Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide - Archipielago Libertad

Darfur: 

Blueprint for Genocide 

November 2004 

Dr James M. Smith 

Ben Walker 

Report No. R01/04

Founded in 2000, the Aegis Trust dev eloped from the work of the Holocaust Centre inNottinghamshire (opened in 1995). Aegis 

addresses causes and consequences of genocide and crimes against humanity. It w orks closely with surv ivors, educationalists, 

academics and policy makers in areas relating to genocide education, research and prevention. 

The memorial centres, both in the UK and Rwanda, are important to the w ork of Aegis. They are a reminder of the terrible 

consequences that ensuewhen the world does not prevent genocide. They also give dignity to the victims and provide a voice 

for survivors, who are often overlooked. This helps reverse some of the dehumanisation that takes place during genocide and 

contributes to rehabilitation. It recognises that the legacy of genocide continues long after the killing stops. 

The Aegis Institute 

Lound Hall 

Bothamsall 

Retford 

DN22 8DF 

Tel: 01623 862592 

Email: james.smith@aegistrust.org 

RegCharity No.1082856 

Cover photo: A woman in Breidjing refugee camp, eastern Chad, July 2004. Her 

husband had been killed six months earlier. © James M. Smi th, Aegis Trust.

Authors: 

Dr James M. Smith is Chief Ex ecutive of the Aegis Trust (see inside cov er) and co-founder of the UK Holocaust Centre. 

He directed the project to establish the Kigali Genocide Memorial Centre in Rwanda which opened in April 2004, and was 

co-editor of Will Genocide Ever End? published by Paragon House in associationwith Aegis in 2003. 

Ben Walker is a Development Studies graduate of Leeds University and Research Assistant at the Aegis Institute.

CONTENTS 

iv 

Table of Contents 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VII 

SECTION 1 

NAMING THE CRISIS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 1 

1.1 Naming it 1 

1.2 Crimes against humanity 1 

1.3 Genocide 2 

1.4 Ethnic cleansing 2 

1.5 Dodging the ‘g’ word 3 

1.6 ‘Genocidal crisis’: a usefulmanagement term 3 

1.7 Management implications once the term ‘genocidal’ is applied 4 

1.8 Hiding behind the humanitarian crisis 4 

1.9 Isn’t genocide just ex treme conflict? 5 

1.10 But isn’t there a civil war? 5 

SECTION 2 

DARFUR AND THE IDEOLOGY OF SUDAN 6 

2.1 Arabization and Islamization 6 

2.2 Precedents of genocidal acts in Sudan 7 

2.3 Acomment on ethnicity: Arabs and Africans? 8 

2.4 Thesignificance of exclusionary ideology 9 

2.5 Exclusionary ideology in Darfur 9 

SECTION 3 

SYSTEMATIC ACTIONS AMOUNTING TO GENOCIDE 13 

3.1 Ideas influence action 13 

3.2 Genocidal acts in thecurrent crisis 14 

3.3 How the InternationalCommunity has defined the situation 19 

SECTION 4 

SECURITY 21 

4.1 Securing populations at risk as a priority 21 

4.2 International response to security 22

Table of Contents 

4.3 Chronology of the security and political dialogue – 2004 23 

4.4 British policy 26 

4.5 Political settlement and security 26 

SECTION 5 

ENDING IMPUNITY 28 

5.1 Who is incontrol? 28 

5.2 Countering the genocidal threat with judicial process 28 

CONCLUSION 31 

RECOMMENDATIONS AND QUESTIONS 31 

APPENDICES 32 

Appendix A: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of theCrime of Genocide 33 

Appendix B: Definitions of the Actions Constituting Crimes Against Humanity 36 

Appendix C: Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum 2004 37 

Appendix D: October 1987 Letter to Sadiq Al Mahdi - Sudanese Prime Minister 1986-89 (Translated from Arabic) 38 

Appendix E: List Compiled by the Son of the Last Sultan of Darfur of Villages Evacuated by Force between 2000 

and 2002 39 

Appendix F: List of Attacks on Villages Compiled by Fur MPs 44 

Appendix G: Breakdown of Security and Political Dialogue by Month 49 

Appendix H: List of Reports Providing Evidence of GoS Culpability 61 

Appendix I: List of Janjaweed Camps with Locations and Names of Commanders 62 

Appendix J: Secret Circular Issued by the Ex ecutive Committee of Arab Gathering (1988) 65 

Appendix K: Orders Issued by the Arab GatheringUnifiedMilitary Command 66 

Appendix L: AReport on the Relationship between the Fur tribe and theNational Islamic Front 67 

Appendix M: Quraish 2 - Arab Congress Circular 71 

Appendix N: Government Letter 73 

Appendix O: Recommendations following fourmeetings of the Arab Gathering PoliticalCommittee with Local 

Councils 74 

v

TABLE OF ACRONYMS 

vi 

AU African Union 

DfID Department for International Dev elopment 

EU European Union 

FCO Foreign and Commonw ealth Office 

GoS Gov ernment of Sudan 

HMG Her Majesty ’s Gov ernment 

HRW Human Rights Watch 

ICC International Criminal Court 

ICG International Crisis Group 

IDP Internally Displaced Persons 

JEM Justice and Equality Mov ement 

MSF Médecins sans Frontières 

NCP National Congress Party 

NGO Non-gov ernmental organisation 

NIF National Islamic Front 

OHCHR Office of the High Commission for Human Rights 

PAIC Pan-Arab Islamic Conference 

PDF Popular Defence Force 

SLA Sudan Liberation Army 

SPLA/M Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement 

UN United Nations 

UNHCHR United Nations High Commission for Human Rights 

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force 

USAID United States Agency for International Dev elopment 

Table of Acronyms

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Executive Summary 

International law allows wide scope for preventing genocide. There are huge moral and political obligations to do so. 

The United Nations Genocide Convention (1948) sets a clear legal framework enabling prevention. Resolve and action to 

prev ent depend, however, on the politicalw ill to do so. 

The presence of an exclusionary ideology (usually meaning institutionalised or organised racism) helps to differentiate 

a genocidal situation from a two-sided conflict. Genocide is organised violence on a massive scale, but it is more akin to 

ex treme racism than ex tremeconflict. 

Exclusionary ideology sets the scene for future genocide. It justifies in the mind of a dominant group extreme measures 

that can be taken against the perceived inferior and vulnerable group. What matters in a genocidal situation is how a 

dominant group perceives both itself and the vulnerable group. Perpetrators of genocide do not invent the identity of 

groups, but they are obsessedwith identify . They augment it, simplify it andcreate an enemy. 

Darfur is suffering the outcomes of ethnic and tribal conflict, power struggles and competition for land. In recent decades, 

how ever, an exclusionary ideology has driven policies of the current and previous Government of Sudan (GoS) that have 

led to jihad and outcomes that can be regarded as genocide. 

The crisis in Darfur is happening in that context and is also driven by the supremacist / racist ideas of the Arab Gathering, 

ideas congruent w ith those of central government in Khartoum. (Arab Gathering documents which as yet Aegis has not 

been able to authenticate are presented in the Appendices. How ever, we believe it is likely that these are genuine 

documents and regard it as important that they are seen.) Since the emergence of these ideas in a letter addressed to the 

Sudanese Prime Minister in 1987 (See Appendix D), v iolence against Africans in Western Sudan has increased and 

becomemore organised. 

In Darfur, despite the complexity of ethnicity that ex ists, Arab supremacists are now promoting the words ‘Zurga’ (nigger) 

and ‘Abid’ (slav e), drawing on stereoty pes and discrimination of the past where an ‘African’ identity was regarded as being 

synonymous with slav e. 

When civilians are being systematically targeted during a crisis and an exclusionary ideology exists, recognising the 

genocidal threat is more important than defining a situation as genocide. In such a situation, the crimes being committed 

may be referred to as crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing or genocide. Such instances should be described as 

genocidal regardless of whether a consensus is reached about whether it is genocide or not. The political and moral 

obligations to prevent are as strongwhen genocide is threatened, as when it is agreed that it is happening. Indeed by the 

time the situation is defined, it may be too late to prevent. So the term genocidal may be used to indicate a risk 

assessment, not provide a legal conclusion. 

The term genocidal should signify a change in the priorities in the management of the crisis. In such a situation, security 

for those at risk must be regarded as much a priority as providing humanitarian aid and achieving political settlement. In a 

genocidal situation, compromisingsecurity in fav our of peace-talks may cost lives. 

In Darfur either the GoS was actively supporting the Janjaweed or it had lost control of them. Both scenarios demanded 

outside help. The InternationalCommission for Interv ention and State Sov ereignty concluded in 2001 that w hen sovereign 

states are unwilling or unable to protect their own citizens, the responsibility must be borne by the broader community of 

states. Yet it was the Government of Sudan that w as asked by the United Nations (UN) to provide protection for the 

vulnerable. Attacks on internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in November by Sudanese security forces demonstrate 

that the need forsecurity is as pressing as ever. 

vii

viii 


Insecurity for those under threat of genocide and impunity for international crimes is a combination that allows 

gov ernments to get away with murder. When a conflict is recognised as genocidal in nature, addressing this duo must 

become central to the management of the crisis. Both have been insufficiently prioritised in managing the crisis in 

Darfur; this has impeded efforts to prevent genocide. 

The British Government has been careful not to blame the GoS. But if there is broad consensus that the GoS bears 

responsibility for mass murder, why is there not an unequivocal message that the perpetrators w ill be brought to 

account? Granted it is not helpful or practical to indict the Government. But the senior figures involved directly in the 

atrocities in Darfur should be brought to account. 

Asking the GoS to ‘rein in’ those responsible must have given the Janjaweed perpetrators great comfort. Because the 

world does not hav e the moral strength to end impunity or protect the v ulnerable, we have to rely on probable 

sponsors of genocide to provide security . 

Now that the mandate of 3000 African Union (AU) soldiers in Darfur has been slightly ex tended, wealthy nations 

should support an increase in the number of AU troops to around ten times the current number, in line with the 

recommendations of Gen. Romeo Dallaire. A no-fly zone is now really too late, nonetheless should be imposed and 

monitored. 

The UN and member states hid behind the humanitarian aid effort. The need to protect citizens in Darfur was 

understood more in the African Union than it was among the wealthy member states, including the UK. However the 

AU mission languished in an under-resourced state, atrocities continued and even the recently expanded force is still 

a sub-optimal arrangement to avert the threat of ‘genocide by attrition’. 

Political settlementwill always be harder to achieve if security for those under threat is not prov ided concurrently. In 

a climate of fear it has been predictably hard to keep the Sudan Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality 

Movement around the negotiating table. 

Justice is often perceived as a post-conflict issue. Impunity, though, in a genocidal situation is a brother to insecurity; 

both tell the perpetrator that there is insufficient resolve or political w ill to stop genocide. Allowing impunity for past 

atrocities in the South of Sudan and in the NubaMountains has contributed to the crisis in Darfur. 

Documentation is the first step in bringing about accountability . But a library of reports will not end impunity if there is 

no resolve for it to lead somewhere. International inquiries have in the past led to the formation of ad hoc tribunals. 

The US refusal to support the International Criminal Court (ICC) is not helpful in ending impunity in Darfur and the 

Security Council should have referred the situation in Darfur to the prosecutor of the ICC once the systematic nature 

of the atrocities w as known. Once the International Commission of Inquiry has finished, member states should be 

encouraged not to veto or abstain regarding an ICC referral. 

While we are focussed on the crisis, we need to be mindful that long term, the problems of Sudan lie in the neglect, 

underdevelopment and inequality in the regions that allow the racism and hostility to be fostered. Sudan will never be 

at rest until these are addressed together and aggressively. Aegis Trust v iews a federal Sudan as a helpful, stable 

way forward but that is for the Sudanese to determine. Whatever route they take, justice and equality will be a good 

foundation for the future. 

Upholding international law at an early stage in this genocidal process by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC 

could have deterred the perpetrators. So far, the perpetrators are not trembling in fear of justice. 

Despite the 1948 Convention (Appendix A) and the signing of the Stockholm Declaration inJanuary 2004 (Appendix 

C), and despite many great efforts by governments and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in respect of the 

humanitariancrisis in Darfur, the genocidal crisis remains ex tremely difficult tocontain or mitigate without a massive 

shift in politicalw ill. Leo Kuper’s contention continues to bear truth: that gov ernments still hav e the ‘sovereign right to 

commit genocide’.

The Aegis Trust recommends that: 


• Security for civilians subject to genocidal acts in Darfur be prioritised through: 

o a ten-fold ex pansion of the AU force and a strengthening of its mandate to include 

disarmament of the Janjaw eed militia, or at least superv ision of disarmament by the 

Gov ernment of Sudan. 

o A no-fly zone to imposed immediately by the UN, to be enforced by the AU with finance 

and resources from w ealthy UN member states. 

• Serious efforts shall be made to address impunity: 

o Preferably the UN Security Council should refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC. 

o If referral to the ICC prov es impossible due to political opposition, av iable alternativ e 

should be put forw ard to end the impunity of perpetrators of acts of genocide and crimes 

against humanity in Darfur. 

• Long term underly ing causes of the crisis must be addressed: 

o Long term, a comprehensive plan should be agreed to reverse the underly ing causes of 

the crisis, namely the inequality and marginalisation within Darfur. A significant 

dev elopment package is required that benefits all groups equally. 

o Political empow erment through a federal system in Sudan may prevent a mov ement 

tow ards autonomy in the West whichw ould lead to greater conflict and the 

fragmentation of Sudan in the future. 

ix

SECTION 1 

Naming the Crisis: Policy 

Implications 

“It’s genocide”, “It’s ethnic cleansing”, “It’s crimes 

against humanity”, “It’s tribal war” 

Quite a lot, it seems, is in a name. 

While it is the view of the Aegis Trust that the events in 

Darfur during this year amount to genocide under the UN 

Genocide Convention (Appendix A), we recognise that 

getting wound up in legal debates about definitions while 

people perish may not help the management of the crisis. 

Sav ing lives should take priority over achieving a legal 

consensus. 

The ev idence is quite clear: somebody wants to ‘get rid’ of 

Africans from Darfur. Does it matter so much what we call 

it? On the one hand, yes, because we should not mince 

words – weshould callsomething by its proper name. 

Calling a crisis ‘genocide’ ought to create certain 

obligations to respond (See 1.3). 

How ever, if w e cannot agree that genocide itself is 

happening, then it will be helpful to describe such a crisis 

as ‘genocidal’ (see 1.4). 

1.1 Naming it 

To date the European Parliament, the United States and 

Germany have all called the situation in Darfur genocide. 

Most states, however, have taken the position that they 

are w aiting for the outcome of the International 

Commission of Inquiry ordered by UN Resolution number 

1564, due to report in January 2005. Few human rights 

NGOs have called the situation genocide. Notable 

exceptions include Genocide Watch, the Physicians for 

Human Rights in the US and Jubilee Action in the UK. 

International Crisis Group has not done so on the basis 

that prov ing genocide involves difficult legal issues 

essentially about ‘intent’ w hich can only be resolved by a 

court. 1 Amnesty International has chosen not to on similar 

1 See Conclusion to Section 3. Intent can be deduced from sufficient 

evidence. Combined with the existence of an exclusionary ideology in Darfur, 

the evidence in Darfur is enough for Aegis to conclude that genocide is 

happening there. It is certainly enough for us to conclude that genocide is a 

very real and urgent threat. 

1 

grounds, saying that it is not prepared to do so based on 

its current information. 

The International Commission of Inquiry is likely to apply 

one of the follow ing three labels to the crisis in Darfur: 

• Crimes against humanity 

• Genocide 

• Ethnic cleansing 

1.2 Crimes against humanity 

Crimes against humanity are defined in the Principles of 

the Nuremberg Tribunal as: 

Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation 

and other inhuman acts done against any civilian 

population, or persecutions on political, racial or 

religious grounds, when such acts are done or such 

persecutions are carried on in execution of or in 

connection with any crime against peace or any war 

crime. 2 

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 

defines crimes against humanity as: 

Any of the following acts when committed as part of 

a widespread or systematic attack directed against 

any civilian population, with knowledge of the 

attack: 

(a) Murder; 

(b) Extermination; 

(c) Enslavement; 

(d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population; 

(e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of 

physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of 

international law; 

(f) Torture; 

(g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, 

forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any 

other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity; 

(h) Persecution against any identifiable group or 

collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, 

cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, 

or other grounds that are universally recognized as 

impermissible under international law, in connection 

with any act referred to in this paragraph or any 

crime within the jurisdiction of the Court; 

(i) Enforced disappearance of persons; 

(j) The crime of apartheid; 

2 Principles of the Nuremberg Tribunal (1950), Principle VI.

(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character 

intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to 

body or to mental or physical health. 3 

The terms in this paragraph are defined in Appendix B. 

1.3 Genocide 

Defined as acrime in international law: UN Conv ention on 

the Prev ention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 

(1948) andRome Statute of the ICC (2002): 

In the present Convention, genocide means any of 

the following acts committed with intent to destroy, 

in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or 

religious group as such: 

(a) Killing members of the group; 

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to 

members of the group; 

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of 

life calculated to bring about its physical destruction 

in whole or in part; 

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births 

within the group; 

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to 

another group. 4 

The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 

the Crime of Genocide allows states to prev ent genocide 

(see Appendix A). Signatories to the Convention 

undertake to prevent and punish the crime of genocide 

(see Article I of Appendix A). 

The Convention creates a huge moral and political 

obligation to prevent genocide. This was recognised by 

the fifty -fiv e member states. It is not specific about how 

states can prevent genocide, as the mechanisms to 

commit the crime may vary, but it does set a clear legal 

framework to enable them to do so, usingw hatev er organs 

of the UN are necessary (Article VIII, Appendix A). 

The Convention gives a huge amount of licence: states 

can call upon the UN organs to take action… as they 

consider appropriate… for the prevention and 

suppression… of acts of genocide (Article VIII, 

Appendix A). 

It goes further and says that this applies even to attempts 

to commit genocide or to complicity in genocide (Article 

III). 

3 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7. 

4 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Convention on the 

Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 

http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm [Accessed 16 November 

2004]. 

Section 1: Naming the Crisis: Policy Implications 

1.4 Ethnic cleansing – a form of 

genocide 

For some bizarre reason, this term causes many of us – 

the media, policy people and NGOs – to breathe a sigh of 

relief, as if it is not so urgent. ‘It’s OK, its not genocide 

after all; it’s just ethnic cleansing.’ 

Actually, the reverse ought to be true. Ethnic cleansing is 

an appalling act of organisedv iolence. It includes forcible 

population transfer (also an international crime under the 

Geneva Convention IV, Article 49 and a crime against 

humanity according to the Rome Statute of the ICC), but 

should not bemistaken as that alone. 

During the Bosnian war of the mid-1990s, the Serb 

nationalists wanted to ‘get rid’ of the Bosnian Muslims. 

What they did to accomplish that amounted to war crimes, 

crimes against humanity and genocide. It w as the lawyers 

in the end who decided. In the meantime, ‘ethnic 

cleansing’ was the term commonly applied. 

Unlike genocide and crimes against humanity, enshrined 

in Conventions and Statutes, ethnic cleansing is not really 

defined as a single crime. In 1993 a UN Commission of 

Ex perts has described it as: 

rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using 

force or intimidation to remove persons of given 

groups from the area. 5 

That sounds like forcible population transfer, but in their 

final report, the Commission expanded on this: 

Based on the many reports describing the policy 

and practices conducted in the former Yugoslavia, 

‘ethnic cleansing' has been carried out by means of 

murder, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, 

extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, 

confinement of civilian population in ghetto areas, 

forcible removal, displacement and deportation of 

civilian population, deliberate military attacks or 

threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and 

wanton destruction of property. Those practices 

constitute crimes against humanity and can be 

assimilated to specific war crimes. Furthermore, 

such acts could also fall within the meaning of the 

Genocide Convention. 6 

Ethnic cleansing, then, is more than moving one 

population from one place to another. The methods used 

to move them are vicious and are intended to kill, maim, 

subjugate and destroy people and property. It fits v ery 

closely w ith the definition of genocide provided by the UN 

Genocide Convention. That’s not surprising as it stems 

5 UN Commission of Experts, First Interim Report, 10 February 1993. 

6 UN Commission of Experts (1994), Final Report of the Commission of 

Experts. 

2

from a desire by perpetrators to ‘get rid’ of a group of 

people. 

Significantly, the Convention recognises the threat of 

genocide even before it is full-scale. In the example of the 

Holocaust (which helped to define the crime of genocide) 

separating what happened before the gas chambers or 

killing fields of Eastern Europe – forced population 

movements, imprisonment, torture, confinement in 

ghettos, killings and starvation – from w hat is described 

above as ‘ethnic cleansing’ would have been quite difficult. 

As late as 1941 there were, as far as is known, no 

documents indicating that a ‘Final Solution’ by gassing or 

mass shooting w as being planned. Still, according to the 

UN Convention, the actions of the Nazis even prior to 

1941 could be regarded as genocide. 

In conclusion, if there is a consensus that ethnic cleansing 

is taking place, it means that genocide couldwell be taking 

place. In fact, the 1992 UN General Assembly Resolution 

47/121 declared that ‘the abhorrent policy of ethnic 

cleansing’ is ‘a form of genocide’. 7 

Far from diminishing the crisis then, using the term ‘ethnic 

cleansing’ should be a loud alarm bell calling the w orld to 

take notice and take urgent action under the UN Genocide 

Convention. 

1.5 Dodging the ‘g’ word 

In some respects, even though some consider ‘Ethnic 

Cleansing’ a good descriptiv e phrase for events such as 

those in Darfur, it seems that av oiding the word ‘genocide’ 

lessens the gravity of the situation and reduces the 

pressure to act. 

1.5.1 Moral and political obligations 

One reason that there is an av oidance of using the w ord 

genocide is that there was a belief that once a situation 

was acknow ledged as genocide, there was a legal 

obligation to prevent. This legal obligation is not as strong 

as the moral and political obligation that the Convention 

confers. Lawyers in the US State Department have 

worked that out now. So unlike during the genocide in 

Rwanda when they av oided using the ‘g’ w ord, the US 

State Department is comfortable being among the first to 

apply the word to the Darfur crisis. States also know that 

they can be as tardy as they like in responding to the 

threat of genocide, as long as they can speak strong 

words and demonstrate that they are doing ‘something’ 

politically. 

Perhaps in the UK we are more reticent to follow this 

ex ample, because political leaders have made statements 

7 General Assembly Resolution 47/121 (1992), Preamble, Paragraph 6. 

3 


about Africa being the ‘scar on the conscience of the 

world’ and the political andmoral pressure to act would be 

heav ier ifwe recognised it as genocide. 

1.5.2 Devaluing the meaning ofgenocide 

Another argument frequently used for not being hasty to 

use the word ‘genocide’ is that people do not want to 

dev alue its meaning. Some feel that unless a catastrophe 

is reaching the vastness of the Holocaust in Europe in the 

1940s, then it is wrong to use the term genocide. But the 

Holocaust became vast because it was not recognised for 

what it was and was not stopped. 

And so human rights organisations and politicians want to 

be quite certain before using the word. They want a 

crystal-clear legal definition. 

Being certain hinges on demonstrating that there is intent 

to commit genocide. 

1.5.3 Intent 

Intent, though, can be deduced from sufficient ev idence – 

admission of intent by the perpetrator is not necessary. 

The language that is used and the abundant ev idence of 

genocidal acts against an identified group (Africans or 

non-Arabs) are shown in Section 3. The systematic 

‘Intent can be 

deduced from 

sufficient 

evidence.’ 

burning of villages coordinated with aerial bombardment 

ov er such a large area, the killing, the widespread rape, 

hav e been documented by many organisations, including 

the Aegis Trust. Together, this shows that there must be 

planning and organisation. This is especially so taking into 

account the v ast area of Western Sudan. It takes serious 

planning to coordinate air attacks with ground attacks in 

such an area. This could not have happened by accident. 

Someonemust have intended it. 

1.6 ‘Genocidal crisis’: a useful 

management term 

Frankly, whichev er of the above three labels – crimes 

against humanity, ethnic cleansing or genocide – the UN 

International Commission of Inquiry places on this crisis, it 

should not affect the management. Recognising and 

responding to the threat is more important.

While the point about not devaluing the meaning of the 

word genocide is worthy, demonstrating that there is intent 

happens to allow for dithering and delay in responding if 

genocide is happening. 

This is not to say that people are sitting around and 

waiting for the crisis to be named; but rather than a legal 

term on w hich it is difficult to agree, it w ould be better to 

hav e amanagement or descriptive term that helps to focus 

responses appropriately. If the label ‘ethnic cleansing’ 

causes us to miss the point or fails to muster political will, 

then the term ‘genocidal crisis’ may help to convey the 

character of the situation. 

If we are comfortable using the phrase ‘ethnic cleansing’ – 

as nearly all organisations and governments are – thenwe 

can call it ‘genocidal’, because this denotes that a 

particular group of civilians, not combatants, are the prime 

target. The Aegis Trust agrees with Genocide Watch and 

scholars such as Helen Fein that ‘ethnic cleansing’ is an 

unhelpful description in practice. According to the UN, it 

is a form of genocide anyway (see 1.4). Sowhy not say it 

is genocidal? At least most of us w ho are not ex perts in 

international law will have a clue that the crisis is not y et 

another civilwar, tribalconflict or even famine. It w illmake 

it clear, before there is a consensus about the name of the 

crime, that someone is getting rid of a group of human 

beings who need protection. 

Applying the term ‘genocidal’ should stir a sense of 

urgency – because it acknowledges that genocide is 

threatened or may ev en be occurring. It implies the same 

moral and political obligations to prevent, contained in the 

UN Genocide Convention, as does the word ‘genocide’ 

itself, w hile circumventing the debate necessary to achieve 

legal consensus on whether or not that word should be 

used. So when the term ‘genocidal’ is applied (e.g. in a 

situation currently accepted as ethnic cleansing), our 

response should be to act as if genocide is happening; 

because in all likelihood it is. 

Using this term ‘genocidal’ appropriately will help shape 

policy and management decisions in crises such as that in 

Darfur. The pressing task of saving lives can be 

addressed, and the rest left to the lawyers to resolve in 

their own time. 

The term should be applied once an assessment of risk 

demonstrates that a civilian population is under threat of 

genocide. 


1.7 Management implications once 

the term ‘genocidal’ is applied 

Becauseciv ilians are increasingly victims of conflict due to 

war crimes and other human rights abuses, great effort is 

often rightly expended to reach a political settlement 

betw een the conflicting sides. This brings stability and 

saves liv es. How ever, if a threat of genocide is 

recognised, it means that an identified civilian group is 

being targeted for destruction, possibly irrespectiv e of the 

armed conflict. It is possible that conflict may exacerbate, 

obscure or be an excuse for genocide. 

If there are equal sides to a conflict without genocidal 

signs (exclusionary ideology and systematic targeting of 

civilians), then security is less of an issue. If, however, a 

risk assessment demonstrates that there are unequal 

sides, that exclusionary ideology ex ists and that 

systematic organised violence against the target group 

has occurred, then this is a genocidal situation and 

security must be prioritised. 

So the key implication in calling a crisis ‘genocidal’ is that 

more attention should be given to the security of the 

vulnerable target group than would otherwise be given in a 

two-sided ‘conflict’ situation, where genocide is less of a 

risk. 

There are three strands to themanagement of thecrisis: 

1. Security 

2. Humanitarian aid 

3. Political settlement 

There should be no debate about whether the response 

should address humanitarian, political or security issues. 

All three must be a priority in a genocidal situation. Section 

4 makes it clear that of the three strands of action, security 

in Darfur was insufficiently prioritised by the international 

community. This remained the case as of November 2004. 

1.8 Hiding behind the humanitarian 

crisis 

During the spring and summer of 2004, the Darfur crisis 

was largely portrayed as a humanitarian disaster. We saw 

refugee camps in the news, and the main spokesperson 

for the UK Gov ernment was Hilary Benn, w ho w as 

generous and organised vast amounts of humanitarian 

aid. The UK quickly became the second largest donor to 

the aid effort. 

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) was under 

pressure from other member states at the UN Security 

4

Council who had little interest in the political issues or 

questions about security, no-fly zones and ending 

Had the crisis been recognised as ‘genocidal,’ the efforts 

to protect may have been as robust as the efforts to feed 

refugees and to achieve a political settlement. 

1.9 Isn’t genocide just extreme 

conflict? 

No. And the difference is v ery significant. Leav ing aside 

the legal definition for just a moment, we must understand 

that genocide is not just ex treme conflict, even though it is 

often associated and confusedwith conflict. 

5 

‘Genocide is more 

akin to extreme 

racism than 

extreme conflict.’ 

Sections 2 and 3 of this report show ev idence of an 

exclusionary ideology in Darfur – racist ideas in this case. 

That is what differentiates genocide from a ‘conventional’ 

two-sided conflict. If we must think about it in such nonlegal 

terms, then genocide is more akin to ex treme racism 

than ex treme conflict – it is organised, one-sided violence 

on a massive scale, and civ ilians, not combatants, are the 

prime target. 

1.10 But isn’t there a civil war? 

Against a backdrop of generations of tribal conflict, there is 

a civil war happening in Darfur also – since February 

2003. Sections 2 and 3 provide sufficient ev idence that 

the rebels are reacting to protect themselves from 

ex termination. 

One significant difference betw een the tw o sides is that 

the Janjaweed and Arab Gathering are driven by an 

objective to achieve exclusion of Africans. Meanwhile both 

rebel groups, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 

and the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), want to see an 

inclusive Sudan, such as a federal state. Such a 

difference is highly significant. This does not make the 

rebels angels; they may be angry and vengeful; they may 

undertake reprisals. But they are unlikely to organise 

genocide. It is not part of their ideology to do so. As 

described in Section 4, in the absence of improv ed 

security, it is likely that the rebels will expand their 

operations. 


impunity. It appeared convenient for the FCO to hide 

behindMr Benn. 

Summary 

International law allows w ide scope for prev enting 

genocide. There are huge moral and political 

obligations to do so. Resolv e and action to prev ent 

depend, how ever, on the politicalw ill to do so. 

Defining a crisis as genocide is not necessary to act. 

The threat of genocide – a genocidal crisis is 

enough. Try ing to define it may lead to delay s in 

action. 

How ev er, the pressure to act is also reduced by: 

• Av oiding the term genocide altogether 

• Keeping the v ictims distant from the 

conscience of the political leadership 

• Emphasising the tribal / civil w ar aspect of the 

crisis more than its genocidal nature. 

Section 2 demonstrates the ex istence an 

exclusionary ideology targetted against the Africans 

of Darfur. Section 3 describes how civ ilians hav e 

been systematically targeted.

SECTION 2 

Darfur and the Ideology of 

Sudan 

Contex t is critical in understanding a crisis. Genocide 

does not happen spontaneously. It needs certain 

circumstances and is driven by ideology. This report 

cannot begin to record the complex history of Sudan. This 

section, however, outlines the importance of the 

background ideology that is a driving 

force in the current situation in 

Western Sudan. 

The Middle East and Africa conv erge 

in Sudan, a vast nation with a 

population of 39 million. Governed 

since independence in 1956 by three 

main ‘Arab’ groups who are for the 

most part Islamists, Sudan is 

fragmented by religion and ethnicity. 

For centuries a dy namic has played 

out in which many African tribes 

adopted not only Islam, but Arabic 

culture and language. Slavery has 

play ed a large role in shaping Sudan. 

African identity was regarded as 

being synonymous with that of a 

slave, leading Africans to assimilate into an Arab identity 

to escape the threat and stigma of slavery. Africans are 

still given the derogatory name ‘Abid’ meaning ‘slave’ 

which has become a more common term in Sudan since 

jihad was declared in the South in 1992. 

This, combined with land pressure from desertification, 

pow er struggles, ethnic tension and Islamization have 

resulted in decades of strife, conflict and genocide. 

2.1 Arabization and Islamization 

Since independence, the Sudanese government has been 

dominated by three ‘Arab’ groups, chief among them the 

Jaalien, the Danagala and the Shaigia from Northern 

Sudan and the v arious branches of these groups. They 

are predominantly Islamists. Successive governments 

hav e sought to form a national identity around the Arabic 

language, Arabic culture and Islam, and have seen this as 

the 

‘The legacy of the 

centuries still 

impacts on tribal 

and ethnic 

relations: Africans 

still are given the 

derogatory name 

‘Abid’ meaning 

‘slave.’ 

solution to the North-South divide. 8 The implementation of 

the current government’s brand of Arabization and 

Islamization has been by far the most aggressive and 

sustained. 

The roots of the current GoS go back to the Muslim 

Brotherhood. This political-religious movement, was 

conceived in Egypt to oppose the secular constitution of 

Egy pt. It aimed to maintain Islamic values such as Sharia 

Law in the face of growing Western influence and drew 

heav ily from absolutist Wahhabi Islam which informs most 

Islamic terrorist groups today. 

Wahhabism takes a literal interpretation of the Koran and 

believes those who do not practice that interpretation are 

heathens whether they are Muslims, Christian, Jews or 

follow ers of any other faith. It justifies the hatred, 

persecution and even killing of people who do not adhere 

to its interpretation. 

The Muslim Brotherhood spread 

across Arab states and officially 

took root in Sudan in 1949 

although its presence had been 

grow ing in Sudan since the late 

1930s and early 1940s. The 

Muslim Brotherhood has been 

described as the ‘forefather of 

virtually all of today ’s Islamic terror 

groups, including Al Qaeda’. 9 

How ever, by keeping a distant 

relationship with such groups it 

was able to maintain a stance of 

plausible deniability over its 

responsibility for such actions. 

Hassan Al Turabi, the ideologue of 

the Islamist regime in Sudan throughout the 1990s, was 

Secretary General of the Muslim Brotherhood in late 1964. 

It established itself among Khartoum’s students and the 

higher education system, from where it was then able to 

infiltrate gov ernment. Since then, Turabi has acted as a 

pow er-broker in Sudanese politics as he has sought to 

achieve his goal of an Islamic state in Sudan. 

In 1986 Turabi formed the National Islamic Front (NIF) 

which staged the National Salvation Revolutionary 

Command coup in 1989. The aim of the NIF was to form 

an Islamic state in Sudan and to fulfill Turabi’s long-stated 

aim to Islamize Africa. 

8 Johnson, D. (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 

International African Institute, London, p. 6. 

9 Jihad Watch, (2004). Muslim Brotherhood Activists Possibly to 

Return to Syria, http://www.jihadwatch.org/archives/002957.php, 

[Accessed 15 November 2004]. 

6

In order to make Khartoum an Islamic centre, Turabi 

hosted the Pan Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC) in 1991. 

Ov ertly it w as a forum for Arab nationalists and Islamic 

organisations. The leaders of many terrorist groups in the 

Arabw orldw ere among the delegates at its first meeting in 

1991. However, secular terrorist groups did not attend 

subsequent conferences. It w as evident during the first 

conference that this was a forum controlled by Islamic 

fundamentalists. 

Attempts to draw towards the Arab world and tow ards an 

Arab identity have been a strong feature of the current 

gov ernment and society in Northern Sudan which have 

gone hand in hand with Islamization. Being able to claim a 

direct bloodline to Mohammed the prophet is regarded by 

many as making one a superior Muslim. It is necessary to 

speak Arabic in order to read the Koran. 

The combination of the desire of those in the North to 

relinquish their African identity , the religious justification for 

the notion of the racial superiority of Arabs and 

Wahhabism have been potent ingredients for the 

dev elopment of an exclusionary ideology in Sudan. 

Arabization and Islamization have formed the tw o strands 

of the ideology of the GoSwhich it has applied through its 

‘Civilization Programme’. Responsibility for the realisation 

of this ideology lay with the Ministry of Social Planning, led 

in the early 1990s by Ali Uthman Muhammad Taha, onetime 

underling of Turabi, a hardliner and now vice 

president and ideologue of the Government follow ing 

Turabi’s split with Bashir (1999). 

Promotion of Arabic culture by such means as the 1992 

General Education Act, which made Arabic and Islamic 

education compulsory, was a key element of Arabization 

and Islamization. Arabic replaced English as the official 

language of government and Friday was made the weekly 

holiday. 

The creation of the Popular Defence Force (PDF) as a 

military force indoctrinated with the gov ernment ideology 

prov ided a means of punishing those who resisted the 

Islamization programme. The PDF was also regarded by 

the gov ernment as a vehicle for ‘national and spiritual 

education’. It w as modelled on the Revolutionary Guards 

of Iran, created by conservative clerics to guard the 1979 

Iranian Islamic revolt from domestic and foreign enemies. 

By 1994/5 all males betw een 18 and 30years of age were 

liable for recruitment. 

Yet a combined policy of Arabization and Islamization is 

ultimately contradictory. Whilst most Arabs are Muslim, all 

Muslims are by no means Arab. In Sudan, Arabs have 

seen themselv es as true Muslims and non-Arab Muslims 

7 

Section 2: Darfur and the Ideology of Sudan 

as both inferior Muslims and inferior beings. The outcome 

of this contradiction can be seen in Darfur, where 

Islamization has giv en w ay to Arabization and would-be 

supporters of the Islamization project have been excluded 

because of the additional ethnic dimension in Khartoum’s 

policy. 

Furthermore, Darfur has been neglected by Khartoum in 

terms of the resources allocated to it, both by the current 

gov ernment and those preceding it. This has led to the 

dev elopment of a political schism betw een the ruling 

northern Arab groups and the population of Darfur (both 

Arab and non-Arab) despite a common faith. 

2.2 Precedents of genocidal acts in 

Sudan 

In 1991 the Government introduced a penal code which 

included a law against apostacy. The Government used its 

vague definition of Apostacy in Article 126 of the Penal 

Code to legalise the annihilation of populations they 

regarded as obstructing their radical Islamization agenda. 

True to its Wahhabi roots, indigenous forms of Islam were 

rejected and those adhering to these forms of Islam were 

labelled apostates by the Government. The law against 

Apostacy was used to justify the declaration of jihad in the 

South in 1992. This ex emplifies the outw orking of an 

exclusionary ideology. 

The civil war in the South began follow ing President 

Nimairi’s division of the South into three administrative 

units and was inflamed by the introduction of Sharia Law, 

to w hich all Sudanese were subject. Beyond Sharia Law 

the underdev elopment of peripheral areas was also highly 

significant. However, the imposition of Islam has injected 

an ex tremely bitter element into the w ar, particularly 

follow ing the declaration of jihad by the NIF government in 

1992. Although a peace deal was signed in May 2004, the 

final details are currently still being teased out. 

Under three Islamist regimes since 1983, there have been 

various instances of genocide against African groups, 

most notably the Dinka and Nuba tribes. 

Helen Fein defines the actions to w hich the Dinka were 

subjected as ‘genocide by attrition’. 10 Between May 1983 

and May 1993, the Dinka were subjected to a policy of 

forced starvation. Both Sadiq AlMahdi’s government, from 

1986 and the NIF government armed the Baggara tribe, 

historical enemies of the Dinka, who systematically looted 

the land and cattle on which they relied for survival. 

10 Fein, H. (1997). ‘Genocide by Attrition, 1933-1993: the Warsaw 

Ghetto, Cambodia and Sudan’, Health and Human Rights, 1997. Vol 

2, No 2. p. 10-45.

Humanitarian aid was denied. Government reactions to 

outbreaks of disease were to herd the displaced Dinka 

closer together, and medical attention was denied. 

Children were kidnapped and herded into camps where 

they were forcibly Islamized. This a clear example of the 

forcible transfer of children from one group to another – an 

action prohibited in Article 2e of the Genocide 

Convention. 11 

Jihad was also declared specifically against the Nuba in 

Kordofan in 1992, three months after the jihad on the 

South. Approx imately 50% of Nuba w ere Muslim, a large 

proportion of the population relative to other populations in 

the South. The jihad was aimed as much against the 

Muslim population as it w as against the Christian and 

animist Nuba. It is evident that racism motivates these 

atrocities as much, if not more, than religion even though 

religious language was used to ‘justify ’ these atrocities. 

Nuba villages were terrorised and destroyed by the PDF 

and Arab militias leading to resettlement of 170,000 and 

the deaths of an estimated 100,000. 12 Like the Dinka, the 

Nuba were rounded up into ‘Peace Camps’ where they 

were confined for Islamization. The ‘Peace Camps’ were 

set up in hostile environments where the means for 

survival were minimal. The land from which the Nuba were 

removed was sold to supporters of the regime. 13 

There are many similarities between the methods used 

against the Nuba in 1992 and the methods being used in 

Darfur now. The specific targeting of the male population, 

the raping of women and the stated intention of the 

Sudanese Government to create safe areas into w hich to 

put the internally displaced are all taking place in Darfur 

and reflect thecrimes towhich theNubaweresubjected. 

2.3 A comment on ethnicity: Arabs 

and Africans? 

Some scholars understandably object to simple 

descriptions of ethnic relationships in Western Sudan 

being portray ed as Arabs against African Sudanese or 

non-Arabs. The authors are aware that ethnic history and 

relationships are often more complex. In times of peace, 

in particular, there is fluidity of ethnic identity including 

intermarriage between groups and tribes. 

11 Fein, H (2002). Genocide by Attrition in Sudan, Crimes of War 

Project, http://www.crimesofwar.org/sudan-mag/sudan-fein.html, 


12 Collins, R.(2004) The Sudan 

http://www.gale.com/enewsletters/history/2004_08/sudan.htm 





Many Sudanese argue that most ‘Arab’ Sudanese are 

black and African in origin anyway. Over the centuries 

tribes assumed an Arab identity – the w hole family 

speaking Arabic as a first language, not just the educated 

men. Being ‘Arab’ differentiated them from people 

regarded as slaves. While it may not always have been 

the prime reason for assuming an Arab identity, it would 

hav e afforded protection from being taken into slavery 

themselves or from being massacred. Today hav ing an 

Arab identity disassociates a family from the stigma of 

being descended from slaves. This is ex emplified in parts 

of Old Khartoum where it is currently unacceptable for 

intermarriage betw een so-called Arabs and so-called 

Africans. This is much more to do w ith culture and 

language thanskin colour. 

When a group is threatened, how they perceive their 

identity , or indeed how sociologists or anthropologists view 

it, becomes immaterial. What matters is how a dominant 

or threatening group perceives them. 

‘Arab’ or ‘Black African’? As a new arrival at Breidjing 

refugee camp, eastern Chad, this man’s identity has already 

been determined for him by the Janjaweed and Sudanese 

security forces. 

An ex ample from the past: German Jews had assimilated 

and intermarried for several generations by the 1930s. 

Many perceived themselves as ‘more German than the 

Germans’. The Nazis did not describe them that way. It 

was the perpetrators’ definition that became significant. 

So it was for millions of others in Europe. They defined 

themselves in one way, possibly in a complex way, or in 

no w ay at all because it just w as not v ery important to 

them. But w hen the chips w ere down, it w as the 

perpetrators’ perspective that counted. Even Catholic 

nuns were deported to Auschw itz and gassed when they 

were found to have a Jewish parent or grandparent. 

To the perpetrators of genocide, identity is very important. 

They simplify it, augment it and create an ‘enemy ’. The 

8

Nazis made the word ‘Jew’ more prominent and negative; 

Hutu radicals did the same to the concept of ‘Tutsi’. 

Perpetrators can even invent an identity. Whatever was 

an ‘Aryan’? We do not understand this totally my thical 

race today, but for a time it was a very real identity for 

millions of Europeans, and still is for a few. Now ‘Arab’ 

supremacists, out of a different historical context again, 

are defining the Sudanese Africans, increasingly using the 

term ‘Zurga’ (‘nigger’) and ‘Abid’ (‘slave’). The 

discrimination and stereoty ping has been around for 

centuries, but is now used to identify , exclude and destroy 

an ‘enemy ’. 

9 

‘To perpetrators 

of genocide, 

identity is 

important.’ 

How citizens and governments view national identity is 

critical to the wellbeing of a nation. It may be argued, 

then, that the key lesson from this is that w e should not 

simplify the situation ourselves. It is true that we must 

guard against stereotypes and generalisation; we must 

striv e for individual responsibility rather than collective 

blame. We must promote inclusion, not exclusion. 

Exclusion is the first step to genocide. 

Let us not delude ourselves though. These are good 

principles for nation-building and community cohesion. 

But if people are being killed or driven out of their lands 

into a wilderness, we need to understand something of the 

mentality of the perpetrators and how they define the 

victim. What matters most in understanding this crisis, is 

that some people perceive themselves as Arab and 

superior, and they victimise another group because they 

identify them as non-Arab or African. In Darfur we have to 

use the perpetrators’ definition of Africans to identify w ho 

is under threat. 

It is true that there is a complex background to this 

situation. Tribal tensions and civil war play a part. Land 

ow nership and poverty are factors. But it is not good 

enough to blame it on ancient tribal wars, not when a 

Gov ernment is involved. It is not good enough to blame it 

on a pow er struggle or a civil w ar. That is where the 

simplification lies. 

The Aegis Trust was told over and ov er again by refugees 

in Chad that they w ere v ictims because the Janjaweed 

said they were African, or slav es (See section 4.2.2). The 

conflict is driven by racism at both regional and central 


Gov ernment level. Attempts to shroud that will undermine 

the resolution of thecrisis. 

2.4 The significance of exclusionary 

ideology 

Ideologues do not necessarily set out to find a w ay to 

destroy a group of people. They set out on a utopian 

mission. If a group is in the w ay of that mission, ways 

may be found to marginalise, exclude and dehumanise it. 

Such ideas can justify , in the mind of a dominant group, 

ex treme measures that can be taken against the 

perceiv ed inferior group. In ex treme situations a racist or 

exclusionary ideology sets the scene for future genocide. 

The National Islamic Front sought to create an Islamic 

state in Sudan – its Civilization Programme has sought to 

return to 7th-century Islam and create an Islamic paradise. 

An exclusionary ideology is a belief system that identifies 

some overriding purpose or principle that justifies efforts to 

restrict, persecute or eliminate certain categories of 

people. Episodes of genocide and politicide become more 

likely when the leaders of regimes articulate an 

exclusionary ideology. 14 By looking at underlying ideology 

we can help differentiate a possible cause of organised 

violence. It is an important factor in a genocidal risk 

assessment. 

‘Exclusionary 

ideology is the 

first step to 

genocide.’ 

The presence of an exclusionary ideology in a time of 

crisis can help to differentiate the threat of genocide from 

other forms of conflict. 

2.5 Exclusionary ideology in Darfur 

2.5.1 Arab Congressbackground 

Whilst the notion of African inferiority has been a feature in 

Sudanese society for centuries, the emergence of an Arab 

supremacist ideology in Darfur coincides with the efforts of 

Liby a’s Colonel Gaddafi to create an Arab belt across 

14 Harff, B. (2003). “ No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? 

Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 

1955” , American Political Science Review, Vol 97, No. 1, pp. 57-73.

Africa, and to the mov ement of Arab militias, originally sent 

from Libya to fight inChad, who fled into Darfur. 

At this time an Arab supremacist ideology in Darfur 

emerged, espoused by the Arab Congress, which 

marginalises and dehumanises Africans. 15 

Ev idence suggests that the Arab Congress was covertly 

active as early as 1980/1. At this time cassette recordings 

calling the Arabs in Darfur to prepare themselves to take 

ov er the then regional Gov ernment were w idely 

distributed. Having classified the citizens of Darfur as 

either Arabs or ‘Zurga’ Blacks, the speakers told listeners 

that the Zurga had had enough time ruling Darfur and that 

it w as time for the Arabs to take power in the region. They 

also demanded that the name of the region should be 

changed from Darfur, meaning land of the Fur, to 

something more suitable. Soon after the distribution of 

these tapes in 1982, the first massacre of Fur took place in 

Aw alvillage in Darfur. 16 

In 1980 the Nimairi Gov ernment broke with tradition in 

Darfur by appointing a governor to Darfur w ho w as not 

nativ e to the region, an Arab from Kordofan. There was 

considerable public protest, w hich forced the Gov ernment 

to replace the governorwith Ahmed Diraige, a nativ eFur. 

2.5.2 Arab Congressletter to the Prime Minister: 1987 

The proponents of this ideology of Arab supremacy openly 

emerged in October 1987 in a letter sent to the Sudanese 

Prime Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, attributing to the ‘Arab 

race’ the ‘creation of civilisation in this region … in the 

areas of governance, religion and language’. 

The letter w as distributed widely in Darfur and Khartoum. 

Its tone w as supremacist and drew upon the stereoty pe 

popular among Arabs of Africans as being of low cultural 

status. 

The salient points of the 1987 letter to the Prime Minister 

are as follows: 

1. The Arabic tribes have been present in Darfur 

since the 15 th Century. They represent a coherent 

and well defined group in spite of the fact that they 

are organized into various tribes. The Arabs 

represent about 70% of the population of Darfur 

and about 40% of the educated Darfurians. They 

are responsible for 90% of Darfur’s gross income 

and 15% of Sudan’s GDP. The Arabic tribe of 

Darfur had 14 MPs in the Parliament of Khartoum. 

15 The Arab Congress is also referred to as the A rab Gathering, 

Arabic Gathering, Quraish & Gureish. 

16 Ferseldin, A. (2004). “ Devils in Disguise” (unpublished essay). 


2. For all these reasons, the ‘Arab Gathering’ 

requested, in their letter to the Prime Minister, to be 

represented by at least 50% of all constitutional 

posts in the regional Government of Darfur and a 

similar percentage in the central Government in 

Khartoum. The ‘Arab Gathering’ warned against 

ignoring the predominant Arab tribes. To ignore 

them would lead to dire consequences for Darfur, 

the letter concluded. 17 

A translation of the full letter can be found in Appendix D. 

The signatories to this letter w ere leaders of a number of 

Arab tribes in Darfur who called themselves the Arab 

Gathering. Their names are listed below: 

1. Ahdallah Ali Masar 

2. Sharif Ali Hagar 

3. Ibrahim Yagoub 

4. Hussein Hassan El Bash 

5. Hamid Bito 

6. Taj Al din Ahmed El Hilo 

7. Ayoub Balola 

8. Mohamed Khof El Fadi 

9. El Nazir El Hadi Eisa Dabka 

10. El Tayeb Abu Shama 

11. Sindka Dawood 

12. Haroun Ali El Sanousi 

13. Suliman-Abkr 

14. El Nazir Mohamed Yagoub 

15. Zakria Ibrahaim 

16. Mohamed Zakria Daldoum 

17. Dr. Omer Abdelgabar 

18. Abdullah Yahya 

19. Hamid Mohamed Khir Alla 

20. Abdel Rahman Ali 

21. Mohamed Shiata Ahmed 

22. Abu Bakr Abu Amin 

23. Jabir Ahmed 

2.5.3 Arab Congressdocuments 

In November 2003 a group called the Political Committee 

visited a number of councils in South Darfur. The Political 

Committee was apparently under the authority of the 

Coordination Council of the Arab Congress. The members 

of this committee w ere well known in Darfur. Some of 

them held important positions in the Government and 

National Congress. 18 The recommendations resulting from 

these meetings are listed below. 

17 This analysis was taken from a research document sourced from 

the Darfur Centre for Human Rights and Development, 

a_ismel@yahoo.co.uk, November 2004. 

18 Ferseldin, A. (2004). “ Devils in Disguise” (unpublished essay). 

10

Recommendations in the November 2003 reportof the 

‘Political Committee’ 19 

11 

1. The ‘idea’ 20 should be carried on with strength to 

achieve the results. 

2. To put an end to intertribal conflicts among the 

Arabs and to achieve unity 

3. Take the ‘idea’ in the context of religion, Sharia 

and the general Islamic principals 

4. To change the name of Darfur with another 

‘suitable’ one 

5. Importance and necessity for the extended 

presence in the Republic of Chad 

6. Opening up of transhumance corridors and 

resting places 

7. Strengthening of the good relations with the 

central Government 

8. Reparation of interclanal defense plan 

9. To bring together all Arab leaders to adopt and 

implement the ‘idea’ 

10. Urge Nazir Madibbo (of Rizeigat ad Dein) and the 

leaders of his region to reconsider their stance 

and regard the matter as being very serious 

11. To take steps to announce without reservations, 

the ‘unity’ of Arabs to public since the ‘idea’ is a 

noble one 

12. All information regarding internal plans should be 

handled in strict secrecy, and careful study to 

ensure safety of actions 

13. To switch from defensive position to an offensive, 

by arguments and initiatives to refute Gossip, lies 

and rumours 

14. Removal of the Popular Police Force from the 

State as it gets involved in a number of violations 

15. Complete take-over of power in South Darfur 

State by taking advantage of our mechanical 

majority 

16. Review with Khartoum the issue of the national 

service 

17. Encourage recruitment of clan members in the 

armed forces, the police and security 

18. Protection of all Arab politicians, especially the 

members of the coordination commission and 

obedience of their orders without reservation 

19. Organise the Janjaweed to perform benevolent 

activities and protection 

20. Review the issue of immigration to Niyala 

At the end of each of the four meetings: 

a. A coordinator for the local Council was appointed 

b. Secretary of the National Congress was ordered 

to collect signatures 

19 Source: Darfur Centre for Human Rights and Development, 

November 2004. 

20 It is thought that the ‘idea’ referred to in this document is a plan to 

create a ‘Great Western State’ (Source: Darfur Centre for Human 

Rights and Development). 


c. The commissioner of the local council was to 

assist the secretary of the congress in collecting 

the signatories and to provide transport for the 

members of the consultative commission to 

Niyala as and when they demanded. 

2.5.4 Comment on recommendations of the Political 

Committee 

By referring to the unity of Arabs rather than that of the 

Sudanese, this document giv es evidence of an 

exclusionary ideology. Like the 1987 letter, this document 

alsocalls for the re-naming of Darfur. 

The command in point 19 concerns organizing the 

Janjaweed. This indicates a direct link between the 

Janjaweed and the Arab Gathering. Point 20b 

demonstrates a working relationship between the National 

Congress and the Arab Gathering. 

2.5.5 The relationship between the Arab Congress 

and theNational Congress Party 

There are strong similarities between Arab Congress 

statements and the Arabization policies of theNIF. 

In an undated, anonymous, confidential report entitled 

‘The Islamic Movement and the Fur Tribe’ w hich was 

widely circulated both inside and outside Darfur, the 

policies of the NIF on the Fur tribe were laid out. It first 

noted the contribution of the Fur to the spread of Islam in 

the region but then highlighted the negligible contribution 

the Fur have made to the current Islamic Movement. The 

report stated that in response to the passive stance of the 

Fur towards the Islamic Revolution, the Islamic Movement 

would, 

“never rest assured until the Fur Tribe is completely 

controlled or eradicated, so that the western front 

[Darfur] is rendered safe” . 

This follows the line of a 1988 Arab Gathering circular, 

which states intent to make Arabs the dominant group in 

Darfur and is a plan to undermine the fabric of African 

societies in Darfur (see Appendix J). 

It has not been ascertained who wrote the report on the 

Islamic Movement and the Fur Tribe. Whether it was an 

indiv idual close to the NIF leadership or not, it gives an 

insight into the relationship between the Fur tribe and the 

NIF/National Congress. This document giv es clear 

indication that the Fur hav e been regarded as an 

obstruction to the NIF/National Congress’ radical Islamist 

agenda and have therefore been likely v ictims of 

exclusionary ideology on the part of the Government. The 

Africans of Darfur and in this case, the Fur in particular,

ev idently faced exclusionary ideology from the national 

and the regional level. 

It has been suggested that the Arab Gathering and the NIF 

will ultimately come into conflict. 21 This is supported by a 

document believed to hav e been written by the Arab 

Gathering but w hich Aegis has as yet been unable to 

authenticate (See Appendix M). 

The ideology of the Arab Gathering is not subscribed to by 

all members of the National Congress Party and there is 

considerable disquiet among members of the current 

Gov ernment (and within the military) over the 

Gov ernment’s Darfur policy. 22 

Following the Political Committee’s visits to South Darfur, 

111 South Darfur NCP members addressed a 

memorandum to the Chairman and Secretary of the NCP 

ex pressing concern at an unnamed ‘racist organisation’ 

which risked undermining NCP cohesion and credibility. 23 

As of March 2004, those who issued this w arning had 

received no reply from theNationalCongress. 

The agenda in Darfur is being directed by a powerful 

clique in the security establishment, some of whom have 

also been responsible for past massiv e violations of 

human rights in Sudan. 24 Based on their past record, it 

seems most likely that it is here where the Arab Gathering 

ideology holds most sway. 

21 Aegis interview with former Darfurian politician (wishing to remain 

anonymous), September 2004. 

22 Justice Africa (2004). Prospects for Peace in Sudan, B riefing June 

- July 2004, http://www.justiceafrica.org/June_July04.htm [Accessed 

23 October 2004]. 

23 International Crisis Group (2004). Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New 

Crisis, (Africa Report No 76). p. 11. 

24 Justice Africa (2004). Prospects for Peace in Sudan, B riefing June 

- July 2004, http://www.justiceafrica.org/June_July04.htm [Accessed 

23 October 2004]. 

Summary 


Darfur is suffering the outcomes of ethnic and tribal 

conflict, pow er struggles and competition for land in 

the south. In recent decades, how ev er, an 

exclusionary ideology has driven policies of the current 

and prev ious Gov ernment of Sudan that hav e led to 

jihad and outcomes that can be regarded as genocide. 

The crisis in Darfur is happening in that contex t and is 

also driv en by the supremacist / racist ideas of the 

Arab Congress, ideas congruent with those of central 

Gov ernment. 

Recommendation 

Exclusionary ideology must be taken into account in 

the risk assessment of a crisis, as described by 

Barbara Harff. It is an important distinction betw een 

the objectiv es of the Janjaw eed/Gov ernment of 

Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army / Justice and 

Equality Mov ement. 

When an ex clusionary ideology ex ists and civ ilians 

are being systematically targeted during a conflict, 

the situation should be described as genocidal 

regardless of whether a consensus is reached about 

w hether it is genocide or not. 

This should lead to the prioritisation of security for 

the targeted group, in tandem with humanitarian aid 

and any efforts to achieve a political settlement. 

12

SECTION 3 

Systematic Actions Amounting 

to Genocide 

13 

“ Something changed in recent years,” Aegis was 

told by a 24-year-old Darfur Arab who had moved 

to Eastern Chad. “ We have had our differences 

with the Massaleit and other Africans for as long 

as I remember. But now the Government trains 

and supports us and I would have to join the 

Janjaweed if I went back home. I will not go back 

home because I know that means I will have to 

kill and destroy.” 

There have been disputes in Darfur for generations, but 

the escalation of organised violence occurred after 1982, 

with the emergence of the ArabCongress. 

3.1 Ideas influence action 

3.1.1 Land possession and conflict 

Darfur w as an independent Fur sultanate until it was 

annexed to Sudan by the British in 1916. The British 

introduced Dars (tribal homelands) but did not allocate 

Dars to most nomadic groups. Many nomadic tribes have 

moved into Darfur since then. Significantly, it is members 

of these nomadic groups w ho make up the Janjaweed. 

The one nomadic group the British did allocate land tow as 

the Baggara in South Darfur. They hav e been much less 

inv olved than the northern Baggara in Janjaweed 

activ ities. 25 

Following the British introduction of Dars, agriculturalists 

willingly accommodated northern herders on their land 

during the dry season when the herders moved south in 

search of better grazing land. 

As elsew here, agriculturalists benefited from the 

pastoralists as the manure left by the herds fertilized 

their crops and the tw o traded with each other. 

Despite competition for land and resources betw een 

nomadic herding groups and farmers, Darfur had a 

tradition of relatively peaceful interethnic relations until the 

25 Ethiopian Reporter (2004). “ Background Briefing Note: Darfur 

Conflict” , June 2004, 

http://www.ethiopianreporter.com/displayenglish.php?id=1084, 

[Accessed 22 October 2004]. 

1970s. Any conflicts betw een nomadic herders and 

agriculturalists were usually settled by the Native 

Administrative System without recourse to v iolence. 

How ever, central Government interference has gradually 

weakened the native administration since the 1960s. 

Conflicts between agriculturalists and pastoralists 

increased in the late 1960s against a backdrop of 

env ironmental degradation. Parties to the conflicts w ere 

defined as just that - agriculturalists and pastoralists. 

Although agriculturalists and pastoralists were 

predominantly Non-Arab and Arab respectiv ely, ethnicity 

was incidental. Disputes over land or w ater could just as 

well be between Arabs as between Arabs and non-Arabs. 

Values of ethnic co-existence were prevalent in Darfur. 

Ethnicity only became a mobilising factor in the late 1980s, 

coinciding with the emergence of the Arab Gathering. 

3.1.2 Chronology of increased attacks 

The erosion of the native administration system and the 

degradation of land hav e been highly significant 

contributing factors to the increased conflict in Darfur. 

How ever, since the emergence of the Arab Congress in 

1982, violence targeted against Africans in Darfur has 

become increasingly commonplace and the organisation 

of the v iolence more ev ident. This is demonstrated in the 

follow ing list. 

1982: An attack on a market in Kabkabiya district. All 

those identified as Arabs were allowed to go free. 26 

1987-89: Fur-Arab conflict. It began as a conflict over 

water and grazing rights, butwas fuelled and intensified by 

propaganda from both sides. The Arab Congress letter to 

the Prime Minister in 1987 (see 2.5.2) coincidedw ith these 

increased incidents of v iolence. Approximately 5,000 Fur 

were killed and 40,000 of their homes destroyed, whilst 

400 Arabs were killed and 700 of their tents burned. 27 

There was apparent intent by the Arabs to destroy the 

social and economic base of the Fur w ith the destruction 

of schools, clinics, w ells and irrigation pumps. Although 

ev iction w as common, there was no evidence of 

subsequent Arab resettlement. 28 

1996-99: Conflict between Massaleit and Arab Rizaiqat. A 

change of administrativ e structure in favour of Arabs led to 

26 Ferseldin, A. (2004). “ Devils in Disguise” (Unpublished essay). 



28 International Crisis Group (2004). Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New 

Crisis, (Africa Report No 76). p. 6.

tension between the tw o communities. Western Darfur 

was put under military rule. Many educated Massaleit and 

Massaleit members of the state council were arrested. 

Against this background of state repression, Arab militias 

began attacking and burning Massaleit villages with 

killings of up to 75 people at a time. Attacks were timed to 

coincide with the harvest. The Government claimed that 

this was a tribal conflict although there were reports of the 

inv olvement of uniformed men. 29 Identity badges found on 

a number of dead militia showed one to be a colonel in the 

Sudanese army and indicated that some members came 

from Chad, Liby a and Sy ria. 30 

Betw een 15 July 2000 and 28 April 2002 therewere 156 

attacks recorded by Fur members of Parliament (National 

Assembly). They handed the list that 

they compiled to Sudanese President, 

Al Bashir. See Appendix F for list 

referring to dates and locations of 

attacks, numbers of people killed and 

injured in each attack and number of 

properties lost. 

Further evidence of organised v iolence 

against African villages pre-dating the 

rebel attacks in February 2003 can be 

found in a document written by the son 

of the last Fur Sultan. Before he died in 2003, he 

documented all the African villages that had been 

destroyed from 2000. The list exceeds 200 villages. A 

translatedversion can be found in Appendix E. 

3.2 Genocidal acts in the current 

crisis 

3.2.1 Killing: targeting civilians 

In Nov ember 2004 the number of deaths commonly 

quoted in Darfur is 70,000. However, this figure only 

represents deaths in IDP camps in Darfur betw een March 

and the beginning of October 2004. 31 To date the accurate 

figure for deaths in the genocide is unknown, but Eric 

Reeves has used a variety of sources and statistical 

methods to estimate mortality numbers approaching 



30 Sudan Human Rights Organization (2000). “ Ethnic Cleansing of 

the Darfur Muslims: The Massaleit”, http://www.shrocairo.org/reports/masaleit.htm, 


31 WHO, (2004). “ Mortality Projections for Darfur” , 15 October 2004, 

http://www.who.int/disasters/repo/14985.pdf [Accessed 13 

November 2004]. 

‘Organised 

violence against 

African villages 

pre-dated rebel 

attacks in 

February 2003.’ 

Section 3: Systematic Actions Amounting to Genocide 

300,000. 32 Save the Children now agrees that 200,000 to 

300,000 have died since the start of the Darfur conflict. 33 

Some of these deaths are a direct result of v iolence, 

others due to the livingconditions of the displaced. 

The Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) station at the Chad- 

Darfur border town of Adré was expecting many wounded 

refugees inChad. But they did not arrive. Many remained 

IDPs in Darfur. The 200,000 that went to Chad by July 

2004 seeped over the long border and gradually 

congregated in camps. As the refugee camps began to 

swell in Chad in the spring and summer of 2004, 

journalists and NGO workers remarked that the refugees 

arriv ed without sign of injury. The absence of obvious 

wounds, blood and corpses suggested that these were 

civilians fleeing a civilwar. 

It took closer scrutiny to understand 

what was happening. In July 2004 one 

of the authors, James Smith, a 

physician, found that many refugees in 

the Chad camps had evidence of 

wounds betw een 3-6 months old, 

consistent w ith gunshot injuries. This 

included many children. Most refugees 

had taken many months to arrive in the 

camps in Chad. They had remained 

internally displaced, then travelled long distances. 

Consequently, by the time they met w estern observers, 

victims had either died of their wounds or they had healed. 

Many also testified to Aegis how they had witnessed 

members of the family being killed. In random groups of 

refugees in the camps; over half of the men, women and 

children had always seen a family member killed during 

attacks on the villages. Most of these had lost multiple 

members of their families. 

Analysis of more comprehensive interviews carried out for 

the United States State Department report found that 61% 

of refugees reported having seen a member of their family 

killed and 67% reported seeing a non-family member 

killed. 34 

In attacks on villages there has often been an emphasis 

on the killing of the male population. There have been 

instances reported of males being rounded up and 

32 Eric Reeves,“ Darfur Mortality Update” , 8 October 2004 

http://www.sepnet.org/index .php?op=ViewArticle&articleId=334&blog 

Id=1 [Accessed 16 November 2004]. 

33 Save the Children spokesman Paul Hetherington, quoted by 

Gethin Chamberlain in The Scotsman, 18 November 2004. 

34 United States State Department (2004) Documenting Atrocities in 

Darfur, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research, (State Publication 11182). 

14

taken away from the v illage to be shot. 35 This mirrors the 

pattern of attacks against theNuba in 1992. 

Halima, a 13-year-old girl, Breidjing refugee camp, eastern 

Chad, July 2004. She had been shot in her left arm in 

February 2004. Clearly the bones were fragmented and the 

arm left non-functional. Her twin brother was shot in the 

head and died. Photo: James M Smith, © Aegis Trust 

3.2.2 Use of racist language by the 

perpetrators 

The use of racist language during attacks is consistently 

reported by refugees. This provides evidence that attacks 

are driven by a racist ideology, and are not just attacks 

against the support base of the two rebel groups. 

Aegis was told over and over again by refugees coming 

ov er the border to Eastern Chad from Darfur: 

15 

The Janjaweed want to steal from us, kill us and 

destroy us, because we are black. 

The US State Department report found that nearly a third 

of refugees interviewed reported hearing racial epithets 

whilst under attack. Reference to Africans as slaves is a 

35 Adam Jones (2004). A compendium of media coverage and 

human-rights reportage about gender-selective killings of men and 

boys in Darfur, Sudan, http://gendercide.org/darfur01.htm, 



racial slur that Northern Sudanese Arabs have used since 

the 19 th century, and it has been commonly used by the 

Janjaweed. The examples below illustrate the v iolent 

hatred in the language used. 

You blacks, you have spoilt the country! We are 

here to burn you…We will kill your husbands and 

sons and we will sleep with you! You will be our 

wives! 

Every black woman must be killed, even the 

children. 

The blood of the Blacks runs like water, we take 

their goods and we chase them from our area and 

our cattle will be in their land. The power of al 

Bashir belongs to the Arabs and we will kill you until 

the end, you Blacks, we have killed your God. 36 

We are the Arabs, we have the priority, you are the 

blacks. 37 

You are opponents to the regime, we must crush 

you. As you are black you are like slaves. 38 

3.2.3 Rape and violence against women 

Systematic rape is characteristically used as a tool of 

genocide – most notably in the past decade during the 

Bosnian crisis in the early 1990s and during the genocide 

in Rwanda in 1994. The International Criminal Tribunal for 

Rwanda recognised rape as a crime of genocide for the 

first time in 1998 in the verdict giv en against Jean-Paul 

Akayesu. 39 

In the local justicesystem of gacaca in Rwanda, dev eloped 

to address crimes of genocide w ithin local communities, 

rape is specifically defined as a crime of genocide in the 

highest category – category one, the accused being tried 

not in the villages but in the conventional courts. 40 

36 Amnesty International (2004) Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: 

Sexual Violence and its Consequences, London, Amnesty 

International, (AFR 54/076/2004) p. 14. 

The quotation is from a song sung by Hakama (traditional women 

singers whose function is to praise male fighters) who have 

accompanied the Janjaweed during attacks on villages. 

37 Ibid p. 23. 

38 Ibid p .12. 

39 International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (1998), “ Historic 

Judgement Finds Akayesu Guilty Of Genocide” 

http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/PRESSREL/1998/138.htm [Accessed 

16 November 2004]. 

40 Victoria Britain (2003). “ Letter from Rwanda”, Global Policy Forum, 

http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/tribunals/rwanda/2003/0901lett 

er.htm [Accessed 16 November 2004].


July 2004: Aegisdiscovered these three women sitting in a small village on the border with Chad, far away from 

the refugee camps. All had been gang-raped at different times, in different places. All had witnessed their 

husbands being killed. Two of them had seen their children being killed also. Fatima, aged forty-eight on the 

left, had eight children. None survived the attack on her village by the Janjaweed and Sudanese army. The 

other two women were six months pregnant as a result of rape. Photo: James M. Smith ©Aegis Trust. 

In Darfur, w omen and girls have been publicly raped in 

front of their families and communities. This points to 

attempts both to subjugate the women and humiliate the 

whole community. 

Racist language has often accompanied sexual violence, 

indicating that these crimes are racially motivated. 

Amnesty International produced a report on sexual 

violence in Darfur and documented one case of a pregnant 

woman being killed because she was bearing the child of 

an “enemy”. 41 

In Darfur, rape is a cultural taboo. Women who have been 

raped are likely to suffer social stigmatisation and are at 

risk of rejection by their families and communities, even 

41 Amnesty International, Darfur: Rape as a weapon of war: sexual 

violence and its consequences, 

http://www.web.amnesty.org/library/index /engafr540762004 


their husbands, leaving them to a future of uncertainty and 

neglect. In some cases the Janjaweed have branded 

women they have raped, so that all who see them know 

what has happened to them. 

As the perpetrators come from the same societies, they 

are fully aware of the implications of their actions for the 

women. Many women carry injuries resulting from violent 

rape and many are pregnant as a consequence. 

Much of the knowledge w e have about sexual violence in 

Darfur has come from refugees in camps in Chad. 

How ever, the majority of w omen who have suffered sexual 

violence have remained in Darfur rather than going into the 

refugee camps in Chad, possibly because they fear 

stigmatization from their communities there. 

16

3.2.4 Systematic destruction: targeting African 

villages 

It is often evident that attacks have been planned in 

adv ance, happening on market days, or during or after 

pray ers at themosque, while people are gathered. 42 

Refugees in Chad consistently testified to Aegis that after 

the Janjaweed raided on horses or camels, the Sudanese 

army regularly entered the villages in motor vehicles, 

shooting and burning to ensure no one remained. They 

did not differentiate betw een the Gov ernment and 

Janjaweed and testified, ‘There is no difference; they are 

the same.’ 

42 Ibid p. 9. 

17 


Fig 1. Satellite imagery used by USAID to monitor the destruction of African villages. This is the latest image made 

publicly available by USAID on10 September 2004. It shows 576 destroyedvillages and152 damaged. 

In some cases, soldiers cordoned off the v illage to stop 

people fleeing. At other times they participated in 

attacks. 43 All major reports produced this year by 

international organisations, state departments and 

international NGOs have found that GoS forces are 

complicit in attacks. 44 

Some attacks have been supported by aerial 

bombardment by the Sudanese Air Force, particularly in 

Northern Darfur. Clearly, this requires planning and coordination 

between forces on the ground and the Air Force. 

43 Ibid p. 9. 

44 See Appendix H for a list of reports by international organisations, 

state departments and international NGOs finding the GoS Forces 

culpable in attacks.

The United Nations Inter-Agency Fact Finding and Rapid 

Assessment Mission noted in April the obv ious ethnic 

targeting of v illages in the region they visited. It presented 

these findings in its April 2004 report: 

The 23 Fur villages in the Shattaya Administrative 

Unit have been completely depopulated, looted and 

burnt to the ground... Meanwhile, dotted alongside 

these charred locations are unharmed, populated 

and functioning ‘Arab’ settlements. In some 

locations, the distance between a destroyed Fur 

village and an Arab village is less than 500 

meters. 45 

At the end of June the United States Agency for 

International Development (USAID) surveyed 578 villages. 

It showed 301 destroyed, 76 damaged and 199 intact. The 

survey of 578 villages was not exhaustive. A US official 

presenting the report said that US surveillance of v illages 

covered much but not all of Darfur. The USAID report on 

its satellite surveillance of Darfur at the end of August said 

that 405 v illages had been destroyed. 46 This report 

follow ed on from the Junesurvey but does not say whether 

it survey ed the same number of v illages or more. If the 

destruction of 405 out of 578 v illages was representativ e, 

we could infer that around 70% of Darfur’s villages had 

been destroyed by this point. 47 USAID material on satellite 

surveillance published on 10 September demonstrates a 

more ex tensive survey, indicating that 576 villages had 

been destroy ed and 152 damaged. 48 

‘Attacks have been 

supported by aerial 

bombardment…this 

requires planning.’ 

These reports show that systematic destruction of v illages 

has continued unabated in contravention of UN Security 

Council resolutions, and despite the stated threat of 

possible economic sanctions. 

45 UN Inter-Agency Fact Finding and Rapid Assessment Mission 

(2004), Kailek Town; South Darfur. 

46 United States State Department (2004) Documenting Atrocities in 

Darfur, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the 

Bureau of Intelligence and Research (State Publication 11182). 

47 USAID (2004). Darfur Humanitarian Emergency Satellite 

Imagery, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/subsaharan_africa/sudan/satelliteimages.html, 

[Accessed 24 September 

2004]. 

48 http://www.usaid.gov/locations/subsaharan_africa/sudan/darfurvillages_0910_tex 

t.html [Accessed 20 

November]. 


The thoroughness of the looting and destruction makes 

future habitation of the villages all but impossible. The 

poisoning and blowing up of w ells – so v ital to survival in 

Darfur’s inhospitable environment – indicates that this is 

the intention of the Janjaweed and Sudanese Armed 

Forces. 

3.2.5 ‘Resettlement’ 

There have been reports from journalists of resettlement of 

destroyed villages by Arabs. This coincides with the 

discovery by Human Rights Watch of a Gov ernment memo 

proposing the resettlement of Arabs in the deserted 

villages of Darfur and ordering the rehabilitation of wells to 

facilitate this. The memo also proposed to resettle the 

million or so displaced in 18 new locations. 49 This may 

hav e been in line with the recommendation in UN 

Resolution 1556 that safe areas be created. However, in 

prev ious similar situations, as in the Nuba mountains 

follow ing the campaign against the Nuba, the GoS set up 

‘peace v illages’ in w hich to resettle the Nuba that were 

more like ghettos or concentration camps. They were 

located in hostile terrain w ith wholly inadequate living 

conditions. 50 

There are fears that these proposed 18 camps may be 

more of such settlements, making displacement 

permanent. 51 

3.2.6 Detention 

Villagers are usually forcibly displaced from their v illages 

and forced to move to big villages or towns which become 

IDP camps, guarded by Sudanese police and armed 

forces, together with the Janjaweed. The IDPs are virtually 

prisoners w ithin these camps, unable to leave them even 

to carry out v ital life-support activities for fear of attacks by 

Janjaweed. The latest confirmation that this is still the case 

came from Louise Arbour, UN High Commissioner for 

Refugees, who described the IDP camps as “prisons 

without walls” following her visit in September. 52 By 

keeping their v ictims inside Darfur, the Government of 

Sudan is concealing the scale of its crimes. 

Ev en inside the camps, women remain vulnerable to rape 

and humanitarianconditions are appalling. 

49 Minkey Worden, (2004) Khartoum’s Directives of Death, New York, 

Human Rights Watch. 

50 See section 2.2. 

51 Human Rights Watch (2004) UN Safe A reas Provide No Real 

Security, New York, Human Rights Watch 

http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/09/01/darfur9286.htm, [Accessed 

25 October 2004]. 

52 BBC (25 September 2004), 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3690232.stm, [Accessed 11 

October 2004]. 

18

3.2.7 Denial of humanitarian access and starvation 

Conditions of life have been imposed on the African 

population of Darfur by which they may not survive without 

humanitarian assistance. This is described as genocide in 

Article II (c) of the UN GenocideConvention (Appendix A). 

In April the UN Inter-Agency Fact Finding and Rapid 

Assessment Mission reported a strategy of systematic and 

deliberate starv ation being enforced by the GoS and its 

security forces. Their report was based upon testimonies 

and observ ations on the ground where IDPs were kept 

within the IDP camp by decree of the regional 

commissioner and had to pay to leave the camp to find 

food. Food deliveries were appropriated by the Janjaweed 

and the IDPs dared not accept humanitarian assistance for 

fear it would make them targets of further assault. 53 

Fear of attacks by Janjaweed prev ent the use of 

traditional foraging methods as a coping strategy, as well 

as the planting of nex t y ear’s crops, ensuring the v ictims’ 

reliance on humanitarian aid for another year. 

Meanwhile the GoS severely obstructed humanitarian 

access by bureaucratic means, withholding vital 

documents such as visas and travel permits. It only 

increased cooperation in July after considerable 

international pressure and a UN resolution calling for 

increased humanitarian access, by which time the rains 

had begun, leaving major routes along which humanitarian 

aid could be delivered impassable. Consequently, 

significant portions of the population were cut off from 

humanitarian aid betw een July and October. USAID, along 

with other UN and NGOs, have estimated that the death 

toll could rise to above 300,000 by the end of 2004 simply 

as a result of humanitarian conditions, w ithout taking into 

account the death toll resulting from violence. 

3.2.8 Destruction of Cultural Symbols 

There has been widespread destruction of mosques and 

desecration of Muslim religious symbols, and this despite 

the Islamic nature of the GoS. 54 


(April 2004) Kailek Town; South Darfur. 

54 Flint, J. (12 May 2004). “ The Shameful Muslim Silence on Darfur” , 

The Daily Star. 

19 


3.3 How the International Community 

has defined the situation 

State bodies 

European Parliament 

Voted 566 to 6w ith 16 abstentions tocall the violence in 

Darfur genocide (16 September). 55 

US State Department 

Colin Powell stated that he and his department had 

concluded that genocide was occurring following an 

inv estigation and report by the US State department. (9 

September). Powell’s statementwas backed up by a 

statement from President George Bush saying the United 

States had concluded that genocide had taken place in 

Darfur. 56 

US Congress 

Both Houses of the USCongress recognised thesituation 

in Darfur as genocide on 22July 2004. The House of 

Representativ es passed a resolution calling it genocide, 

with 422v otes in favour, 12 abstentions and novotes 

against. The US Senate passed its Resolution by voice. 57 

Germany 

Defence Minister Peter Struck stated on 18 September 

2004, "We cannot sit by while genocide is going on." 58 

Sweden 

In May, Swedenwarned that there was a risk of genocide. 

The Swedish Government takes thev iew that thesituation 

in Darfur is of thesame character as genocide andmust 

be treatedwith the same gravity and urgency. 59 

France 

Refers to the situation in Darfur as ‘massive human rights 

violations.’ 60 

55 European Union (2004). “ EP- Sudan Crimes ‘tantamount to 

genocide’” , http://europaeuun.org/articles/lt/article_3810_lt.htm 


56 United States State Department (2004), “ The Crisis in Darfur” , 

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/36042.htm, [Accessed 16 

November]. 

57 BBC News (2004). “ US House calls Darfur Genocide” , 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3918765.stm, [Accessed 16 


58 Daily Times, (2004) “Berlin Calls Darfur Crisis a Genocide” , 

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_19-9- 

2004_pg4_12, [Accessed 16 November 2004]. 

59 Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004) “ Darfur must be 

Treated as Genocide” , http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/3308/a/28085 


60 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2004) “ Questions about the 

situation in Darfur” , 

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=44438, 

[Accessed 16 November 2004].

UK 

Waiting for the International Commission of Inquiry to 

report. 

NGOpositions 

Médecins sans Frontières 

Has av oided defining thesituation in Darfur in terms of 

genocide, but has published ample evidence of it since 

May. 

International Crisis Group 

Considers that the atrocities in Darfur are likely to 

constitute genocide but believes it cannot make a legal 

determination. 61 

Human Rights Watch 

Has called the situation in Darfur ethnic cleansing and 

crimes against humanity. 62 

Amnesty International 

States that w ar crimes and crimes against humanity have 

been committed. 63 

USHMM -Committeeon Conscience 

Has declared a genocide warning, saying genocide is 

imminent or actually happening. 64 

61 AllAfrica.com (2004) “ To Save Lives in Darfur, Black African 

peacekeepers and Demand War Crimes Accountability, Says ICGs 

Prendergast” , http://allafrica.com/stories/200408040001.html 


62 Human Rights Watch (2004) Darfur Destroyed; Ethnic Cleansing 

by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan, 

http://hrw.org/reports/2004/sudan0504/ [Accessed 16 November 

2004]. 

63 Amnesty International (2004) Darfur: Rape as a Weapon of War: 

Sexual Violence and its Consequences, London, Amnesty 

International, (AFR 54/076/2004). 

64 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Committee on 

Conscience (2004) “ Is Sudan Staring Genocide in the Face” , 

http://www.ushmm.org/conscience/staring_genocide_in_the_face/m 

ain.php [Accessed 16 November]. 


Summary 

In the v iew of the Aegis Trust, the ev idence in this 

section indicates that genocide, according to the 

definition prov ided by the UN Genocide Convention, 

is taking place in Darfur (see 1.3). 

Intent can be deduced from sufficient ev idence – 

admission of intent by the perpetrators is not 

necessary. Racist language and abundant 

ev idence of acts against non-Arabs (or black 

Africans) – including systematic burning of v illages 

coordinated w ith aerial bombardment, killing, and 

w idespread rape – hav e been documented by many 

organisations, including the Aegis Trust. 

Together they demonstrate planning and 

organisation, as opposed to random instances of 

assault on civ ilians during a civ ilw ar. 


The systematic targeting of civ ilians demonstrates 

the genocidal characteristics of this crisis. This 

should hav e altered the management in relation to 

security and ending impunity , as demonstrated in 

the follow ing tw o sections. 

20

SECTION 4 

Security 

4.1 Securing populations at risk as a 

priority 

4.1.1 Humanitarian aid and political settlement are 

necessary, but not sufficient in a genocidal situation. 

The label of ‘genocidal conflict’ or ‘threat of genocide’ is an 

important one: it infers great threat to civilians. In the 

management of such a situation, security must be as much 

a priority as providing humanitarian aid and achieving 

political settlement. This is the key difference in the 

management of a conflict where the risk of genocide is 

minimal. Although the killing unfolded more slowly in 

Western Sudan than in Rwanda ten y ears previously, the 

principle remains the same: in a genocidal situation, 

compromising security in fav our of peace talks may cost 

liv es. 

4.1.2 Responsibility to protect 

In 2001 the International Commission for Interv ention and 

State Sov ereignty reached its conclusions about the 

world’s responsibility to protect. When sovereignstates are 

unw illing or unable to protect their ow n citizens, the 

responsibility must be borne by the broader community of 

states. 65 

Yet during the crisis in Darfur there has been a distinct lack 

of attention to security for those at risk. Either the GoS has 

actively supported the Janjaweed or it has lost control of 

them. Whichever scenario is true, externally implemented 

security measures are needed. 

It w ould be unfair to suggest that security has not been 

considered at all. It is astounding, however, that so much 

confidencewas placed in the GoS to provide protection for 

the vulnerable, for tw o reasons: 

First, there is v ast ev idence that the Gov ernment is 

complicit in the organisation and funding of the killing. Had 

65 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 

(2001). “ The Responsibility to Protect; Report of the International 

Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty” , 

http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/iciss-ciise/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf 


21 

the exclusionary ideology driving the crisis been 

recognised and its implications understood, capitulation to 

Sudan’s wishes – that it be allowed to address the security 

issue internally – could not have been justified. Asking 

them to ‘rein in the Janjaweed’ was a lame excuse for the 

rest of the world not to do any thing else substantial. 

Second, the ‘Peace Villages’ run by the Government in 

Kordofan during the so-called forced resettlement in 1992 

were brought into total disrepute – they were more akin to 

concentration camps or ghettos. 66 So when, in August, 

Jan Pronk agreed a plan with the GoS to provide 18 safe 

areas for internally displaced refugees, it w as more than 

surprising. While these w ere different from previous safe 

areas, and it would have been hoped that AU observers 

would at least have access to them, they were to be 

guarded by Sudanese police. It w as not long before 

journalists were reporting how Janjaweed militiamen 

became policemen, guarding the people they had ravaged 

and displaced from their homes. 

4.1.3 Who is in control? 

Some argue that the GoS is not fully in control of policy in 

Darfur. In a failing state this would be understandable. A 

clique of around 40 people in the security establishment is 

thought to be dominating the agenda in Darfur. 67 Ali 

Osman Mohamed Taha, the Vice President, is the leading 

figure so the clique is in a position of strength within the 

Gov ernment. It still does not make sense, though, to ask 

the GoS to ‘rein in the Janjaweed’, as the so-called clique 

is in all likelihood coordinating the air strikes and security 

on the ground anyway. 

While we continue to deal with the Government in 

Khartoum, we should not be surprised that the situation is 

grow ing worse. When Bosnian Muslims were being killed 

by Bosnian Serbs, the UK’s FCO wanted the Serb 

Gov ernment in Belgrade to bring the rogue Bosnian Serb 

leader, Radovan Karadzic, under control. They believed 

that a strong Milosev ic was the answer to Bosnia’s 

problems – they did not want to undermine his 

Gov ernment for fear of creating anarchy. But Yugoslavia 

was already a failing state, descending into bloodshed and 

fiasco, as Karadzic organised mass murder. 

Milosevic did not rein in Karadzic. Khartoum will not rein in 

the Janjaweed. 

66 See section 2.2. 

67 Justice Africa (2004). “ Prospects for Peace in Sudan, Briefing” 

June - July 2004, http://www.justiceafrica.org/June_July04.htm 

[Accessed 23 October 2004].

4.1.4 Civil war and rebels 

The rebels appear to have been the only actors in the 

conflict aw are of the imperative of civilian security . MPs 

within Darfur were calling for foreign intervention in 

December 2003; rebels requested higher numbers of 

monitors from the outset of the Ceasefire Commission and 

in July rebels called for foreign military intervention. It has 

been slow in coming and is still insufficient. Consequently, 

during October and early November peace talks were 

deadlocked ov er the security issue. Although the SLA and 

JEM signed Humanitarian and Security Protocols w ith the 

GoS on 9 November follow ing talks in Abuja, this provides 

minimal cause for optimism; Sudanese security forces 

display ed contempt for the agreement by conducting a raid 

on IDPs at the El-Geercamp the following day. 

If there are no plans to protect the vulnerable, it is not 

sensible to stop the victim group from defending itself in a 

genocidal situation. If security is not provided, ceasefires 

may decrease, not increase security 

for the vulnerable. This is the key 

difference from a conflict w here 

genocide is a low risk. 

In Rwanda in 1994, it w as the then 

rebel group, the Rwandan Patriotic 

Front, that stopped the genocide. 

Not the UN peacekeepers, not the 

Arusha peace deal. That lesson 

should also have been learned from 

Bosnia. An arms embargo imposed 

on Yugoslavia in 1991 left the poorly 

armed Bosnian Muslims unable to 

obtain arms to defend themselv es against the well armed 

Serb forces. Under Resolution 819 (1993), which created 

the ‘safe area’ of Srebrenica, UNPROFOR (United Nations 

Protection Force) troops disarmed all Muslims within the 

safe area. This was the condition laid down by the Serbs 

for ceasing attacks on the area. It w as also UN action that 

left the Bosnians vulnerable to the subsequent occurrence 

of genocide in Srebrenica inJuly 1995. 

We are repeating thesemistakes in Darfur. 

4.2 International response to security 

Sending Western troops to Sudan w ould have been 

inappropriate under the best of circumstances. After the 

inv asion of Iraq howev er, it became politically 

inconceivable for Western nations to consider entering the 

sovereign territory of another Muslim state. Ironically, 

while the recent w ar in Iraq remains difficult to shoe-horn 

into legality, there is little question that international law 

would allow member states to interv ene to protect human 

‘In a genocidal 

situation… 

ceasefires may 

decrease, not 

increase security 

for the 

vulnerable.’ 

Section 4: Security 

life under threat of genocide in Western Sudan. Political 

nerv ousness about where an intervention may lead, and 

strong opposition from Arab states and China, contributed 

to the issue of security being av oided as much as possible. 

As a result, v iable alternatives to providing protectionwere 

not considered carefully or early enough. 

Yet the need for security to be a top priority was clear and 

was confirmed in a report by the UN Inter-Agency Rapid 

Assessment Fact Finding Mission in April 2004. It reported 

instances where starv ing IDPs were asking not to be given 

humanitarian assistance, fearing that receipt of 

humanitarian aid would make them targets of the 

Janjaweed in and around the IDP camps. Yet it was not 

until July that the need for an international security 

presence was recognised in a UN resolution. 

Instead, the UN and member states hid behind the 

humanitarian aid effort, which w as also needed to save 

liv es. For ex ample, in the UK the Secretary of State for 

International Development, Hilary 

Benn, was the main Government 

spokesman on the issue. He 

undertook his aid role with great 

generosity, but deftly avoided 

questions about security or the 

political process. The Foreign 

Secretary and his ministers kept a 

low profile behind Hilary Benn and 

barely uttered a word until July 2004. 

The joint FCO-DfID Sudan Unit knew 

that security was needed in Darfur, 

as well as food, but they equally 

understood that leading the rest of 

the reluctant Security Council members to such a position 

was a steep, uphill task, especially as the Iraq problems 

diminished any moral high ground held by theUK andUS. 

4.2.1 The AU force 

A tiny ex ternal military presence was finally established in 

Western Sudan, after months of killing, rape and 

dev astation. 154 Rwandan troops arrived on 14 August 

and 153 Nigerian troops on 30 August – to protect AU 

observers. 

The need to protect citizens was understood more in the 

African Union than it was among the wealthy member 

states. Reflecting on the experience in his own country, 

President Kagame of Rwanda said that whatever mandate 

was given, his soldiers would not stand and watch civilians 

being killed. On the 27 th July the AU Peace and Security 

Council passed a resolution which called for a proposal to 

be made for transforming the observer protection force into 

a fully fledged peacekeeping mission, with the requisite 

22

mandate and size to ensure the effective implementation 

of the Ceasefire Agreement w ith particular emphasis on 

the disarmament and neutralization of the Janjaweed 

militia. 68 

The UK Department for International Development w as 

quick to donate tw o million pounds for the AU observer 

mission and provided logistical support, rations and 

transport for the Nigerian troops. The German 

Gov ernment offered 100,000 Euros of communications 

equipment. The EU offered 12 million Euros. How ever, the 

AU mission languished in an under-resourced state. 

Communications were dire: as of late August, three 

helicopters, thirty -five vehicles and a handful of mobile 

phones were being used to cover an area the size of 

France. 

It is no surprise that the African Union, human rights 

groups and journalists continued to report aerial 

bombardment, killing and the burning of villages. Although 

these reports decreased after the arrival of the AU 

observers, that may well be a function of the high 

percentage of villages in the region already razed to the 

ground, as evidenced by US satellite surveillance, with 

their inhabitants displaced orkilled. 

The necessity for a larger, more effective force was selfev 

ident before the AU mission arrived. Western policy 

makers regarded the observer missions in the North-South 

conflict to hav e been a success and were conv inced that 

this conservativ e approach was the most prudent. This 

was also a convenient argument, as any thing other than a 

few ex ternal observers in Darfur was vigorously opposed 

by the GoS and its allies. 

The African Unionwas w illing to send more troops in June 

2004: thousands of peacekeepers instead of hundreds of 

observers. The GoS rejected this offer and the member 

states of the Security Council capitulated. Finally, UN 

Resolution 1564, adopted on 18 September 2004, called 

for an expanded AU force with a broader mandate. 

When, on 20 October, the AU observer mission was 

ev entually expanded African Mission in Sudan 2 (AMIS 2) 

with 3,320 personnel, it still had no peace-keeping 

mandate, although its remit was expanded to include the 

protection of ‘civilians whom it encounters under imminent 

threat and in the immediate v icinity, w ithin resources and 

capability ’. 69 The primary purpose of the armed AU troops, 

how ever, was to protect 450 observ ers. At this time, 

Darfurians were perishing at a rate of between 10-30,000 

68 Communiqué of the 13 th meeting of the Peace and Security 

Council, 27 October 2004. 

69 Communiqué of the 17 th meeting of the Peace and Security 

Council, 20 October 2004. 

23 


per month. 70 While AMIS 2 w as welcome, itw as still a suboptimal 

arrangement to av ert the threat of ‘genocide by 

attrition’. 

Lt. Gen. Roméo Dallaire, who commanded the UN force in 

Rwanda during the 1994 genocide, said in October 2004 

that Darfur needed 44,000 African Union peacekeepers, 

ex tensively supported by major powers providing training 

and equipment, physical logistics, and command and 

control support, including advanced communications 

equipment and satellite-based ‘eyes in the sky.’ 71 

To date, the UN has not even imposed a ‘no-fly ’ zone, 

despite tens of thousands being killed in attacks involving 

aerial bombardment. This contrasts w ith the response of 

the French in early November 2004 after nine French 

peacekeepers were killed in a bombing raid by the Iv ory 

Coast air force. The French destroyed the entire Iv orian 

air force on the tarmac. Nine days after the attack on the 

French, as a direct response, an arms embargo was 

imposed on the Iv ory Coast in UN Resolution 1572. The 

Resolution also threatened to impose travel and financial 

sanctions against leaders if they failed to implement peace 

agreements by 15 December. It was passed unanimously. 

This demonstrates just how fast and effectively western 

nations and the UN can mov e when the political w ill is 

there. 

4.3 Chronology of the security and 

political dialogue – 2004 

What follows is a chronological analysis of the security and 

political dialogue throughout 2004. This was drawn from a 

monthly break-down of the international community ’s 

response, and was compared with the information publicly 

known about the situation during each month (see 

Appendix G). This demonstrates that actions aimed at the 

protection of civ ilians lagged far behind the threat, both in 

terms of time and prov ision. 

* * * 

70 Source for 10,000 per month: BBC News, (2004) 70,000 Darfur 

Dead’ Since March, 

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3747380.stm [Accessed 20 

October 2004]. Source for 30,000 per month: Reeves, E. (2004) 

“The Meaning of AU Forces Deployment to Darfur” , Sudan Tribune, 

http://www.sudantribune.com/article_impr.php3?id_article=6168 


71 Roméo Dallaire, Omer Ismail, John Prendergast, Samantha 

Power, Michael Ignatieff: Notes and video of the Forum discussion at 

Harvard, October 18, 2004 

http://platform.blogs.com/passionofthepresent/2004/10/romeo_dallair 

e__1.html [Accessed 16 November].

Security of African civ ilians in Darfur has been an issue 

since 2000 (See Appendices E and F). International 

attention only turned to the region in September 2003 

follow ing six months of armed resistance to the GoS. But it 

was only in June 2004 that the security of civilians became 

an issue on the international community ’s agenda. As of 

November 2004, the practical measures taken to increase 

security remain wholly inadequate. 

In early 2004, those members of the international 

community engagingwith the GoS over Darfur employed a 

tactic of quiet diplomacy, fearing that any thing more would 

jeopardise the impending North/South peace deal. 

Although by February the first reports were being 

published giving the background to the crisis and ev idence 

of the ongoing and w idespread atrocities, 72 the crisis was 

cast and managed as humanitarian in nature. 73 A ceasefire 

was being pursued by the international community, 

primarily with the aim of securing humanitarian access. 

The security of civilians remained low on the priority list 

shaping policy. Perhaps there was an assumption that a 

ceasefire would provide security . That is not necessarily 

the case in a genocidal situation. 

Following the signing of the ceasefire in Ndjamena on 8 

April, its maintenance and the attainment of a political 

settlement became the major concern. 

Deployment of observers to monitor the ceasefire between 

the GoS, SLA and JEM was seen as key. Whilst the 

monitoring of the ceasefire was vital, on its own this w as 

not a measure that w ould provide security for the 

threatened population. This was a ty pical response to a 

conflict situation. But this was not just a conflict situation. 

In IDP camps such as Kailek, a policy of forced starvation 

was being implemented against civilians. These measures 

would do nothing to help them. Quiet diplomacy and 

emphasis on the humanitarian crisis continued despite 

reports that in camps such as Kailek, security was so bad 

that starv ing IDPs refused humanitarian aid for fear it 

would single them out forJanjaweed attack. 74 

Following publication of the United Nations High 

Commission for Human Rights (UNHCHR) report at the 

beginning of May, the language used by the international 

community to describe the situation began to change, 

indicating that the grav ity of the situation in Darfur w as 

72 Amnesty International (2004) Too Many People Killed for no 

Reason, Report no. AFR 54/008/2004. 

73 Slim, H. (2004). “ Dithering Over Darfur” , International Affairs, Vol 

80, No 5, 811-833. 


(April 2004), Kailek Town; South Darfur. 


beginning to register with policy makers. 75 How ever, the 

lack of attention in the Security Council betrayed a lack of 

urgency on the part of the international community, despite 

USAID w arnings that 350,000 might die unless decisive 

action were taken. 76 Despite increasing reports of 

Janjaweed being incorporated into the GoS’s Popular 

Defence Force to ‘provide security in Darfur’, many EU 

countries were calling for Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed. 

No enforcement actions were being taken, nor appeared 

likely to be taken in the near future. The international 

community was continuing to rely upon the good faith of 

the GoS, of which therewas little evidence. 

By June, Darfur had become a major international concern 

and civilian security was beginning to be recognised as a 

key issue. The diplomatic pressure exerted by the 

international community increased, with a number of highlev 

el diplomatic visits to Sudan. Serious consideration was 

giv en to taking enforcement action to pursuade the GoS to 

comply with its ceasefire agreements, with consideration of 

sanctions and no-fly zones. 

Diplomatic pressure reached a peak at the beginning of 

July, with the visits of the UN Secretary General, Kofi 

Annan and US Secretary of State Colin Powell. Both 

pressed the GoS for the disarmament of the Janjaweed. 

Annan obtained promises from the GoS that it would 

deploy more troops to stop militia violence. However, 

knowledge of previous complicity of Sudanese security 

forces in attacks and the bad faith demonstrated by the 

GoS up till now meant that this promise should not have 

raised any hopes. Indeed, further troops in the region was 

more acause for alarm. 

The US continued to force the issue into July. Following a 

month of disagreement ov er the measures that should be 

taken against Sudan, a UN resolution was passed. Whilst 

welcome, the 30 days’ grace given by UN Resolution 1556 

before sanctions would be imposed was generous to the 

GoS, considering it had spent the last three months 

violating the agreements it had made in the April ceasefire 

agreement, and reports from the new AU monitors 

confirmed that atrocities were continuing. Although there 

was w ill for stronger action among some members of the 

Security Council, most notably the United States, strong 

UN action was opposed, in particular by China, which has 

inv estments in Sudan’s oil industry worth $15 billion. Arab 

League opposition w as also significant, especially at a 

time when Western actions against Sudan could easily be 

75 Statements made by the UN and the US calling the situation in 

Darfur genocide. Sweden warns that Darfur faces possible genocide. 

76 UN Wire (2004) “ Sidelining of Factions Could Threaten Sudan 

Peace Ex perts Warn” , 

http://www.unwire.org/News/328_426_24350.asp [Accessed 16 


24

linked w ith the situation in Iraq and cast as an attack 

against the Arabworld. 

The initial lack of international support for Rwanda’s 

insistence that its troops w ould not stand by while civilians 

were being killed, and their insistence on a mandate which 

would allow them to interv ene if they saw atrocities taking 

place, represented a missed opportunity for the rest of the 

international community to support the AU in its efforts to 

improve security, although an expanded mandate has 

belatedly received UN endorsement. 77 

Following UN Resolution 1556 at the end of July, security 

became embedded in the dialogue betw een the 

international community and the GoS. When it came to 

policy, however, many in the international community were 

holding back. Following the passage of the UN Resolution, 

the international community appeared to sit waiting for the 

30-day deadline to pass, during which time there was 

disagreement over whether sanctions really should be 

imposed in the event of Sudan’s non-compliance. The UK 

said that it was unnecessary to increase the mandate of 

the AU force to peacekeeper status. Belgium called for the 

international community to adopt a neutral attitude instead 

of putting all the pressure on the GoS. In the meantime, 

AU monitors reported continuing attacks against v illages. 78 

Despite commitments of financial support from the 

international community, the AU protection force w as 

deployed late due to logistical and financial problems 

which continued once the force was deployed. What had 

become the ‘flagship’ of international action to increase 

security in Darfur was given faltering support when it 

needed it most. 

25 

‘The AU Protection 

Force…was given 

faltering support 

when it needed it 

most.’ 

During September a number of members of the 

international community declared that the situation in 

Darfur w as genocide. This should have led to a rethink in 

management of the crisis. It did not. Management 

continued as before. Jan Pronk’s report to the Security 

Council, and the reports of Juan Mendez and Louise 

77 See UN SC Resolution 1574. 

78 African Union Ceasefire Commission, Commission Ceasefire 

Report on the Attack in Nortig Village, 28 August 2004. Report 9 

September 2004. 


Arbour following their visit, made clear that security was 

not improving. An atmosphere of fear in displaced persons 

camps w as being increasingly reported, demonstrating that 

the AU forcewas wholly insufficient. 

The insufficient size of the AU force was addressed in UN 

Resolution 1564, which called for an ex panded AU force 

and mandate. Again there was considerable opposition to 

the attempts to impose threats of sanctions in this UN 

Resolution. Following the passage of the Resolution, a 

number of European states continued to take the view that 

Sudan was cooperating sufficiently for sanctions not to be 

imposed. 

Following the passage of Resolution 1564, the focus 

turned towards the AU and expanding the force. The UN 

Security Council secured an agreement from Sudan for an 

ex panded force andmandate, and substantial support was 

pledged for the expanded AU force. 

Because attacks on villages decreased in frequency 

tow ards the end of September and the beginning of 

October, some players in the international community 

made statements which assumed that the situation w as 

improving and inadvertently dumbed down its urgency. 

How ever, increased attacks later in the month showed the 

need for security was as great as ever. With increased 

attacks on aid conv oys, and the refusal of the SLA and 

JEM to sign humanitarian agreements before an 

agreement on security was reached, criticism of the rebels 

increased. Whilst valid, it was disproportionate to the 

condemnation afforded the GoS in relation to the offences 

committed by the two parties. 

In November the security situation deteriorated further, 

with raids on displaced persons camps, and one taking 

place the night after the 9 November signing of the Abuja 

Protocols by the GoS and the rebels. AU troops were 

present during the attack but did not interv ene; they judged 

they did not have the mandate to do so (despite the 

ex pansion of their mandate on 20 October to include 

protection of civilians), providing strong echoes of Rwanda 

in 1994. At this point, further AU troops had arrived as part 

of the ex panded AU force. However, their mandate w as 

unclear and like the first deployment, they were delayed for 

financial reasons. Once they arrived, they were hamstrung 

by a lack of v ehicles and supplies. Western countries had 

pledged much of the $221 million of financial support 

needed for the whole year. However, it is evident that 

pledges hav e either not been delivered with the necessary 

speed or not been backed up with the necessary technical 

and diplomatic support.

4.4 British policy 

Main pointsof British policy 

• Believes it can achieve more applying quiet behindthe-scenes 

pressure. 

• Assumes the good faith of Khartoum despite its past 

record. 

• Looks to Khartoum to be the peacemaker. 

• Has tended to capitulate to Khartoum’s protests. 

• Fails to recognise the racial element in the crisis in 

Darfur. 

• Takes a much stronger line with the rebels relativ e to 

their wrongdoings. 

• Careful to avoid placing blame for atrocities on 

Khartoum. 

March: Following a policy of quiet diplomacy. Engaged in 

facilitating negotiations between GoS, SLA and JEM. 

Aiming for a ceasefire, preferably with international 

monitoring, with a view to securing humanitarian access. 

Appealed to the parties to the conflict to ensure the 

protection of civilians. 

April: Continuing to press for a ceasefire. Rejected calls 

for a mandatory UN arms embargo on the grounds it w ould 

not make a difference in the necessary timeframe. 

May: Main concern is maintenance of the ceasefire. 

Towards that end is giving priority to the rapid deployment 

of the AU force. States that it w ill provide funds and 

persuade others to do the same. Does not consider a 

Chapter VII resolution necessary andw ill not support calls 

for military intervention or the threat of sanctions. 

Continues with a policy of ‘quiet diplomacy ’. 

June: States that Sudan bears the primary responsibility 

for security in Darfur. Supports the fast deployment of AU 

and human rights monitors. Considers putting forward a 

no-fly zone proposal to SC. Visit by Hilary Benn. Commits 

to contributing £2 million to AU mission. Regards the 

situation in Darfur as a conflict that has got out of hand. 

Ensuring the situation remains under review in the Security 

Council. 

July: Expresses support for the US in wishing to impose 

sanctions on Sudan. Considers troop deployment, 

although says it is not at the stage of deploying them yet. 

Presses the EU to provide further support to the AU 

mission. General Mike Jackson claims 5,000 troops 

av ailable if necessary to send to Darfur, but HMG says at 

the end of the month that it has no intention of sending 

troops. GoS having made commitments on security, will 


giv e it a short period of time to fulfil them. Otherwise 

pressure to be applied through the Security Council. 

August: States that it would support the enlargement of 

the AU protection force but not necessarily an increase in 

its mandate to peacekeeping status. Reiterates that it has 

no intention of deploying troops in Darfur but w ould 

support the AU military presence. States that it is the 

responsibility of the AU to prov ide troops. 

September: Calls for the UN to set Sudan clear 

benchmarks, alongwith a timeline, detailingwhat steps the 

GoS must now take towards meeting their responsibilities 

and resolving the conflict. If there is significant failure to 

meet these then sanctions should be imposed. Says 

Sudan is cooperating enough for there not to be a need to 

impose sanctions immediately. Still no decision on no-fly 

zones. 

October: Prime Minister Tony Blair visits Sudan and 

presses Presdient Al Bashir to end v iolence in Darfur. 

Reminds him that the threat of sanctions remains if Sudan 

fails to bring an end to the conflict. Blair demands the AU 

troop contingent be boosted, that the Government provide 

the locations of its troops in Darfur and pull them back in 

conjunction with a rebel w ithdrawal, commit to an ov erall 

peace agreement for Sudan by the end of 2004, and abide 

by signed UN humanitarian protocols. Pledges £20 million 

to AU force. States support for autonomy in Darfur. 

November: Becomes increasingly critical of the rebels. 

Introduces a draft resolution to the UN SC which focuses 

largely on the North-South peace agreement. Darfur is 

giv en a cursory mention with a tame warning to “take 

appropriate action against any party failing to fulfill its 

commitments”. By softening the language in Resolution 

1574, the threats contained in Resolutions 1556 and 1564 

that action under Article 41will at least be consideredwere 

undermined. The British government states its position on 

how it wants judicial proceedings to commence after the 

International Commission of Inquiry, saying the Sudanese 

Gov ernment should voluntarily accept the jurisdiction of 

the InternationalCriminalCourt. 

4.5 Political settlement and security 

Political settlement will always be harder to achieve if 

security for those under threat is not prov ided concurrently. 

The tw o rebel groups may not be angels, but they had a 

reasonable argument: civilians continued to bekilled and a 

no-fly zone could have been enforced in the first months of 

2004, had there been the will to do so. In such a climate 

of fear it has been predictably hard to keep the Sudan 

Liberation Army and the Justice and Equality Movement 

around the negotiating table, although they did sign a fresh 

26

agreement with the GoS on 9 November. 79 They 

repeatedly called for an international intervention to 

prov ide security. If they see no reasonable security effort 

from the international community, we cannot blame them if 

they take the matter into their ow n hands. The camps of 

Darfurian refugees that w e feed today will become 

recruiting grounds for the rebels. We should not ask 

ourselv es why. Our tardiness throughout 2004 has given a 

message to Darfur refugees that if they are concerned 

about theirsecurity, then they can only trust in themselves. 

27 

Summary 

With the current enforcement of the AU monitoring 

force, measures are now being taken to improv e 

security . But the attention giv en to security has 

increased much too late and implementation of 

security measures has been much too slow. In 

such instances the priority given to security needs 

to increase as the threat of genocide increases, so 

as to counter the genocidal threat. 


A no-fly zone should have been imposed at the 

beginning of 2004. Even though it is too late, a nofly 

zone should be imposed immediately by the 

UN, to be enforced by the AU w ith finance and 

resources from wealthy UN member states. 

The AU force should be ex panded ten fold and it’s 

mandate ex panded. 

79 The Abuja Protocols. 

Section 4: Security

SECTION 5 

Ending Impunity 80 

Justice is often perceiv ed as a post-conflict issue. 

Impunity, though, in a genocidal situation is a brother to 

insecurity; both tell the perpetrator that there is insufficient 

resolve or politicalwill to stop genocide. 

Indeed, Darfur is just one more instance in Sudan’s circle 

of v iolence and impunity. Perpetrators of previous 

atrocities in the Nuba mountains in 1992 and in the 

Western Upper Nile oil fields in the late 1990s have not 

been brought to justice and some of the leading figures 

who directed these events are now directing policy on 

Darfur. 81 

5.1 Who is in control? 

Hav ing returning from Darfur at the beginning of June 

2004, the UK Secretary of State for International 

Dev elopment, Hilary Benn said, "There is no doubt that the 

GoS bears the primary responsibility.” 82 He also said in 

answer to questions in Parliament that, “those who have 

committed these atrocities should be called to account for 

what they have done.” 83 

Mr Benn’s gut reaction and passion 

for action against the GoS clearly 

was not shared by everyone in Her 

Majesty ’s Government. Since June 

of 2004, the FCO has been careful to 

place blame for the atrocities on the 

Janjaweed militia, not the GoS. 

Neither has any UN resolution stated the responsibility of 

the GoS for the atrocities. 

Some, arguing in favour of Khartoum, conclude that the 

ev ents in Darfur are out of the control of the GoS – ev en 

though the crimes areso highly organized and systematic. 

80 This chapter is an adaptation of an article published in the Aegis 

Review on Genocide (Summer/Autumn 2004). 

81 Justice Africa,“Briefing June-July 2004” , 

http://www.justiceafrica.org/July04.htm [Accessed 23 October 2004]. 

82 Briefing at the House of Commons, 18 June 2004, at which Aegis 

was present. 

83 Answer to a question in Parliament from Rev. Martin Smyth MP 

(UUP), Hansard, 9 June 2004, Column 283. 

‘Impunity…in a 

genocidal situation 

is brother to 

insecurity.’ 

In a failed state, it is possible that order is lost at a v ery 

high level – at such a high level that individuals have 

enough power to control certain events or territories. 

How ever, this is not a reason to allow impunity. On the 

contrary, control is lost, in part, because people do not fear 

accountability . In such a case, impunity contributes to the 

anarchy of a failed state, which allows crimes against 

humanity and genocidal acts to occur. 

How ever, in most countries, the use of the air force to 

support crimes against humanity would indicate 

Gov ernment culpability. The intervention of the Vice 

President, Ali Osman Taha, in the release of Janjaweed 

leader Musa Hilal to lead the Janjaweed points to 

Gov ernment culpability at the highest level. Musa Hilal had 

prev iously been imprisoned for mass killings. 84 

So, whether it is genocide organized by central 

Gov ernment or powerful individuals w ithin the governing 

structure in Khartoum, a referral to the ICC would help to 

bring future stability. The prosecutor’s office of the ICC 

would not be interested in accusing or indicting the GoS. It 

is interested in the individuals responsible for these crimes 

– whether they represent the Government or not. 

5.2 Countering the genocidal threat 

with judicial process 

Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said on 7 September “We 

want an end to that climate of impunity and we therefore 

support proper international investigation of all the 

ev idence about w hat international 

crimes have been committed…and 

by whom.” 85 

Already, report after report from 

within the UN, the US State 

department and numerous human 

rights groups found the GoS culpable 

for these crimes. These led US 

Secretary of State Colin Powell to re-state on 9 September 

2004, “We concluded that genocide has beencommitted in 

Darfur and that the GoS and the Jingaw eit bear 

responsibility – and genocide may still be occurring." 86 

Documentation is the first step in bringing about 

accountability . The efforts of the US State Department, 

84 Wax , E. (2004). “ Janjaweed Leaders Describe Campaign against 

Africans as Self-Defence” , Washington Post, 18 July 2004. 

85 Hansard, 7 September 2004, Column 619. 

86 United States State Department (2004), “ The Crisis in Darfur” , 

http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/36042.htm [Accessed 16 

November]. 

28

Centre for International Justice, International Crisis Group, 

Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International in 

amassing evidence are important, but many, especially in 

the Arab world, still do not accept that Khartoum is 

responsible for these crimes. The International 

Commission of Inquiry, proposed in the 18 September UN 

Resolution, will be helpful to establish more universal 

acceptance of responsibility. 

But a library of reports w ill not end impunity if there is no 

resolve for it to lead somewhere. In the past international 

inquiries have led to the formation of ad hoc tribunals and 

as John Prendergast pointed out, ‘that won’t be lost on the 

Khartoum Government.’ 87 It is disappointing that in 2004 

the best w e can do is collect ev idence in the hope that a 

tribunal could be formed to try the perpetrators, or that the 

Gov ernment in Sudan will reform enough to hold its own 

trials. The US refusal to support the ICC is not helpful in 

ending impunity. The British Government contributes to 

11% of the annual running costs of the ICC and it was to 

end impunity in situations such as Darfur that this 

international institution w as created. Upholding 

international law at an early stage in this genocidal process 

by referring the situation in Darfur to the ICC would have 

been a strong signal to future perpetrators that they would 

be swiftly brought to account, not merely provided a hope 

that they may be punished y ears later. So far, the 

perpetrators are not trembling in fear of justice. 

Because Sudan has not signed the Rome Statute of the 

International Criminal Court, the situation in Darfur can 

only be referred to the ICC by the Security Council. But 

three of the five permanent members of the Security 

Council have not ratified the Rome Statute either: China 

and Russia, who both have investments in Sudan, and the 

US, which opposes the court in principle. Britain and 

France have ratified the Statute but are unlikely to push 

the issue if it will be vetoed at the Council. Nor were other 

non-permanent members of the Security Council, including 

Pakistan and Algeria, enthusiastic about referring the 

situation in Darfur to the ICC. 

87 Speaking at International Crisis Group meeting, London, October 

2004. 

29 

‘A library of 

reports will not end 

impunity if there is 

no resolve for it to 

lead somewhere.’ 

Section 5: Ending Impunity 

So it seems that the rest of the w orld went to great 

ex pense and effort to establish the ICC, precisely to deter 

crimes such as those being committed in Sudan, yet the 

nations that sit on the Security Council emasculate the 

concept of the court. That has not been lost on Khartoum 

either. 

It is preferable that prosecution happens within the country 

where the crimes were committed – that w as the key 

lesson from the InternationalCriminalTribunal for Rwanda, 

which, being based in Arusha, is somewhat disconnected 

from the people of Rwanda. But in Rwanda, the 

Gov ernment lacked capacity, not will, to try perpetrators of 

genocide. Capacity could have been built. In Sudan, if 

gov ernment structures are so broken down, they are 

unlikely to be able to bring justice themselves without a 

great deal of support. If structures are not broken down, 

they w on’t put themselves on trial. Either way, this is the 

purpose of having a permanent internationalcriminalcourt. 

Another strong argument in fav our of bringing those 

responsible to account is that in the future we can be less 

concerned about w ho is in power in Sudan. Whether it 

becomes a federal or an Islamist state, all leaders will 

understand that if they commit crimes against humanity, 

they w ill be brought to account. The Sudanese peoplecan 

determine their ow n future, knowing that their leaders will 

be less inclined to support racist and genocidal ideas than 

they hav e been in the past. Justice, then, contributes to 

future stability and helps to negate scary discussions about 

regime change and powervacuums. 

During his visit to Sudan in August, Jack Straw 

encouraged the GoS to bring Arab militias to justice. UN 

Security Council Resolution 1556 called for the GoS to 

‘bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates 

who have incited and carried out human rights and 

international humanitarian law violations and other 

atrocities’. However, it is naïve to ex pect a Government 

driv en by a genocidal ideology to deliver justice for its 

victims. Asking the GoS to ‘rein in’ those responsible must 

hav e given the Janjaweed perpetrators great comfort; 

those who armed them, trained them and gav e them aerial 

support could hardly be expected to get tough with them 

now. Little surprise that Jan Pronk’s September report 

concluded that therewas ‘no progress in ending impunity’. 

If there is broad consensus that individuals within the GoS 

bear responsibility for mass murder, why is there not an 

unequivocal message that they will be brought to account? 

Chris Mullin, British Foreign Office Minister for Africa, 

ex plained on 14 September 2004: “I agreewith the need to 

end impunity, but w e also have to keep at least a minimal

cooperation of the GoS.” 88 In other words, the GoS has 

the UN over a barrel. Because the world does not have 

the moral strength to end impunity or protect the 

vulnerable, we hav e to rely on probable sponsors of 

genocide to prov ide security. 

The people responsible should be named – the likes of 

Colonel Ahmed M. Haroon. He was responsible for many 

massacres in the Nuba mountains during the 1990s. He 

was not brought to justice and today conducts atrocities 

again - this time in Darfur. 

The Nation State makes up the w orld order we have, but 

despite progress in recent y ears and the desire to take 

prev ention seriously, the Darfur crisis shows what an 

imperfect system it is. Lack of resolve to live up to moral 

and political obligations, or to uphold international law, 

means that in Leo Kuper’s words, states still have the 

“sovereign right to commit genocide”. 89 

88 In a letter to Dr James Smith, CEO Aegis Trust, dated 14 

September 2004. 

89 Kuper, L (1980) Genocide, New Haven: CT: Yale University Press, 

p. 119. 

‘States still have the 

sovereign right to 

commit genocide.’ 

Summary 

Section 5: Ending Impunity 

Impunity in a genocidal situation is a brother to 

insecurity . Upholding international law at an early 

stage in the genocidal process may deter the 

perpetrators. Reporting and inv estigations are 

important but do not end impunity on their ow n. 

They must lead to a judicial process. Leav ing this to 

the GoS is not ending impunity in Darfur. 

Perpetrators must be faced w ith a credible 

mechanism by w hich their actions could lead to a 

conv iction in a court of law w hether that be through 

the ICC, an ad hoc tribunal or another alternativ e 

solution. 

Recommendations 

The UK Gov ernment should make clear that it has 

resolv e to promote justice, both broadly for the 

people of Darfur by supporting long term equality 

and political empowerment. 

Also specifically by upholding international law in 

bringing perpetrators to account. This intension 

should hav e been stated from the outset. 

When the International Commission of Inquiry 

publishes its findings, the UK Gov ernment should 

be prepared to robustly support it at the Security 

Council. Following the embroilment in Iraq, this will 

not be so easy, but it represents an opportunity to 

support the UN instruments to prev ent genocide. 

There should be a referral of the Darfur situation by 

the UN Security Council to the Prosecutor’s Office 

of the International Criminal Court. 

It is understood that this w ill be difficult, giv en the 

opposition of the US and other states. If other states 

v eto a referral, doing nothing to bring justice must 

not be an option. While large tribunals distant from 

the country w here crimes w ere committed may not 

be the most effectiv e method, other alternativ es 

should be pursued. 

30

SECTION 6 

Darfur: Key to Sudan’s Long 

Term Stability 

It is argued by the British Government and many 

commentators that w e must tread softly around the 

Gov ernment of Sudan over Darfur in order to protect the 

North-South peace deal. While this is understandable 

giv en the investment to make it w ork, in the long term, 

failing to robustly address the problems in Western Sudan 

will also cause theNorth-South axis to unravel. 

In six years a referendum will take place to determine 

whether the Southwill become autonomous. Such an 

31 

outcome w ill be unacceptable to Khartoum. It w ill be 

characteristic for them to promote division in the SPLA and 

create havoc and violence in the South using proxy militia, 

especially as there will now be less recruits for the 

Sudanese army from the West. 

Currently the consensus in Darfur is that it should remain 

part of Sudan. If there is not significant development, 

benefiting all groups and if there is no political 

empowerment in Darfur, this consensus may change over 

the nex t few years. Calls for self-determination in Darfur 

near the time of the referendum in the South will cause the 

fragmentation of Sudan. A serious proposal for a 

federalised Sudan may reduce the drive for autonomy in 

Darfur. This would stabilise the West at a time when the 

North-South relationship is at its mostv ulnerable. 

A self-determination movement in Darfur will again 

encourage the South to split from Khartoum. Conversely, a 

stable, developing Darfur with equality and political 

empowerment may prove to the South that it is possible to 

work with Khartoum. 


Darfur then, rather than unravelling the North South 

ax is, may be thekey to Sudan’s future stability . A 

window of opportunity ex ists at this point in time for 

the international community tovigorously pursue this 

long term solution for all of Sudan while resolv ing 

the current crisis in the West.

CONCLUSION 

Insecurity for those under threat of genocide and 

impunity for international crimes is a combination that 

allows Gov ernments to get aw ay w ith murder. The 

ex istence of an ex clusionary ideology indicates a 

genocidal threat. When such a threat is recognised, 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

1. When an exclusionary ideology ex ists and 

civ ilians are being systematically targeted during a 

conflict, the situation should be described as 

genocidal regardless of whether a consensus is 

reached about w hether it is genocide or not. 

2. Exclusionary ideology must be taken into account 

in the risk assessment of a crisis, as described by 

Barbara Harff. It is an important distinction betw een 

the objectiv es of the Janjaweed / Gov ernment of 

Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army / Justice and 

Equality Mov ement. 

3. The systematic targeting of civilians 

demonstrates the genocidal characteristics of this 

crisis. This should alter the management of the 

crisis in relation to security and ending impunity . 

4. A no-fly zone should have been imposed at the 

beginning of 2004. This should be imposed now, 

ev en though it is v ery late. 

5. The AU force should be expanded ten fold and 

it’s mandate ex panded. 

6. The UK Gov ernment should make clear that it 

has resolv e to promote justice. Broadly for the 

people of Darfur by supporting long term equality 

and political empowerment. 

Conclusion & Recommendations 

addressing this duo must become more central to the 

management of the crisis. Both hav e been insufficiently 

prioritised in managing the crisis in Darfur; this has 

impeded efforts to prev ent genocide. 

Specifically international law can be upheld by 

bringing perpetrators to account. This intention 

should hav e been stated from the outset. 

7. When the International Commission of Inquiry 

publishes it’s findings, the UK Gov ernment should 

be prepared to robustly support it at the Security 

Council. Following the Iraq war, this will not be so 

easy , but it represents an opportunity to support the 

UN instruments to prevent genocide. 

8. There should be a referral of the Darfur situation 

by the UN Security Council to the Prosecutor’s 

Office of the International Criminal Court. 

It is understood that this w ill be difficult, giv en the 

opposition of the US and other states to the ICC. If 

other states v eto a referral, doing nothing to bring 

justice must not be an option. While large tribunals 

distant from the country w here crimes w ere 

committed may not be the most effectiv e method, 

other alternativ es should be pursued. 

9. Long term, a comprehensive plan should be 

agreed to rev erse the underlying causes of the 

crisis, namely the inequality and marginalisation 

w ithin Darfur. A significant dev elopment package is 

required that benefits all groups equally. 

10. Political empow erment through a federal system 

in Sudan may prevent a mov ement tow ards 

autonomy in the West w hich would lead to greater 

conflict and the fragmentation of Sudan in the 

future. 

32

APPENDICES 

33 

Appendix A 

Appendix A: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 

Genocide 

The Contracting Parties, having considered the declaration made by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its 

resolution 96 (I) dated 11 December 1946 that genocide is a crime under international law, contrary to the spirit and aims of 

the United Nations and condemned by the civilized world, 

Recognizing that at all periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity, and 

Being convinced that, in order to liberate mankind from such an odious scourge, international co-operation is required, 

Hereby agree ashereinafter provided: 

Article I: The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in ti me of peace or in time of war, is a crime 

under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish. 

Article II: In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 

part, a national, ethnical, racial or religiousgroup, as such: 

(a) Killing members of the group; 

(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to me mbers of the group; 

(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; 

(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 

(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 

Article III: The following acts shall be punishable: 

(a) Genocide; 

(b) Conspiracy to commit genocide; 

(c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; 

(d) Attempt to commit genocide; 

(e) Complicity in genocide. 

Article IV: Persons committing genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be punished, whether they are 

constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals. 

Article V: The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary 

legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for 

persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III. 

Article VI: Persons charged with genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III shall be tried by a competent 

tribunal of the State in the territory of which the act was committed, or by such international penal tribunal as may have 

jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties which shall have accepted its jurisdiction. 

Article VII: Genocide and the other acts enumerated in article III shall not be considered as political crimes for the purpose of 

extradition. 

The Contracting Parties pledge themselves in such cases to grant extradition in accordance with their laws and treaties in 

force. 

Article VIII: Any Contracting Party may call upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under the 

Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of 

the other acts enumerated in article III.

Appendix A 

Article IX: Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present 

Convention, including those relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in 

article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute. 

Article X: The present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, 

shall bear the date of 9 December 1948. 

Article XI: The present Convention shall be open until 31 December 1949 for signature on behalf of any Member of the United 

Nations and of any non-member State to which an invitation to sign has been addressed by the General Assembly. 

The present Convention shall be ratified, and the instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of 

the United Nations. 

After 1 January 1950, the present Convention may be acceded to on behalf of any Member of the United Nations and of any 

non-member State which has received an invitation as aforesaid. Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the 

Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

Article XII: Any Contracting Party may at any time, by notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, 

extend the application of the present Convention to all or any of the territories for the conduct of whose foreign relations that 

Contracting Party is responsible. 

Article XIII: On the day when the first twenty instruments of ratification or accession have been deposited, the Secretary- 

General shall draw up a proces-verbal and transmit a copy thereof to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the 

non-member States contemplated in article XI. 

The present Convention shall come into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the twentieth instrument of 

ratification or accession. 

Any ratification or accession effected subsequent to the latter date shall become effective on the ninetieth day following the 

deposit of the instrument of ratification or accession. 

Article XIV: The present Convention shall remain in effect for a period of ten years as from the date of its coming into force. 

It shall thereafter remain in force for successive periods of five years for such Contracting Parties as have not denounced it at 

least six months before the expiration of the current period. 

Denunciation shall be effected by a written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

Article XV: If, as a result of denunciations, the number of Parties to the present Convention should become less than sixteen, 

the Convention shall cease to be in force as from the date on which the last of these denunciations shall become effective. 

Article XVI: A request for the revision of the present Convention may be made at any time by any Contracting Party by means 

of a notification in writing addressed to the Secretary-General. 

The General Assembly shall decide upon the steps, if any, to be taken in respect of such request. 

Article XVII: The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall notify all Members of the United Nations and the non-member 

States contemplated in article XI of the following: 

(a) Signatures, ratifications and accessions received in accordance with article XI; 

(b) Notifications received in accordance with article XII; 

(c) The date upon which the present Convention comes into force in accordance with article XIII; 

(d) Denunciations received in accordance with article XIV; 

(e) The abrogation of the Convention in accordance with article XV; 

(f) Notifications received in accordance with article XVI. 

Article XVIII: The original of the present Convention shall be deposited in the archives of the United Nations. 

A certified copy of the Convention shall be transmitted to each Member of the United Nations and to each of the non-member 

States contemplated in article XI. 

34

35 

Appendix A 

Article XIX: The present Convention shall be registered by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the date of its 

coming into force.

Appendix B 

Appendix B: Definitions of the Actions Constituting Crimes Against Humanity 

For the purpose of paragraph 1: 

(a) “ Attack directed against any civilian population” means a course of conduct involving the multiple commission of acts 

referred to in paragraph 1 against any civilian population, pursuant to or in furtherance of a State or organizational policy to 

commit such attack; 

(b) “ Extermination” includes the intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access to food and 

medicine, calculated to bring about the destruction of part of a population; 

(c) “ Enslavement” means the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over a person and 

includes the exercise of such power in the course of trafficking in persons, in particular women and children; 

(d) “ Deportation or forcible transfer of population” means forced displacement of the persons concerned by expulsion or 

other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully present, without grounds permitted under international law; 

(e) “ Torture” means the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the 

custody or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in 

or incidental to, lawful sanctions; 

(f) “ Forced pregnancy” means the unlawful confinement of a woman forcibly made pregnant, with the intent of affecting the 

ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law. This definition shall not in any 

way be interpreted as affecting national laws relating to pregnancy; 

(g) “ Persecution” means the intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason 

of the identity of the group or collectivity; 

(h) “ The crime of apartheid” means inhumane acts of a character similar to those referred to in paragraph 1, committed in 

the context of an institutionalized regime of systematic oppression and domination by one racial group over any other racial 

group or groups and committed with the intention of maintaining that regime; 

(i) “ Enforced disappearance of persons” means the arrest, detention or abduction of persons by, or with the authorization, 

support or acquiescence of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of 

freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the 

protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. 

Source: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 7, http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm. 

36

Appendix C: Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum 2004 

This was signed in 2004 by 55 nations, including the United Kingdom 

37 

Appendix C 

The Holocaust, as reaffirmed by the Stockholm International Forum Declaration of January 2000, challenged the foundations 

of human civilization. Recalling our responsibility to fight the evils of genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism, 

islamophobia and xenophobia, we, the participants of the Stockholm International Forum 2004: Preventing Genocide: Threats 

and Responsibilities, conscious of our obligations and responsibilities under international law including human rights and 

international humanitarian law, deeply concerned with the repeated occurrence of genocide, mass murder and ethnic 

cleansing in recent history as well as with the widespread occurrence of impunity for such crimes, are committed to doing our 

utmost for the prevention of these scourges in order to build a more secure future for us all. 

To this end we declare that: 

1. We are committed to using and developing practical tools and mechanisms to identify as early as possible and to monitor 

and report genocidal threats to human life and society in order to prevent the recurrence of genocide, mass murder and ethnic 

cleansing. 

2. We are committed to shouldering our responsibility to protect groups identified as potential victims of genocide, mass 

murder or ethnic cleansing, drawing upon the range of tools at our disposal to prevent such atrocities in accordance with 

international law and fully upholding the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 

3. We are committed to ensuring that perpetrators of genocidal acts are brought to justice. We are also committed to 

supporting survivors of genocide to rebuild their communities and to return to normal life. 

4. We are committed to supporting research into the possibilities of preventing genocide, mass murder and ethnic cleansing. 

5. We are committed to educating the youth and the wider public against genocidal dangers of all kinds through formal and 

informal educational structures. We are also committed to disseminating knowledge of these dangers to those involved in 

government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, humanitarian and peace support operations and the 

media. 

6. We are committed to exploring, seriously and actively, the options presented at the Forum for action against genocidal 

threats, mass murders, deadly conflicts, ethnic cleansing as well as genocidal ideologies and incitement to genocide, including 

the concrete proposals presented by the United Nations Secretary-General. 

7. We are committed to cooperating in our search for effective measures against genocidal dangers with all members of the 

family of nations, in the United Nations and other relevant global and regional organizations as well as with non-governmental 

organizations, labour organizations, the media and with business and academic communities.

Appendix D 

Appendix D: October 1987 letter to Sadiq Al Mahdi - Sudanese Prime Minister 

1986-89 (Translated from Arabic) 

[Source: Darfur Centrefor Human Rights andDevelopment] 

Mr Pri me Minister 

The Sudanese ethnic group currently known as the Arab tribes of Darfur entered Sudan in the 15 th Century. This ethnic group 

though divided into a number of tribes is in reality of one and the same origin. The said tribes settled in two areas of Darfur. 

The first area is situated in South Darfur Province and comprises 80% of the province area. The second area is situated in the 

North, South, West and East of North Darfur Province and comprises 55% of the area of the Province; the Arab tribes 

represent more than 70% of the total of Darfur’s population. 

Since their settlement in Sudan and throughout the centuries, the Arab tribes have played a predominant role in shaping the 

identity and character of Darfur. The Arabs in this part of the homeland are the makers of civilisation whether in the sphere of 

government, religion or language. The Arabs have played an important part in the evolution of Sudan as it is known today. 

They were part and parcel of the Mahdia Revolt and they fought in defence of Sudan to the finish. 

They have participated in the economic development, political stability and social progress not only of Darfur but the whole of 

Sudan. For all this we would like to emphasise our relentless adherence to the unity of the Country and that we totally reject all 

acts that lead to disunity and friction. 

Mr Pri me Minister, students of the systems of government in the World come up with a number of definitions of regional 

government. However, these definitions indicate that in order to achieve regional government it is important to move from 

centralisation to decentralisation with the aim of effecting economic political and administrative reforms in the state structure. 

Regional government further means that the administration of each region should be placed in the hands of the sons of that 

region. 

If the above is a true understanding of regional government then we Arabs feel that we are deprived of true representation in 

the leadership of Darfur region and that we have become a majority without weight and subjects, not citizens. 

The following facts should be taken into consideration: 

1. The Arabs represent 70% of the population of Darfur region. 

2. The educated Arabs represent 40% of all educated Darfurians of whom thousands are university graduates and hundreds 

are MA and PhD holders in all specialities. 

3. The participation of Darfur Arabs is not less than 15% of the Sudan GDP. 

4. The Arabs contribute about 90% of total government revenue in Darfur. 

5. The Arabs are over represented in the army and sacrificed their sons to defend the country. 

6. The Arabs had 14 MPs in Parliament in Khartoum. 

Mr Pri me Minister, the above goes to reveal the political, economic and social predominance of the Arab tribes in Darfur. 

Consequentially we request to be represented by 50% of all government constitutional posts in the region and a similar 

percentage of Central Government posts. 

Mr Pri me Minister, should negligence of the Arab race continue and should the Arabsnot be allowed their fair share in 

government, we are afraid that things may get out of the hands of wise people and revert to the ignorant people and mob. 

Then a catastrophe, with dire consequence, may take place. 

In conclusion, we would like to confirm our faith in the Country’sunity. All that we are asking for is justice and equality. Long 

live Sudan under the banners of freedom and democracy. 

Signed by the Committee of the Arab Gathering (23 Arab tribal leaders) 

38

39 

Appendix E 

Appendix E: List Compiled by the Son of the last Sultan of Darfur of Villages 

Evacuated by Force between 2000 and 2002 

[Source: Darfur Centrefor Human Rights andDevelopment] 

In the Name of God the Benevolent the Compassionate 

The Permanent Committee for the follow up of the decisions and recommendations of the Fur Conference held at the town of 

Nartiti 

List of Fur Villages evacuated by Force (Plunder, Murder, Torching) 

A – District of Kas 

Number Name of Village 

1 Mosa Tikaj 

2 Dima Talay 

3 Kargo 

4 Norma 

5 Tibi East 

6 Saly 

7 Kalo 

8 Tawaraga 

9 Ada 

10 Bronga 

11 Krokoli 

12 Amar Jadid 

13 Arenga 

14 Toply 

15 Kamjako 

16 Arabia 

17 Marmouh 

18 Sino 

19 Balaj 

20 Rimalia Vidi 

21 Aradeba Shimal 

22 Gadaria 

23 Targobah 

24 Dandora 

25 Taudi 

26 Nama Kargoli 

27 Om SuoKa 

28 Saw Saw 

29 Galdi Baro 

30 Za Ja Jo 

31 Samila 

32 Sal Donga 

33 Kagia Aniee 

34 Goz Himid 

35 Wasa 

36 Fu Lo Lo 

37 Far Fara 

38 Miraia

B – Jebel Mara District 

Number Name of Village Administration Local Government 

1 Furo Mori Nertiti 

2 Trong Tawra Mori Nertiti 

3 Kibi Korti Kibi Nertiti 

4 Kibi Kosti Kibi Nertiti 

5 Kibi Rauga Leweng Nertiti 

6 Kibi Bala Kibi Nertiti 

7 Kibi Gadormo Kibi Nertiti 

8 Kibi El Omda Kibi Nertiti 

9 Kibi Solongo Kibi Nertiti 

10 Madl Basi Kibi Nertiti 

11 Hilat El Ansari Kibi Nertiti 

12 Hilat El Fabi Muktar Kibi Nertiti 

13 Hilat Arkis Kibi Nertiti 

14 Hilat Malgo Hila Kibi Nertiti 

15 Hilat Miti Kibi Nertiti 

16 Hilat Jalala Kibi Nertiti 

17 Hilat Kringa Leweng Nertiti 

18 Gariat Zoga Leweng Nertiti 

19 Katla Laban Am Haraz Karani Jaldo 

20 Katla Hilat Musa Am Haraz Karani Jaldo 

21 Suna Suna Am Haraz Karani Jaldo 

22 Daba Nayra Am Haraz Karani Jaldo 

23 Modo Am Haraz Karani Jaldo 

C – Kabkabia District 


1 New Khartoum 

(Khartoum Jadid) 

2 Hilat Salih 

3 Hilat Ahdel Razig 

4 Hilat Lo 

5 Hilat Rabinga 

6 Amar Jadid 

7 Hilat Saw 

8 Saga 

9 Hilat Waskro 

10 Horab 

11 Shoba 

12 Milo 

13 Teronga 

14 Bla Zorash 

15 Bara Kolongo 

16 Hilat Zata 

17 Tora 

18 Badatki 

19 Dili 

20 To Lombisa 

21 Maroda 

22 Hilat Korou 

23 Vagat Dalo 

24 Milo Hilat A Jooz 

Appendix E 

40

41 

Niyla District 


1 Kora 

2 Magogi 

3 Koro Koli 

4 Hilat Hussein Zahl 

5 Hilat Mansour 

6 Hilat Mohamed Nar 

7 Binilo 

8 Kol Maug 

9 Gasg Ano 

10 Zar Jani 

11 Dari Kwa 

12 Hilat Yousif 

13 Topli 

14 Kadingo 

15 Gambring 

16 Hilat Kaldi 

17 Zarig Siwa 

18 Tamra 

19 A Ji 

20 Zango 

21 Hilat Al Zabi Adam 

Dodo 

22 Morla 

23 Dibaira 

24 Hilat Toujor (Two 

villages) 

25 Hilat Zagawa 

26 Nagaro 

27 Hilat Taw 

28 Allah Gi Ja 

29 Muri 

30 Angaraiba 

31 ??? 

32 Jaune Adar 

33 Adar Sori 

34 Kaskor Hilat Shiek 

Adam 

35 Tangalania 

36 Tika 

37 Hishaba 

38 Hilat Zaki Salih 

39 Dlongar 

40 Songa 

41 Lorenj Midl 

Appendix E

Zaling District 

Number Name of Village Administration Local Government 

1 Saraf Toubora Aribo Aribo 

2 Lo Aribo Aribo 

3 Mirli Aribo Aribo 

4 Toro Torkolmi Kotia Aribo 

5 Sorai Torkolmi Kotia Aribo 

6 Bisiri Torkolmi Kotia Aribo 

7 Kolmi Torkolmi Kotia Aribo 

8 Kargo Torkolmi Kotia Aribo 

9 Tin Daco Diri Dama 

10 Ksin Diri Dama 

11 Bijigi Diri Dama 

12 Sarti Diri Dama 

13 Diki Dor Dama 

14 Abu Diki Gali Topola 

15 Tarniga Gali Dar Karni 

16 Bringa Miri Dar Karni 

17 Hafra Miri Dar Karni 

18 Joai Miri Dar Karni 

19 Salo Miri Dar Karni 

20 Brokoi Ebta Dar Karni 

21 Siribia Gali Dar Karni 

Appendix E 

42

43 

Wadi Salih District 


1 Tor 

2 Bojo 

3 Kargoso 

4 Shagil Tobaia 

5 Taba 

6 Daba Goraba 

7 Firking 

8 Sigla Kara 

9 Lola 

10 Kasalo 

11 Daba Jamoos 

12 Zayinja 

13 Hajar Bida 

14 Bahrko 

15 Tilni 

16 Zalmo 

17 Krofua 

18 Ramkaia 

19 Hilo Mori 

20 Zomtara 

21 Bikiso 

22 Minla 

23 Dili Kabar 

24 Kato Gora 

25 Basi 

26 Jaldo Bia 

27 Ari Hilat Alomdah 

28 Hilat Hasano 

29 Shalal 

30 Tiré 

31 Yara 

32 Tishom 

33 Atoh 

34 Tango 

35 Alé 

36 Norgi 

37 Kabalo 

38 Tirmo 

39 Taradona 

40 Kajo 

41 Dirgia 

42 Kling 

Appendix E

Appendix F 

Appendix F: Chronological list of attacks on the Fur villages in Darfur, Western 

Sudan – from 15 July 2000 to 28 April 2002 

[Source: Darfur Centre for Human Rightsand Development] 

These attacks werecarried out by rebelJanjaweed. 

The following report was handed to President Al Bashir on 1May 2002 by the representativ es of the Fur in the Sudan 

National Assembly. 

S.N Date Village District Dead Injured Property Remark 

Area persons 

lost 

1 15/7/2000 Butke Kabkabiya 4 0 0 

2 Golo Jabal Marra 3 0 0 

3 Waranga Jabal Marra 3 0 

4 Nertete Jabal Marra 4 0 0 

5 15/9/2000 Bari 

Kulungo 

Kabkabiya 4 3 449 Cattle 

6 15/9/2000 Barei Dulue Kabkabiya 0 0 0 

7 15/9/2000 Elle Fatta Kabkabiya 0 0 139 Cattle 

8 15/9/2000 Maruda Kabkabiya 0 0 0 

9 15/9/2000 Mailo Kabkabiya 0 0 600 Cattle 

10 10/10/2000 Aali Kabkabiya 0 0 0 

11 13/10/2000 Kabkabiya 

Rural 

Kabkabiya 1 17 0 

12 18/10/2000 Sonasona Jabal Marra 13 0 0 

13 18/10/2000 Kutulo Jabal Marra 0 0 0 

14 19/10/2000 Maruda Kabkabiya 18 0 0 

15 22/10/2000 Sonasona Jabal Marra 8 0 2 Government 

Nertete & 

vehicles are 

Rutrut 

confiscated 

16 1/11/2000 Barei Dulue Kabkabiya 1 2 0 

17 1/11/2000 Fugo Dikkó Kabkabiya 1 0 30/20 Cattle, goats 

respectively 

18 1/11/2000 Tilimbisa Kabkabiya 1 0 Looting and 

village burning 

19 1/11/2000 Elle Fatta Kabkabiya 1 0 Looting and 


20 1/11/2000 Mailo Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting and 


21 1/11/2000 Maruda Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting and 


22 1/11/2000 Bari Kabkabiya 3 0 45/50/1 Looting goats, 

Kulungo 

cattle, horse and 

burning grain 

mill 

23 20/11/2000 Saga Jellei Jabal Marra 3 0 Looting and 


24 22/11/2000 Waskiro Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting and 


25 23/11/2000 Maruda Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting and 


26 25/11/2000 Shawa Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting and 


44

45 

Appendix F 

27 26/11/2000 Shoba Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting and village 

burning 

28 13/12/2000 Tulgu Kabkabiya 0 0 Cattle looting 

29 13/12/2000 Muallaga Kabkabiya 3 0 Vehicle 

confiscation 

30 13/12/2000 Juldu Jabal Marra 0 5 Cattle looting 

31 13/12/2000 Birka Saira Kabkabiya 2 0 Cattle looting 

32 13/12/2000 Juldu Jabal Marra 3 0 [near] Vehicle 

confiscation 

33 13/12/2000 Gurni Jabal Marra 2 0 Cattle looting 

34 2/1/2001 Jellei Jabal Marra 0 0 Cattle looting 

35 4/1/2001 Nertete Jabal Marra 1 0 Cattle looting 

36 6/1/2001 Nertete- Jabal Marra 0 0 1131 Cattle looting 

Gurni 

37 Mailo Kabkabiya 0 0 Cattle looting 

38 12/1/2001 Nertete Jabal Marra 1 0 Looting and 

intimidation 

39 12/1/2001 Waskiro Jabal Marra 0 0 Intimidation 

40 18/1/2001 Sulo Zalingei 3 0 Looting and village 

burning 

41 5/2/2001 Kujo Jabal Marra 3 0 40 Truck, property 

stolen, women 

raped 

42 9/2/2001 Nertete Jabal Marra 0 0 0 Intimidation 

43 11/2/2001 Tawila Al Fashir 10 18 

44 12/2/2001 Mara Zalingei 0 0 150 Cattle looting 

45 14/2/2001 Nertete Jabal Marra 2 0 0 

46 17/2/2001 Murtajello Jabal Marra 1 0 0 

47 17/2/2001 Morrai 

Jengei 

Kass 0 0 0 

48 25/2/2001 Rutrut & Jabal Marra 2 0 1 Vehicle 

Juldu 

49 5-8/3/2001 Nertete Jabal Marra 4 0 1 Vehicle and 

looting [villages] 

50 16/3/2001 Goz Mitti Jabal Marra 26 0 6 Vehicles, dead 

bodies distorted 

51 17/3/2001 Nertete Jabal Marra 15 0 

52 18/3/2001 Arwalla Salei 1 0 0 

53 18/3/2001 Gurni Jabal Marra 5 0 

54 19/3/2001 Khawat 

Kebe 

Jabal Marra 6 0 0 

55 26/3/2001 Murta Jello Jabal Marra 5 0 Confiscated 

vehicles 

56 Nertete- Jabal Marra Jabal Marra 0 0 0 

road 

57 29/3/2001 Jurab Kabkaiya 1 0 0 

58 1/4/2001 Saga Jabal Marra 3 0 0 Looting burning 

59 2/4/2001 Nama Kass 2 0 1 Looting, burning, 

confiscated vehicle 

60 2/4/2001 Shoba Kabkaiya 13 0 0 Looting, burning 

61 7/4/2001 Abu Jidad Kabkaiya 15 0 Looting, burning 

62 10/4/2001 Nama Kass 2 0 Looting, burning 

63 10/4/2001 Gurni Jabal Marra 4 0 Looting, burning, 2 

women abducted 

64 10/4/2001 Kujo Market Jabal Marra 1 0 Looting, burning

Appendix F 

65 10/4/2001 Kabkabiya 

South 

Kabkaiya 3 0 1 Horse 

66 15/4/2001 Kasrra Jabal Marra 1 0 Looting, burning 

67 25/4/2001 Bishra at 

Taib 

Jabal Marra 5 0 0 Looting, burning 

68 25/4/2001 Mailo Kabkaiya 5 0 Looting, burning 

69 25/4/2001 Shoba Kabkaiya 0 0 350 Cattle 

70 25/4/2001 Deble Kabkaiya 0 0 Looting, burning 

71 25/4/2001 Belbel Jabal Marra 30 0 Looting, burning 

72 26/4/2001 Waranga Jabal Marra 0 0 200 Cattle 

73 26/4/2001 Kulo Fugo Jabal Marra 0 0 400 Cattle 

74 28/4/2001 Nabagaia- Kass 0 0 161 Cattle, looting, 

Nama 

burning 

75 30/4/2001 Daili Kabkaiya 0 0 600 Cattle 

76 1/5/2001 Kujo-Gurni Jabal Marra 3 0 Confiscated trucks 

with cargo 

77 3/5/2001 Bardei Kabkabiya 4 0 0 Confiscated trucks 

with cargo 

78 3/5/2001 Burogng To Jabal Marra 0 0 Looting 

79 4/5/2001 Shau Fugo Jabal Marra 1 0 Cattle looting, 

burning 

80 5/5/2001 Zalingei Zalingei 0 0 1 Cattle looting, 

vehicle confiscated 

81 5/5/2001 Golol Jabal Marra 2 0 Cattle looting, 

burning 

82 6/5/2001 Fanne Karal Zalingei 2 0 Burning, cattle 

looting 

83 7/5/2001 Fanne Karal Zalingei 0 0 Burning 

84 9/5/2001 Konjo Jabal Marra 1 0 Burning, cattle 

looting 

85 10/5/2001 Dirbat Niyala 0 0 Burning, cattle 

looting 

86 16/5/2001 Kabkabiya Kabkabiya 5 0 Cattle looting 

87 16/5/2001 Ajja Jabal Marra 2 0 Cattle looting 

88 17/5/2001 Shau Fugo Jabal Marra 0 0 Burning, cattle 

looting 

89 18/5/2001 Saraf Umra Jabal Marra 0 4 Burning, cattle 

looting 

90 20/5/2001 Abur Jabal Marra 1 0 

91 27/5/2001 Shau Fugo Jabal Marra 0 0 

92 1/6/2001 Juldu Jabal Marra 9 0 

93 1/6/2001 Golo Jabal Marra 7 8 1250 Cattle 

94 Shau Fugo Jabal Marra 9 0 Sudatel officer 

killed 

95 3/6/2001 Tango Jabal Marra 9 0 5 Trucks 

96 3/6/2001 Juldu Jabal Marra 0 0 

97 4/6/2001 Zalingei 

University 

Zalingei 0 0 100 Cattle 

98 4/6/2001 Kebe Jabal Marra 0 0 Looting, burning 

99 5/6/2001 Kebe-shau Jabal Marra 5 0 350 Cattle looting, 

vehicle confiscated 

100 10/6/2001 Tango Jabal Marra 0 0 Burning, looting 


102 18/6/2001 Burongang 

Ro 

Jabal Marra 5 0 500 Cattle 

46

47 

Appendix F 

103 18/6/2001 Bara Ardeba Kabkabiya 3 0 Burning, looting 

104 23/5/2001 Tawila Khor Fashir 1 0 Looting 

105 27/6/2001 Juldu Jabal Marra 0 0 300 Cattle 

106 28/6/2001 Singo Jabal Marra 0 0 Device cash 

107 16/7/2001 Nertete Jabal Marra 0 0 Looting 

108 16/7/2001 Golo Jabal Marra 0 0 318 Cattle looting 

109 26/7/2001 Debbe Naira Jabal Marra 5 0 Looting 

110 26/7/2001 Butke Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting 

111 28/7/2001 Mara Jabal Marra 0 0 Looting 

112 28/7/2001 Gurni Jabal Marra 0 0 500 Cattle 


114 2/8/2001 Uo Fugo Jabal Marra 0 0 316 Cattle 

115 3/8/2001 Shoba Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting 

116 3/8/2001 Jurab Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting 

117 3/8/2001 Muallaga Kabkabiya 1 4 Raping women 

118 5/8/2001 Saraf Umra Kabkabiya 4 0 Looting 

119 7/8/2001 Fugo Kafur Jabal Marra 2 0 Looting 

120 23/8/2001 Arwalla Wadi Salei 0 0 1 Vehicle 

confiscation 

121 2/9/2001 Shoba Kabkabiya 1 0 Cattle looting 

122 1/10/2001 Kalu kitting Jabal Marra 5 0 Cattle looting 

123 3/10/2001 Aish Barra Kabkabiya 6 0 Cattle looting 

124 3/10/2001 Sharg Al Jabal Marra 0 0 

Jabal 

125 6/10/2001 Kurgul Kabkabiya 0 0 Looting passengers 

126 8/10/2001 Sigirinj Kabkabiya 2 0 Cattle looting 

127 8/10/2001 Janga Kabkabiya 0 0 Cattle looting 

128 29/10/2001 Barjongo Kabkabiya 5 0 Cattle looting 

129 27/11/2001 Kujo Jabal Marra 1 0 Destroyed farms 

130 27/11/2001 Nertete Jabal Marra 1 0 Destroyed farms 

131 28/11/2001 More Kabkabiya 0 0 Destroyed farms 

132 28/11/2001 Fuldung Kabkabiya 6 0 Destroying farms 

133 28/11/2001 Juldu Jabal Marra 0 0 Looting burning 

houses 

134 26/12/2001 Diplong Jabal Marra 2 0 75 Houses burnt 

during fasting 

celebration of 

Ramadan 

135 26/12/2001 Kartum Kabkabiya 7 0 185 Cattle looting 

Jadid 

136 27/12/2001 Tolfonj Kabkabiya 3 0 Cattle looting 

137 27/12/2001 Awin Jiro Kabkabiya 1 0 Cattle looting 

138 30/12/2001 Muallaga Kabkabiya 1 1 Cattle looting 

139 30/12/2001 Jirai Kabkabiya 4 0 Religious man 

killed in his 

mosque 

140 1/1/2002 Melesa Kabkabiya 1 0 Killing during 

morning prayers 

141 6/2/2002 Um Haraz Jabal Marra 1 0 Killing in the early 

morning 

142 6/2/2002 Muallaga Kabkabiya 1 0 Cattle looting 

143 12/2/2002 Jaddara Kabkabiya 1 0 Cattle looting 

144 12/2/2002 Sigirinj Kabkabiya 2 1 Cattle looting 

145 12/2/2002 Hashaba Kabkabiya 1 1 Cattle looting 

146 4/3/2002 Imar Jadid Kabkabiya 2 0 Cattle looting

Appendix F 

147 4/3/2002 Jaddara Kabkabiya 3 0 Cattle looting 

148 4/3/2002 Hashaba Kabkabiya 2 1 Cattle looting 

149 4/3/2002 Murguba Kabkabiya 3 Cattle looting 

150 11/3/2002 Kala Kabkabiya 1 0 Looting 

151 11/3/2002 Um-lauta Kabkabiya 1 0 Cattle looting 

152 26/3/2002 Mailo Kabkabiya 13 Cattle looting 

153 14/4/2002 Tur Jabal Marra 1 0 A woman killed, 

body distorted 

154 24/4/2002 Um Haraz Jabal Marra 20 20 Killing in the 

mosque during 

155 24/4/2002 Debbei 

Naira 

morning prayer 

Jabal Marra 3 2 Killing in the 

mosque during 


156 28/4/2002 Kerenga Kabkabiya 3 3 Killing in the 

mosque during 


157 28/4/2002 Shoba Kabkabiya 17 23 Killing in the 

mosque during 


48

49 

Appendix G 

Appendix G: Breakdown of Security and Political Dialogue by Month 

[Source: Aegis Trust research notes.This is not a comprehensive list of international statements and actions on security and 

political dialogue on Darfur] 

Security & Political Dialogue: March 2004 

During March those in the international community engaged in Darfur employed a quiet diplomacy approach fearing 

that ex erting pressure over Darfur w ould jeopardise the impending North/South peace deal. Although information had 

by this time emerged of the atrocities being committed in Darfur, the crisis w as cast and managed as a humanitarian 

crisis. The ceasefire was being pursued by the international community , primarily with the aim of securing 

humanitarian access. 

New Information: ICG produces report giv ing a solid background to the conflict including evidence of the ex istence 

of the Arab Supremacist Arab Gathering in Darfur. Details Janjaw eed and GoS force attacks, and giv es details of 

gov ernment intransigence in efforts to end the conflict and in the delivery of humanitarian aid. 

Latest Situation: The UN declares Darfur the w orld’s greatest humanitarian and human rights catastrophe 

10,000 dead. 700,000 internally displaced. 130,000 refugees. UN humanitarian Co-ordinator refers to the situation in 

Darfur as ethnic cleansing. 

International Response (Security Issues): Quiet Diplomacy. Diplomatic efforts led by the United States w ith the EU 

and the UK to facilitate negotiations betw een the GoS, the SLA and JEM. Calls made for an immediate ceasefire to 

facilitate deliv ery of humanitarian aid. International Community follow ing a policy of sequencing betw een the 

North/South and the Darfur peace talks. 

International Organisations 

AU: Facilitating peace talks betw een the GoS, the SLA and JEM. 

EU: Engaged in facilitating negotiations betw een GoS, SLA and JEM. Issued a statement urging all parties to agree 

on an immediate ceasefire. 

United States: Facilitating peace talks betw een the GoS, the SLA and JEM. 

UK: Engaged in facilitating negotiations betw een GoS, SLA and JEM. Aiming for a ceasefire preferably w ith 

international monitoring, w ith a view to securing humanitarian access. Appealed to the parties to the conflict to 

ensure the protection of civilians. 

Security & Political Dialogue: April 2004 

Continuing quiet diplomacy. The focus during April was on the maintenance of the ceasefire signed early in the 

month and attaining a political settlement. Deployment of monitors to monitor the ceasefire betw een the GoS, SLA 

and JEM seen as key. A ty pical response to a conflict situation w hichw ould hav e little impact on the situation of 

IDPs in, for instance, the Kailek camp, where a policy of forced starv ation w as being implemented on civilians.

Appendix G 

New Information: UN Inter Agency Fact Finding and Rapid Assessment Mission to Kailek publishes its report. Giv es 

details of its v isit to an IDP camp where the IDPs are virtual prisoners, w here there is no food and rape is a regular 

occurrence. Provides ev idence of GoS forces’ complicity in the running of the camp. Concludes there is a strategy of 

sy stematic and deliberate starv ation. 

Human Rights Watch publishes the “Darfur in Flames” report which describes a government strategy of forced 

displacement, targeting civ ilians of the non-Arab ethnic communities. Documents the aerial bombardment of civ ilians 

and attacks by GoS security forces alongw ith militia men on Fur, Massaleit and Zaghaw a villages. Describes a 

climate of impunity. 

Latest situation: Peace agreement signed betw een the GoS, the SLA and JEM 8 th April in N’Djamena. 1 million 

internally displaced. British gov ernment states it is aw are of the systematic clearing of areas of Darfur based on 

ethnic origin. GoS denies access to UNHCHR inv estigators. Attacks and bombardments on villages continue despite 

the signing of a ceasefire. 

Peace Talks: SLA, JEM & GoS negotiations: 4 days after the signing of the peace agreement the SLA accuses 

gov ernment of attacks on tw ov illages. JEM accuses GoS of v iolating the ceasefire by integrating Janjaw eed into the 

army rather than disarming them. Much of the month is spent try ing to agree an agenda and location for further talks. 

International Response (Security Issues): Much international attention paid to the North South agreement. 

Attention to Darfur centred around the maintenance of the ceasefire. First Security Council attention giv en to Darfur. 

AU begins preparations for monitoring mission. US and EU urging the parties to the ceasefire to honour their 

agreements. Talks of military interv ention play ed dow n by the EU. 


United Nations Security Council (UN SC): 1 Briefing. Released a statement ex pressing concern about the massiv e 

humanitarian crisis and called on the GoS and opposition groups to reach a ceasefire and a political settlement. 

Sends a Fact Finding mission to investigate allegations of w idespread atrocities. Deputy Secretary General of the 

Security Council approaches EU regarding deployment of troops to Darfur. 

AU: Takes responsibility for setting up the Ceasefire Commission and submits proposals to the GoS for a Ceasefire 

Commission and deployment of military observ ers. 

EU: Denies rumours that it has considered deploy ment of EU troops to Darfur. 

United States: Holding back on the easing of sanctions prev iously conditioned upon agreement of North/South 

peace deal until the Darfur crisis is resolved. 

UK: Stated the need for a ceasefire, preferably with international monitoring, with a view to securing humanitarian 

access. Rejected calls for a mandatory UN arms embargo on grounds it w ould not make a difference in the 

necessary timeframe. 

Security & Political Dialogue: May 2004 

A change in the language used by the international community to describe the situation indicates that the grav ity of 

the situation in Darfur is beginning to be realised. How ev er, the lack of attention in the Security Council belies a lack 

of urgency on the part of the international community despite the USAID w arning that 350,000 may die unless 

50

51 

Appendix G 

decisiv e action is taken. The international community still relies upon the good faith of the GoS w ith no enforcement 

actions being taken or looking likely to be taken soon. The focus of international action remains on humanitarian 

access. Many statements are made amongst EU countries calling for Sudan to facilitate the deliv ery of aid and to 

disarm the militia. The AU Ceasefire Commission’s reconnaissancev isit marks the first steps tow ards putting an 

international force on the ground. 

New Information: 

OHCHR report. Identifies disturbing patterns of massiv e human rights violations in Darfur, including forced 

displacement, arbitrary killing of civ ilians, and rape, perpetrated by the GoS and its proxy militia, many of which may 

constitute w ar crimes and/or crimes against humanity. Notes that the influx of refugees into Chad and the pursuit of 

the refugees by militia into Chad poses a threat to the peace and security of the region. 

ICG “Now or Nev er” states that interv ention is too late to stop ethnic cleansing but action at this point by the Security 

Council, w hich may hav e to include use of force, could sav e thousands of liv es. Warns that Sudanese plans to 

‘neutralise’ the Janjaw eed include incorporating them into the police and security forces. Accuses the international 

community of neglecting Darfur in fav our of pursuit of the Naivasha peace accords. 

HRW publishes “Darfur Destroy ed: Ethnic Cleansing by Government and Militia Forces in Western Sudan”. Details 

the characteristics of the conflict, prov iding evidence of ethnic cleansing in Darfur, including the destruction of 

resources v ital for human surv ival and resettlement of deserted African villages by Arabs. Also presented evidence of 

GoS culpability in Janjaweed attacks, including payment of salary by the GoS to the Janjaweed and orders by the 

GoS to the police not to interfere in the activ ities of the Janjaweed. 

All three reports prov ide ev idence the GoS is not acting in good faith follow ing the April peace agreement. 

MSF warns of danger of mass starv ation. 

Latest situation 

Grav ity of the situation daw ning on international community . 30,000 killed, 1 million internally displaced. 130,000 

refugees in Chad. Statements defining the situation as ethnic cleansing are made by the UN and the US. Sweden 

w arns Darfur faces a possible genocide. Area is said to have calmed since the signing of the ceasefire but refugees 

still entering camps in Chadw ith freshw ounds. USAID estimates that 350,000 liv es could be lost if decisiv e action is 

not taken. 26 May, the Naiv asha peace accords are signed, ending the war in the South. 

Security Policy Summary: 

A month of statements from the international community. US by far the most activ e in seekingw ays to apply pressure 

to the GoS, seeking to put Sudan on the UN Security Council agenda. EU actions w ent no further than statements. 

Algeria, China, Pakistan and Russia lobbied to keep Sudan off the UN Security Council agenda. African Union 

monitoring team not y et deployed. 


UN SC: Sudan off the Council’s agenda during May whichw as dominated by Iraq. Issued a Presidential Statement at 

the end of May drafted by the US, condemning the acts of v iolence and calling for the gov ernment to respect its 

commitment to disarm the militias. UN Representativ es sent on the AU reconnaissance mission. 

Arab League: Praised the efforts of the GoS to realise peace and security in Darfur and ex pressed keenness to 

support these efforts. 

AU: Conducts reconnaissance mission prior to setting up the ceasefire commission. 

EU: Representativ es sent on the AU reconnaissance mission.

US: Seeks to put Sudan on the UN SC agenda. Supports the placement of sanctions on Sudan. Rules out 

deployment of foreign troops in Darfur. Representativ es sent on the AU reconnaissance mission. 

Belgium: Urges Sudan to facilitate the deliv ery of aid. 

France: Urges Sudan to stop militia attacks. 

Germany: Proposed the deployment of a European peacekeeping force but says it has no troops to spare to 

contribute to such a force in Sudan. Calls for a UN Resolution. 

Appendix G 

UK: Main concern is maintenance of the ceasefire and tow ards that end is giv ing priority to the rapid deployment of 

the AU force. Will prov ide funds and persuade others to do the same. Does not consider a Chapter VII resolution 

necessary. Said it would not support calls for military interv ention or the threat of sanctions. Continues with a policy of 

‘quiet diplomacy ’. 

Algeria: Lobbied for the Sudan not to be formally added to the UN SC agenda. 

China: Lobbied for Sudan not to be formally added to the UN SC agenda. 

Pakistan: Lobbied for Sudan not to be formally added to the UN SC agenda. 

Russia: Lobbied for Sudan not to be formally added to the UN SC agenda. 

Security & Political Dialogue: June 2004 

Darfur has become a major concern to many members of the international community and security is coming to be 

recognised as a key issue. The diplomatic pressure exerted by the international community increases w ith a number 

of high lev el diplomatic visits to Sudan. Indications that Sudan is responding to this pressure emerge with 

humanitarian access being improv ed and w ith ex tra police being deployed in Darfur. Serious consideration is giv en 

to taking enforcement action to get the GoS to comply with its ceasefire agreements w ith consideration of sanctions 

and no-fly zones. How ev er, the GoS’s promise to deploy more police in Darfur reduces the momentum building up in 

the international community for enforcement action in Darfur, this despite know ledge of prev ious complicity of 

security forces in attacks and the bad faith demonstrated by the GoS until now. 

New Information: USAID satellite imagery show ing 301 destroy edv illages. 

Latest Situation: Sudan deploying ex tra police. Two months after ceasefire Janjaweed still not disarmed. Follow ing 

threats of sanctions Bashir vow ed to disarm militias. Reev es estimates death toll at 100,000. UN estimates 1.2 million 

displaced. Rains beginning. USAID estimate that 300,000 w ill die in Darfur due to the humanitarian crisis regardless 

of forthcoming actions. 

Peace Talks: SLA demand imposition of a military no-fly zone, free access for aid workers and war crimes trials for 

Arab militias before the beginning of political talks. 

52

53 

Appendix G 

International Response (Security Issues): Many high lev el diplomatic v isits. International community begins to 

consider options bey ond diplomacy for putting pressure on Sudan. Joint statement issued by US and EU ex pressing 

grav e concern and calling for protection and security of civ ilians and disarmament of the militias. 


UN SC: Resolution 1547 on the North/South peace agreement includes call for an immediate halt to fighting in 

Darfur. Condemns all acts of violence and ex presses utmost concern at the consequences of the conflict. Did not 

commit the UN SC to any action. Visit by Kofi Annan. UN puts forw ard a 90-day action plan for the Promotion and 

Protection of Human Rights in Darfur w hich includes plans for 8 human rights monitors. Annan states that he is not 

ready to send troops iny et – Sudan has to create an env ironment that w ill allow the displaced to return home. 

UNHCHR: Began deploy ing human rights observ ers. 

Arab League: Report accepting human rights violations but not holding the GoS responsible. 

AU: 34 monitors deploy ed. Full deployment ex pected by end of July. 

EU: Offers €12 million to support rapid deployment of AU monitors. Summit of EU leaders calls on Sudan to disarm 

Janjaw eed. Contributes 6 observers to AU observ er mission. 

United States: Lawyers begin to review w hether the situation in Darfur is genocide. Considering freezing assets of 

Sudanese officals. US states that it w ould fav our military action in Sudan by other states but didnot intend to deploy 

its ow n military force. Names sev en militia members it plans to impose sanctions on. Visit by Colin Pow ellw ho 

threatens UN sanctions if security situation does not improve. Drafts a UN resolution imposing an arms embargo and 

a trav el ban on militias. 

France: Diplomatic Visit. Offers to help Sudan in its efforts to attain security in Darfur. 

Germany: Diplomatic Visit. 

Italy: Diplomatic Visit. 

UK: Sudan bears the primary responsibility for security in Darfur. Needs a political solution. Supporting fast 

deployment of AU and human rights monitors. Considering putting forw ard a no fly zone proposal to SC. Accused 

Sudan of complicity in Darfur. Visit by Hilary Benn. Commits to contributing £2 million to AU mission. Regards the 

situation in Darfur as a conflict that has got out of hand. Ensuring the situation remains under review in the Security 

Council. 

Security & Political Dialogue: July 2004 

Follow ing a month of disagreement over the measures that should be taken against Sudan, a UN Resolution is 

passed. Whilst w elcome, the 30 days’ grace giv en by UN Resolution at the end of the month before sanctions would 

be imposedw as rather generous to the GoS, considering it had spent the last 3 months v iolating the agreements it 

had made in the April ceasefire agreement and reports from the new AU monitors confirm atrocities are continuing. 

Although there w as will for stronger action among some members of the Security Council, most notably the United 

States, strong UN action w as prevented in particular by China who has investments in Sudan’s oil industry worth $15

Appendix G 

billion and ev en has its own troops in Sudan to protect this inv estment. The lack of international support for Rw anda’s 

insistence that its troops w ould not stand by w hile civilians w ere being killed, and their insistence on a mandate w hich 

w ould allow them to interv ene if they saw atrocities taking place, represented a missed opportunity for the rest of the 

international community to assist in the security issue. 

New Information: AU monitors report continuing atrocities. 

Amnesty International publishes ‘Darfur - Rape as aw eapon of w ar’ – Using ev idence collected from interv iews w ith 

refugees in Chad, the report details the w idespread use of rape by militias to terrorise and humiliate the African 

community. There are a number of references in the report to racial language being used during attacks. 

Human Rights Watch uncov ers documents giv ing evidence of a GoS policy of militia support. 

Latest Situation: Continuing atrocities. Sudan announces plan to create 18 safe areas. Khartoum lifted trav el 

restrictions on aidw orkers although obstacles to humanitarian relief remained. Initial cooperation w ith AU observers 

but reports later in the month of obstruction of the observ ers. UN notes progress in aid deliv ery but not refugee 

protection. US Congress votes to call the situation in Darfur genocide. UN makes conserv ativ e estimate of 50,000 

death toll. Eric Reeves estimates death toll to be in excess of 150,000. 90 

Peace Talks: JEM officials say they w ill not enter into political discussions w ith the GoS until agreements made so 

far are honoured. Says troops must leave before political talks can begin. Puts forw ard six conditions for political 

talks to begin; disarming of militia, access to international inquiry into genocide charges, bringing perpetrators to 

justice, unimpeded humanitarian access, release of prisoners of w ar and agreement on a neutral venue for further 

talks. GoS refuses to accept and the rebels w alk out of talks. 

International Response (Security Issues): Threats and division in the international community over what the nature 

of the threats should be. US pressed for targeted sanctions on Janjaw eed members and Khartoum officials and 

complained of more words than action from the international community. US and EU position became more united as 

the month w ent on. Were rumours of the US, UK and Australia all considering making troops av ailable for a military 

interv ention, although there is a consensus building up in Western nations to support the AU mission rather than 

send their ow n troops. Rwanda offers troops to the monitor protection force on the basis that they w ill take action if 

they witness atrocities. Passage of UN Resolution at the end of the month endorsing the deployment of an AU 

monitoring mission, imposing an arms embargo on the Janjaw eed and calling for the disarmament of the Janjaw eed 

and threatening sanctions if security is not improv ed. 


UN SC: Joint communiqué agreed betw een Kofi Annan and the GoS. Passage of Resolution 1556 endorsing the 

deployment of AU monitors and monitor protection force, calling for the establishment of credible security conditions 

for the protection of civ ilians, imposing an arms embargo on the Janjaweed, and calling for the disarmament of the 

Janjaw eed. Following pressure from Algeria, China, Pakistan and Russia the threat of sanctions in prev ious US 

sponsored drafts is dropped and replaced by ‘economic measures’w hich would be implemented if Sudan failed to 

disarm the Janjaw eed. An assessment to be made in 30 days. 

Arab League: Ex presses opposition to the imposition of sanctions on Sudan. 

AU: States that the troops in the monitor protection force will not stand and stare if they see civilians being killed. 

Follow s insistence from Rwanda. Tries to reviv e peace talks betw een the GoS, the SLA and JEM. Considers the 

possibility of making the monitor protection mission into a fully fledged peacekeeping mission. Calls for more troops 

to be sent under AU auspices. Passed a resolution w hich called for a proposal to be made for transforming the 

90 Using data available from humanitarian organizations working in Darfur and epidemiological data used by USAID to form mortality 

projections. 

54

55 

Appendix G 

observ er protection force into a fully fledged peacekeeping missionw ith the requisite mandate and size to ensure the 

effectiv e implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement with particular emphasis on the disarmament and neutralization 

of the Janjaw eed militia. 

EU: Supports arms embargo on Sudan. Foreign Policy chief demands disarmament of Janjaw eed. Threatens 

sanctions. 

US: Rules out calls for international peacekeepers, say ing security in Darfur is the responsibility of the GoS. Presses 

for sanctions to be included in the UN resolution. 

France: Ex presses doubt that apply ing sanctions w illw ork. Encourages African states to take the lead in ending 

v iolence in Darfur. Began deploying 200 troops on the Chad Sudan border to stop militias marauding in Chad. 

Germany: Urges arms embargo on Sudan. Increasingly ex erting diplomatic pressure on Sudan. Uses v isit of Foreign 

Minister to pressure Pakistan to accept UN resolution introducing sanctions on Sudan. 

Holland: Provides 3 helicopters. 

Spain: Supports imposition of sanctions on Sudan in the UN Resolution. 

Sweden: Swedish Prime Minister sought to build united EU position on which normalised relations betw een Sudan 

and EU dependent upon progress in Darfur, particularly in the disarmament of militias. 

UK: Expresses support for the US inw ishing to impose sanctions on Sudan. Makes consideration of the option of 

deployment of troops, although says it is not at the stage of deploy ing them yet. Pressing the EU to provide further 

support to the AU mission. General Mike Jackson claims 5000 troops av ailable if necessary to send to Darfur. Says 

at the end of the month it has no intention of sending troops. Hav ing made commitments on security , w ill giv e Sudan 

a short period of time to fulfil them. Otherw ise pressure through the SC. 

Algeria: Resists the imposition of sanctions on Sudan in the UN Resolution. 

Angola: Resists the imposition of sanctions on Sudan in the UN Resolution. 

Brazil: Resists the imposition of sanctions on Sudan in the UN Resolution. 

China: Resists the imposition of sanctions on Sudan in the UN Resolution and abstains in the Security Council 

v ote. 

Pakistan: States that Sudan’s sovereignty must not be violated. Resists the imposition of sanctions on Sudan in the 

UN Resolution and abstains in the Security Council vote. 

Philippines: Resists the imposition of sanctions on Sudan in the UN Resolution. 

Romania: Supports the imposition of sanctions on Sudan in the UN Resolution. 

Russia: Resists the imposition of sanctions on Sudan in the UN Resolution. Supplies Sudan with MiG aircraft.

Security & Political Dialogue: August 2004 

Appendix G 

Security is now embedded in the dialogue betw een the international community and the GoS, but when it comes to 

the policies being follow ed on the security issue many in the international community are holding back. Follow ing the 

passage of the UN Resolution the international community appeared to sit w aiting for the 30-day deadline to pass, 

during w hich time there was disagreement ov er whether sanctions really should be imposed in the event of Sudan’s 

non compliance. In the meantime attacks against v illages continued. Despite commitments from the international 

community of financial support, the AU protection force is deployed late due to logistical and financial problems w hich 

continue once the force is deploy ed. 

New Information: USAID satellite imagery show ing 405 destroy edv illages out of 578 surv eyed. This surv ey cov ers 

many but not all of the v illages in Darfur. 

HRW Sudan: “Janjaweed Camps Still Activ e” – Report on information gained from interv iews with refugees about 

Janjaw eed camps openly being run, along w ith Sudanese armed forces during August. Names locations and camp 

commanders. 

HRW “Empty Promises? Continuing Abuses in Darfur, Sudan” – Report based on interv iews. Provides ev idence of 

the continuation of abuses and insecurity since the UN resolution. 

Latest situation: Attacks are said to have decreased in intensity but are continuing. US Senate declares Darfur 

situation to be genocide. 1.2 million displaced. GoS deploy ing more police and accepts it needs the help of AU troops 

but negligible progress made in improv ing security. 

Peace Talks: JEM & SLA demand that Sudan comply w ith Resolution 1556 before talks begin. SLM calls for the US 

and the UK to take immediate military action in Darfur. A new round of talks begins. 

International Response (Security Issues): The AU comes to the fore in tackling the issue of security. Marked the 

beginning of cooperation betw een Arab League and AU. Western states were quiet for much of the month and signs 

of lack of resolv e regarding imposition of sanctions emerge, should progress in Darfur be found to be unsatisfactory 

as the 30 August deadline draws near. Creation of safe areas agreed by UN and GoS. Many statements of concern 

throughout the month that Sudan w as not making enough progress on the security issue. 


UN SC: Sends a team to Darfur to w ork with the AU to assess w hat the requirements would be for a peacekeeping 

force. UN Envoy to Sudan states that the UN/Sudan Action Plan "does not set 30 days as a deadline but as a period 

w hich can be renew ed and amended until all provisions are met". States its strong support for the leading role of the 

AU in resolv ing the crisis. 

Arab League: Rumours of a plan for an Arab battalion to be deploy ed within the framew ork of the AU mission as a 

peacekeeping force. Seeks to ex tend the 30-day deadline set in Resolution 1556. Algeria, Egy pt and Liby a offer 

troops to AU force. 

AU: AU protection force (307 troops) deploy ed 2w eeks behind schedule due to financial and logistical problems. 

Nigeria pressing for deployment of a larger force and offers 1,500 of its own troops. Offer of 100 troops from 

Tanzania (although Tanzania stipulates that its troops would only go as peacekeepers. Not willing to put them in a 

position w here they might be trading fire w ith one of the conflicting parties). Mediating in the resumed peace talks. 

Warns against the imposition of sanctions on Sudan as the 30 August deadline approaches. 

56

57 

Appendix G 

United States: States that it has not given up on getting sanctions imposed but the ex pansion of a highly v isible AU 

force becomes the preferred US option. 

Belgium: Called for Darfur crisis to be resolved through peaceful means and urged the international community to 

adopt a just, neutral attitude instead of putting all the pressure on the GoS. 

France: Deploy s 200 troops along the Chad Sudan border to prev ent marauding militias from entering Chad. Says 

peacekeepers may be needed in Darfur. Say s political solution is the only solution to the problem. 

Holland: Airlifts Rw andan Troops to Darfur. 

Sweden: Supports sanctions if Sudan is found to hav e failed to comply with Resolution 1556. 

UK: Stated that it w ould support the enlargement of the AU protection force but not necessarily an increase in its 

mandate to peacekeeping status. Reiterated that it had no intention to deploy troops in Darfur but w ould support the 

AU military presence. Said it was the responsibility of the AU to prov ide troops. 

Russia: Asserts that the time for sanctions is not right, saying Sudan has made some progress in ameliorating the 

humanitarian crisis. 

Security & Political Dialogue: September 2004 

The US states that the situation in Darfur is genocide. How ev er it does not link this to implications for their role in 

helping to manage the crisis. Jan Pronk’s report to the Security Council and the reports of Juan Mendez and Louise 

Arbour follow ing their v isit make clear that security is not improving. An atmosphere of fear in displaced persons 

camps is being increasingly reported. Questions put to governments ov erw hat they w ere doing to improve the 

security situation w ere answ eredw ith statements on the lev el of support given to the AU force. How ev er the figures – 

136 observ ers to monitor the area the size of France – and ev idence emerging in reports demonstrate the current AU 

force is wholly insufficient. This w as addressed in UN Resolution 1564w hich called for an expanded AU force and 

mandate. Again there was considerable opposition from interested parties to imposition of a threat of sanctions in this 

UN Resolution. Following the passage of the Resolution, a number of European states continue to take the v iew that 

Sudan is cooperating sufficiently for sanctions not to be imposed. 

New Information: Report of the Secretary General pursuant of paragraphs 6 and 13-16 of Security Council 

resolution 1556 – Concludes that the gov ernment has not fully met its commitments to increase security . Attacks 

against civ ilians are continuing and the v ast majority of militias remain armed. 

The US State Department published ‘Documenting Atrocities in Darfur’; an analysis of 1136 interv iews w ith refugees 

in Chad, w hich informed Colin Pow ell’s decision to define the situation in Darfur as genocide. 

USAID – 574 tow ns and villages destroy ed. 

Latest situation: Improv ement in humanitarian access but attacks continuing. US declares situation in Darfur 

genocide. Various accounts of IDP camps being virtual prison camps. Militia attacks on v illages becoming less 

frequent but a marked rise in banditry . No progress made in the improv ement of security. 

Peace Talks: SLM & JEM w elcome Colin Pow ell’s definition of the Darfur situation as genocide. Talks break dow n 

ov er refusal of GoS to discuss a political solution. Instead the GoS is insisting on the disarmament of the JEM and 

the SLA.

Appendix G 

International Response (Security Issues): International consensus on the deployment of more AU monitors and 

troops. NATO Secretary General says it could cooperate w ith the EU and AU if requested. Reluctance to impose 

sanctions and debate ov er their effectiv eness after passage of Resolution. Arab League countries united in their 

support of Sudan against sanctions. Apparent lull in international activ ity follow ing UN Resolution. 


UN SC: Annan calls for an increased international force in Sudan. Provides a blueprint for such an international force 

to the AU, involv ing 3000 peacekeepers. Pronk recommends an expanded mandate for the AU force but says time 

for sanctions has not come. Passes Resolution calling for ex pansion of AU mission in both size and mandate. 

Threatens actions against Sudan’s petroleum sector and calls for Sudan to refrain from military flights ov er Darfur. 

Lays out plans for how it would like to see the mandate expanded. 

Arab League: States opposition to the threat of sanctions in the new UN resolution. 

AU: Announces plans to deploy 3-5000 troops. Calling for support from EU and US. 

EU: Threatens sanctions if Sudan does not mov e to end fighting. EU says it is prepared to send a police mission in 

collaboration w ith the AU, should the AU request it. GoS claims despite threats EU w ill not impose sanctions. Says it 

is ready to support the AU force but w aiting for specific request. 

United States: US supports UN proposal of an enlarged AU force. Rejects Pronk’s recommendation that the time for 

sanctions has not yet come. Introduces Resolution threatening sanctions against Sudan’s oil industry and calling for 

a bigger UN forcew ith an ex panded mandate. Has ‘unspecified number of military personnel’ assisting AU monitors. 

Says is ready to support the AU force but w aiting for specific request. 

Germany: Calls for sanction to be imposed and AU peacekeepers to be sent. 

Spain: States support for the AU as the ideal framework for increasing security in Darfur. 

Sweden: Fav ours diplomatic pressure rather than sanctions. 

UK: Calls for UN to set Sudan clear benchmarks, along with a timeline, detailing what steps the GoS must now take 

tow ards meeting their responsibilities and resolving the conflict. If there is significant failure to meet these, then 

sanctions should be imposed. Says Sudan is cooperating enough for there not to be a need to impose sanctions 

immediately . Still no decision on no fly zones. 

Algeria: Resists the call for sanctions in the new US-sponsored Resolution. 

China: Resists the call for sanctions in the new US-sponsored Resolution. 

Pakistan: Resists the call for sanctions in the new US-sponsored Resolution. 

Russia: Resists the call for sanctions in the new US-sponsored Resolution. 

58

Security & Political Dialogue: October 2004 

59 

Appendix G 

The focus turns away from sanctions tow ards the AU and ex panding the force. The UN Security Council secures an 

agreement from Sudan for an ex panded force and mandate. Substantial support is pledged for the ex panded AU 

force. Because attacks onv illages decreased in frequency tow ards the end of September and the beginning of 

October, some players in the international community made statements w hich assumed the situation w as improv ing 

and inadv ertently dumbed dow n the urgency of the situation. How ever, increased attacks later in the month showed 

the need for security w as as dire as ev er. With increased attacks on aid convoys, and their refusal to sign 

humanitarian agreements before an agreement on security is reached, criticism of rebels increases. 

New Information: In their report back to the Security Council, Louise Arbour, Head of UNHCHR, and Juan Mendez, 

UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, state that Sudan's efforts to bring security to Darfur had been 

inadequate and that the authorities did not command the trust and confidence of those they promised to protect. 

Latest situation: The security situation deteriorates throughout the month w ith the number of attacks against IDPs 

on the increase. There are a number of instances of aerial attack. Towards the end of the month concerns grow 

about forced return of IDPs. The ceasefire is deemed not to be holding. Sudan claims to be in full control of the 

situation. 

Peace Talks: The GoS states it supports a federal system but refuses self-rule. Peace talks resume tow ards the end 

of the month. Deadlock ov er security talks, w ith impasse ov er SLA/JEM demands for no-fly zones prov ing particularly 

difficult to ov ercome. 

International Response (Security Issues): Threat of sanctions raised again by the UK and the EU. Substantial 

financial support pledged for the expanded AU force. Deploy ment of AU troops to ex pand the protection force begins 

at the end of the month, albeit delayed by tw o weeks. Diplomatic pressure beginning to be exerted on SLA/JEM over 

ceasefire v iolations. Neighbouring Arab states state opposition to ‘foreign interv ention’. 


UN SC: Conducts closed door meeting with the Sudanese foreign minister after w hich he agrees to accept an 

ex panded mandate for the AU mission and 3,500 troops. Annan reports no positiv e action by the GoS to restore 

security in Darfur. UN offers administrativ e help in setting up AU force. Kofi Annan says EU must contribute more to 

peacekeeping, particularly in Sudan. States the ceasefire is not holding. Sets up Panel for the Commission of Inquiry . 

Warns rebels against v iolating the ceasefire agreement. 

Arab League: Ex presses wish for Arab troops to be included in the expanded AU force. A number of Arab League 

Members – Egypt, Chad, Liby a and Sudan alongw ith Nigeria – hold a mini-summit to discuss solutions to the Darfur 

crisis. Concludes that foreign interv ention is unwelcome. 

AU: Peace and Security Council agrees expansion of the AU force in Darfur to 3,320 for 1 y ear at a cost of $221 

million. Rw andan troops due to be deploy ed on 17 October but not able to because accommodation not y et 

arranged. Deploy ment begins at the end of the month. Resumes peace talks on security and begins talks on a 

political settlement in Abuja tow ards the end of the month. 

EU: Visit of an EU delegation. Raises the threat of sanctions again but says it will wait for the UN lead before 

imposing sanctions. Pledges to pay half the cost of the AU force - €80 million. Urges the SLA and JEM to sign the 

humanitarian protocol. States readiness to send police forces to Darfur to train Sudanese police forces in Darfur.

Appendix G 

United States: Focus on the AU force rather than sanctions. US House of Representativ es called for sanctions to be 

put on Sudanese officials. Contributes $20 million to support the AU force. Includes prov ision of transport for the 

new ly deploying forces. 

Sweden: Offers $0.8 million to the AU. 

UK: Tony Blair visits Sudan and presses Al Bashir on endingv iolence in Darfur. Reminded that the threat of 

sanctions remained if Sudan failed to bring an end to the conflict. Blair demanded the AU troop contingent be 

boosted, that the gov ernment provide the locations of its troops in Darfur, pull them back in conjunction w ith a rebel 

w ithdraw al, commit to an overall peace agreement for Sudan by the end of 2004, and abide by signed UN 

humanitarian protocols. Pledges £20 million to AU force. States support for autonomy in Darfur. 

Algeria: Stresses wish to preserve Sudan’s sov ereignty . 

China: Restates its opposition to sanctions but Chinese diplomats in Beijing say they may soon hav e to giv e in due 

to international pressure. 

60

Appendix H: List of Reports Providing Evidence of Government of Sudan 

Culpability 

[Source: Aegis Trust] 

Reports by the UN 

United Nations Inter-Agency Fact Finding and Rapid Assessment Mission 

25 April 2004 

Report of the Secretary General pursuant of paragraphs 6 and 13-16 of Security Council resolution 1556 

27 August 2004 

Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Situation of Human Rights in the Darfur Region of the Sudan 

7 May 2004 

Report by the US State Department 

Documenting Atrocities in Darfur 

September 2004 

Report by Congress Research Service 

Sudan: The Genocide in Darfur 

16 June 2004 

Reports by Amnesty International 

Too many people killed for no reason 

3 February2004 

Darfur: Rape as a weapon of war: sexual violence and its consequences 

19 July 2004 

Report by Foreign Policy Centre 

Darfur and Genocide: Mechanisms for Rapid Response, An End to Impunity 

July 2004 

Reports by Human Rights Watch 

Darfur in Flames: Atrocities in Western Sudan 

2 April 2004 

Darfur Destroyed 

4 May 2004 

Darfur Documents Confirm Government Policy of Militia Support 

20 July 2004 

Empty Promises? Continuing Abuses in Darfur, Sudan 


Sudan: Janjaweed Camps Still Active 


Reports by International Crisis Group 

Darfur Rising 

25h March 2004 

Sudan, Now or Never 

23 May 2004 

Darfur Deadline 


61 

Appendix H

Appendix I: List of Janjaweed Camps with Locations and Names of 

Commanders 

[Source: Human Rights Watch] 

Appendix I 

USTANI 

Location: west of Serif Omra (also the location of an IDP camp), near Hashaba, on the road between Geneina and Kebkabiya, 

West Darfur 

Opened: June 2003 

Composition: Janjaweed commanders (very few fighters) and not less than 200 GoS troops 

Name of Janjaweed commander: Ahmed Jeladi 

Structure: Housesand tents, airstrip for helicopter (only the Sudan government has helicopters and aircraft) 

Notable for: First Janjaweed camp opened; Janjaweed headquarters for all North Darfur (Darfur was previously divided into 

North and South Darfur, and this headquarters has jurisdiction over the old North Darfur, including most of an area that is now 

West Darfur). 

JEBEL KAYA 

Location: 30 kilometers east of Geneina, between Geneina and Hashaba, West Darfur, in the mountains 


Composition: Janjaweed only, number unknown 

Structure: airstrip for helicopter 

Notable for: Janjaweed headquarters for West Darfur; livestock stolen in North and West Darfur kept here. Most Janjaweed 

camps are provided with sheep from this location, and the sheep are sometimes transported by helicopter to other camps. 

GIRGIGIRGI 

Location: 85 kilometers northeast of Geneina, West Darfur 

Opened: September 2003 

Composition: Janjaweed only, number unknown (this was the base of the now-deceased Janjaweed leader Shurkutallah) 

Structure: old village, civilians driven out 

DAMRA SHEIKH ABDEL BAGUI 

Location: 10 kilometers west of Kutum (location of IDP camp), North Darfur 

Opened: November 2003 

Composition: Eighty Janjaweed; unknown number of GoS and/or police 

Names of Janjaweed commanders: Omda Adam Abdel Jalli, Jedou Adam Abdel Nabi 

Structure: Tents 

MASRY 

Location: 7 kilometers southwest of Kutum (location of IDP camp), North Darfur 

Opened: August 2003 

Composition: Janjaweed and GoS army troops, 500 altogether (majority Janjaweed) 

Names of Janjaweed commanders (three brothers): Abdel Jabar Abdallah Gibrin, Georgi Abdallah Gibrin, Hassan Abdallah 

Gibrin 

Structure: Old occupied village 

Equipment: Well equipped, all types of weapons 

MILLA (30 villages) 

Location: 75 kilometers northeast of Kebkabiya, North Darfur 

Composition: Janjaweed only, more than 300 

Name of Janjaweed commander: Abdul Wahid (retired government army soldier) 

Structure: occupied villages, civilians (Fur, Tunjur, Zaghawa) driven out 

Equipment: six vehicles 

UM SAYALA (Lumlum, Alku, Hilla Khater, El Haj Oulad Babay, Um Hamnoki villages) (Um Sayala is the location of an IDP 

camp) 

Location: 20 kilometers east of Kutum, 5 kilometers west of Um Hiaye, North Darfur 

62

63 

Appendix I 

Opened: late 2003 

Composition: Janjaweed and GoS army troops together totalling 300 

Names of Janjaweed commanders: Yohanes Abdallah Jadallah (Itefat tribe), Illei Ahmed Taher (Jallul tribe), Abdelhazim Ibrahim 

Abdallah Jadallah (Itefat), Mohamad Saleh Ibrahim Abdallah 

Structure: occupied villages, civilians (Tunjur, Mima) driven out 

Notable for: More than one hundred villagers reportedly were killed when the camp was installed, sixty-nine in Lumlum alone. 

Note: visited by African Union ceasefire monitors on July 11, 2004 (the government of Sudan complained of an attack on their 

forces at Um Sayala on July 3, but the A.U. ceasefire monitors after investigation concluded that no such attack could be 

verified). 

FUNU 

Location: west of Kutum (location of IDP camp), West Darfur 

Opened: January 2004 

Composition: Janjaweed and GoS army troops (separated by a wadi or seasonal riverbed) 

Numbers: The number of Janjaweed varies but never less than 200; GoS troops, 300. 

Structures: No tents during the dry season, Janjaweed camp under the trees 

Equipment: well equipped, most types of weapons the GoS possesses (sometime brought by helicopter) 

Notable for: Stolen livestock kept here 

UM HEGLIG 

Location: northeast of Mellit (east of Kutum; both locations of IDP camps), North Darfur 

Opened: January 2004 

Composition: Janjaweed only, number unknown but high rotation 

KUMA 

Location: 60 kilometers east of El Fasher, North Darfur 


Structure: camp installed outside the village of Kuma 

ABU JIDAD 

Location: 60 kilometers south of Karnoi, West Darfur 

Opened: May 2004 

Composition: Janjaweed only, no less than 500 

Structure: Occupied farms (farmers cannot access their houses or fields) 

Equipment: many weapons and five vehicles provided by the GoS 

ISHARAYA 

Location: 75 kilometers south of Nyala, 3 kilometers north of Buram, South Darfur 

Opened: May 15, 2004 


Structure: occupied farm villages, civilians (Binga, Mima, Kretch, some Masalit) driven out 

Equipment: three or four cars and horses 

KURGUE (15 villages), extension of Funu camp 

Location: 85 kilometers west of Kutum, east of Funu camp, West Darfur 


Composition: Janjaweed only, about 200 

Structure: old occupied villages (well, mosque), civilians (Fur, Zaghawa, Tunjur) driven out 

Equipment: well equipped by GoS; trucks, horses, and camels 

ASSALAYA 

Location: east of Nyala, 40 kilometers west of Ed Da’ein, 5 kilometersnorth of a GoS army base, South Darfur 

Opened: July 2004 

Composition: Janjaweed and GoS army troops, numbers unknown 

Structure: airstrip for helicopter 

Equipment: same as government army troops

RAZALLAH JAWAZAT 

Location: east of Nyala, 8 kilometers west of Ed Da’ein, South Darfur 


Composition: Janjaweed only, 200 

Structure: occupied villages, civilians (Borgo, Bergid, Sam Tama, Berti) driven out 

Equipment: vehicles, horses, and some camels 

TAISHA 

Location: 17 kilometers east of Nyala (IDP camps in Intifida and Kalma, east of Nyala), west of Labadu, South Darfur 



Structure: occupied villages, civilians (Dayo ethnic group) driven out 

Appendix I 

64

Appendix J: Secret Circular Issued by the Executive Committee of Arab 

Gathering (1988) 

[Source: Darfur Centre for Human Rights & Development] 

65 

Appendix J 

The authenticity of this document has not been verified by Aegis. If genuine, it is highly significant – taken with the 

other documents reproduced here, it show s that the troubles in Darfur are organised and pre-meditated. 

This document is brief but lays out a blatant strategy for the exclusion of Africans from society and the destruction of 

the fabric of their societies. 

Its key elements are: 

Exclusion from state prov ision and from local serv ices 

Exclusion from positions of influence 

Exclusion from education 

The social fabric is to be destroy ed by the follow ing: 

Disruption of economic activ ity 

Creation of insecurity 

Targeted killings of key people in their societies 

Reproduced as received from source without correction. 

1. Dominance of the Arab race in Darfur cannot be gained except by armed struggle. 

2. The regional government in Darfur should be destabilized by all possible means. It should be stopped from 

achieving economic and sociological reforms. 

3. All government services in the Zurga (Black) areas should be curtailed and life be made difficult for the Blacks 

(Negro) people so that they feel unsafe, unprotected and unable to survive. 

4. Arab volunteers should infiltrate the Zurga areas and be ready to fight. 

5. Every possible effort should be made to create conflict and friction amongst the African (Black) tribes of Darfur 

to destroy their unity and weaken their resolve. 

6. Furthermore those members of the Arabic Gathering who occupy positions of influence should strive to deprive 

the areas with a majority of black people of the basic health, education and security services. Schools in Black 

areas should be closed and educated African people should not be allowed to occupy influential government 

posts.

Appendix K: Orders Issued by the Arab Gathering Unified Military Command 


Appendix K 


other documents reproduced here, it show s that the troubles in Darfur are organised and pre-meditated. This 

document states the violent intent of the organization. 


Orders issued by the Unified Military Command (1992) 

1. To torch and annihilate all Fur villages. 

2. To confiscate cattle belonging to the Fur tribe. 

3. To kill all leaders of the Fur tribe and to assassinate educated Furs. 

4. To disrupt transport and communicationsbetween Fur villages so as to stop medical assistance to those 

affected. 

5. To place Arab fighters in fortified positions on hills and mountainsaway from retaliation. 

6. To infiltrate Fur villages and hamlets. 

66

67 

Appendix L 

Appendix L: A Report on the Relationship between the Fur tribe and the National 

Islamic Front 

[Source: Darfur Centre for Human Rights & Development. As yet Aegis has been unable to confirm the authorship of 

this report] 


other documents reproduced here, it show s that the troubles in Darfur are organised and pre-meditated. This report 

lays out NIF policies on which its relationship with the Fur tribe is based. Elements of this report demonstrate synergy 

betw een Arab Congress policies and those of the NIF. 


The Islamic Movement and the Fur Tribe 

Confidential Report 

The Fur tribe is one of the largest tribes in the Sudan, which played an instrumental role in the history of the country. 

The opinion of the historians, both Sudanese and foreign, was divided as to the origin of the Fur tribe, however, all 

indications are that they are one of the main Negroid tribes. As a matter of fact, there is an important lapse in the 

history of the Fur particularly the period preceding the era of Sultan Suleiman Solong and this doesn’t deny the 

existence of some ancient artefacts and information on some of the earlier Sultans like “Dali” and “ Shaw” . Such period 

needs to be researched by the people of Darfur because of its importance. 

The earlier contribution of the tribe in the Islamic Movement: 

It is needless to emphasize the role of the Fur in proliferation of Islam in the Sudan and its Western neighbours. The 

Fur tribe contributed in proliferation of Islam and its teachings in an area larger than the size of countries like Morocco, 

Tunisia, Ghana, Benin, Congo Brazzaville and so forth. During it’s reign, the Sultanate [kingdom] of the Fur has been 

endowed by characteristics which were not available for the neighbouring Kingdoms and sultanates, namely that, is 

has consolidated an Islamic, shura [democracy] and federal rule in Greater Darfur and divided the land into Dars based 

on the tribes of the sultanate such as Dar Gimir, Dar Masaalit, Dar Zaghawa and so froth. Despite the fact that the Fur 

represented the backbone of the Sultanate, nevertheless, positions in the sultanate were not a monopoly to the Fur as 

it was possible for a Dajo to become the Minister of defence, a Bornu as a Minister of religious affairs. Despite the fact 

that the Fur tribe has been associated with Islam, nevertheless, historians have ignored to point out important facts like 

how Islam proliferated in such a big tribe like the Fur tribe? Is it plausible to take for granted the story of Ahmed El- 

Ma’agoor without a thorough critique? One is sometimes very sceptical, despite the diversity of the tales, about the 

way Islam proliferated in Darfur in this fairy tale manner. Over and above there is a missing historical fact in this 

respect like what were the other religions of Darfur? Were they animist or believers in God? One of the contributions 

that can be mentioned is that the Sultanate of the Fur was able to defend for a long period of time Greater Darfur from 

the Christian colonisation. In this respect, the Sultanates ‘Mahmal’ to the two holly mosques reflect the deep roots of 

the Islamic belief in the people of Darfur. The Fur have encouraged the scholars to come to Darfur and settle there 

particularly from Egypt, Tunisia and the Hijaz. Scholars like Malik Elfotawi under whom Sultan Abdurrahman Elrasheed 

was educated, and Hussein Wad Amari during the era of Sultan Mohamed Elfadul, Abdurrahman Kakoom, Mohamed 

Salih Elkinanai from Hijaz and he was the Imam of the mosque of Sultan Mohamed Daura. Darfur is considered one of 

the Kingdoms of the Sudan belt, which has contributed in proliferation of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa. 

Contribution of the tribe in the contemporary Islamic movement project: 

By the Islamic movement we mean the movement that has taken different names throughout its evolution which 

embraced the principles of Islam and its methodology, namely, (Muslim Brothers) and to be more precise it is the

Appendix L 

movement that started in 1946 and continued to date. Throughout this period the contribution of the Fur tribe was 

negligible and was confined to individuals the most prominent of these was the late Elrashid Eltahir Bakur who is 

considered to be one of the leaders of the Muslim Brothers movement. He was the secretary general in the 1960s but 

was removed after he was implicated in a coup attempt without the approval of the executive office of the movement 

and joined the Democratic Unionist Party and later joined the May regime and was appointed Vice President. During 

the 1970, other leaders like Engineer Dawood Yahia Bolad, Faroug Mohamed Adam, Dr Idris Abdulmawla and Abdul 

Jabbar Adam have also emerged. A number of the tribesmen have also joined the National Front to oppose the rule of 

President Numeri and as a result have suffered severe consequences. 

As a matter of fact, after the Ingaz revolution, the contribution of the Fur tribe in the Islamic State project was weak and 

unclear. With the exception of some individual contributions, there were no tangible group contributions in the large 

revolutionary projects such as the popular defence forces, popular police force and so forth. 

Lack of interaction of the Fur tribe with the Ingaz ideology may be attributed to a number of reasons including the 

following: 

1. Lack of trust between the movement and the Fur tribe in particular after successive fallouts between some 

members of the Fur tribe and the movement, notably among these are Elrasheed Eltahir Bakur, Faroug Mohamed 

Adam, Abdul Jabbar Adam and the rebel Bolad. This is from the part of the movement but from the part of the Fur, they 

have always viewed the Islamic movement as taking sides with their enemies. The movement has been behind the 

media campaign against Ahmed Ibrahim Direige during the late 1980s. In addition to supporting the Arab tribes at a 

time when the tribe was involved in an unbalanced extermination war. As a matter of fact the NIF has refused to grant 

permission for a million-people rally to protest against armed banditry and the presence of the Islamic legion in Darfur. 

2. Lack of a link between the movement and the Fur with the departure of Bolad, Abdul Gabbar and Faroug. The 

other members of the movement from the Fur tribe were not able to fill the vacuum. 

3. Dawood Bolad’s military insurgency meant that the Islamic movement has lost one of the most instrumental 

members and the tribe has lost one of its most important middle level cadres that could have contributed in bridging the 

gap between the two parties. 

4. The miscalculations of the leaders and the elites of the tribe towards the revolution as they thought the revolution 

would last fro long which has retarded their positive contribution. 

5. Failure of the movement to understand the psychology of the Fur and the treatment of interest groups to the Fur 

with contempt. In this respect, the movement miscalculated the losses it will accrue from the lack of interaction of the 

Fur tribe with the religious legacy. The movement has committed a mistake in attacking Ahmed Direige and continuing 

its negative attitudes towards the Fur and the problems they face such as armed banditry and tribal conflicts. The 

movement did not benefit from the historic mistake committed by (Abdalla Torshain) who wanted to forcibly Mahdize 

the Fur and has imprisoned their leaders and when the colonial army was defeating his army he wanted to go towards 

Darfur but Ali Dinar slapped the doors of the West at his face. 

6. The successive plights that hit the tribe such as famines, tribal conflicts, armed banditry and regional conflicts 

inside Darfur region have made the people of the tribe to become more preoccupied with their personal needs rather 

than participation in the public cause. 

7. The agenda of Arabism of the Islamic Movement made the movement to view the problems of Darfur from the 

angle of Arabism. 

The challenges facing the Fur tribe 

The Sudan with its Islamic programme has attracted substantial enemies including the super powers. Countries like 

Sudan, Iraq and Libya have become the substitute enemy after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. In this new world 

order, the Sudan has been condemned to death and as a result, the military confrontations in the South were more 

than a war between a government and a rebel movement. It was rather a regional war particularly after a new front in 

the East has been opened. The international plan goes in two directions: The first is to attack the Sudan by a 

multinational African force in order to divide it up into smaller countries and the second is a military intervention from 

the West under the cover of humanitarian relief to achieve the same objective. Such events are moving according to a 

rapid scenario before the third millennium. The question is, where is the Fur tribe from these developments? 

We have previously mentioned that the weak participation of the Fur in the current projects of the revolution has 

adversely affected the Tribe as the tribe has been considered as part of the opposition to the current programme. It is 

true that attempts have been made to provide some solutions such as the (Bai’a) and political participation but at the 

68

69 

Appendix L 

same time it is true that the revolution does not belief in these cosmetic solutions. The revolution believes in how much 

contribution the tribe has made to the Mujahideen? How much members it provided? How many training camps the 

tribe has opened? When the revolution allowed the ‘Council of Elders’ to function it was looking for gentlemen!! But did 

not find them. The revolution has reached a conclusion to bypass this tribe, which occupies a strategic place in 

disseminating the ideas of the Islamic movement to West and Central Africa in addition to occupying an area 

considered to be the last line of defence to the movement in case it has been cornered. Therefore the movement has 

bypassed this tribe and has worked to strengthen other powers in Greater Darfur and has accommodated Chadian 

tribes armed to the teeth in Darfur in addition to promoting conflicts and divisions among the elements constituting the 

Fur Sultanate (Fur and Tunjur, etc). The movement will not feel secured until this tribe is contained or exterminated to 

secure the Western front. 

The Fur Council of Elders 91 

A number of factors have contributed in its formation: 

1. The need to create a leadership that is loyal to the Islamic movement to suppress rebellious tendencies prevailing 

in the tribe in addition to the fact that the movement (NIF) wanted to undermine the role of the historical leaders of the 

Fur who oppose the movement. 

2. The feelings of the tribe to have a leadership of whatever kind. Probably one of the successes of this council was 

the creation of a centralised leadership for the tribe all over the Sudan and the second success was to reduce security 

pressures on opposition members of the tribe inside the Sudan and one further success is the creation of leading 

cadres to lead the political movement in Darfur in particular in Western and Southern Darfur excluding Northern Darfur. 

However, one of major problems of the council was its failure to attract a large and considerable number of tribesmen 

to form a strong lobby to protect the tribe’s interest in the state. In this respect the leader of the Council as well as the 

prominent leaders inside and outside the Sudan should have been absorbed in the movement (Islamic Movement – 

NIF). Such efforts should have culminated in an agreement similar to the Khartoum peace agreement (between GOS 

and SIM). A further problem is also the failure of the Council to mobilise the tribe to participate in the national projects 

like the popular defence forces, popular police forces, and in the various mobilisations. Our view is that for various 

reasons, any member of the Fur tribe should have been forced to take part in the popular defence forces. One more 

problem is the failure of the Council to promote members of the Fur tribe to prominent central positions as well as its 

failure to create an effective organisational structure capable of activating the various social activities of the tribe. 

Political groups within the tribe and their effect: 

1. A secular group opposing the regime 

This group is represented by Ahmed Ibrahim Direige and the rest of the members of the tribe in exile opposition. This 

group has support inside the Sudan despite it doesn’t have any deep work or clear vision amongst members of the 

tribe. And because of its uncompromising secularism it doesn’t exist within the tribe despite it is being looked at as the 

major defender of the tribe’s interest. 

2. Islamists group 

This is an emerging group and the formation of the Council of Elders could be considered as one of its first 

achievements but it has a low support for various reasons. It seems to be difficult for this group to become effective 

because it is linked to the movement. Most of the effective initiatives have come from this group such as the 

resignation of Bolad and Abdulgabbar. 

3. Future trends within the tribe 

Association of the tribe with secularism and its opposition to the government and its adoption of the policies that call for 

restoration of democracy with its traditional, sectarian and secular political parties as well as its support of the 

international dimension ignored two important factors: Firstly; So what afterwards when the Ingaz regime is toppled? 

91 Established in 1993

Appendix L 

Would the secular, sectarian, leftist and Christian African parties become the solution? We add to that another 

question; is that what the tribe is aiming for? The second factor is who has destroyed Darfur and who brought the 

Islamic Legion and armed the Arabic Gathering? Isn’t it the Sectarianism? This option is sour and the second choice is 

to count on the movement membership within the tribe to exercise pressure on the movement to reverse its hostile 

policies towards the tribe. This group should be asked the question of what were the achievements of the Council of 

Elders during its four years of existence? We believe this group can create elites who would enhance their own interest 

but it is beyond their capability to have an effective influence on the interest of the tribe. Practical experience has 

shown that this option is doomed to failure not because of insincerity of this group to the tribe but subsequent events 

have bypassed it. In addition to the fact that the group deals with an expansionary movement governed by an empire 

that bypassesethnicity which impedes its plans. 

The third option: To follow moderate option and that is the formation of an Islamic movement that adopts ideas, 

programmes and the methodology of the Islamic Movement mixed with pan African ideas. This group would benefit a 

lot from the experience of Pan Africanism, which does not contradict with religion. 

Recommendations: 

1. Detach the Council of Elders from the political groups and the activitiesof all other groups. 

2. Formation of an African Islamic Party. 

70

Appendix M: Quraish 2 - Arab Congress Circular 


71 

Appendix M 


other documents reproduced here, it show s that the troubles in Darfur are organised and pre-meditated. Removing 

the Africans from Darfur w ould be the first step in a plan ex tending to 2020. It also suggests that the Arab tribes in 

Darfur do not see ey e to ey ew ith Khartoum and plan to infiltrate and control the Central Gov ernment. 

Quraish 2 does not explicitly state the ex tent to w hich it intends to increase its power. How ever, the opening 

paragraph ex presses resentment at the Jaalien, the Danagala and the Shagia having held power in Sudan over the 

last century . It states as its interim target the three states of Darfur and the three states of Kordofan. Its ambitions of 

its ultimate target must therefore ex tend bey ond this. In point A11 it talks of the containment of conflict among ‘all our 

kins all ov er the country ’. Taken together, these points give a strong indication that the Arab Gathering has ambitions 

on the w hole of Sudan. 

There are indications in Quraish 2 of the dev elopment of the capacities of state apparatus. A1 talks of the expansion 

of education to prepare highly qualified cadres in politics, economics, security and the military whilst A2 talks of the 

establishment of economic institutions. Moreov er A22w hich encourages ‘strict discipline against … talk of the 

Baggara state’ indicates that the creation of a state is the objectiv e. 

For now, howev er, it is evident from Quraish 2 that it is the intent of the Arab Gathering to gain the cooperation of the 

gov ernment in its plans (A5, A7 & A16). It is also clear that it intends to infiltrate the gov ernment (A3, A4, A18, A25). 


Quraish 2 

[1998 or after – implied by reference to the National Congress] 

Strictly confidential 

As you all know, the Jaalien, Danagala and Shaigia [River Nile tribes of the northern Sudan] have been an obstacle for 

us over a century in ruling the Sudan. Although they claim Arab lineage, they are in reality hybrids which are in 

ethnicity and culture part and parcel of Egyptianized Nubians. That trio plans to rule the Sudan for ever for it came to 

our knowledge that they are under oath to keep power to themselves. 

As Quraish is now in a critical stage, it is required from all, especially the two parts, to keep themselves above 

ideological and sectarian affiliations for the sake of the noble objectives and the preservation of achievements thus far. 

In order to achieve those objectives, it is of utmost i mportance to strictly perform the following: 

a. Target Date: 2020 

b. Objective: Quraish 2 

c. Interim Target: The six western states (Darfur 3, Kordofan 3) 

d. Plans: Programmes and means: 

A : Internally 

1. Vertical and horizontal expansion of education to prepare highly qualified cadres in politics, economics, security and 

the military. 

2. Establishment of economic institutions 

3. Planned infiltration in the army and security forces 

4. Continue to pretend collaboration with the incumbent government 

5. Preservation of existing working relations with certain dignitaries of the trio in the country’s leadership 

6. Coordination with our cousins in the centre and east

Appendix M 

7. Stress importance of the border tribes (with southern Sudan) and urge the government to provide additional financial 

support, arms and training (Popular Defence Forces, Mujahideen, Peace Forces, …etc) 

8. Urge all the bodied persons of our group to get recruited in the Peace Forces 

9. Preservation of the channels for understanding with Dinka 

10. Strict implementation of the provisions of operation “ Shaheen” in South Kordofan 

11. Containment of emerging conflict between En Nahud (Hamar tribes) and to call upon all our kins all over the 

country to avoid such conflicts which dissipate the energies. 

12. Not to raise the issue of the petroleum before it is actually extracted 

13. Containment of problems arising from the Niyala incidence in the narrowest extent and make plans to set the 

horsemen (Fursan) free. 

14. Ensure the presence of the sufficient pastures for the herds in Sudan, Chad and the Central African Republic. 

15. Take a strong negative stance against land tenure systems (Hawkeir...Dars…etc) by all means. 

16. Prove our national role in standing against the non-Arab tribes in the West as being a natural extension of the 

rebellion (of the Southern Sudan) 

17. Widen the gap of mistrust between the centre and the non-Arab tribes, by inducing carefully selected Zurga leaders 

to adopt a more radical stance in expressing the injustice on the west (of Sudan), and carefully coaching them to the 

ethnic and regional affiliations. 

18. Acquire more of the constitutional positions in the centre and the regions. 

19. Preservation of the achievements of “ Programme Jamus” for the Western Darfur with all its calculated 

shortcomings. 

20. Operations Tireifi (2) and Tireifi (3) should continue to strengthen the foothold of Quarish in Darfur. 

21. Preparation for any elections in the six states (of the west) 

22. Exercise strict discipline against unwarrantable behaviour, such as the talk about the Baggara State. 

23. Leaders to accord due importance to positive information. 

24. Upgrading of the financial performance of Quraish 

25. The superior leaders of Quraish should remain in the National Congress (3) among Quraish (3) and make 

decisions in accordance with the situation. 

B. Externally 

1. Strengthening relations with Quraish in the neighboring countries 

2. Development of strategic relations with Jamahiriya (Libya) in accordance with the plans laid down by Al Baggillani, 

Assel and Shaik Ibn Omer. 

3. Improvement of the camel race to strengthen relations with our brothers in the Gulf States. 

72

Appendix N: Government Letter 


73 

Appendix N 


other documents reproduced here, it show s that the troubles in Darfur are organised and pre-meditated. Removing 

the Africans from Darfur w ould be the first step in a plan ex tending to 2020. It also suggests that the Arab tribes in 

Darfur do not see ey e to ey ew ith Khartoum and plan to infiltrate and control the Central Gov ernment. 

Aegis holds a copy of this letter. It is w ritten on paper bearing a GoS header and is dated 18 November 1990. The 

aims stated in this letter bear comparison with the aims stated in the 1987 Arab Congress letter and also the 

recommendations of the Political Committee of 2003 (See section 2.5 and Appendix O). 


Central Region 

Blue Nile-Al Damazin 

Governor’s Office 

Dear Mr Badri 

It is to be hoped that you are well and in good health. 

Mr Ah med Dagrasham will come to see you shortly. He will discuss with you the importance of changing the name of 

Darfur province to the Western region. As you know the name Darfur led to conflict because the Fur were not the only 

inhabitants of Darfur. They were not a predominant majority and they were not the first people to establish a kingdom 

in that land. This is a good suggestion which merits further discussion. 

Yours sincerely, 

Hamid Goreet

Appendix O: Recommendations following four meetings of the Arab Gathering 

Political Committee with Local Councils 


Appendix O 

The ‘idea’ referred to in this document w as the plan to create the ‘Great Western State’ in the West of Sudan. By 

referring to the unity of Arabs rather than that of the Sudanese, this document giv es ev idence of an exclusionary 

ideology. 

The command in point 19 to organize the Janjaw eed shows a direct link betw een the Janjaw eed and the Arab 

Gathering. Point 20b also demonstrates a w orking relationship betw een the National Congress and the Arab 

Gathering. 

Coordination Council of Arab Congress 

(Sudan) 

Political Committee 

Date: 15. 11. 2003 

Subject: - Report of the above mentioned committee trip to local councils 


Of Burma,Tullus, Reheid al Birdi and Idd El Fursan 

The committee left for Buram Local Council Monday 10 .11. 2003 at 5 .00 p .m. and arrived at 10.300 p.m. The 

committee started immediately by holding a meeting with leaders, tribal administrators, politicians, executives and 

notables. 

The meeting discussed what was suggested the following recommendations: - 

1. The [idea - the Arab unity] should be carried on with strength and clarity so as to produce perfectly sound word. 

2. To seek assistance from learned men and people known to have good ideas and economists. 

3. To insure equitable sharing resources, especially under the expected peace agreement at state and federal 

levels. 

4. To erase any inter-tribal conflicts among the Arabs. 

5. To put the [issue] in the context of religion, Sharia and Islamic goodness. 

6. Spread the thought through the Sudan. 

7. Change the name of the state Dar Fur to another suitable name 

8. Importance of: information and documentation research. 

9. Appointment of brother / Omer Ali Al Ghali, assistant of the Nazir, as coordinator of Buram Local Council to liaise 

between the citizens of the council and the Coordination Council. 

10. Collect signatures of members of the consultative commission in the state (South Dar Fur }and send them to 

Niyala soonest possible . 

11. All present attested on oath to work together to make success of this unification concept. 

The following day the committee visited Nazir Salah Ali Al Ghali to explain the details of the concept, to which he 

fully agreed. Also, the Committee visited the Commissioner [Motamad] at HQs in his house and the commissioner 

of the Local Council who welcomed the concept and fully agreed to it. 

74

75 

Appendix O 

12. The commissioner of the Local Council was asked to support and assist the secretary of the National Congress in 

collecting the signatures and to provide transport for members of the Consultative Commission as soon as they 

requested. 

On 11.11.2003 the Committee visited Tullus where they met with leaders of the tribal administration, politicians and the 

executives. 

The Commissioner addressed the meeting thanking the Coordination Council, as represented by the committee, and 

explained the dangerous state of affairs and the necessity for unification and then presented the Committee members 

to the meeting. After elaborate explanation of the issue, followed by discussion, the following recommendations are 

made: 

1. All agreed on the idea of unification and its implementation. 

2. Setting up of information committee. 

3. Necessity for extended presence in the Republic of Chad. 

4. To spread the idea among university students 

5. Opening up of transhumance passages and resting areas. 

6. Comprehension and organization of executive and political work. 

7. Security of relations with the Federal Government. 

8. Formulation of inter-clan defense plan. 

9. Appropriate economic planning for security of unification. 

10. Activation and development of native administration. 

11. Preparation of a clear memorandum of association for this work. 

12.Strict secrecy. Omda / Yousif Omer Khatir was appointed as coordinator ( of committee) for Tullus Local Council 

Secretary of the National Congress asked to collect signatures of the members of the consultative commission and 

send to Niyala as soon as possible, while the commission was asked to provide transport for the Consultative 

Commission members whenever they asked. All confirmed, to implement and protect the unity. The Committee then 

met Nazir / Ahmed Es Sa mmani Al Bashar who agreed on the idea of unity and added more recommendations to 

affect: 

1. There is need to bring together Arab leaders to ensure security of the idea and to implement it. 

2. Urge Nazir Madibbo (of Relegate) to take the matter seriously with all the leaders of his area. 

Note: [Tullus is the domain of Fallata or Fulani whose language and culture are nowhere related to the Arabs]. 

On 12 /11 /2003 the Committee visited Reheid Al Birdi Locality where it met with tribal leaders, politicians and notables, 

who unanimously agreed on the idea (Unity) and affirmed their willingness to protect it and made the following 

recommendations: - 

1. Advertise the unit to the public since it is a noble idea 

2. Secrecy of information regarding internal (local plan) 

3. Give a clear name for the unity. 

4. Clear goal for this unity and its implementation. 

5. To switch from defensive to offensive position by arguments and initiatives to refute gossip, liesand rumors. 

6. Careful study to insure safety of action. 

7. Cleanliness in dealing with others. 

8. Remove popular police force from the state as it is involved in a number of violations. 

9. A well studied economic plan to support this action. 

10. Complete take-over of authority in South Dar Fur using the mechanical majority. 

11. Change name to another one. 

12. Review the issue of national service with Khartoum in all aspects. 

13. Encourage the sons the clans for recruitment in the armed forces, police and security.

Appendix O 

After oath taking brother / Yousif Mohammed Yousif was selected as coordinator for Locality, while the secretary of the 

Congress was asked to collect the signatures of the Consultative Commission to send them to Niyala. It is worth 

nothing that the meeting was attended by all families and clans ,especially the Salamat, that are resident in Reheid Al 

Birdi. 

On Thursday 13/11/2003 the Committee held a meeting with tribal leaders, notables and politicians at Idd Al Fursan. 

After explanation of the objectives of its visit the Committee listened to the discussion, which finally put forward the 

following recommendations: - 

1. Setting up the information and research committee. 

2. Preservation of the principles and their development. 

3. Protection of the politicians of all the clans by all means. 

4. Change the names of Dar Fur States into more logical ones. 

5. Strengthening the social fabric of the Arabs and exchange of visits. 

6. Lay strong and clear economic foundations and principles. 

7. Announcement of Arab action without reservations. 

8. Organize the Janjaweed [Arab militias] for benevolent action and protection. 

9. Unreserved obedience for the Arab leaders, especially the coordination commission. 

10. Arbitration to solve the inter-state problems between all races to attain harmony and gain cordialness from others. 

11. To pay attention to external trade. 

12. Secrecy of information 

13. Adoption of university students researchers. 

14. Employment graduates in government institutions. 

15. Improvement of administrative and executive systems in the capital of the state [South Dar Fur Niyala] and 

strengthening of native administration at all levels. 

16. Review planned patriation to Goz Dongo and water projects approved in the name of Idd Al Fursan that end up in 

other areas. 

17. Review of immigration to Niyala. 

This was followed by attestation on oath and brother /Dabaka Isa Dabaka was appointed coordinator for the Locality. 

Secretary of the Congress was asked to collect signatures of the members of the Consultative Commission for 

dispatch to Niyala. 

76

Darfur: Blueprint for Genocide - Archipielago Libertad

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?