have, like the sports palace, which cost a bit and which is currently not used. I would intervene in these things because the administrators have more means to change this than to create jobs, for*

example.”

R *“What do you think it’s important, and what do you expect?”*

I 20 (M, 43, lawyer): *“Yes, looking at it, in my profession, one should secure the certainty of punishment. In Italy, we have this widespread sense of impunity. Now it’s almost common-sense to think that no one goes to jail, so you must revise the current criminal law ...reduce all the alternative measures other than prison. Being under house arrest is not enough, it’s a matter of justice for a community.”*

R *“And now what do you ask for to a candidate? What do you expect?”*

I 19 (F, 67, former teacher): *“Maximum priority to justice, starting from tax evasion, I mean this is not sustainable.”*

R *“What do you mean?”*

I 19: *“I mean that, for example, I bought this house by making a lot of sacrifices and I don’t like that I am taxed all the time for this goddam house. I paid for it, it wasn’t gifted. I paid my taxes when I bought it; I continue to pay taxes, and I’m never reassured that this house is actually mine, then what’s the difference between owning and renting?”*

R *“And then?”*

I 19: *“Then a better attention to the territory, starting from tourism. For example, I would like to have a train towards Milan and one towards Turin, which works. Railways are abandoned, then we speak about tourism, and we don’t have a touristic vocation, there simply aren’t the proper structures. I come here from afar, but how much does the highway cost? So, we are discouraging tourists, who come here and they don’t find a place to go out dancing, there is nothing, not a leisure activity. So, when we say that we have a touristic vocation, we are just saying this, nothing more.”*

R *“And you? What do you want from politics?”*

I 39 (F, 38, veterinarian): *“At a national or at a local level?”*

R *“As you prefer.”*

I 39: *“More attention for the territory, which at this moment is suffering from environmental problems, both at the local and at the provincial level. One must stop building new waste burners. Then, more attention to tourism, because the revamp of this territory comes from tourism, but if you think that we are close to Lecce, which has no big industry but has a very high average income, higher, than ours, and we have industries. The matter is that one should do entrepreneurship in all sectors, especially agriculture and tourism.”*

R *“What would you put on the plate?”*

I 52 (M, 29, engineer and teacher): *“On a local level I would give a clear direction to the development of the community, so choosing an economic sector to invest in ...one has to understand the territory, what it has to offer regarding natural and human resources, what it can sell and so on. It’s important to be good at selling what the territory can produce. Then, at the national scale, one should act on the judiciary and on the laws of the state to tidy up the legislative chaos, which stops the free initiative of the citizens. Second, reduce taxes for all, but especially for those who produce wealth and don’t evade taxes. Third, paying attention to the youth, not as a paternalistic measure, I would like the idea that any young person with an idea might become a Zuckerberg even in Italy, I mean that he can expand on an original idea.”*

In the answers of these southern electors, there is an apparent trace of universalist expectations, which is the most striking common element of all the previous testimonies. Alongside with specific attention to universal benefits, i.e. those who are addressed to all the citizens and to those most in need, voters are primarily concerned with policies that have a high impact on their everyday reality and material condition. Hence, the transcripts are replete with references to jobs as

the long-standing disease of all the areas under investigation: jobs, as we shall see later, is considered the universal benefit *par excellence*. Participants provide a variety of other needs which should be addressed by elected officials and which are invariably overlooked. First, health and the chronic shortcoming of decent treatments in southern regions. Then, the problem with public transportation is conceived as essential to a balanced and sustainable development. Third, school as an instrument to provide opportunities to young people. Finally, there is a widespread concern with the overall standards of services (especially for local officials) such as sport, leisure, and cultural services. Besides these essential needs, which are the necessary condition for attaining full citizenship, in the respondents' words, there is an element of a more generalized attention towards development-oriented policies. Hence, there is no lack of proposals concerning the environment and culture, understood as pillars for a long-awaited development and, in turn, capable of providing a high return on employment rates. On the one side, thus, these interviews depict services as missed rights, which are necessary to bridge the gap with the industrialized and developed Centre-North of Italy. On the other side, there is a more positive dimension in these descriptions, where universal benefits originate from a savvy harnessing on the resources of the territory. In this second case, politicians are interrogated about their projects and strategies, or lack thereof: they are expected to have long-term visions and future-oriented solutions to current problems. Lastly, even though sometimes the interviewer had to provide some stimuli, in all the informants in this section, there was a genuine attentiveness towards the problems of their communities and a capacity to read the complexity of the issues. Especially on environment and culture, there seems to be a shared awareness of clearly identified paths and strategies. But, as said, jobs are the most widespread need in almost all the interviews.

7.1.3 *The biggest of all benefits: a job*

But, as said, jobs are the most widespread need in almost all the interviews. It is a crucial aspect of the research path in due to fundamental role of a job place in every life of the electors involved in the research. The different and various aspects related to a job place are well-highlighted in the words of the informants.

R “So what do you expect? I mean from the politician?”

I 59 (M, 58, carpenter craftsman): *“Jobs first, I mean not for myself, for all. Who is already in the labor market, who needs to get in, it’s as simple as that. Then one must figure out how to create jobs, it’s not easy or something you do overnight. Then I would work to make people stay, because now all the towns are depopulating, not only the small villages. This is the sign that people leave because there are no job opportunities.”*

R “And what are your expectations?”

I 4 (M, 46, policeman): *“Let’s start by saying that the fundamental problem in this country is jobs. The first thing is to create jobs, even though I realize that today it is hard, because here in Sicily there is still this culture of the open-ended contract, and this is something that penalized this area a lot, for different reasons. First, at the national level there was a possibility of retiring after nineteen years, six months and one day: now the retirement age we don’t even know where it is or where it’s going. This culture of permanent jobs in councils, regions, state branches has produced that the turnover happens after a lot of years, it’s a dog chasing its tail because there are many people, especially young, who decide to emigrate because other countries offer different opportunities. But we could talk about that for ages without reaching a solution.”*

R “And you, what would you want? What would you expect?”

I 13 (M, 61, school janitor): *“First, at each level of government, the priority should be to create jobs, especially for these young people. For example, those who don’t know where to hold on to, and it’s not fair that our youth, my children included, have already left. With three children, I cannot have even one at home, because in their own country they couldn’t bring bread to the table. This is what politics should be about, not chatter.”*

R “So, jobs.”

I 13: *“Yes, employment in all sectors ... because if agriculture is neglected, it’s our rulers’ fault, because if you fund agriculture ... my son went to the north because he didn’t find anything ... for me jobs are the main issue, because when there’s job, everything is possible.”*

R: *“And what would you ask your candidate?”*

I 18 (F, 56, salesperson): *“The priorities are, well jobs are banal, also to give some hope to our young people: for example, I believe very much in the fact that young people are going back to agriculture, not as it was made in the old days, but with new machinery, a primary sector which can help these people because the first thing is to help them to realize their dreams. Otherwise, they stop dreaming, or they leave altogether.”*

R: *“What do you expect in a “sensitive” candidate, as you say?”*

I 31(F, 51, teacher): *“From the top of my head, two things. The first is for your young people: I think that unemployment is the final social plague, so I would go for a light policy to provide jobs for young people because I believe that society depends on the work the youth, you are the future. To work means to build a family and, in this way, the all economy starts to work, it’s not a job that makes a difference: personal realization means that I studied and I want to realize myself through my job. All this is good, but for me, work means invest resources and make money circulate, this is the first thing, and do that through light and fast policies.”*

R *“Yes, sure... so what do you expect?”*

I 41(M, 44, unemployed): *“Our politicians, our rulers, should get closer to us and listen to us, and for me, work is the most important part, I don’t accept replies to the idea that ‘work is dignity,’ it’s what it is, full stop. No bullshit, work is dignity and a person who does not have a job, especially if you have a mortgage and hardship situations, I don’t dare to imagine the situation they live in. When there*

aren't jobs, there's no dignity because in whichever way you present yourself, and you don't know who you are ... You don't know in which condition you are in this world."

R "Getting closer, sure. In which way?"

I 41: "Let's put aside abstract stuff and fashionable elucubrations: let's have weekly meetings on the hottest topic, which is always the same because people have to bring bread to the table. The rest of the problems will be settled after this, as it gets settled when and if people start working because they start smiling and believing in their dreams, which don't stay closed in the drawer anymore."

R: "So what would you expect?"

I 49 (M 57, community service): "At a political level, we should be stronger and guaranteeing more job opportunities through state policies."

R "What do you mean?"

I 49: "For example, the State used to intervene and actively create jobs through funding of, for instance, infrastructural jobs, street construction, and you employed people...practically, they called these measures incentives. Now, what do we have? European regulation say that the State cannot get involved in this way, the State cannot oppose the European Community, and hence it leaves private enterprises alone."

R "And what should be done in your opinion? What do you expect?"

I 35 (F, 27, student): "Jobs. Here, the first problem, I tell you because I had difficulties myself, I have a good CV, but 30 years, you are too old, they prefer hiring boys around 18-19, three-month contracts, interns without experience, they prefer that, and they don't like you. Then it's not that I don't stay afloat, but there are people, families with children who really can't arrive at the end of the week. People in Naples know this because many of them live in the city center and have other problems such as garbage, but em-

ployment is still the first issue. If you don't have a job, what do you do? You go and rob, what can you do?"

R *"And despite this, what do you want? What do you expect?"*

I 3 (M, 51, precarious civil servant): *"Listen, if we talk about the polis and the public good, we should start again giving rights to workers, which have been cancelled, a revamp of school and healthcare, but first and foremost work, workers' rights and this guy (Renzi) is going on cancelling, he's doing the opposite of what he said at the beginning."*

I 27(F, 53, teacher): *"I would like to see honesty from everyone, respect for rules because without that kind of respect there's no democracy, everyone takes a club and does what he wants."*

R *"Sure. And what else?"*

I 27(F, 53, teacher) *"And then labor, working harder to create job opportunities ...to go back to the point of mayors who don't do anything, I've seen structures abandoned for 55 years, these structures could have been used to create jobs, and this is not a joke, it's not. And then it would be so simple to provide the chance for all to be better off: in the Ionic coast, we have a Greek-Roman settlement, so people who prefer to go to Sharm el Sheik could come here instead and fill their heart of marvelous things. Then I tell you, I've been in Vicenza to have surgery, all the doctors were southerners. I mean why you must go away if you want to work? Yeah, now you choose Europe, it's an entirely different vision, and it's good. But it isn't fair that I must leave my son, or that my son must leave, or I must leave my land because I don't have the opportunity to do the same job that in Australia is remunerated ten times as much? Also, this is unfair, I think."*

R *"Yes, the lack of merit. But what would you ask today?"*

I 65 (F, 45, shop clerk): *"Hmmm, difficult question. Listen, if I could ask anything to a local or even national leader,*

I'd ask one thing: to make possible for people to work in tranquility, starting from small entrepreneurs."

R *"What do you mean?"*

I 65: *"What I mean? I mean that small entrepreneurs such as the owner of the shop I work in, they're oppressed by restrictions and quibbles. What can I say...not only tax limits, the ones we know very well ... but also more bureaucratic curbs. For example, the other day two traffic wardens went in my owner's shop and told her that the sign was not regular, after 25 years they say that, since it's in the historical center, some signs are not suitable ...I mean you get it ...do you get what I'm saying?"*

R *"If you had a candidate that you trust, which expectations would you have for him?"*

I 29 (F, 32, social worker): *"(the territory) is not valorized, I would expect that our things, where there are opportunities to harness them. We have a resource; we could create beautiful things, try to make the best out of what we have. In the summer, we have Montecovello, it's very nice, and they organized the Covello Summer Fest, it was fantastic. The Council helped the people as it could, and the result was a good thing, so you understand that that could be a source of income for the town, and if tourists come, you bring nice bands. Then you call people from Cosenza, because there is an abandoned camping area, and they can get it up and running again, so that when the tourist comes, instead of giving him camping for free, you can have a professional camping, so that you can have a return on your investment and plan other stuff."*

In these interviews, there is almost an obsessive request for jobs, understood as the highest and most "universal" of the universal benefits that are claimed here. Naturally, in the words of the interviewees, the correlation between the need for jobs and the capacity of the leader to deliver a universal answer is incredibly complex to untangle. Hence, we will come back to this point in the closure of the chapter: what is striking from the first reading of these transcriptions are the multifold meanings ascribed by the informants to work. Work as a universal be-

nefit, in fact, is not connected to income and, hence, to the satisfaction of a logic material need. Delving deeper, and leaving participants free to speak without stimuli, it emerged a socially inclusive value ascribed to work. Besides the concept of dignity, in many cases, work is understood as capable of providing economic security and, hence, a degree of stability apt to create strong social ties and deal with the future with more serenity and confidence.

Moreover, most informants share a strong preoccupation for the lack of jobs for young people, and hence a concern with the future. The conversations are replete with references to the need to create opportunities, so that young people can find jobs. Especially when informants are mothers, grandmothers or fathers, the accounts are charged with a profound sense of anguish connected to the future of younger generations. Precisely when facing this dimension of work as a warranty for future generations, work itself trespasses a merely economic dimension as a source of income, and it becomes something more. It becomes an opportunity for social redemption from disadvantaged social and economic conditions, or as the way to give continuity to the path traced by fathers and ancestors. Work, hence, becomes the tool to realize dreams, or the necessary condition to experience a full, active and responsible citizenship. In other words, work becomes a social glue, which creates trust in the community and hope for the future. In this, not strictly material nuance, work becomes an entirely universal benefit because, while still concerning the individual, it has immediate effects and repercussions on the collectivity. These effects are, first, economic ones, because it secures the livelihood of persons and households. There is also less material, yet as important effects, such as the social acceptability of a worker as an active member of a community. Apparently, work and youth entangle with other issues such as the relinquishing of land, emigration, and depopulation, deriving from the definitive exodus of younger people and the correspondent lower natality of those who remain. Despite the description of work as a universal benefit might be fascinating and worth deeper scrutiny, it is unavoidable to focus on other, less immediate elements, which are still very significant for the research.

The first element is the haziness of the ways in which a politician is supposed to tackle the problem of unemployment. In the parts of the interviews which are more inspired by universal benefits understood as services (roads, schools, hospitals) informants often provide concrete

and detailed solutions. Conversely, jobs are hardly ever associated with practical examples. In many interviews, in fact, the sources themselves point out at the difficulties that every politician face when trying to deliver more jobs. In synthesis, the central elements of these interviews are i) the vagueness of the propositions connected with work, unlike the very detailed solutions described for infrastructures and services. At the same time, ii) the objective difficulty facing politicians who want to create jobs is acknowledged. Lastly, there is a third implicit and unspoken element in all the listed interviews. All the informants, in fact, recognize public intervention as the sole driver for more employment and development. There is no call to the private sector as an engine of wealth and income, let alone to the market. Everything seems to pass through the hands of politics and individual, often local politicians. This aspect is important because also in past research on the theme (Wolf 1966, Tarrow 1972, Putnam 1985) the accent has been placed on the adverse effects of the missed development of capitalism in the south of Italy in determining detrimental political practices such as clientelism. Maybe, the less intense relevance of the private sector and the lack of an economical fabric produced, in time, a political consciousness in southern Italian voters, which is inspired by the idea that there is no job besides what is provided by politics. Or, more simply, many voters are aware of living in an economic system which even in the presence of private economic initiatives, cannot survive without the constant support of political leaders (both national and local), so that they must be relied upon when searching for opportunities of employment and development. It cannot be assessed without a doubt which one of the two dimensions is preponderant in the words of the informants. However, despite frequent claims to the lack of trust in politics and politicians, there seem to be no envisioned alternative to political leaders as “creators” of jobs. In this sense, the mandate given to politicians seems to be absolute and total. Moreover, regardless of the policy (lowering taxes on firms which hire young people, raising salaries to create aggregated demand, etc.), this mandate compels elected officials to find fast and satisfying solutions for as many people as possible.

7.2 *Answering the research question: a personal vote, expecting universal benefits*

Summarizing what written so far, the research has indeed shown

the existence of a personal vote oriented towards universal benefits. However, as depicted in the last pages, the kind of universalism that this voting behavior assumes different shapes which make it difficult to classify it per neat and precise criteria and schemes. Trying to synthesize the different accounts emerged in the interviews, the Personal/Universal vote seems to be concerned with:

- A Personal/Universal vote understood as an ideal approach to policy themes, and as an expectation of universal benefits grounded on projects, ideas and capabilities of politicians and their ideas about the future.
- A Personal/Universal vote which derives from clear and real needs, especially the constant request for services and both material and immaterial infrastructures. This approach stems from a desire to overcome the divide with the Center-North of the country, hence taking the form of a territorial claim. Unlike the first type of Personal/Universal vote, however, this claim aims to obtain actual improvements such as communications and connections, regional projects for tourism, and so forth.
- The third type of Personal/Universal vote identifies work as the most critical of universal benefits and, as said in the analysis of the interviews, acknowledges work as going beyond income, to encompass identity, social integration and, in the end, the very wellbeing of an individual.

Even though these approaches assume different forms, these three types of personal/universal vote represent, in various ways, the affirmative answer to the research question inspiring this thesis. However, despite the universalist orientation shared by the informants, there are remarkable differences between the different approaches and, hence, in the levels of expected universalism. In the first two cases, it is possible to distinguish two approaches about the degree of abstraction of the desired benefits. Conversely, work requires a supplement of reflection and sophistication. In fact, the expectations associated with the types as mentioned earlier of personal/universal vote already provide a satisfactory answer to the research question. However, it is also true that work assumes a more profound significance, which emerges from the intensity of the accounts given by those southern voters who are more attentive to this theme. The overall sincerity of the informants seems to be confirmed by the fact that most of them are searching jobs, either

for themselves, for their children or their loved ones. In many cases, the very act of speaking meant uncovering difficulties angsts for an uncertain future. In these interview settings, the tensions have been strong, and not rarely has it been necessary to have breaks to avoid a complete failure of the whole discussion. Intensity seems to provide a reliable measure of the sincerity of the informants, who speak about work as an asset which can multiply the total amount of available universal benefit. This because it guarantees stability, confidence towards the future and, more in general, it allows for a person to have a clear role within society. Overall, if the three types of vote just described confirm the existence of a Personal/Universal vote, it is also true that the content of the interviews points out to the fact that not all the universal benefits are equal. There are some, such as work, which are “more universal” in nature since they do not revolve around individual elements of everyday life, such as services and goods do. Rather, they influence the very life and well-being of the citizens-voters.

CONCLUSIONS

The End of a Journey and a More Informed Approach to the Study of the Personal Vote.

Let us summarize the logical path that informed this research, its purpose, methods and results. This study aimed to address the question: *does it exist a type of personal vote, among the southern Italian voters, that seeks to achieve universal benefits?*

As outlined in the first chapter, this research question emerged from the literature on the personal vote in the South, since most of the studies show a negative evaluation of personal vote as clientelism, in turn, associated with corruption and Mafia. Subsequently, the second chapter deployed a conceptual framework from a close reading of available scholarship: voting behaviors were divided into four types based on expectations (particular/universal) and orientation (parties/candidates.) Moreover, the protagonists were defined according to their rational strategies and their degree of political sophistication. The third chapter, in turn, was devoted to the analysis of the four types of vote: party (ideological) oriented, clientelism, patronage and constituency service. The third chapter provided a review of the existing scholarship on clientelism, focusing on the culturalist and structuralist approaches. Moreover, it had to grapple with separating the concepts of *patronage* and *clientelism* from each other. The fourth chapter outlined the methodological framework; it justified the choice of semi-structured interviews as a suitable method; it described the selected sample of informants, and it described the structure of the interviews.

This first part of the thesis, the literature review provided the reader with a comprehensive picture of what has been said and written so far about the personal vote. However, the interviews themselves represented the most important part of the research: since the project adopted a post-positivist epistemological stance, its aim was less to test a set of hypotheses than to retrieve a new type of personal vote from the empirical material, i.e. a type of personal vote animated by universal expectations. The exposition of the results gave space also to the other types of voting, by analyzing the interviews first according to the degree of personalism, and then to the kind of expected benefits. The sixth chapter compared the account of the respondents with the types of voting behaviors emerged from the literature, i.e. party-oriented voting,

patronage, and clientelism. While the first and the last cases appeared several times in the interviews, patronage in its organizational was notable for its absence. Lastly, the final chapter addressed the research question itself by recounting several examples of personal voting strategies aimed at achieving universal benefits.

Overall, the research has confirmed the existence of a relationship between candidates and voters grounded on the exchange of benefits which does not directly involve people who are politically close to the candidate (patronage), or who belong to his or her personal network (clientelism). Rather, these exchanges involved the community as a whole. However, an affirmative answer to the question is not enough, without elaborating on that answer in further detail. First, universal benefits needed to be divided and grouped according to their nature, such as public services and public transportation vis-à-vis labor and jobs. Regarding the first category of benefits, a certain degree of need for public utilities was already expected before undertaking empirical research: many parts of the South, regarding public services, belong to a different country from Centre-North examples. Rather, the surprising result was that high expectations were placed on local candidates, rather than on the state more in general.

The lack of adequate healthcare, infrastructure, and transportation emerged not only in the many examples provided by the informants but in the experience in the field itself, i.e. in the very research activity conducted in the communities under investigation. In Naples, for example, one interviewee showed the existence of unauthorized buses, which provide an overlapping and informal transportation service, thereby filling the gaps in the public transit network. In another example, from a small town in the Calabrian countryside, one informant was eager to make a phone call during an interview to show how it was possible to be admitted to the local hospital only if one had the right network inside the healthcare service. For the others, the only option was the hospital in Catanzaro, two hours away. Without expressing ethical evaluations of these and other examples, it is all too clear that the lack of services, and the need thereof, is a shared need, besides those who already possess the necessary wealth to make use of private services and facilities.

However, labor is the expected benefit with the highest degree of universality, among those emerged from the words of the interviewees. In fact, the informants concurred in thinking of labor as much more as a commodity, exchanged between a candidate and his or her voters, and this for two essential features of labor itself. First, it represents a source of income that enables and empowers people through a highly desired

but hardly achieved economic independence. “Living on one’s work,” as often said by elder informants, is the best cure against Mafia and mischief because it deprives the criminal organizations of the economic leverage against ordinary people. Second, labor is paramount to put an end to young emigration. This new wave of departures from Italy is considered worrying by the participants because it is based on the idea of “no return,” while previous emigrants used to maintain a strong connection with the place of origin, e.g. through remittances or by coming back after a while.

However, labor is depicted as much more than a material resource: it is such an essential element that it can compete with other rights and principles such as health. For example, Taranto’s ILVA steel factory is proved to be harmful, but it remains central. In the words of an informant: “Ilva allowed many people to buy a house, to provide education for their children, but most importantly it allowed us to stop working in the fields barefoot, at 4 in the morning, being paid piecework. We became working class, with shoes, a wage, and a dignity.” Hence, labor is the most important vantage point from which to judge voters’ universalism or particularism: both among clientelist electors (a minority) and among universalist ones, labor is the bargaining chip with politics and candidates. While the hardship of the South makes work a crucial political issue, labor understood as economic development is connected, in particular among respondents with relatively high levels of education, with the capacity of candidates to lead and bring change to their communities in a more comprehensive way. Respondents with high levels of either political sophistication, education, or both, provided a causal narrative that connects tangible benefits such as services and infrastructure with labor and, more in general, with the need for candidates with sophisticated and comprehensive visions for their communities. It is problematic to synthesize hours of dialogues, but one recurring theme was politics understood as care for the polis. Functioning roads, services, and jobs as sources of welfare, are nothing but a complete idea of society oriented towards collective and individual wellbeing. Candidates are very often asked to deliver on this aspiration, despite the disenchantment and the intense anti-establishment feeling which pervades almost all the interviews.

Hence, the articulated structure of the response to the research question makes the results of this research compelling. The variety of expected universal benefits gives vigor to the idea that there is a type of personal vote animated by universal expectations:

- First, the *diversity* of anticipated benefits derives from the high le-

vel of articulation in the accounts provided by the respondents, and the different perceptions of the social context and its needs. This high degree of dynamism proves interviewees' sincerity and positivity. Not only do they provide brief and summary answers: when solicited, they replied in a sincere way, based on his or her subjective perception of reality. It is not a coincidence, for example, that roads and transport connections are more relevant for people in the countryside and less salient for voters living in cities.

- Moreover, especially in longer and in-depth interviews, the list of expected benefits follows a clear order of priorities. Not all the universal benefits are equally desired because, in some cases, the need for a road might be more urgent than lowering taxes, or vice versa. Overall, the interviews did not provide a cold a rational definition of what is needed. Rather, they listed priorities, as if the responses were a proper ready-made party platform, to be offered to a candidate. This attention from the interviewees to the specific interventions confirms the good faith of the informants and the validity of the results.

Many questions remain unanswered, and there is room for further confirmation of the results. For example, it would be important to unpack the relationship between power and citizens, and the role candidates play in mediating between the two. Especially elder voters, in fact, often express the need for personal connections with the candidates, mainly to feel less detached from politics, and at the same time to be heard by decision makers. Proximity to the power that local leaders represent is often the only remedy to indifference and populism, especially in elder voters with lower levels of education. Moreover, this attachment to a candidate cuts across the right-left divide, as it seems to encompass conservative and progressive voters alike, alongside with "apolitical" or independent ones. The causes of the centrality of territory in the relationship with politics might be diverse, such as the lack of mass parties in the South, the widespread presence of local notables in southern politics, and so forth.

Second, it remains to be studied in further detail the demographic variations of political behaviors: younger voters show an overall refusal of clientelist practices, which are judged disastrous on a functional and ethical ground. Especially people under 35 with higher levels of political sophistication are more oriented towards universal benefits as an antidote to clientelism. Many young voters deploy a functional critique of clientelism in an accurate and history-sensitive way, and they

sharply judge clientelist systems as utterly inefficient. Many informants cite as an example the fictitious nature of the benefits that clientelist politics brings to the local community, which prioritizes short-sighted projects over collective improvements. Besides this practical and ethical judgment, many informants are worried to be forever associated with a collective appraisal of the South as inherently clientelist, hence unproductive and parasitic. Young entrepreneurs share an intolerance of political habits which were common back in the days, which are sought to be eradicated as hinders to development and modernization. While proposing a causal explanation for this inter-generational cleavage is impossible, the differences towards clientelism in elder and younger voters are clear, and a fragment can easily synthesize them:

“Politicians like De Mita filled local state companies of friends, who bankrupted them and destroyed even the few jobs that there were here. Now, who is my age and favors people like De Mita needs to know that the job he doesn’t have is not there because of De Mita, because he destroyed jobs with senseless policies and clientelist appointments, aimed at keeping power.”

In conclusion, this research answered positively to the research question and justified in detail this response: a type of personal vote which is oriented towards universal benefits exists. This finding makes two contributions. First, methodologically, this result suggests a less cynical and critical stance towards personal relations between candidates and voters. A decision to cast a ballot based on elements of the individual candidate represents one of many possible cognitive shortcuts used by citizens to structure electoral behaviors. Personal vote, hence, deserves the same analytical dignity as a research object as the other possible voting strategies. In the South, personalism and personal vote have old roots that require in-depth and value-free analyses. Second, normatively, this research argues for a more informed appraisal of the potential beneficial role that the personal vote might play in bridging the gap between citizens and institutions. In a time of crisis in political participation and widespread anti-politics, this proposed type of universalist personal vote might be a fertile ground on which to experiment good practices in political participation. Of course, the findings of this project are more nuanced and ambivalent, and more studies are needed before one can claim that a form of constituency service can develop in the South. However, political science commands to deal with these and further possibilities in genuinely analytical terms, especially with regards of the institutional milieu. Hence, it will be necessary to consider the

possible degenerations of the personal vote, firstly clientelism, under the light of the possible exogenous causes which prevents undesirable practices from spreading. Limitations in public expenditure imposed by law, international control, the significant development of the Internet, and mass communication more in general, are but a limited number that limit the “gray area” where corrupt politicians, at a national and local level, can generate benefits for the few and costs for the many.

Overall, the important processes of social and political transformation which traversed Italy from the transition between the First and the Second Republic until today, require a revision of the analytical paradigm concerning the personal vote. A personal vote animated by the expectation of universal benefits may not only exist, as this research has shown: it also can represent a virtuous reinvention of the relationship between citizens and politics.

APPENDIX

CAPITOLO 5

5.1.1 *The party*

I 2 (M, 48, impiegato pubblico) “Dovrebbe essere animato solo dal proposito di non solo rappresentare chi lo vota ma di tendere ad educare anche chi lo vota, cioè se riceve dei voti non è che li deve pesare, non li deve pesare perché il voto può essere appunto il frutto di una corrispondenza a un senso di appartenenza, allora io mi sento di appartenere di condividere degli ideali di un tal partito piuttosto di un tal movimento ecc.ecc. il voto per me è il frutto di una corrispondenza di ideali (...) la persona deve più che altro raccogliere l’eredità del partito e portarlo avanti”;

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “quello che non mancava (negli anni 60) era il senso di appartenenza ad un movimento, un partito politico i leader rispecchiavano quel momento storico, incarnavano il senso di appartenenza forte con delle idee chiare e poi si poteva governare”

I 6 (M, 28, piccolo imprenditore) “negli ultimi 40 anni quante volte abbiamo detto sta cosa? E il leader quello che conta il leader e poi non è mai venuto niente di buono, torniamo alle idee, ritorniamo al dibattito politico centro destra e centro sinistra e basta parlare di nomi, di Alessandro ecc.ecc”

I 16 (M, 34, barista-giornalista) “ti parlo sinceramente è inutile girarci intorno, oggi fondamentalmente non voti la persona, dal mio punto di vista è quasi impossibile voti il partito, la corrente cioè voglio dire un paese fino a 30-40 mila abitanti magari fai a tempo a costruirti un rapporto personale e magari è anche possibile fidarsi, ma già se superi un tot di abitanti e poi a livello nazionale e regionale diventa impossibile fidarsi al 100% e ti affidi allora alla corrente politica di cui fa parte”;

I 23 (M, 21, studente) “perché magari ti aspetti che con quella persona ci sia una comunità di vedute perché state nello stesso partito.... porta avanti le idee di tutte, in sostanza non conta come persona e ti affidi soltanto in quanto esponente di un partito, si fanno gravi errori affidandosi soltanto alla persona, che poi succede come la Spinelli al parlamento europeo”;

I 31(F, 51, insegnante) “...certo a volte ho deciso di mettermi in gioco e

l'ho fatto per il bene del partito perché ancora esistono alcuni valori che distinguono i partiti anche nel centro-destra”;

I 40 (M 20, studente) “il politico conta nella sua attività quotidiana istituzionale politica per l'appunto nella misura in cui è espressione diretta delle sue idee e di quelle del partito” - “la persona acquisisce un suo peso nella misura in cui riesce ad imporre la sua volontà all'interno del partito”;

I 42 (F, 26, studentessa) “e guarda per me è importante il pensiero. Nel senso certo la persona aiuta, ma vengono al secondo posto rispetto al pensiero, rispetto al bene comune insomma”

I 43 (F, 31 studentessa-lavoratrice) “... si a livello nazionale leggo il programma sono più attenta a quello che è il programma e quello che ..diciamo la logica del partito, le idee del partito, ma questo vale molto a livello nazionale ovviamente, a livello locale è diverso”

I 57 (F, 62, psicologa) “dovrebbe servire a realizzare veramente grandi scopi, ideali far sì che quelli che sono ideali utopie diventano veramente realtà quindi avere a cuore il bene dell'umanità.....Cioè non pensare soltanto alle cose tecniche strumentali ma riuscire a proiettarsi oltre, al futuro, le giovani generazioni, quello che diamo loro, l'ambiente, il mondo dove viviamo”;

I 58 (F, 26 praticante avvocato) “A me è stato insegnato, quando sono entrata in rifondazione comunista che prima da subito c'è il partito e la struttura ha rilievo, poi vengono i dirigenti e quindi le persone, certo persone come Vendola hanno contribuito alla primavera pugliese in maniera straordinaria, ma io credo nei processi collettivi e quindi nei partiti e non nei processi individuali.

I 3 (M 53, lavoratore socialmente utili) “all'epoca c'era Lotta Continua ora la politica non la riconosco più, noi .facevamo volantinaggio e ci si spendeva per delle idee e mai ho accettato la logica mangiano loro ma almeno mangiamo tutti,mai mi ha sempre fatto schifo” - “Ho vacillato soltanto quando si è presentato Orlando...era della Democrazia Cristiana, per me il male...però ho vacillato”;

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “la persona conta all'interno di idee ben definite che ne rispecchiavano le idee e quello che non mancava mai era il senso di appartenenza ad un movimento, quegli anni erano pieni di passione e personaggi illustri, Berlinguer per il Pci e Almirante per noi (MSI) erano questo, impersonavano idee”.

In sostanza, rispetto agli intervistati che hanno memoria dei partiti del '900, i riferimenti all'idea di partito e di conseguenza al voto orientato in primo luogo da una scelta di appartenenza sono chiari e riferiti a fatti realmente accaduti e vissuti dagli intervistati. Se invece si

analizzano le risposte degli intervistati più giovani (19-30 anni) e maggiormente orientati al voto ideologico, notiamo qualcosa di particolare: I 23 (M, 21, studente) “Certo le persone contano, ma in relazione alle idee del partito... come espressione di una piattaforma... Vendola, il suo percorso l’uso della poesia in politica, quello che rappresenta, vengono prima degli aspetti strettamente leaderistici”;

I 44 (M,35 disoccupato) “certo i partiti contavano un tempo...luoghi di formazione e crescita ormai si può fare poco i leader durano poco e non risolvono se un partito riuscisse a promuovere idee diverse, portarle avanti, io non credo onestamente nel potere della singola persona”-”De Magistris ad esempio può essere un eccezione virtuosa perché ha fatto qualcosa di buono ha creato un movimento di persone...”

I 42 (F, 26, studentessa) “Si ho dato delle preferenze, dentro il partito, ma solo per persone che sapevo avere le mie idee che poi sono quelle del partito...i partiti sono in uno stato pietoso, Grillo che è una finta risposta, il PD di Renzi ormai un partito di destra e anche Vendola e il suo entourage hanno fatto danni a sinistra”

I 29 (F, 32, operatrice sociale) “Io sono filosoficamente comunista ma più come corrente filosofica diciamo una ideologia di vita nel senso che sono di sinistra a livello di comunismo di Berlinguer, ma se il partito mi propone un cretino non lo voto”- “...e poi abbiamo deciso di appoggiare quel ragazzo anche se era dei DS perché ci sembrava diverso... insomma io non sono comunista come Antonella...”;

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “Per me chi rappresenta il partito deve essere almeno competente e istruito e noi abbiamo cercato sempre candidati così che sapessero distinguersi perché istruiti, colti...a volte non ci sono piaciuti questi candidati e non li ho votati, anche se non è stato semplice”. Ancora una volta, dalle parole degli elettori più ideologizzati si ricava un forte senso di appartenenza ad una comunità politica (il partito) che però non prescinde mai totalmente dal ruolo della persona che poi effettivamente si fa carico delle aspettative del partito candidandosi. In tal senso occorre quindi considerare un aspetto apparentemente marginale, ma che risulta interessante per comprendere la complessità delle scelte di voto, che a volte caratterizzano gli elettori meridionali. Molto brevemente consideriamo alcuni passaggi di interviste che potremmo definire candidate oriented :

I 52 (M, 29 ingegnere-insegnante) “Io ho un’idea abbastanza chiara...i valori per me sono tutto e devono esser valori fissi, non trattabili”;

I 53 (F 30 disoccupata) “Forse sbagliamo perché abbiamo perso un pochino quegli ideali iniziali che magari uno dice può fare tante cose ma poi non funziona e perdiamo subito fiducia. Dovremmo superare

nuove generazioni questo modo di pensare fondato sul compromesso, dovremmo recuperare un pochino di ideali”.

5.1.2 *Party and Leader*

I 1 (M, 47, impiegato regionale) “..parlo ad esempio del Movimento 5 Stelle che molti ne parlano senza contezza senza sapere il lavoro straordinario che hanno fatto Grillo e i ragazzi del movimento e siccome mi sono letto il programma e il regolamento interno e siccome vado a vedere di persona cosa fanno, i soldi che hanno investito nella micro-impresa..insomma non sono male”

I 9 (F, 58 lavoratore socialmente utili) “D.B. Ho votato lui...che sai che lui è PD e poi è giovane”- “E poi...per le regionali chi era quella ragazza? Aspetta non ricordo..ah sì Teresa,brava ragazza, ci dissero che stava nel Pd che portava de Luca insomma e la votai”.

I 11 (F, 60 pensionata) “...sempre stata socialista perché credevo nella libertà, nella tolleranza si parlava tanto di Proudhon e quindi sono anche approdata a posizioni meno estremistiche meno marxiste..e poi c’era Craxi che era un leader vero, mi piaceva tanto al di là di com’è andata finire;

I 13 (M, 61 personale ATA) “Allora noi in famiglia sempre stati comunisti..come insegnava mio padre...niente meno che nel 70 siamo andati a Reggio durante la rivolta..perché eravamo di quella gente lì”- “Ingrao perché rappresentava l’uguaglianza i diritti e i doveri e l’abbiamo sempre seguito fino a quando è diventato presidente della Camera, sempre seguito”;

I 17 (M 72, pensionato)“io sono democristiano moroteo e ancora oggi mi sento di definirmi così, ho avuto questa grande fiducia nel movimento giovanile della democrazia cristiana spinti dall’idea di Moro di raccordarci di più verso sinistra, verso il centro sinistra visto che nella Dc sicuramente Moro era più orientato a sinistra rispetto a Fanfani”;

I 20 (M, 43 avvocato) “... Sì nel 94 aderì a Forza Italia perché sul territorio c’era un bel movimento e perché Berlusconi mi affascinava come uomo per come si presentava quindi io ho creduto al miracolo italiano, poi figurati venivano fuori dalle ceneri di tangentopoli ti rappresentava un’ipotesi di novità, ero piccolo per sapere che lui era il delfino di Craxi e quindi si sostanzialmente questo e poi c’erano degli amici che stavano in Forza Italia e quindi insomma questo”;

I 26 (M, 67 commerciante) “No guarda a votare non ci vado quasi più troppo schifo tutta sta gente ste poltrone sti politici...quest’anno forse torno a votare il Movimento 5 Stelle che fanno molte cose buone restituiscono i soldi e a Benevento hanno fatto accattà i computer per i

ragazzi della scuola e quel ragazzo eletto ad Acerra, C.A. penso si chiama...non prende lo stipendio so bravi insomma”;

I 31 (F, 51, insegnante) “Credo e mi sono spesa in Fratelli D’Italia, specialmente con Giorgia Meloni che ritengo preparata e molto vicina alle mie posizioni per quello che riguarda i programmi, ripeto poi bisogna vedere se gra il processo di negoziazione che cosa io prospetto che cosa dico e la realizzazione di quanto promesso poi andiamo è un altro discorso quello insomma si può anche parlare essere affascinanti essere poi però in realtà poco”;

I 46 (M, 51 personale Ata) “Noi in famiglia sempre stati democratici (democristiani) e sempre votato per F.M. Che ha fatto tanto per la Piana a partire dagli ospedali e da tutti i reparti che ha portato nella Piana... oggi invece no, farei fatica a dirti quali partiti ci sono, magari i leader quelli sì...insomma è difficile..rispetto al passato voglio dire quando andavi alla sezione dei socialisti e poi anche dei comunisti”;

I 53 (F,30, disoccupata) “Sempre stata di centro-sinistra si insomma Pd..ma Bersani non mi stava molto simpatico Renzi è meglio....sembra che fa più cose, che è più attivo per noi giovani e infatti nonostante sia di centro sinistra ho tradito il Pd, ma per colpa di Bersani non mi piaceva proprio”.

5.1.3 Leader

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “un politico deve avere la modestia e la capacità...perché tu devi conquistarti la fiducia degli elettori ...quindi tu politico devi mostrarti capace di perseguire e raggiungere degli obiettivi”;

I 8 (M 61, impiegato) “(il politico) ...deve avere le competenze, deve essere competente deve dimostrarmi di sapersi battere in consiglio, di conoscere i meccanismi e la macchina istituzionale...poi magari non riesci a fare niente...perché poi sai quelli che hai intorno..quello che ti fanno fare... però di base devi essere competente”;

I 12 (M 70, imprenditore) “ No..io la persona guardo e cerco gente competente che si attiva per il territorio che lo conosce...che fa cose, una persona si deve mettere in vista per quello che fa proprio a livello di quartiere, che si interessa al bene della città e poi una persona che conosca il territorio e i suoi problemi”;

I 14 (F 48, insegnante) “Certo guardo il suo excursus personale la sua esperienza sia che si tratta di un politico o se si tratta di un manager, mi interessa sapere quello che sa fare, se ha già fatto altro quindi sì...ecco anche liberi professionisti, dico cioè non prendere un ragazzo senza esperienza che poi viene manovrato, da quello superiore, da quello più in alto.”;

I 17 (M 72, pensionato) “Certo l’onorevole Moro, al di là delle chiacchiere, ha portato l’Ilva per portare Sviluppo perché queste era una zona poverissima..non si tratta solo di saper parlare vuol dire saper risolvere le cose...a me viene da ridere quando sento parlare questi di chiudere l’Ilva..negli anni 60 a Taranto c’era il 40% di disoccupazione gente che lavorava nelle miniere in Francia, in Belgio e Moro che ha fatto? Ha semplicemente risolto il problema occupazionale di un terra che era disgraziatissima e allora a quel punto abbiamo avuto 40 anni di benessere e non era scontato caro mio”;

I 20 (M, 41 avvocato) “Eh sì non mi vergogno a dirlo per me Berlusconi nel 94...eh a me piaceva pensavo che se ha fatto bene l’imprenditore farà bene anche all’Italia perché avrà senza dubbio delle capacità, delle doti da manager”;

I 24 (F 64, impiegata) “Guarda l’unica persona che ricordo con piacere è l’assessore regionale S. persona colta, capace e con idee brillanti aveva creato un percorso artistico-culturale sul valore del mito una cosa meravigliosa, bella bella...poi era tanto chiacchierato, ma meglio chiacchierato ma capace che pulito ma immobile e inutile come Crocetta”;

I 25 (M, 51 operatore turistico) “Certo mi interessa sapere che ha fatto.. e poi vedi se ha fallito nel suo mandato se non ha realizzato nulla per il proprio territorio non ha dato un apporto che si possa chiamare apporto e quindi in generale quello che hai dimostrato di saper fare o non saper fare”;

I 29 (F, 32, operatrice sociale) “per dire una persona che si metteva a disposizione...per dire una cazzata che entrava in un bar e cercava di aiutare chi ne aveva bisogno..che vedeva il problema e cercava di risolverlo;, insomma gente che sta con i piedi per terra, che vive la realtà.

I 35 (F, 27 studentessa) “Scelgo il meno peggio.... però fondamentalmente scelgo quello più concreto, che so che mi prende meno per il culo e ha programmi realizzabili, mi hanno insegnato questo in generale, che le persone capaci, quelle serie e competenti non sparano cose...che poi vallo a vedè se lo fanno ”;

I 39 (F, 38 medico Asl) “No certo le persone contano...ma a me piace giudicarli per quello che fanno e per i collaboratori che si scelgono...nel tempo ho capito che conta tanto, cioè prima mi lasciavo molto trascinare dagli aspetti emotivi, si insomma dalla persona poi però, su consiglio di qualcuno ho imparato a guardare chi si sceglie il politico come collaboratori e in base a chi sceglie...si ecco da quello si può capire molto”;

I 41(M, 44 disoccupato) “Deve sapersi (il candidato) calarsi nella realtà...capire e risolvere i problemi delle realtà dei cittadini devono ascoltare questi ragazzi che hanno delle idee, dargli ascolto da competenti da

persone che possono dargli delle dritte che ne so dirgli stai dicendo una cosa che non ha né capo né coda oppure no questa è una buona idea..ma perché hai le competenze per farlo sì per dirlo.”;

I 50 (M, 54 imprenditore) “ No no senza dubbio la persona che reputo sia capace e quindi tutta la sua storia per quanto di mia conoscenza e non scelgo il partito perché io voglio prima di tutto un moderato e non sempre i partiti fanno queste scelte, io non ho problemi neanche a nominare le persone che reputo..abbiano fatto bene a R. ”;

I 54 (F, 36 disoccupata) “Essere in grado di risolvere...si insomma di vivere nella realtà e avere la capacità di risolvere i problemi dovrebbero sentirsi più uomini parte di una comunità più che senatori e deputati di un istituto chiamato Parlamento e poi legiferare per il bene di tutti... risolvere i problemi della gente comune”.

I 1 (M, 47, impiegato regionale) “Cioè Rita (Borsellino) ha fatto tanti sbagli ma non è mai scesa a compromessi però è messa da parte..... Salvo è arrivato più in alto però per me è una delusione nel senso che ovviamente sarò grato in eterno a lui per quello che ha fatto però.. (Crocetta) no.. ha sbagliato, non si è dimostrato coerente”

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “ Uno che abbiamo votato con piacere e oggi non c'è più, l'abbiamo sostenuto.... un ragazzo in gamba M.T. persona con idee chiare...forte personalità anche lui figlio di un vecchio dirigente del movimento sociale, purtroppo una disgrazia ci ha privato della sua presenza, ma finché era in vita l'abbiamo seguito.”

I 9 (F, 58 LSU) “L'abbiamo conosciuta al sindacato, ci fecero conoscere questa ragazza.... io sinceramente non conoscevo nessuno e dissi va bene, non ci stanno problemi e l'ho votata convintamente..poi sai una ragazza molto educata mi ha dato un bell'impatto”.

I 11 (F, 60 pensionata) “ Certo, fondamentale... e deve essere prima di tutto una persona di cui mi possa fidare, una persona pulita, una persona corretta, pulita, il che oggi non è facile ecco trovare in politica, una persona pulita che poi deve amministrare a livello locale quindi che ne so l'assessore alla sanità deve amministrare insomma ognuno ha il suo ruolo.

I 12 (M 70, imprenditore) “Mi ricordo Lombardi...un grande leader... alla casa dello studente uno in grado di esaltare...di esaltare le folle, mi piaceva faceva gli interventi, allora c'era anche Emma Bonino e anche lei sempre apprezzata la conosco da quando ero ragazzo!”.

I 13 (M, 61 personale ATA) “ E' stato un grande sindaco e un bravo maestro...conservo un bellissimo ricordo una persona prima di tutto dal calore umano forte...che ti trasmetteva allora il sindaco chi io sappia non era retribuito era gratuito e lo faceva per il bene del paese e allora

prendere questo incarico alla mattina faceva il maestro e poi il sindaco un esempio”

I 14 (F 48, insegnante) “Craxi...poi l’hanno fatto fuori...perché forse voleva muovere troppo...ma lui era un capo, un leader forte, mi piaceva come uomo, come idee insomma veramente era... mi è rimasto impresso ecco quello sì forse perché ero più giovane quindi quello che mi veniva di più”.

I 15 (F 46, medico) “Ripeto quello che mi convince è il contatto, la conoscenza voglio sapere se è una persona d’animo..ora mi penderai per stupida ma per esempio il Papa è un leader...sì il Papa, ma non come capo della chiesa ma come leader...nella società...cioè che parla alla persone.”

I 19 (F 69, pensionata) “Io mi ricordo quando andavamo a sentire i comizi, noi vedevamo in loro (parlamentari DC del territorio) un modello, ci dicevano cose che ci affascinavano che interpretavano i nostri desideri avere una casa, la famiglia, i nostri ideali e in loro vedevamo che c’era una certa garanzia, sì ecco garanzia....anche di serietà, di futuro, quella garanzia che oggi non c’è più.”

I 21 (F 26, insegnante) “Vabbè soprattutto se è del paese mio...anche se è del Pd...diciamo però come ti dicevo deve trasmettermi una certa giustizia un certo senso di equità e poi che faccia cose buone, non mi interessa di che partito sei basta che fai cose buone per la popolazione, per la zona e allora non mi interessa il colore che hai”

I 24 (F 64, impiegata) “Quel Di Maio...mi sembra presuntuosetto e l’amico toscano che fa lo smargiasso.... invece che bella figura che è il Presidente della Repubblica, che bella persona... mi piace serio, silenzioso, greve mi ispira severità, serietà, certo non è uno sbruffone, uno smargiasso; al contrario dell’amico toscano che fa sempre il bullo, si atteggia da smargiasso” .

I 25 (M, 51 operatore turistico) “Guarda al primo posto viene fiducia e onestà, il candidato è questo che mi deve ispirare e voglio sapere quello che posso sulla sua vita...che poi i fatti testimoniano più delle chiacchiere, dimostrarsi all’altezza ed essere un guida per la comunità”;

I 31 (F, 51, insegnante) “ Un leader che affascini...che riesca a coinvolgere, ecco la Meloni mi piace perché ha questo stile, franco, fresco e giovane e un buona tecnica di comunicazione poi certo...l’abilità retorica, saper parlare, a prescindere se poi mantieni, quello è un altro discorso, ma l’abilità oratoria accidenti anche quella conta moltissimo”

I 34 (M 74, pensionato) “ Intendiamoci, in questo tempo, ci vuole anche una cosa importante che è la leadership...senza leadership forti, anche un po’ autoritaria non si va...sì insomma voglio dire non si va da nes-

suna parte”;

I 37 (F, 57 LSU) “Deve essere una persona semplice....come ti devo dire..mi deve emozionare per questo io penso che i vecchi comizi vanno fatti ancora, devi avere contatto con la gente, devi guardare negli occhi non in televisione..personaggi come Enrico (Berlinguer) che grande persona, non si arrabbiava mai, ci spiegava le cose INTERRUZIONE PIANTO”;

I 39 (F, 38 medico Asl) “ Certo..Vendola vabbè l’ho anche conosciuto il suo carisma, il suo registro linguistico..sarei stata ore e ore ad ascoltarlo...sì insomma era abbastanza affascinata tant’è che credevo e speravo che presto diventasse leader del Pd, mentre Renzi mi piace... ecco il suo dinamismo e per la sua immediatezza nella comunicazione”;

I 47 (M 35, personale ATA) “ Senza dubbio la fiducia...un politico deve alzare il culo dalla sedia ascoltare le persone e guadagnarsi la fiducia altrimenti che fai..e no che vieni a dirmi delle cose che poi già si capiscono che non farai nulla, no devi trasmettermi fiducia ”;

I 49 (M 57, disoccupato) “mmh..come dire deve essere una persona innanzitutto come...come definirlo...ti deve ispirare fiducia nel senso che deve essere l’onestà deve essere una persona molto retta e molto cioè presente sul territorio come impegno effettivo no? come impegno attivo quindi coerente con quello che lui...con le sue idee e quindi come impegno attivo quindi coerente con quello che lui effettivamente dice“

I 52 (M, 29 ingegnere-insegnante) “l’onestà del politico è un presupposto fondamentale però deve avere anche idee, capace e avere sempre una sorta di onestà e di dignità personale che gli consenta di potersi presentare io ragiono molto con la mia testa e lo vedo come un persona da rispettare ma che non deve mai calpestare la dignità degli elettori.... e poi dovrebbe avere anche un pochino di carisma e quindi essere in grado di usarlo, un po’ sentimentale, dovrebbe riscaldare i cuori”.

I 26 (M, 67 commerciante) “ Cosa voglio? L’onestà...la gente che va là ha da essere onesta!!!”- “Prendemmo l’appalto mensa alla scuola... ma io solo per aiutare mio fratello..che lo sapevo che era na nculata..paghi na mazzetta là, un regalo qua e per farci uscire i soldi dovevamo aggiungere latte e pangrattato negli hamburger per aumentare il peso senza mettere troppa carne”

I 51 (M 25, disoccupato) “Certo per carità devono essere persone oneste figurati, io sono cresciuto con il mito di Borsellino” - “Io credo che M. e D.M. non abbiano creato il male sul nostro territorio...poi certo che devi fare devi averci a che fare con sta gente..poi al massimo se sbagli è giusto essere punito”.

I 39 (F, 38 medico Asl) “Se mi informo dopo il voto?...mhh si certo

seguo soprattutto quello che succede rispetto ai problemi..si insomma se migliora qualcosa davvero”

I 54 (F, 36 disoccupata) “ Certo che li controllo, specialmente sui problemi strutturali...magari non il giorno dopo..ecco cose complicate non è che...”.

5.2.1 Particularistic Benefits

I 33 (M, 62 esodato) “Io all’inizio ho avuto a che fare con S.M. democristiano e tutto nel periodo più nero per me perché io al tempo lavoravo per un’azienda privata e stavo magnificamente bene...poi persi il lavoro e venne lui per darmi il famoso posto”-”Sono andata dietro tutti i vari politici di destra di sinistra prima per il posto per me ero disoccupato e mi prendeva sempre per i fondelli diceva ci vediamo tra 15 giorni e lui per la sua carriera aiutava i compagni, sì lui democristiano faceva lavorare i compagni, ma vero dico, posso sottoscrivere !! Faceva lavorare i compagni sicché noi diciamo suoi elettori che per bisogno andavamo dietro a lui con la speranza di un posto.

I 45 (M, 34 disoccupato) “Non è il metodo che mi piace, anche perché conosco delle persone che sono state aiutate...un aiutino così non per un lavoro a tempo indeterminato fisso. A me non me m’hai stato offerto, giusto non so una cosa dopo la laurea se mi vuoi dare per due o tre mesi una consulenza per una cosa piccola eh, non una cosa grande... conosco un mio amico che è stato un po’ alla comunità montana, part time 200/300 euro al mese eh... a me n’cazzo no m’è mai stato offerto.

I 51 (M, 21 studente) “A me non fa strano che uno della provincia di Benevento venga a chiedere un posto di lavoro, non mi fa assolutamente strano...

R “Ah no?”

I 51 “ M. ha solo risposto ad una esigenza. M. non ha creato il clientelismo in città, qualora l’avesse creato. M ha risposto ad una esigenza, ha risposto alla povertà, D.M. Ha fatto lo stesso, N ha fatto lo stesso, logicamente con mezzi e strumenti diversi.

I 52 (M, 29 ingegnere-insegnante) “... l’ex sindaco non sono andato io a chiedere lavoro lui è venuto da me. Ora il motivo per cui lui abbia scelto me non lo so, forse perché l’ho sostenuto..non lo so ma io non sono andata ad implorare niente.

I 30 (F, 38 donna delle pulizie) “Io anche lo farei, chiederei se può fare qualcosa per mio marito...certo poi ci penso e gli altri? Perché è sbagliato perché non c’è solo mio marito....ma intanto penso...che qua ormai siamo al si salvi chi può.

5.2.2 *Universal Benefits*

I 1 (M, 47, impiegato regionale) “Intanto devono essere determinanti (i politici) nel creare lavoro perché oggi mi rendo conto, anche perché mi sono interessato allo studio del mercato del lavoro, i processi di globalizzazione coinvolgono tutti, per fare un frigorifero... oggi lo fanno i robot.

I 2 (M, 48, impiegato pubblico) “Il turismo, vorrei che i politici di S. puntassero di più sul turismo anche per occasione di scambio culturale e quindi educativo. Se noi pensiamo alla Silicon Valley negli stati uniti, andiamo a vedere chi c’è, chi c’è? Tutto il mondo, c’è la globalizzazione della cultura”.

I 3 (M 53, LSU) “riprendere insomma a dare i diritti ai lavoratori che sono stati cancellati, un rilancio della scuola che la sto vedendo allo sbando ho visto dal 2008 in poi, ma il peggio, l’ho visto da quando c’è l’attuale Renzi....quello è stato il peggio, nell’arco dei pochi anni distrugge la qualsiasi”.

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “Premettendo il fatto che il problema fondamentale di questo paese, di questa regione, di questa città è il lavoro, premettendo questa cosa innanzitutto riuscire a creare lavoro anche se oggi mi rendo conto che è veramente difficile perché vedi anche qui in Sicilia vige la cultura del posto fisso e questa è una cosa che ha penalizzato moltissimo....”-” e poi la sanità perché anche qui tocchiamo un tasto difficile, perché mio suocero è stato a Padova a curarsi e c’è un abisso tra i loro standard e gli standard siciliani.

I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “Mi aspetterei che sappia coinvolgere tutte le forze vere e vive e comprese le università, compresi le varie istituzioni che possono dare in contributo anche tecnico e scientifico per un progetto di zona e cioè io mo’ torniamo alla tipicità, come faccio a capire quali sono gli sblocchi per determinare ricchezze che ci sono in un territorio se non c’è qualcuno che sappia dire “questa è la via”.”

I 6 (M, 28, piccolo imprenditore) “Serve uno sveltimento della burocrazia in primis e anche qui per quanto tutto sommato io dico che la puglia è stata la regione in Italia forse da un certo punto di vista che ha favorito la crisi perché ci eravamo illusi.

I 11 (F, 60 pensionata) “La prima cosa secondo me è il lavoro, poi la sanità. Ospedali che funzionino, il diritto alla salute che prescindano dalla latitudine in cui si vive e in cui ci si ammala.

I 13 (M, 61 personale ATA) “ prima di ogni cosa creare posti di lavoro per sti giovani che non sanno dove aggrapparsi e non è giusto che i nostri figli compresi i miei figli che sono andati via, con tre figli non posso averne uno a casa”.

I 14 (F 48, insegnante) “Servizi al territorio che non ci sono più, lavoro per i giovani che altrimenti subentrano tutte quelle cose negative, giustamente, anche delinquenza e via dicendo.

I 15 (F 46, medico) “a me interessano le infrastrutture, farci funzionare tutti meglio, già questo sarebbe un bellissimo obiettivo, senza entrare nel dettaglio non ti sto parlando della spazzatura potremmo fare tantissimi esempi però cercare di cambiare veste alla città. Io dico creare lavoro ok però il lavoro dobbiamo anche inventarcelo.

I 17 (M 72, pensionato) “Qualsiasi iniziativa che vada incontro a uno sviluppo dell’occupazione, qualsiasi iniziativa che crei lavoro, qualsiasi perché il Sud e Taranto sta morendo per questo....forse l’eccessiva propensione allo sviluppo industriale di Taranto va ripensata, va compatibilizzata con altri però non si può fare che ogni giorno viene uno e se ne inventa una”.

I 18 (F, 56 rappresentante commerciale) “Vabbè è banale il lavoro, soprattutto per dare una speranza ai ragazzi che vogliono fare per esempio io credo molto vedo molti giovani che stanno tornando ad amare l’agricoltura non come veniva fatta un tempo, ma con i macchinari e quindi aiutare questi giovani che credono nell’agricoltura biologica”.

I 19 (F 69, pensionata) “Vorrei che i politici avessero una maggiore attenzione per il territorio perché vedo molto abbandono e non si creano posti di lavoro e quei pochi posti sono così provvisori che non aiutano la società a vivere meglio quindi c’è tanta pure delinquenza perché manca lavoro.... poi il turismo..voglio dire io vorrei almeno un treno che va a Milano e uno che va Torino e uno per Roma..siamo tagliati dal mondo”

I 20 (M, 43 avvocato) “Sì una politica fiscale diversa e farla subito... guardando un attimo al mio mestiere e si prende l’attuale sistema fiscale e lo si butta via perché è una politica suicida quella di continuare ad aumentare la pressione fiscale, non riusciamo a combattere l’evasione ma grazie al cazzo, scusa il francesismo, se tu mi aumenti la pressione fiscale”.

I 22 (F, 59 piccola commerciante) “Dovrebbero fare cose più pratiche e aiutare l’imprenditore diciamo del cemento perché si fermata questa impresa e poi ci sono troppe tasse da pagare anche per le persone che devono costruire in edilizia perché c’è bisogno che questi uomini tornino a lavorare.

I 23 (M, 21, studente) “Io credo che la battaglia da portare a casa ora sarebbe il reddito universale, che però dia davvero un reddito nella misura universale che non abbia quelle criticità che ha messo Emiliano, sostanzialmente una misura familistica, una misura insufficiente.

I 24 (F 64, impiegata) “ Devono eliminare le spese inutili le deve elimi-

nare, ecco. Le spese....ma queste sono cose che ti dirà chiunque qualunque persona di buon senso, ecco non è che sto dicendo cose, sto dicendo cose che tutti pensano.

I 26 (M, 67 commerciante) “Deve funzionare il lavoro, chi non è raccomandato..allora tutta sta gente raccomandata non fanno nu cazz. Vanno solo là per perdere tempo....le strade so sporche e a munnezza non si ritira e si vanno a nascondere perché si imbosciano e non fanno niente. L’ordine, la serietà e servizio, a famiglia come funziona: se un capo di famiglia non dà l’esempio la famiglia è squilibrata.

I 29 (F, 32, operatrice sociale) “Se parliamo di regione ad esempio vorrei più attenzione per i fondi UE che poi vengono ripartiti tra le varie regioni per essere investiti e la regione Calabria non partecipava perché i parlamentarti là oppure i consiglieri regionali per esempio se uno si occupa dell’area sociale diciamo le politiche sociali, va a vedere se c’è questo fondo se può essere finanziati insomma occuparsi veramente della propria terra, della proprio regione io l’unica cosa che mi aspetto da qualsiasi parte è pensare al cittadino sfruttare tutto quello che abbiamo a disposizione anziché arricchire il proprio portafoglio.

I 31(F, 51, insegnante) “La prima cosa che mi viene in mente è a favore dei giovani e quindi l’occupazione io credo che sia veramente una piaga sociale quindi una manovra snella e facile per dare lavoro ai giovani perché credo che la società dipende proprio del lavoro ai giovani.

I 35 (F, 27 studentessa) “Il lavoro è la priorità su tutto perché poi è normale che nel momento in cui io napoletano di base non riesco a trovare lavoro e devo portare avanti una famiglia mi arrangio a fare le cose più brutte anche poi c’è chi dice no preferisco vivere di stenti ma non mettermi in mano a cose strane.-”...e poi la vivibilità ora io ti parlo di Napoli ti ripeto perché ci vivo e la conosco e ti assicuro che uscire per strada e vedere...non è bello uscire per strada per farti un passeggiata beccare i militari che piantonano le varie piazze”

I 36 (M 52, medico) “ la prima cosa che devono fare i politici è ridurre la tasse perché la pressione fiscale loro dicono che è sempre la stessa però l’inflazione se l’è mangiata....questa è una cosa che negli anni ‘80.. come la chiamavano? Ah la svalutazione”.

I 39 (F, 38 medico Asl) “Vorrei dai politici locali una maggiore attenzione al territorio visto che in questo momento il territorio sta soffrendo per le criticità di tipo ambientale sia a livello locale sia a livello provinciale perché il paese in cui risiedo voglio dire adesso c’è questa situazione da risolvere (ILVA).”

I 40 (M 20, studente) “Allora ad esempio al Primo Ministro chiederei un ampliamento della spesa pubblica. Primo soprattutto istruzione,

nell'ambito della sanità, nell'ambito delle opere pubbliche a livello strutturale e infrastrutturale dato che il nostro Paese è carente in alcune aree particolarmente in Calabria, Puglia, Sicilia rete ferroviaria ad esempio”.

I 41(M, 44 disoccupato) “ Delle cose da fare? Ad esempio intanto iniziare a pianificare andando sul concreto...argomento del giorno non giriamoci intorno l'argomento più caldo è sempre lo stesso perché la gente deve portare il pane a casa e poi tutto il resto si sistema piano piano...quando la gente lavora e porta a casa lo stipendio inizia a tirare fuori anche il sorriso”.

I 42 (F, 26, studentessa) “partendo dalla mia esperienza diciamo che la cultura è un po' al centro di tutto diciamo specie su questo territorio e poi appunto la cultura intesa in maniera totalizzante diciamo dalla formazione a diciamo all'accesso della cultura quindi al cinema piuttosto che teatro l'acquisto di libri eccetera per fare un esempio una bella esperienza del comune di Barletta sul reddito di formazione”.

I 43 (F, 31 studentessa-lavoratrice) “In ordine sparso...allora maggiore incentivi per i giovani e chi mi favorisca a un mio progetto di vita quindi che sia aprirmi un'attività o inventare qualcosa produrre qualcosa credo che mi sia dato spazio e anche materialmente darmi uno spazio cioè tipo ti parlo di Napoli al cose che vorrei tipo tutti gli spazi del comune un elenco di tutti gli spazi che il comune ha a disposizione e metterli a disposizione”.

I 44 (M,35 disoccupato) “ Io ad esempio ho molto apprezzato De Magistris che per la questione che ha fatto molto aumentare il turismo a Napoli ed è stata una grande risorsa...ci sono molti miei amici che si sono sistemati con Air b&b”.

I 46 (M, 51 personale Ata) “ Le prime priorità sono far stare bene le persone trovare le loro diciamo cioè sport, stadi, piste e piste pedonali, strade camminare parchi queste cose qui.

I 47 (M 35, personale ATA) “ In un popolo civile ci vogliono i servizi, sono la prima cosa....Strade ospedali, scuole queste cose qua. Poi dopo avrebbero fatto questo poi dice qual'è la cosa più essenziale il campo di calcio, ti faccio un esempio una cazzata , può venire dopo.

I 49 (M 57, disoccupato) “Appunto prima di tutto tasse ridotte rispetto a quanto effettivamente perché poi tasse significa come vogliono far capire tasse paghi tali tasse perché servizi una più una equa ripartizione cioè se una persona è più facoltosa dovrebbe pagare tasse in maniera diversa rispetto a chi è più povero”.

I 50 (M, 54 imprenditore) “due impianti...siccome c'è una evoluzione del fatto dell'ambiente ed Roccella ha ottenuto grandi riconoscimenti

l'investimento deve continuare sull'ambiente come? C'è un impianto di depurazione ? C'è la raccolta differenziata, l'umido non dobbiamo buttarlo.

I 53 (F 30 disoccupata) “ forse pure pochi collegamenti con la città, abbiamo pochi collegamenti giusto un pullman che passa che fa un giro e uno è costretto a utilizzare per forza le macchine tipo per andare a Napoli due ore di Pullman perché fa un giro enorme....ecco su questo dovrebbero impegnarsi i politici locali”.

I 55 (M 57, clochard) “Avere un futuro più meglio...per cominciare è di Palermo? Va bene comincia a fare le cose per Palermo se lui ha questa mentalità che comincia a fare qualcosa per questa gente”.

I 56 (F 36, Dentista) “L'altro giorno parlavo con due mie amiche lesbiche di un problema che ora è un problema di stato si parlava di questo fatto che loro vogliono un figlio....ecco secondo me i politici dovrebbero risolvere questi problemi...perché le persone etero pensano a me non riguarda, a me che me ne frega, ma molti ne soffrono e non è giusto”.

I 57 (F, 62, psicologa) “Tu politico dei dirimi prima voglio realizzare questo, grandi sogni grandi utopie dopodiché organizzo la pratica per arrivare a quell'obiettivo lì non posso pensare solo qui e ora solo l'emergenza non guardare nient'altro perché veramente si perde ogni slancio, la politica diventa solo emergenza, soldi e il sindaco diventa solo amministrare della città..non va bene”.

I 60 (F 23, Studentessa) “Vabbè per esempio la prima cosa il riuso dei beni confiscati o di immobili che non vengono utilizzati che a Bari ce ne sono parecchi darli sia a persone che hanno bisogno a uso abitativo ma anche ad associazioni, cooperative, enti che possono diciamo usufruirne a scopo sociale a scopo aggregativo

CAPITOLO 6

6.1.1 Clientelism as a system

I 33 (M, 62 esodato) “Io ho avuto a che fare, posso dire il nome?”

R “ Certo”

I 33 (M, 62 esodato) “con S.M. democristiano, è stato eletto presidente della regione Sicilia poi inquisito con imbroglio della regione nella zona industriale e tutto nel mio periodo nero perché ero stato licenziato..lavoravo per una industria privata e stavo magnificamente bene e lui venne per il famoso posto e ho visto come ragionava lui, di destra poi ho conosciuto altre persone di sinistra e l'ultimo uno di destra è stato anche un nostro assessore F. G. che lui forse era uno di sinistra nella

destra perché qualcosa l'ha fatto però sempre col proprio tornaconto”

R “Cioè”

I 33 (M, 62 esodato) “cioè, cioè che ti posso dire faceva avere dei finanziamenti a me per poter fare un'opera turistica però indirettamente mi imponeva deve lavorare tizio caio e sempronio. Questa è una frase pesante che sto dicendo.

R “cosa non ti andava?”

I 33 “questo discorso dell'imposizione io ti facevo avere la diciamo la sovvenzione però tu mi devi far lavorare, ti interessa? Praticamente tipo un circolo vizioso, un autofinanziamento diciamo. Io li do a te, tu li dai a lui penso eh, ma è così. Boh non lo so, c'era un altro politico che io sono amico perché essendo di qua sono amico di tutti che lo chiamavano signor 5%”

R “perché”

I 33 “perché per ogni commissione che lui faceva avere prendeva il 5%”

I 33 “Andavo dietro ai vari politici di destra e di sinistra per il posto per me che ero disoccupato e mi prendeva per i fondelli diceva ci vediamo tra 15 giorni e lui per la sua carriera aiutava i compagni sì, lui democristiano faceva lavorare i compagni, ma vero posso sottoscrivere, faceva lavorare i compagni sicché noi diciamo sui elettori no...tanto pensava questi con la speranza di un posto dice tanto un voto me lo danno gli altri no”.

6.1.2 Clientelism as authority over a territory.

I 51 “no ti faccio un esempio teatrale nel senso come io vedo queste persone, c'è un'opera teatrale di Eduardo De Filippo che si chiama “Il Sindaco di Rione Sanità” c'è questo “guappo” di quartiere, quartiere Sanità, che in passato da piccolo aveva commesso qualche piccolo reato...poi un giorno uccise il capo che lo umiliava e tramite i falsi testimoni si è salvato, nonostante avesse ucciso a seguito di un'ingiustizia e da quel giorno si è messo a risolvere i problemi del quartiere. Ora cosa fa questo signore di rione sanità? Casa sua è diciamo lo studio di uno psicologo, di un avvocato, di un politico, accoglie i bisognosi, accoglie chi è vittima di strozzini e grazie al suo potere costituito in maniera non legale risolve i problemi.”... Va quindi analizzata meglio questa cosa, io vedo D.M. , M. li vedo come il sindaco di rione sanità. Cioè loro sono una parte del sistema anche corrotto anche sbagliato ma grazie al loro sistema corrotto e sbagliato riescono a risolvere problemi della gente.

I 51 “Hanno risposto ad una esigenza”

R “Ad una esigenza”

I 51 “Hanno risposto ad una provincia che moriva di fame. Voglio dire ad una città del Sud che subisce, che è sempre all’ombra di Napoli, è all’ombra di Avellino, è all’ombra di Salerno, che per tanti anni è stata definita un’oasi felice per il semplice fatto che nessuno ci considerava, ma comunque nel frattempo venivano a sbirciare. Hanno risposto ad una esigenza, cioè voglio dire è normale che un padre, se uno non ha un lavoro è normale che un padre di famiglia espone questi problemi al politico.

R” il lavoro è un tema sensibile, come si fa in questi casi?”

I 51 E’ diverso dallo stato il privato...nel primo caso fai proprio intermediazione, mentre nel caso dell’imprenditore...voglio dire io chiamo il mio amico alla Ferrari c’è sti’ ingegnere lo vuoi? Io so benissimo che è un imprenditore con i contro-coglioni e se è una persona incapace non la prende...a me stesso mi hanno chiesto una figura professionale io l’ho individuato, lo conoscevi, lo vedi e gli ho detto questo è vostro se vi sta bene altrimenti non fa niente...capisci che voglio dire?

I 51” Nel senso la politica come strumento per aumentare il proprio potere professionale è sbagliato. Perseguirla per questi scopi è ingiusto, perseguirla per favorire il potere di altri è altrettanto sbagliato, perseguirla come strumento per valorizzare il proprio territorio e difenderlo è giusto. Ora non so se facendo quello che hanno fatto, hanno fatto bene o male so soltanto che hanno influenzato i processi, che hanno portato Avellino ad essere avanti rispetto a noi. Hanno avuto un Presidente del Consiglio e una buona classe dirigente e tutti, anche gli imprenditori e in generale la classe dirigente di quel territorio si è sentita investita e responsabilizzata.

I 51 “Io non lo so se De Mita rubava, se i soldi andavano alla camorra... Io so soltanto...pensa all’autostrada Napoli-Bari che passa per Avellino tra le montagne del Parteggio; passare per Benevento-Napoli ci mettevi mezz’ora, ora ci metti un’ora e dieci...questo significa determinare i processi, cioè tu crei due svincoli ad Avellino, Avellino Est e Ovest tra Mar Tirreno e Mar Adriatico e tagli fuori Benevento.” - “...e poi la benzina la fai ad Avellino, e paghi le multe ad Avellino, e metti a lavorare gente di Avellino ecc. ecc.”

6.1.3 “Desperate” Clientelism

I 45 (M 34, disoccupato) “Vabbè io penso che...per la comunità c’è bisogno comunque di fare...in un certo qual modo riacordo con gli altri sindaci della zona, con le altre amministrazioni per cercare di creare qualcosa che possa essere utile alle nostre terre, non so i prodotti tipici, igt quello che cerca di preservare la natura perché qui già non c’è niente

quindi... facendo pozzi di petrolio ora vogliono fare le trivellazioni qui nel Sannio e ste cose danneggiano e non portano nessun beneficio”.

R “è un tema importante questo per te?”

I 45 “Certo, ti faccio un esempio, qui in zona, come penso in ambito nazionale si pensa soltanto ai soldi, agli appalti, alle opere pubbliche e basta, niente più, non è che c’è un’idea di progresso che può essere diversa, ecologica, puntare non so sull’arte, sulla cultura. -”e poi i consorzi per coltivare ulivi e viti che dovrebbero essere resi pubblici che il nostro olio non ha niente di meno di quello Toscano ad esempio”.

I 45”Cioè in Italia come qui c’è sempre stata la botta”.

R “Cioè?”

I 45 “La spinta l’aiutino per sistemare le varie persone nei posti. Qui per avere il posto c’è bisogno della botta, lo so che sono termini dialettali ma qui si usa così”

R “ e che ne pensi sinceramente?”

I 45 “Ma assolutamente nulla. Sicuramente c’è tanta gente di valore che magari è stata inserita anche in posti importanti e che svolge bene il suo lavoro, ma c’è anche tanta gente che non meritava nulla e magari una persona valida è a spasso. Poi se ci sono delle persone che devono essere aiutate che sono veramente in difficoltà...se ci sono due posti alla forestale e il sindaco deve scegliere è normale che io preferisco che venga dato a quello che ha due-tre figli è normale.

I 45 “Sì è vero non è il metodo che mi piace, anche perché conosco delle persone che sono state aiutate... un aiutino così non per un lavoro a tempo indeterminato fisso. A me non mi è mai stato offerto, giusto non so una cosa dopo la laurea se mi vuoi dare due o tre mesi un consulenza per una cosa piccola eh, non una cosa grande...conosco un mio amico che è stato un po’ alla comunità montana, part time per guadagnare 200/300 euro al mese. A me non mi è mai stata offerta”

R “e ti ha fatto incazzare”

I 45 “Sì perché agli altri sì e io no come mai? Allora questo mi ha fatto capire che evidentemente se gli altri hanno avuto è perché tu alla prossima elezione vuoi il voto da quelle persone io invece te l’ho già dato non ho diritto a nulla.

I 45” Giacché non ho mai avuto nulla e non voglio nulla perché voglio essere un uomo libero”

R “cioè?”

I 45 “Un uomo libero...che quello che faccio deve essere frutto del mio lavoro e non devo dire grazie a nessuno”.

6.2 *Party oriented vote*

I 23 (M, 21, studente) “vabbè non sono un’utopista cioè non mi aspetto che tutto il programma che di fatto viene propinato viene pubblicizzato sia effettivamente realizzato; però cerco una convergenza in dei punti focali che di fatto caratterizzano le mie necessità, le mie idee . Quindi ti faccio un esempio se uno mi viene a parlare di reddito universale e io vedo che effettivamente c’è un progetto comunque intende realizzarlo io è normale che darò attenzione a questo candidato a questa forza politica quindi sostanzialmente si diciamo uno sguardo al programma se ha ancora senso parlare di programma visto..., però appunto è normale che nel programma o comunque vedo il programma vedo comunque qual è l’orientamento ecco forse magari si, si può dire che sono superate le categorie destra sinistra, io non sono di questa idea perché purtroppo questa idea che c’è stata diciamo propinata dal diffondersi dalla democrazia e tutto ha permesso di fatto il riemergere dell’avvicinamento tra quelli che sono il centro destra e centro sinistra e l’emergere di populismi vuoti di fatto; io credo che il programma o comunque le idee presenti in esso abbiano ancora un peso in termini di scelta una dimensione realistica di quello che può essere realizzato e quello che non mi faccio illudere ma uno sguardo al programma lo si da, si segue la campagna elettorale”.

R “ e una volta scelto cosa ti aspetti, cosa vorresti?”

I 23 “io credo che la battaglia da portare ora sarebbe il reddito universale, che però sia davvero un reddito nella misura universale che non abbia quelle criticità portate da Emiliano, sostanzialmente una misura familistica, una misura insufficiente, una misura che può favorire del nero una situazione che tu a distanza di dodici mesi per rivedertelo confermato sei costretto di fatto, sei una situazione ricattabile, perché quasi esteso sono stati dati 130/140 euro a persona per una famiglia di 5 persone per riconfermartelo devi sostanzialmente stare a spasso, quindi tu con quella cifra non puoi sopravvivere anche la parola dignità è una parola umiliata, tu sei soggetto a rischio di lavorare a nero anche il lavoro socialmente utile, il baratto amministrativo che non c’è dignità altre misure è un’altra roba totalmente svilente, sapere che ha un’inadempienza fiscale va a incidere sul figlio che non può accedere alle mense, a un servizio significa mandare a puttane l’articolo della costituzione in cui lo stato deve fare in modo di eliminare tutte le barriere credo che la battaglia principale sia su una misura di reddito che sia davvero inclusiva che non si limiti che non sia puramente assistenzialistica reddito reale che può dare quella marcia in più può diminuire questi problemi intesa misura su cui creare tutti quei parassitismi che è il problema che ti dicono che si crea magari sia anche accompagnato da percorsi reali di

inserimento nel mondo del lavoro che non sia il tirocinio, lo sfruttamento legalizzato in cambio di offerte di lavoro veramente valide.”

R “ e che dovrebbe fare”?

I 40 (M 20, studente) “...per me il politico deve in un modo o nell’altro portare avanti il Paese, la collettività insieme al suo partito di cui egli è emanazione e che necessariamente poi rappresenta una parte della popolazione che l’ha votato all’interno di un quadro istituzionale fondato sulla rappresentanza parlamentare”-” ...poi oggi i miei coetanei sono più sfiduciati, meno interessati a differenza di un mio coetaneo degli anni ‘70/’80 quando appunto questi si mobilitavano unitamente e compiutamente per riuscire a trasformare radicalmente lo stato delle cose presenti attorno a loro e quindi vi era uno spirito di aggregazione di comunità, a partire proprio dalle stesse università dove per esempio per l’appunto i ragazzi si riunivano, riunioni di ogni tipo.

R “misure in che senso”?

I 40 (M 20, studente) “Allora per esempio io chiederei un ampliamento della spesa pubblica: Primo, soprattutto istruzione nell’ambito della sanità, nell’ambito delle opere pubbliche a livello strutturale e infrastrutturale dato che il nostro Paese è carente di alcune aree particolarmente in Calabria, Puglia, Sicilia, rete ferroviaria ad esempio. Chiederei di attuare politiche di drastica riduzione del debito pubblico tramite chiaramente una vera e propria rinegoziazione”-”...e poi vorrei una revisione dei trattati internazionali cioè opporsi a tutte quelle ingerenze che ci condizionano profondamente in termini militari ad esempio.

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “per quanto mi riguarda veniamo da 50-60 anni di malgoverno però all’ora, rispetto a oggi, secondo me quello che non mancava mai era il senso di appartenenza a un movimento, un partito politico; i leader secondo me rispecchiavano quel preciso momento storico che in ogni caso era un senso storico che in ogni caso un senso di appartenenza forte con delle idee chiare poi si poteva governare...io per come ricordo, se un uomo politico apparteneva ad una corrente ben definita non c’era motivo alcuno che si potesse spostare da una parte e dell’altra...oggi ci si ritrova subito fuori da un partito per entrare in un altro solo per la poltrona abbandonando quelli che sono probabilmente degli ideali e dei concetti politici che oggi secondo me non ci sono più”.

R “hai avuto esperienze, diciamo personali?”

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “Io ho seguito molto da vicino la storica svolta di Fiuggi del Movimento Sociale Italiano che transitava in Alleanza Nazionale quel primo Gianfranco Fini di quel periodo aveva dato secondo me segni di continuità poi anche lui si è perso.

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) “Premettendo il fatto che il problema fondamen-

tale di questo paese, di questa regione, di questa città è il lavoro, premettendo questa cosa innanzitutto riuscire a creare lavoro anche se oggi mi rendo conto che è veramente difficile perché vedi anche qui in Sicilia vige la cultura del posto fisso e questa è una cosa che ha penalizzato moltissimo...”-” e poi la sanità perché anche qui tocchiamo un tasto difficile, perché mio suocero è stato a Padova a curarsi e c’è un abisso tra i loro standard e gli standard siciliani.-”...e poi l’ambiente la pulizia, secondo me ancora...a me capita ancora oggi, nel 2016. una cosa che secondo me è di una inciviltà che non ha pari io ancora incontro gente che per strada abbassa il finestrino e butta la carta dalla macchina questo secondo me a livello civico è una delle cose più gravi perché tu mi stai dicendo che te ne strafotti...”

R “ Non ti sei ritrovata insomma?”

I 57 (F, 62, psicologa)” Ma già è stato un errore l’Ulivo; io non l’ho votato perché non si può mettere insieme la democrazia cristiana abbiamo lottato una vita contro la democrazia cristiana e poi ci siamo messi insieme. Questo ha ucciso la sinistra, i valori laici: la Democrazia Cristiana il Papa, il Vaticano che cercare di tenere tutti buoni e questo non va bene.”-”Io mi ricordo i tempi di Lotta Continua, quindi ricordi delle riunioni che facevamo, le manifestazioni, poi i tempi del femminismo, la lotta per i diritti delle donne quindi ricordo che più che altro questo.

I 57 (F, 62, psicologa) “ La politica deve servire a realizzare grandi scopi ideali, far sì che quelli che sono ideali utopie diventano veramente realtà quindi avere a cuore il bene dell’umanità non essere autoreferenziali”- “Ma già dopo gli anni 70 la politica ha cambiato volto prima era sogno utopia i giovani erano protagonisti, mentre invece ora sono spettatori della loro vita.

I 57” Prima di tutto mi deve dire io voglio realizzare questo, grandi sogni, grandi utopie dopodiché organizzo la pratica per arrivare a quell’obiettivo... non si può pensare solo all’emergenza, ai soldi ma perché è crollato un tetto e il sindaco diventa l’amministratore e nella città non cambia nulla, pensiamo solo alle emergenze.

R “e altro”?

“Sì, certo e poi creare lavoro perché è veramente fondamentale anche il disagio che si vive in famiglia è fortemente influenzato dall’assenza di lavoro... i figli soffrono moltissimo...mi fanno ridere politici che si battono il petto parlando della famiglia di qua e di là, e poi non vedono l’ovvio...famiglie che soffrono letteralmente la fame”

6.3 Patronage: the Missing Type

I 63 (impiegata 34) “Certo dove lavoro io la politica ha un peso, il politico ha un peso”

R “In che senso?”

I 63 (impiegata 34) “penso innanzitutto che al matrimonio del mio capo c'erano V. e la G. e al mio invece non c'erano e non penso che ci sarebbero venuti....Poi va capito che significa raccomandazione: ora se a me mi mandano via perché E. ha deciso di sostituire 40 che c'erano prima con 40 dei suoi a me sembra un'ingiustizia anche se nel pubblico non essendo il privato può farlo”

I 68 (formatore 42) “Io non credo che lui era proprietario di un simbolo e secondo me è sbagliato”

R “ti ha deluso insomma”

I 68 (formatore 42) “Sì me e molti della mia zona perché...si insomma a B., negli uffici della Regione, negli uffici nuovi creati soprattutto da lui come l'Ente di promozione del turismo, ci ha piazzato soltanto i suoi, quelli del territorio di riferimento e della sua area e N.F. era il suo referente...in molti da queste parti dopo averlo sostenuto, aiutato in campagna elettorale e anche dopo si sono ritrovati fuori”

R “fuori da cosa?”

I 68 (formatore 42) “fuori dai posti dentro l'amministrazione regionale o agli enti collegati...insomma alla fine, soprattutto dopo il primo mandato che non era stato male, V. ha dovuto garantire e i suoi, quelli più fedeli, a partire da N.F. erano tutti di quel territorio e questo ha generato molto malcontento nella nostra provincia.

I 51 (M 25, studente) “... fatto sta comunque Avellino adesso sta cercando di creare un brand di territorio a crearsi un'immagine e curarla e difenderla e hanno avuto una discreta classe dirigente oltre a De Mita”

R “In che senso?”

I 51 (M 25, studente) “Io dico che i nostri cugini irpini sono un passo avanti a noi, probabilmente anche grazie a quella classe dirigente che comunque hanno avuto un capo di governo e comunque anche ottimi imprenditori e probabilmente loro sentendosi protagonisti ognuno di loro si è sentito un De Mita; e d'altra parte è così... Avellino stava all'Italia con De Mita come ora Firenze sta all'Italia con Renzi”.

R “In che senso?”

I 51 (M 25, studente) “Perché Renzi ...vedi no? Le nomine vengono tutte dalla Toscana; De Luca e i suoi assessori, le nomine, vengono tutti dall'area di Salerno. In Irpinia voglio dire... il governo della Dc ha portato tanto all'Irpinia dall'Italia ed è anche giusto che sia così... cioè trovo normale, naturale che la cosa più vicina..uno come De Luca

intendo, faccia delle nomine che vengono da Salerno perché io penso che queste nomine siano legate a una questione di fiducia perché se io ho fatto il sindaco di Salerno, ho collaborato con dirigenti, assessori che stavano a Salerno e quindi reputo capaci li porto con me...come accade da Firenze e dalla Toscana”.

Capitolo 7

7.1 Different types of universal benefits

R “quindi questa arretratezza non è soltanto questione di soldi”

I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “ Ma no assolutamente... certo un tempo, se pur con molti limiti la Cassa del Mezzogiorno creava qualche condizione di sviluppo, anche tanto rubare, ma anche sviluppo ma è una condizione più generale...una condizione del luogo”

R “Una condizione del luogo?”

I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “certo...se tutto il complesso è piuttosto di livello basso allora siamo tutti portati a tenere comportamenti familistici, se ci fosse offerta di lavoro per tutti non ci sarebbe raccomandazione. Se ci fosse una mentalità di servizio all’ospedale non ci sarebbe bisogno che io telefoni all’amico per farmi ricoverare prima o per tenermi un posto nella stanzetta o perché per un diritto devo rivolgermi a qualcuno che mi fa un favore. Dobbiamo invece uscire da questa logica, partendo dalle agenzie educative ovvero scuola e famiglia che devono esser luoghi di crescita...altrimenti la povertà culturale che nasce dalla povertà di mezzi non si arresta. Ma voglio dire noi..noi siamo così ignoranti che noi non conosciamo le nostre tipicità..è dovuto venire un trentino a parlarcene...”

R “ in che senso un trentino?”

I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “Sì il vescovo B. quello che c’era prima...Io da lui, che veniva dal Trentino, ho sentito parlare di tipicità proprio da lui. Noi le nostre tipicità non le conosciamo, non le sappiamo valorizzare non sappiamo quale sono le nostre tipicità mentre lui le aveva capite”

R “e chi si candida in questi luoghi, insomma che aspettative ripone in lui? Che dovrebbe fare?”

I 5 (M, 73 parroco) “Mi aspetterei che sappia coinvolgere tutte le forze vere e vive e comprese le università, compresi le varie istituzioni che possono dare un contributo anche tecnico e scientifico per un progetto di zona e cioè io... mo’ torniamo alla tipicità, come faccio a capire quali sono gli sbocchi per determinare ricchezze che ci sono in un territorio se non c’è qualcuno che sappia dire “questa è la via”...che sia in grado

di avere una visione ecco, appunto un'idea di dove andare e dove condurre questo territorio”.

R “e che vorresti allora da un candidato, che aspettative hai oggi?”

I 43 (F studentessa-lavoratrice,31) “allora parlando liberamente io: partirei dalle condizioni dei giovani...vorrei maggiori incentivi per chi ha delle idee, cioè hub o comunque qualcosa che favorisca un mio progetto di vita quindi che sia aprirmi una qualche attività...magari individuare degli spazi fisici..censire gli spazi vuoti del Comune, anche se nemmeno loro sanno quanti e quali spazi sono (risatina). Insomma quello e dare più supporto a chi ha la capacità...”

R “un aiuto ai giovani insomma..”

I 43 (F studentessa-lavoratrice,31) “ No, non credo, credo che aiutarmi sia una brutto termine, ha qualcosa di paternalistico, di cattolico, non mi piace. L'aiuto è qualcosa...quando tu dai e non hai niente in cambio, invece investire è un termine più...investire sui giovani!!”

R “in che senso?”

I 43 (F studentessa-lavoratrice,31) “e quindi investire è diverso: investire su qualcosa è diverso che aiutare perché è una scommessa e non si sa se si riesce o meno; mentre aiutare è una cosa che finisce e l'investimento ha anche un ritorno per chi investe e per chi comunque produce qualcosa è una scambio e credo che di questo ci sia bisogno. Un politico deve credere nell'innovazione e bisogna investirci si lavora in quel determinato campo e così si cresce...”

R “e chi fa politica dovrebbe farsi carico di questo? Dovrebbe.....”

I 43 (F studentessa-lavoratrice,31) “sì, che poi è quello che ho detto e dovrebbe attuarsi ovunque e credo sia compito della politica, di chi la fa domandarsi da qui a vent'anni cosa sarà questo Paese, al di là della durata della legislatura. Perché questa è una cosa che ho sempre odiato della politica, non avere mai un programma di lungo termine. Nel senso, voglio dire,tu programmi determinate cose che non riguardano solamente l'immediato e che anzi guardino lontano. Questo credo sia la responsabilità dei politici, pensare a lungo termine quindi magari al di là del consenso perché le cose più visibili creano più consenso nell'immediato, ma sono specchietti per le allodole”.

R “e cosa ti colpirebbe allora nel programma di un candidato”

I 7 (F, studentessa 19) “Personalmente idee innovative e originali nel senso che, essendo cioè una ragazza quindi ovviamente parlo per la mia età, qualcosa che possa interessare ai giovani qualche corso, qualcosa per promuovere appunto l'istruzione qualche collegamento universitario al lavoro qualcosa che ti cattura non sempre le solite cose che si usa dire durante... poi dipende anche se vado a votare il sindaco”

R “per esempio”

I 7 (F, studentessa 19) “qualcosa riguardante l’ambiente. Credo che in Italia abbiamo un patrimonio culturale che viene valorizzato poco e soprattutto una sporcizia... anche le raccolte differenziate non funzionano quindi qualcosa che promuova l’ambiente e avvicini i giovani all’ambiente che faccia capire che l’ambiente va curato e qualcosa pure sull’Università cioè di collegamento con il mondo del lavoro”

R “ e altro? ”

I 7 (F, studentessa 19) “A Benevento abbiamo l’arco di Traiano, la chiesa di Santa Sofia e tanti altri monumenti che sono a livello di turismo zero: quindi insomma vorrei qualcosa che aumentasse il turismo a Benevento anche perché una cosa assurda è che molte cose non sappiamo valorizzarle. Poi mettere in sicurezza la città dopo l’ultima alluvione abbiamo capito di non essere sicuri e ci sono stati danni e sicuramente perché non si sono fatte le cose al tempo giusto, quando andavano fatte”.

R “e cosa ti aspetteresti quindi?”

I 11 (F, 60 pensionata) “Prima cosa per il sud, lavoro...e sanità. Ospedali che funzionino, il diritto alla salute come diritto che prescindano dalla latitudine in cui si vive e in cui ci si ammala che sia un diritto per tutti noi qui al sud moriamo di più anche perché non abbiamo gli ospedali giusti, si arriva al pronto soccorso e già al pronto soccorso non si sa in che ospedale ti devono portare perché qui è pieno e lì è pieno. Diritto alla sanità, diritto al lavoro e diritto allo studio perché da noi i ragazzi devono andare a studiare per forza fuori a Firenze, a Milano perché non devono avere qua possibilità e devono andare a studiare fuori? Le infrastrutture, il sud, il lavoro. Ecco questo per me.

R “e cosa vorrebbe quindi da un candidato?”

I 12 (M 70, imprenditore) “Ma... risolvere il problema dell’occupazione giovanile: perché io penso che ai giovani non stiamo dando speranze per il futuro, e quindi bisogna crearli prospettive nel nostro piccolo diamo da lavorare a 2000/3000 persone e quelli che sono dietro, le famiglie...e bisogna migliorare le scuole; l’istruzione non è più fatta come una volta; prima uscivano dei ragazzi diplomati in maniera seria; oggi la scuola è fatta anche di insegnanti che hanno timore dei ragazzi, bullismo, delinquenza. Allora non esistevano queste cose quando andavo a scuola io ci si alzava in piedi davanti all’insegnante, si studiava; oggi invece no. Io dico: se uno va a scuola non va bene a lavorare adesso e crearli il problema...cioè i giovani bisogna motivarli, spronarli fargli capire che nessuno ti regala niente e che ormai ti tocca competere a livello globale e allora occorre rimboccarsi le maniche”

R “quindi istruzione, come problema...”

I 12 (M 70, imprenditore) “Sì, perché bisogna creare i presupposti per inserirli nel mondo del lavoro, creare un collegamento tra scuola e mondo, del lavoro proprio oggi c’è un taglio netto a volte arrivano dei giovani a fare dei colloqui che proprio non capiscono niente, ed io creerei in questo feeling con le scuole professionali, non dico umanistiche scientifiche ma professionali, creare un collegamento dalla scuola direttamente col mondo del lavoro per fargli capire quello che effettivamente si aspetta il mondo del lavoro dal mondo della scuola mentre c’è un taglio netto perché poi non ti servono a nulla e poi ci devi lavorare sopra per fare formazione questa formazione la potrebbe dare la scuola di concerto con il mondo del lavoro...questo dovrebbero fare i politici e la politica!!!”.

R “E tu invece cosa vorresti? Cosa servirebbe per te?”

I 28 (M, studente 21) “Io credo nel reddito minimo garantito, che secondo me risolverebbe molti problemi perché se tu a me mi dai 80 euro a settimana, e io senza lavorare me ne prendo 600 non vengo a lavorare da te allora tu per assumere personale devi adeguarti ad un salario minimo. E quello è un modo per creare dignità lavorative per sconfiggere un certo tipo di lavoro a nero che è un problema reale”:

R “cioè”?

I 28 (M, studente 21) “cioè che magari un ragazzo che lavora al bar 10 ore al giorno per 5 giorni a settimana lo fa per arrotondare e non ha possibilità di scelta e tu su queste cose devi intervenire in che modo? Offrendo alle persone la possibilità di rifiutare questo genere di sfruttamento e chi ti propone qualcosa deve offrirti qualcosa di adeguato e quindi si combatte in questo modo. E poi il reddito minimo aiuta il collocamento

R “in che senso?”

I 28 (M, studente 21) “Nel senso che io Stato, che io pubblico non voglio spendere i soldi a caso e quindi sarò più incentivato a trovarti in fretta un lavoro per evitare di spendere quei 600 euro al mese che devo darti se non lavoro. Semplice.

R “cosa ti aspetti? Cosa dovrebbe fare il candidato?”

I 32 F, aiutante domestica 46) “Bè occuparsi dei problemi di Benevento...che poi è la disoccupazione, la sanità insomma forse..e poi le leggi contro il femminicidio...sì forse sono un po’ di parte perché donna.... (risata)

R “cioè”?

I 32 (F, aiutante domestica 46) “no no è che mi fa molta rabbia perché penso che le donne cioè non vengono considerate nemmeno dalle per-

sonne che dicono di amarle e lo stato nemmeno fa niente e i politici e poi vediamo i dati...quante ne vengono uccise...insomma ci vorrebbe la forza di reagire a queste situazioni..."

R "è una cosa importante per te"?

I 32 (F, aiutante domestica 46) "sì sì, lo penso e io so che a Benevento ci sono dei casi del genere; forse non se ne parla però andrebbe aperta assistenza anche nei paesi...insomma vorrei si impegnasse in questo...e poi..vabbè poi l'ambiente sicuramente l'ambiente. Sicuramente c'è molta gente ancora incivile che lascia la spazzatura per la strada e quindi bisogna insegnare alla gente come fare...che questa è casa loro e devono rispettarla. Lo so che non è una cosa semplice da fare per chi si candida...però voglio dire sono loro che si sono candidati...(risata)

R "e quindi se ci fossero elezioni, cosa si aspetterebbe da un candidato? Quali "priorità" come dice Lei?"

I 34 (M 74, pensionato) "è una domanda molto difficile...perché in Italia c'è un meccanismo per cui è difficile individuare responsabilità per il cittadino...difficile capire chi gestisce determinate situazioni e quindi... Si dice che serve la politica...a Siracusa c'è la crisi della monnezza giusto? E il popolo cerca la politica...io se dovessi fare un ragionamento più di giustizia inizierei pensando, per così dire agli ultimi, cioè quelli che pur non avendo voce non riescono a farla arrivare a chi comanda perché questa voce non ha molte mani per mettere firme e votare. Chiaro? Però ci sono i disabili in questa città, e sono tanti. Quelli che vivono in una condizione abitativa pesante ci sono e sono lì..."

R "chiaro"

I 34 (M 74, pensionato) "poi su un piano generale scuola in Italia c'è ma questa scuola prepara a che cosa? Fare diventare tutti filosofi... sono meccanismi molto pesanti sui quali bisognerebbe intervenire in fretta e poi un piano che tocca tutti e di cui siamo tutti responsabili che è la qualità della democrazia perché nel momento in cui non c'è partecipazione non c'è democrazia e oggi è un problema...serio in Italia".

R "e cosa vorresti che facesse? Quali priorità?"

I 47 (M 35, personale ATA) "In un popolo civile ci vogliono i servizi, sono la prima cosa. Quando ci sono i servizi c'è sviluppo, perché senza servizi lo sviluppo non arriva mai; e dopo se facessero una cosa del genere si potrebbe parlare delle cose prioritarie. Scuole, strade, ospedali queste cose qua. Poi fatto questo poi ti faccio un esempio? Dico una cazzata: il campo di calcio, quello poi, può venire dopo."

R "servizi quindi"

I 47 (M 35, personale ATA) "Sì...io l'ho vissuto sulla mia pelle, io sono stato là (Bergamo) senza macchina, era meglio senza macchina; non

avevo picci (preoccupazioni), prendevo il treno alla stazione, prendevo il bus e andava dove cazzo volevo e io non me la sentivo di venire qua solo perché quando arrivi a Lamezia sei morto. O hai qualcuno che ti viene prendere o niente...e se arrivano i turisti che gli dici? O ti affitti la macchina o se hai qualche parente che ti viene a prendere..capisci perché da fastidio sta cosa qua”.

R”e quindi che vorresti dal prossimo candidato?”

I 50 (M, 54 imprenditore) “senti a parte migliorare la raccolta differenziata, magari utilizzando il l’umido per fare il compost..direi il turismo. Io penso un Roccella Slowfood con una sede al Castello e percorsi di degustazione...Il discorso però è che tu devi conoscere devi far conoscere i prodotti, gli agrumi, il mare produrre origano e poi tutto si tiene. È importante fare rete perché ormai il turismo va in quella direzione le persone vogliono fare una vacanza differente.

R “ e cosa vorresti da questo candidato? Cosa ti aspetti?”

I 53 (F 30 disoccupata) “Il teatro (risata)

R “(risata) “certo il teatro e poi?”

I 53 (F 30 disoccupata) “No seriamente...poi forse non lo so qualche possibilità per i ragazzi, che ci stanno ste cose che lo Stato offre pure questi piccoli lavoretti, servizio civile, che magari sembrano stupidaggini, per i ragazzi di 20 anni magari che stanno qua senza far niente perché non c’è lavoro magari qualche opportunità così di lavoro anche saltuario e poi vabbé ci mancano tante cose forse pure i collegamenti con le città abbiamo pochi collegamenti giuso un pullman che passa che fa un giro e uno è costretto per forza ad utilizzare la macchina per andare a Napoli e ci metti due ore in pullman perché fa un giro enorme per arrivare a Napoli.

R “E tu cosa vorresti di chi si candida? Quali aspettative hai?”

I 62 (F , 51 impiegata) “Bè se ragioniamo per priorità sono i bisogni del cittadino Ma non solo del cittadino in generale voglio dire il bisogno di lavoro e naturalmente questo un candidato non può dartelo però chiederei ad esempio il sindaco un Paese più pulito, non mi scandalizza vedere la carte per terra però bisognerebbe promuovere maggiore cultura ambientale e poi attenzione ai ragazzi”

R “cioè”

I 62 (F , 51 impiegata) “ i ragazzi nella stragrande maggioranza com’è giusto che sia devono trascorrere il tempo al pub, al bar ma anche forse bisognerebbe dargli qualche opportunità in più degli impianti sportivi che possono essere fruiti gratuitamente, delle piste ciclabili dove poter eventualmente andare in bici; ma non perché voglio fare la salutista ma solo perché tanta gente vorrebbe fare dello sport ma non se le può per-

mettere. Ma anche valorizzare quello che abbiamo, come il palazzetto dello sport che abbiamo che costa, che ha avuto un costo e che non si utilizza su queste cose interverrei perché gli amministratori locali hanno più mezzi per queste cose rispetto a creare lavoro ad esempio...che è difficile.

R “Sì, cosa sarebbe importante fare, cosa vorresti e ti aspetti?”

I 20 (M, 43 avvocato) “Sì bè allora guardando un attimo al mio mestiere bisognerebbe anche garantire la certezza della pena perché in Italia c’è un senso di impunità pauroso. Ormai è penetrata nelle nostre menti l’idea che non va in carcere nessuno quindi bisogna rivedere il sistema di attuazione delle pene...ridurre tutte le misure alternative al carcere... stare ai domiciliari non è la stessa cosa...è una questione di giustizia rispetto alla collettività...come si vive in un mondo dove non esiste la certezza della pena.

R “e oggi che vorresti da un candidato? Cosa ti aspetti?”

I 19 (F 67, ex insegnante) “massima attenzione alla giustizia, a partire dalle tasse che insomma così non va bene.

R “ In che senso?”

I 19 (F 67, ex insegnante) “il fatto per esempio che io mi sono comprata questa casa con grandi sacrifici e non mi piace che mi si tassi continuamente questa benedetta casa, l’ho pagata non me l’anno regalata, ho pagato le mie tasse all’acquisto, continuo a pagare tutte le tasse di questo mondo e non ho mai la garanzia che questa è veramente mia allora che differenza c’è tra stare in affitto e comprarla?.

R “e poi?”

I 19 (F 67, ex insegnante) “una maggiore attenzione al territorio a partire dal Turismo. Io per esempio vorrei un treno per Milano e uno per Torino e che funzionassero le ferrovie perché sono abbandonate, poi parliamo di turismo e non siamo a vocazione turistica, non ci sono strutture vengono qua da lontano ma quanto gli costa l’autostrada? Quindi scoraggiamo i turisti che poi arriva e non c’è un posto dove andare a ballare, non c’è niente, non un divertimento e quindi diciamo che siamo a vocazione turistica, ma ce lo diciamo e ce lo raccontiamo soli....”

R “E tu cosa vorresti, cosa ti aspetti da chi fa politica?”

I 39 (F, 38 veterinario) “a livello locale o in generale?”

R “come vuoi tu, come preferisci?”

I 39 (F, 38 veterinario) “attenzione per il territorio che in questo momento sta soffrendo per le criticità ambientale sia a livello locale che provinciale... occorre bloccare la costruzione di nuovi termo-valorizzatori. Poi maggiore attenzione al turismo perché il rilancio di questo territorio nasce dal turismo, pensa che noi ci troviamo a pochi passi

da Lecce che non ha grosse industrie ma ha un reddito pro-capite più alto del nostro nonostante qui qualche industria è che bisognerebbe fare l'imprenditoria un po' in tutti i settori, soprattutto agricoltura e turismo. R "e cosa vorresti "mettere sul campo"?"

I 52 (M, 29 ingegnere-insegnante) "a livello territoriale punterei sul dare un indirizzo chiaro allo sviluppo del territorio, quindi scegliere un livello economico su cui puntare...Bisogna capire il territorio, cosa può offrire in termini di risorse naturali, umane cosa può vendere bisognerebbe essere bravi a vendere quello che di buono abbiamo. Poi sul piano nazionale bisognerebbe agire sulla magistratura e sulle leggi dello stato per mettere ordine al disordine normativo che vige che blocca la libera iniziativa del cittadino. Poi secondo punto ridurre la tassazione per tutti ma in particolar modo per chi la ricchezza la produce e non la evade e terzo fare attenzione ai giovani non come assistenzialismo io vorrei che ci fosse l'idea che qualsiasi giovane che oggi ha un'idea, anche in Italia possa diventare com Zuckerberg cioè che la giovane gli venga consentito di esplodere se ha un'idea innovativa".

R "E cosa ti aspetti quindi? Dal politico intendo"

I 59 (M, 58 artigiano edile) "La prima cosa che penso è il lavoro, ma lavoro non per me, lavoro per tutti. Chi è già avviato, chi deve iniziarsi nel mondo del lavoro questo, solo questo. Poi uno dice come creare lavoro non è facile, non è una cosa che un giorno o l'altro ti inventi. Poi lavoro per far stare qui la gente nella zona che ormai qualsiasi paese e non solo i paesini si stanno spopolando i paesi quindi è per questo che la gente se ne va che manca lavoro"

R "e quali sono le tue aspettative ecco?"

I 4 (M, 46, poliziotto) "premettendo il fatto che il problema fondamentale di questo paese, di questa regione, di questa città è il lavoro, premettendo questa cosa, innanzitutto riuscire a creare lavoro anche se oggi mi rendo conto che è veramente difficile perché vedi anche qui in Sicilia ancora vige la cultura del posto fisso e questa è una cosa che ha penalizzato tantissimo questo popolo per mille ragioni già partiamo a livello nazionale che ricordo ancora quando c'è la possibilità di andare in pensione dopo 19 anni e 6 mesi e un giorno vuoi che l'età pensionabile ormai non sappiamo più dove è arrivata, dove arriverà quindi il discorso del posto fisso, i posti che siano comunali, regionali, posti statali io chiaramente oggi il ricambio avviene dopo tanti anni da questo punto di vista anche noi facciamo un po' pochino pare che sia il cane che si morde la coda perché se alla fine c'è tanta gente che decide a un certo punto, tanti giovani soprattutto, che decidono di emigrare fuori paese per andare a cercare fortuna perché probabilmente gli altri paesi

offrono grandi opportunità diverse rispetto a quante ne offre il tuo Paese. Capisco però che potremmo starne a parlare per mesi senza trovare soluzione.

R "e tu che vorresti invece? Cosa ti aspetti?"

I 13 (M, 61 personale Ata) "Prima di ogni cosa a livello governativo creare posti di lavoro per sti giovani per esempio: che non sanno dove aggrapparsi e non è giusto che i nostri giovani, compresi i miei figli, che sono già andati via, con tre figli non ne posso avere uno a casa perché nel suo paese non è riuscito a trovare il pane quotidiano per poterci rimanere questo deve fare un buon governante e non chiacchiere..."

R "quindi lavoro"

I 13 (M, 61 personale Ata) "Certo lavoro in tutto... perché se l'agricoltura è abbandonata è colpa dei governanti perché se tu la finanzia... mio figlio quando è andato al nord però non ha trovato niente...per me è il lavoro la cosa principale, perché quando c'è il lavoro c'è tutto".

R "e davanti al tuo candidato quali aspettative porresti? Cosa chiederesti?"

I 18 (F, 56 rappresentante commerciale) "Le priorità da mettere in fila, vabbè è banale, il lavoro, soprattutto per dare una speranza ai ragazzi che vogliono fare: per esempio io credo molto, vedo molti giovani che stanno tornando ad amare l'agricoltura non come veniva fatta un tempo, ma con i macchinari, un'agricoltura che possa aiutare questi giovani perché la prima cosa è aiutare i ragazzi a realizzare i sogni perché non sognano più e anzi se ne vanno.

R "cosa si aspetta da un candidato "attento", come dice Lei"?

I 31(F, 51, insegnante) "Immediatamente mi vengono in mente due cose e la prima è rivolta a voi giovani a favore di voi giovani: quindi l'occupazione io credo che sia veramente una piaga sociale quindi una manovra snella e facile per dare lavoro ai giovani perché credo che la società dipenda proprio dal lavoro dei giovani rappresentate il futuro. Lavorare anche significa mettere su famiglia e quindi immediatamente l'economia inizia a girare e muoversi quindi non è un lavoro fine a se stesso la realizzazione io ho studiato e mi voglio realizzare attraverso il lavoro cosa giustissima e sacrosanta dico ma se veramente vogliamo risolvere il problema e la crisi economica secondo me il lavoro significa anche spendere soldi e fare circolare denaro questa è la prima cosa che mi viene in mente e farlo attraverso provvedimenti snelli...veloci.

R "Certo...capisco e cosa ti aspetti quindi"?

I 41(M, 44 disoccupato) "I nostri politici, i nostri governanti di dovrebbero avvicinare alle idee debbono venire debbono ascoltare e per me è il lavoro la cosa principale e sulla frase "il lavoro è dignità" io non accetto

repliche è così punto e basta. Non ci sono altri cazzi, il lavoro è dignità e una persona che non ha lavoro specialmente chi ha il mutuo e situazioni particolari non oso immaginare che situazione vivono questi poveretti e quando manca il lavoro manca la dignità perché comunque ti presenti non sai chi sei...non sai come sei combinato in questo mondo qua....”

R “avvicinarsi certo, in che modo?”

I 41(M, 44 disoccupato) delle cose da fare per esempio intanto iniziare a pianificare andando sul concreto lasciamo perdere le cose astratte e i ragionamenti fascinosi, iniziando ad avere settimanalmente degli incontri per esempio un incontro mirato a: argomento del giorno qual è non giriamoci troppo attorno l’argomento più caldo è sempre lo stesso perché la gente deve portare il pane a casa e poi tutto il resto si sistema piano piano ma si rimetterebbe perché quando la gente lavora e porta lo stipendio a casa inizia a tirare fuori il sorriso a tirare fuori anche proprio i sogni che prima rimangono chiusi non nel cassetto

R “e cosa vorresti allora? Cosa ti aspetti?”

I 49 (M 57, lsu) “a livello politico bisognerebbe essere più forti e garantire maggiore possibilità di lavoro insomma alle persone...tramite interventi dello Stato”

R “in che senso?”

I 49 (M 57, lsu)” per esempio lo Stato interveniva creava posti di lavoro attraverso diciamo finanziamenti per esempio erano che si doveva loro attraverso lavori stradali per dire allora tu impegnavi delle persone tramite... cioè praticamente chiamavano in un certo qual modo degli incentivi. Adesso invece che succede? Succede che le direttive europee fanno sì che lo Stato non si può impegnare in questo modo e lo Stato stesso non si può opporre alla Comunità Europea e quindi lascia fare solo alle imprese private che non riesce ad uscirne da questa situazione da solo”.

R “E per te cosa si dovrebbe fare? Cosa si ti aspetti insomma?”

I 35 (F, 27 studentessa) “Lavoro. Qua il primo problema te lo dico perché mi sto trovando in difficoltà io ho un buon cv alle spalle ma a 30 anni sei troppo grande preferiscono prendere i ragazzini 18/19 contratti trimestrali stagisti senza esperienza ma gli vanno bene e loro non preferiscono te. Poi non ti dico io che comunque bene o male riesco a galleggiare però ci sono comunque persone, famiglie che hanno figli che veramente arrivano a fine settimana arrancano...e questo il napoletano lo sa, perché molti di loro vivono nel centro storico e vivono altri problemi come la spazzatura e altro, ma è il lavoro il primo problema... che poi se non hai lavoro che vo fa? E te ne vai a rubare che devi fare”

R”E nonostante ciò tu cosa vorresti? Cosa ti aspetti?”

I 3 (M, 51 precario pubblico) “ma guarda se parliamo di polis, di cosa pubblica, bisognerebbe riprendere a dare diritti ai lavoratori che sono stati cancellati, un rilancio della scuola della sanità ma prima di tutto il lavoro e i diritti dei lavoratori che anche questo qui (Renzi) sta cancellando e sta facendo tutto il contrario di quello che ha detto”.

I 27(F, 53 insegnante) “Io vorrei onestà da parte di tutti e rispetto delle regole perché senza il rispetto democrazia non c’è, non c’è democrazia ognuno si prende un bastone e fa quello che vuole.

R”Certo. E poi che altro?”

I 27(F, 53 insegnante) “e poi lavoro, lavorare con più coscienza per creare lavoro...io per tornare al discorso dei sindaci che non fanno niente ho visto delle strutture abbandonate per 55 anni e quelle strutture potevano essere usate per creare lavoro e questo non è un gioco, non è un gioco. E poi basterebbe così poco per creare opportunità per farci stare bene tutti ma noi nella Ionica siamo un insediamento greco-romano la gente invece che andare a Shalm el Sheik viene qua e si riempie il cuore di cose belle. E poi dico, sono stata a Vicenza per fare un intervento e i medici erano tutti meridionali mo dico ma perché per lavorare devi andare via? Certo mo si sceglie l’Europa è una visione completamente diversa e ben venga però non mi sembra giusto che io debba lasciare mio figlio o mio figlio debba lasciare o io personalmente debbo lasciare la mia terra perché qua non ho la possibilità di fare un lavoro che in Australia è retribuito dieci volte tanto? E anche questo è sbagliato credo.

R “certo, il merito che spesso manca. Ma oggi che chiederesti?”

I 65 (F, 45 commessa) “mmhh domanda difficile. Senti se, potessi al politico locale, ma anche nazionale perché no, gli chiederei una sola cosa: fare in modo che le persone possano lavorare in serenità a partire dai piccoli imprenditori.

R “in che senso?”

I 65 (F, 45 commessa) “ in che senso? Nel senso che i piccoli imprenditori come la titolare per cui lavoro, è gente afflitta dai vincoli, ma che ti posso dire...vincoli non solo di tasse, che quelle lo sappiamo insomma...ma anche vincoli di tipo burocratico. Per esempio, per dirtene una, l’altro giorno sono arrivati due vigili e hanno detto alla mia titolare che l’insegna non andava bene, dopo 25 anni dice che siccome è centro storico certe insegne non vanno bene... ora capito..capisci che voglio dire?”

R “se avessi un candidato del quale ti potessi fidare quali aspettative riporresti in lui?”

I 29 (F, 32, operatrice sociale) “non è valorizzato (il territorio) mi aspetterei che le nostre cose dove c’è l’opportunità sfruttarla, noi abbiamo

una opportunità si potrebbero creare delle cose veramente carine quindi cercare di sfruttarla al massimo in estate abbiamo Montecovello è molto carino un anno hanno fatto il Covello Summer Fest è stato fantastico, il comune li ha aiutati come ha potuto, nel piccolo ed è uscito una bella cosa allora tu hai capito che quella può essere una fonte di guadagno per il paese non sto parlando perché se viene il turista vengono tu porti dei gruppi carini magari ci sono dei ragazzi di Cosenza c'è chi viene quindi c'è un'area camping abbandonata che cosa fai tu cerchi di valorizzare l'area camping di mettere i bagni e aggiustarli così quando viene il turista invece di farlo gratuito puoi fare un campeggio per recuperare quello che magari spendi di investirlo, ti fai pagare il suolo, una minima cosa e quindi valorizzare quello, insomma fare delle cose per valorizzare le nostre cose”.

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