There is no copy right for these declassified reports and documents within the USA. For Educational purpose use only. Documents are accessible from the CIA web site, “Reading Room. However, there is no Title to the documents other than the assigned numbers. One has to go through hundreds, if not thousands of documents in order to find out the content of each document. Since I will be going through most of these documents for my research, I considered that compiling some selected documents may be helpful for other researchers. E.A CONTENTS Inner Antagonisms in the Leadership of the All-Russian Communist Party and Stalin’s new government. Comments on the Change in Soviet Leadership – P17 THE SUCCESSION OF POWER IN THE USSR – P19 Further evidence on "Stalin’s” Role in current Party Indoctrination -P28 INDICATIONS THAT IN MID-JANUARY 1956 THE CPSU PRESIDIUM REACHED THE DECISION TO ATTACK STALIN PUBLICLY – P61 INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES -P66 MALENKOV AND STALIN’S DEATH – P70 Soviet peace tactics and probable reactions in the non-Communist world to these tactics -P73 PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF DEATH OF STALIN -P75 MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITIVITIES -P85 CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS IN THE COURSE OF THE DESTALINIZATI0N CAMPAIGN – P137 SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF STALIN MYTH -P169 THE COURSE OF DESTALINIZATION IN SOVIET DOMESTIC PROPOGANDA – P178 New Information on Khrushchev’s Attack on Stalin at 20th CPSU Congress – P189 Foreign Policy Implications of Stalin's Death and the Doctors' Plot – P193 STALIN'S UNRULY GHOST – P208 Stalinism; Past and Present – P219 NEO-STALINISM IN THE SOVIET UNION – P227 Neo-Stalinism: Writing History and Making Policy -P247 Forthcoming Book: The Young Stalin by Edward Ellis Smith -P271 THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE -P274 Stalin's Ghost in Contemporary Soviet Politics – P292 THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE- P304 DATE DISTR. 18 August 1947. COUNTh'i" USSR SUBJECT Imler Antagonisms J.n t.'1e LeaderaM,p of the AJ.l�uso1miNQ, OF PAGES Communist Party and �'talintv mew ,Jover.nment. 25X1 15' NO. OF ENCLS. (U..'\Tl£D BELOW) SUPPLEMENT TO 25X1 . REPORT NO. ;:.!:; THI• OOC\JM.:.N1 COl'ilTAINO· lNFORMATION APPICTINci fHS HATIOf!;.). Cllf'l?NSI. Of' THS UM,YCO 01'ATGS 'IJJTHIN Tl·Ul JICANfl!':'I 01' THC: RSPONAae ACT. !10 U,:,, c.• $1. ANO 31• .AG AMRf.,;Oi::), IT4 TffAtctla.llSSIOH on TH� fllVILATION 01' IT(I CONTll.fTtl 1 .. ANY MAt4Nl?R TO AN UNAUTHDRl%1:D PltA40H 10 Pft(:tfll&ltlO OY LAW, IT "AV NOT Ull Nt.PAOOUC•O IH WHOI.C. 0(- IN ll'ART. r.v OTHER TUA►t THI OTATI&. WAR. on DI" fllnwlSISIOU 0,. THll Dtn&CTO" 25X1 ��v:11:Rt�:e�tt�':t:i�=��� I 25X1 ·1 0 .,' .. I During the laet .few.::nonths, Stalin h.33- efi'ecterl a. nWllber of .f'undamentq::. changes both ii.:.' the structure and in the personal. c01I1position o! the most 1111pc:'.•;:aut g-ov­ e:rnmcmtaJ. in.s-liitut;iona of the USSR. Tlle meaning o:t -t,hese elumgos :l.L'J n:::i; ;yl'l'li clear in detai1, but there ce.n no longer be any doubt as to the general line they have t&ken, an ever greatei• concentration of power in the hands of stal:i.n--­ himelt is tGld.ng� e. buring ihe war he mil> al-ready, io all intents and pur­ h poiea, a dlcta£or, w. , unlimited powers, but at that time this w.s comd.dered as a temporar,y- atate of affairso It has now been made permanent.. fho i.lSSR hos ncm- c::1terod upon a perlcd of personal. p:i.ctatorsh:l.p in form as well as :, " practice. Tho meat 14.-po�·tant of the rec�r,t innovations ere: (a) Ueaaures which lega1ly :u'i'i1n stalin•s position as to the top nlead.l:ll'" (this title, borr017Gd from the !talo-Qerman FasciElt terminology, it? now .in universal uee in oi'.fil":l.al Sov.Let literatui•e} 9 who stands high above al'l oliher state functionaries, and in whose hands are concentrated the maJ.11 thre!A�s or :itate, party, &.nd military governmen·t;., (b) The transformation of nlr:lost all the n:embers of the hig'- 1st organi�,.,.tion of the ruling party., the :Politica.l Eurea.u of the Ctmtral Coimnittee of t>e All­ Russimi ColDIDWlist Pa,.-ty., men VihOse status ,w,w p1•svlously., i'orne.J.Jy at ;, . a.st, equal to Sto.lin'a, into the l.s.tter¥s 11 aubatitutes A :ln vai·lous gove:rnme::·_u. i'wwtions., in other woros, into Stalln 1fl intetlc,rs in the state hierar,:izy-. (_, (o) Th<? creation of a speciF..u. boc'W Vlhich hes charge of all the count:ryin mili­ tary af'fail"S - "The Ministry of the Armed Forces of tlle ussa11 - which �,.nducts all '.1orlc connect�d m.th preparlng ·tha country !or a.r111C.-d conflict with outside enemies. This ministry ie headed by 11aener·allsairno n s·talin himself', w� has chosen ns hi::: aasiatants the meat brilliant milltary command1.,1r1:1 of t,he ;;ar. The. word 11nafens011 ha.CJ bet:n c,;rdttod from the ne.me of the Miniat:ry, and comments in the Soviet pres::i 1nake it clea.r that ·thio omtsaion is a ,deliberate pm�� and poli'liioal in character: th:1 tasks of the new rn:lnistcy are Mt 0011£:1.ned �· praptiring the country merely fol' deferiseu r I ST,\TE WAR ( d) The complete 11:ltera.tion of the structure of t,he OrganizationuJ. Burf'l!�_,.l o£ thB Coumunist Fart.y, that most iinportant body ...,hich dirE.-Cts rul the 1ri i· ir work of the party and diatrlbutea �he J>arliy .1'01.'Cea ( �ndres).; both in 1'01'2u IUld :Ln fe.ct StaJ.in iti the head of this bureMUo CLASSIFICATION SISCRET 0ISTAISUTI0N 1 I · 1 11 II II :...:,___ __ l Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A006000360009-0 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This material contains Information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, u.s.c. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which In any manner to an unauthorized person Is prohibited by 25X1 SECRET COUNTRY USSR SUBJECT Comments on the Change in Soviet Leadership REPORT ------ -------�' � DATE DISTR. 2 NO. OF PAGES REQUIREMENT NO. DATE OF INFO. 25X1 RD REFERENCES jThis is UNEVALUATED Information! c.01111ri: EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. 1. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. 25X1 Even in Stalin's time there was collective leadership. The Western idea of a dictator within the Communist setup is exaggerated. Misunderstandings on that subject are caused by lack of comprehension of the real nature and organi­ zation of the Communist power structure. Stalin, although holding wide powers, was merely the captain of a team and it seems obvious that Khrushchev will be the new captain. However, it does not appear that any of the present leaders will rise to the stature of Lenin and Stalin,so that it will be safer to assume that developments in Moscow will be along the lines of what is called collective leadership, unless Western. policies force the Soviets :to stream­ line their power organization. The present situation is the most favorable from the poin:t of v:i.ew of upsetting the Communist dictatorship since the death of Stalin�·· 2. There wi'll not be a dramatic purge. Inasmuch as the MVD has already been cleaned up and the Party and .the Army have not been in the hands of Malenkov's favorites, there can be expect'ed only a normal replacement of officials in the reorganization of the top-level administration of the Party and the Govern­ ment. 3. It is hard to draw any parallel between present events and those of the 1920 1 s when Stalin was ascending to power. rrhere is now no organized opposition inside the Party or in the Soviet Union in general. As the Communist rulers, and evidently also the Soviet people, see it, there is a grave outside menace. 4. Since the death of Stalin and the blow which was given to the power of the secret police, the Soviet internal situation has been in a state of flux. The new Soviet setup needs time for consolidation. The struggle between national-minded "Titoist" elements in the Soviet leadership and those who think in terms of the more orthodox international line is still going on. 5. No improvement in the food situation can �e expected. The promises of Malenkov to improve the poor material conditions of the masses were not kept. Inasmuch SEC T STATE X ARMY NAVY AIR FBI AEC (Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".) ][N]lr©�M#\u�©lNl ���©�¥ ---,---'------------�------------'�-...,.... ----· -v'R'>�"""'---"-'-------------Approved For Release 2008/02/26: CIA-RDP80-00810A006000360009-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/31 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002800120002-6 SECRET CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY THE SUCCESSION OF POWER IN THE USSR ORE9 13 January 1948 Copy No. )-'"i�- (JI) 5 C SECRET _,.,.. �9t'.':l�9 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/07/31 : CIA-RDP78-01617A002800120002-6 , ., Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000200330007-6 ,..; 25X1A8a ALL PIEll) STA'l'Iors CONCER.Um T01 P'ROMa SUBJPm: 25X1A2d1 Atto.ohed mmhange Paper, entitled "P'urthf.a9 Evidtm@• on Stalin 9 s Jlol<, 111 Om-rent � Indoo1rl.m:t1on" (E'-12) lo Tha attached paper is thG eeoom and timl in the emu begun 'With "Stalln° a Role in �t ·Par't.7 Indoctr:1m.tion and . rteoruitmant• (E-ll) .. 2,, It ia s1.1ggeoted that, 1n tnnsmitting the paper it be 3o Such ohanpa should 1noludei ·pointed out to the reoipimt that we should. like-, rcic;!ve re­ fH'.G."t. on tbe loao.l situation insofar aa aignifioant cbt.ngee oon-­ cern1ng the patt«rn preaented can bo o'bae.'l"Vl4o (a) disappearance ot Stalin•a writing indootr1naM�J (b) ·emergenoe of nGV (o) rrom Partq Pa1"tJ' 1-tboolm; inorea.e!ng use of Stalln1 s vorks o .. s■- Sanitized - Approved For Release : CIA-RDP78-00915R000200330007-6 Approved 1-,r Release E�78-00915Ri80400410002-0 g INDICATIONS THAT IN MID-JANUARY 1956 THE CPSU PRESIDIUM REACHED THE DECISION TO ATTACK STALIN PUBLICLY 1. A review of Pravda and Kommunist and spot checks of Izvestia and the Cominform Journal between l October 1955 and the advent of the CPSU 20th Congress (14 February 1956) reveals that all public favorable mention of Stalin by Soviet Communists ceased as of 23 January. Prior to this date press treatment of Stalin still conformed to the old party line established in July 1953, whereby Stalin was pictured as the11great continuer of Lenin's cause". The halt in Soviet references to Stalin three weeks before the opening of the 20th CPSU Congress and approximately one month after Khrushchev and Bulganin returned from their Asian tour indicates the CPSU Presidium :reached at this juncture a decision on the subsequent overt attack on Stalin. 2. The pattern of positive references to Stalin prior to 23 January 1956 is evident in the following quotations, which include those from speeches by leading Soviet Communists in November, December and January: a. Kaganovich, who addressed the Moscow Party's city organization at the 6 November celebration of the 38th anniversary of the October Revolution, and who spoke before an immense dual portrait of Lenin and Stalin, made four references to Stalin in his speech: the teachers of the working class, Marx-Engels­ Lenin-Stalin •.• 11 11 • • • After his death, the Communist Party which had been built by Lenin continued, under the leadership of his faithful co-worker the great Stalin, to bring the Lenin plan into actuality. 11 11 11 • • • the great ideas of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin... 11 We shall continue to walk the path to complete victory under the banner of Marx-Engels -Lenin-Stalin. 11 11 b. Pospelov, who wrote a review of II The Decembrist Armed Insurrection of 190511 for the 21 December edition of Pravda, listed Stalin as one of "the powerful figures in the Party who took part in the organization and direction of the armed struggle11 in 1905. Approved For Release: CIA!itiiftfo191sR000400410002-0 HAR 1952 51.;.4 i.; STATINTL Approved For Release 2002/06/28: CIA-RDP78-04864A000300050014-8 CLASSIFICATION FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY INFORMATION FROM FOREIGN DOCUMENTS OR RADIO BROADCASTS COUNTRY COMMUNIST CHINA SUBJECT INDICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL VULNERABILITIES REPORT NO. I._____. CD NO. DATE OF Mar. 9-15, 1953 INFORMATION i �R.d HOW PUBLISHED DATE DIST. WHERE PUBLISHED NO. OF PAGES 4 DATE PUBLISHED I SUPP LEM EN1 TO RE,POR.T NO. LANGUAGE l'INI. ; 'o, THI UNI TEO ITATU, WITHIN THI MIANINO o, TITLE 11, UCTIONI .7,lf ;t.NO' 7U, Qr THI U,1, COOi, Al AMINHO, ITI TRANIMllll•ON· 0� �l�I• ; ,\.ATION o, ITI CCNTINTI TO 0� �ICll�T IV AN UNAUTHO�IZIO' �l"ldN l'I ,,HIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION SOURCE Monitored Broadcasts CPW Report No. 6, -- COMMUNIST CHINA (Mar, 9 - 1,, 19,3) CLASSIFICATION FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY STATE ARMY 1'153 ILLEGIB r .. �anitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600150114-8 ·- c� CLASSIFICATION CENTRAL �� REPORT 50X1-HUM CD NO. COUNTRY SUBJECT Politie al - Foreign policy, Caminmist Part.� personalities DATE OF INFORMATION DATE DIST. b NO. OF PAGES .Mar 1953 Apr 1953 50X1-HUM 2 SUPPLEMENT TO REPORT NO. ■ '1111 m<UM'INT CG.UJU ,1'1111,tJHAflQ,B an1cn•• ffl uno,J.A;. Da:Fl II �, nu IIUIITIO IV"RI tnnn• fMI ■U.11H o, Uf'tOIIAH ..(?;1' to 1, 1. -t., Ii AJi� 11, U 11>•fllDHI. ITf TUlll �J.'�Jr.-1! 01 ,,_I IUIYIIJ,Ti-01! Ot 1ft. CC)tHIUITI 1·l Hf ■l',H!Jlt N) ,U &:¢U.Wtllll'JIIIH Pit.ION A'f. f'RG• HllltlD H UW. QfflCHCTIOW 'lit HI! PC"H ,II HfiltU!IJID. THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION ■ 50X1-HUM MAJ'..EIU..OV AND STALill'8 DEATH It ia posaibl:? that the advent to pave..- in the United Sta�s of the Repub­ lican Par.ty and the Eioenhower Administration, llDd the active efft)rts, connected vith this, to organize the armed forces ot the US and the democn.tic countriP.B r..ave :.i.ade the yo-;mger Kremlin rulers• (Malenkov, Berlya, Bulganin, et al..) decide to attack the \lest before it bu time to prepare it■elf for defensl!!. Malenltov and Derlya l!.noll" tbet-1.'l!e USSR, vith China IIJld the SateJ.11tee, baa at present a military •�riority- avf!.r the US end the West vbich in armed cc:cnict llight gi.ve the Kremlin a dec:l.ei•re victory (enable it. to seize Europe and .A..aia). s�.a.lin, cautiOUD by nature, could ac!ll'Cely agre9 Vitb t)lis poim; of vlev; . be avoiued the risk of a major var, for, aa a true Marxist-Leninist, he vu convinced that the ��isting vorld situation WO'J.ld sooner or la�er les.d to llJl econcaic crisis it. the capitalistic vorl.d, e11pecially in the US., and. finally to a triumph of Cam111miB111 throughout the vorld. Stalin believed in t� inevit.abUity­ of the crisis and of the <lovnfall of capital.ism. He just developed Lenin'111 pr:..nriplP.b -- worked out methods to foster and intensity the .:risis of capital.i1m Vi thout l"isking a major var "w'ith ii. Stalin respected � faared 03 econooic power. tbdoubtedly, Stalin knev of th� iucllnation U10ntl the young maben of the Pol itburo to take advantase of tbe pre1ent unprepared state of the West IUld to start e. var b<efo:re the organization of a European UW1J thl'I reato.-ation of the military :;,c:,ver ot Wett Oe%111&DY and Japan. 'l'be 'f'cn:.Dg __,.n or the Pollt,buro do net h&ve the Sll&UI fa.1"'.h 1n i:.he principles of lllarx1D-t.en1n1a. u djd Stalin l'l.Dd the Lenin �•nerat1.on ot »ol.lhevib. Xa.lelilcoT, Beriya, Bulpnin, am the o+.hers believ� that capita1ism has vithin itself the ponr to cb&Dge its fOl"IIIB am rnr_, -�·�,,..::�L.,'"·�.,::J;:11/��2;��:,:i�::@tf· . l - CLASSIFICATION �•.·-.��:�=.::�����:::t.;;��.12.r::::���.:;�:_: :i;:·. . Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/16: CIA-RDP80-00809A000600150114-8 -J_ .� .....-.... Approved For Release 2006.{Q� Ftu)E�IJAdso1676R004000050088-9 f _ ._, � Ril9Lsnt] ¼1st 3 Security lnformallon � . 24 April 1953 MEMORANDtM FOR THE DEPUTY DmECTOR/CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE 25Xl SUBJECT: Meeting of l .... ______,lconsultants rsation of this Mon, the our 1. Conf j next meeting ofJ the : ; Consultants will be on and 7. Most of our group Wednesday and Thurs a:y, 2. On Wednesday we shall discuss the current Soviet peace 11 tactics and probable reactions in the non-Connnunist world to these tactics. As background, the Consultants will have read the minutes of the last meeting, of which a copy is attached,! I 25Xl 25Xl 11 3. I hope very much that you can attend. We can make arrangements for transportation and for a room at the Inn. 25Xl 25Xl [v10RI/CDF F'aqes 2-'1 ·1] -:_ONFiDEi�TiAl Security Information "--' Ap roved For Relea':: 2006/09/21 : CIA-RDP80B01676R00400�ts'cJcfs's�9 ( /� ;"ZZ; �. ... ' 76R004000050088-9 Approved For Relea�e 3006/09/21 : CIA-RDP80B016 � 25X1 -�= ..,,,; muJwmJLT/\NTS' · DISCUSSI<Jl Cl1 l.0-19 UARCH OF SE-39 COl·!IM1!E!IOES Oil 1!!E llE/ITII OF �AUK AIID OF THE Eth'V'ATION OF WlLEI'lKOV 41'0 .LEADERSHIP DI fflE USSR" (10 March 19SJ) l.. The. discussion . focussed on 1he qUeetion of transfer ot power in the USSR and, epocii'icaJ.li, on whether and with What dearee ot risk the enortll)us. power concentrated :tn Stalin personally could be transferred to a succesaor or suocessorso 'lhe majority ot the consultants leaned to the View thm;. in the process or solving the tZ"anster ·or powor .prot;ler;i, the Soviet s,stem would probably be weakened. In this re"PGct, . the msJority doparted from the vin which has gersrnlly · obtained in O/NE, that the trans.fer of poN8l" would probably be aeoor.ipllshed vtithout weakening the continuity and e.tfeat1venese ot the Soviot state. 2o Broadly speaking, two points of viow emarged from the discussionr ao The inajo:ri ty� with the degree of con.t'idonce varying w1th individuals ., argued largely on tho basis ot historical .analogy that the transfer of power might ahake the Soviet systemo 'Ibey vie11ed the structure or power in the USSR as intenselJr personal. 'lbey said that Malenkov lacks the majeet7 of Stalin and is surrounded by atlbi t1ous and fearM men who ., it they cqw.d, would challenge flhat sppeers to be his pre,.eminent posi tion11 These consul tnnts also believed that a man such as Ualenkov, reared in. the shadow or Stalin, m6Jy' have qualities and de.flciencies which would make it difficult tor him to succeed to Stalin's pomrD These c9nsulta1:1ts conceded, however. that despite the dangers which they saw menacing the Soviet system, the trnnsi'er or power mq nevertheless be effected 111 thout damago to the ayutem.:i bo The contrary vieW was based upon nn analysis of Soviet society itself, and concluded thar. tb.ere was little or no prospect that the transfer of power would shake or .....,, __,, R0040000 Approved For Release 2006/09/�-RDP80B01676 50088-9 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771R000200300001-3 • MATERIALS FOR EXPLOITATION OF SOVIET SENSITl VI'l'IE::> REVEALED BY THE 30 JUNE CPSU RESOLUTION AND OTHER SOVIET STATEMENTS • July 1956 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771R000200300001-3 Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771R000200300001-3 A P P E N D I X CRITICISMS AND QUESTIONS RAISED BY FOREIGN COMMUNISTS IN THE COURSE OF THE DE-STALINIZATI0N CAMPAIGN The material herein has been organized to cor­ respond generally with the organization fol­ lowed in the body of the paper, The preponder­ ance of American and Italian materials is ex­ plained by the fact that Communists in these countries have raised the most penetrating ques­ tions. Extensive use has been made of quota­ tions from Pietro Nenni, the leader of the Italian Socialist Party, which has been in close alliance with CP Italy. Approved For Release 1999/08/24: CIA-RDP78-02771R000200300001-3 NSC BRIEFING SOVIET DESTRUCTION OF STALIN MYTH I. Clearest view of recent events in USSR comes from hard look at known facts, and recent history. A. Fact that, during three years since his death (5 Mar'53) Stalin's position has been undergoing gradual and calculated alterations. 1. Pattern consisted of playing Lenin up, Stalin down: campaign was rolling by Jan '54 (Lenin's 30th anniversary), when Stalin was described as 0 continuator of Lenin s cause n , rather than independent genius of equal stature. 2. I By time of second anniversary Stalin's death (5 Mar '55), day went by almost unmarked. B. Thus, Stalin myth already well-whittled even before Feb '56 Party Congress. Nonetheless, this occasion-­ first meeting of Party rank-and-file since Stalin's death--was first when really major, although oblique, blows were publicly stnuck at remnant of myth. 1. \��ij@Ut a11!'1111i:l!1 iiaJ:1aa.:iu9s1.iMiiS ·, Khrushchev �t,,.u,;,& mat;le §PY1�1iiPti- bQi�.iFw,_;fl•rt..-ele ''restoration of the norms of Party life elaborated by Lenin, which have previously been often violated." Approved For Release 1999/09/0 P80R01443R000400310002-3 ��'¢lit;> - - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/26 : CIA-RDP83-00586R000300150023-0 I.HE Cill/JlliE._01!' DF,i�r.INIZATIQli .., . .lli_SOVIET DO!�TIC PROPAGANDA THROIJGE 8 February 1957 JUN]_l: 1956 I. Introduction Th_e Problem for Soviet Propagan9.s. Stalin! Always we iieaz· in our souls his dear name. And here in the Kremlin, his presence touches us at every step. Vie walk on stones which he may have trod only quite recently. Let us fall on our knees and kiss those holy footprints. from THE RUSSIAN LAND, published by the Komsornol in 1946. Thousands of workers :::-epresenting generations of Soviet people are marching past; their life flons under the sign of love and gratitude to Stalin, Stalin--the beginning and end of our life. from Radio J{;oscow 's account of the celebration of tt.e 35th Octo­ ber Revolution anniversary, 7 No­ vember 1952. The public defamation of Stalin launched at the XX Soviet Party Congress in February 1956, setting off a chain of repercussions that continue to threaten the cohesion of the Soviet Bloc, confronted Soviet propagan­ dists with a challenge of extraordinary magnitude. The propaganda appa­ ratus, which since 1929 had been using its full resources to promote the adulation of Stalin, had now to direct its efforts toward minimiz­ ing the dangers and reducing the liabilities inherent in the process of destroying the infallible idol it had itself helped to create. For 25 years, the peoples of the Soviet world and mernber-s of fol'eign Communist parties had been taught to bow to Stalin as "the greatest genius of mankind" and to accept all his dictates 11ithout question. By the time of Stalin's death, his image had been firmly established in the pr-opaganda as that of an all-wise, all-knowing genius whose knmvledge was supreme in almost every conceivable field, from politics, history, philosophy and science to folk-singing and stocl,breeding. He was hailed as the inspirer of all the successes of the Soviet Union and the international Communist movement, including the winning of World War II. Three years after his death, Soviet propagandists were called upon by Stalin's heirs to tear down this overpowering image. That they have not been altogether successful is manifest in the recent events in the Satellites and is attested by signs of "re-Stalinization" in the Soviet world. Cautious Deflation 0£ Stal�n•s Image After His neath Following Stalin's death, a decision to deflate his image to some de·• gree was reflected in the propaganda's deemphasis of the Stalin cult and grea�er attention to Lenin. . But there was no evident pl'Opi:iganda prel?aration for the open attack on Stalin at the XX Congress, no indi­ cation in the propaganda that a step-by-step process of denigrating Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/08/26: CIA-RDP83-00586R000300150023-0 Approved F_or Release 2001/08/28: CIA-RDP78 -0QiH5R000500130009 � -3 SECRET NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL BRIEFS ON INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM 1957 - II - New Information on Khrushchev ts Attack on Stalin at 20th CPSU Congress 11 March 1957 Approved For Release 2001/08/28: CIA-RDP78 -00915R00 0500130009-3 SECRET NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL Approved For Release 2004/02/13: CIA-RDP80-00810A001500150002-7 ... CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY This DQcwnent contains information atrectinc the Na­ tional Defense of the Unite<J State,, within the mean­ inc of Title 18, Sections 793 and 794, of the U.S. Code, u amended. Ita tn.nmilulon or revelation of ita con tenta to or receipt by an unauthorized peraon Is prohibited by law. The reproduction of this form ls prohibited. INFORMATION REPORT 25X1 -----------...::::====::_______________ SEGJ:?"'1E;£.......,..A =====------....l L 25X1 25X1 COUNTRY USSR REPORT NO. SUBJECT Foreign Policy Implications of Stalin's Death and the Doctors' Plot DATE DISTR. 18 June 1953 NO. OF PAGES 2 25X1A 25X1 REQUIREMENT REFERENCES I I ;- , THE SOURCE EVALUATIONS _IN 1HIS lt901tT ARE DEFINITIVE.' THE A.Pl'lt.AISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE. (FOlt «.EY SEE REVERSE) 2 5X1 I I 25X1X· 1. The new regime that was set up after Stalin's death has been formed by two strong men ., G.M. Malenkov and L.P. Beriya ., who have been bound by a long friendship and complicity. This regime has come into power by a real coup d 1 eta� and has destroyed the Stalin structure of government and t,he',9omin.imist Party organization which had been e�leoted at the 19th Party Congree1 according to the dictatorial "'.tahes of Stalin. It is doubtful that Mal.enkov 1 s real position V1as as strong as was indicated by the fact that he had been proclaimed the hE"lr :-i Stalfo by the international. press and even by Stalin himself. It is highly probable that Stalin, irritated by and suspicious of the clamor for an heir apparent, had selehped,.Jiueako¥tilel!ely to guiet the clamor and to. wait for further developments when other provisions .could be m&de. In any case ., if the composition of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CommW1ist Party had been favorable to Malenkov and Beriya ., there would have been no need to reduce it to approximately a third (36 in the original, now cut to 14) in such a. drastic and sudden manner. It was probably' ·� ;· done because Malenkov and Beriya f'el t that the Presidium could not be trusted. The same argument can be applied to the reduction of federal ministries by about 50 percent. 2. 3. I It has been rumored;th�t, in his last few days., Stalin had been extreme+y nervous ., almost as though he felt death to be near. He may have had an intuition that the noted doctors were incorrectly treating him deliberately on specific orders., and after their arrest. he forced them ., with approprfate, methods ., to confess to being nzionist agents and spies". He then capitalized on the event to accuse the United States of being connected with the plot and adopted the Tsarist trick of employing anti-Semitism to gain the sympathy of the people. It•is certain that the seeking of Arab_ s_upport was se,condary. I In the light of ,.rec�nt. events ., however ., the possibility cannot be excluded that Stalin may have designed the doctors' arrests as a step against Malenkov and STATE E� X I ARMY I I X NAVY SE CRETJ I I X AIR X I FBI I AEC - Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Releas� _?Q1_?�0�/28: CIA-RDP78-030?1AQgg1909_1.9_903-s 50X1-HUM STALIN'S UNRULY GHOST I some forms of Stalinism* have regained ground in the USSR since early 1965. Such gains are noticeable in the cultural, political, economic, and military spheres, as well as in the distinctly less unfavorable press treatment of Stalin and his era. Evidence of a trend towards reviving Stalinism, as well as of opposition against this trend, is discussed below and is given in greater detail in the attached survey. Whereas the consistency of the evidence is convincing that there has been a step back towards Stalinism by the power establishment, it is dif­ ficult to measure the extent of such a reversion. Similarly, there is evidence of determined resistance to Stalinism by a broad range of intel­ lectuals but it s strength cannot be easily measured, Nor can opular refto strike 50X1-HUM . actions be gau,q;ed. But it is not the purpose the balance between the forces for and against Stalinism. Rather, it is to provide the background of an issue that now plagues the leaders of the USSR** , and is expected to continue to cast a long shadow over the future of the Soviet society. I _ *We call STALINISM the degenerated form of the "dictatorship of the prole­ tariat" wherein the power of the class, or of the party, is replaced by one-man rule and wherein the other dignitaries of party and government, even in the top echelon, are reduced to mere yes-men and tools of the dic­ tator. The decision-making processes that result from the whims of one­ man rule are incompatible with the original teachings of Marx and Lenin and are devastating not simply in the expenditure of human life but, even more important for the whole society, politically and historically. **Neither Brezhnev nor Kosygin has made a meaningful statement of policy concerning Stalinism; however, as will be pointed out, there is clear evi­ dence that Brezhnev at least has considered Stalinism to be a major prob­ lem. SEC RET n Cont . ) 50X1-HUM Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400010003-5 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400010003-5 li.Ue,uo u .L;;,vv Stalinism*; Past and Present Stalin's reign of 30 years left deep imprints on Soviet society: his influence and the self-serving interests of the CPSU bureaucracy have resisted subsequent efforts to eradicate the effects of his policies and personality. These efforts, usually termed de-Stalinization**, have been sporadic. Right after Stalin's death the Malenkov regime adopted policies which differed radically from Stalin's. Khrushchev, in bidding for and rising to power in 1954 and 1955, urged and then reinstated some of Stalin's policies (e.g., the clear-cut primacy of heavy industry). During most of his 9 ½ year reign however, Khrushchev's policies led the USSR away from Stalinism -- a development ,dramatized by his denigration of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress in 1956 and his removal of Stalin's body from its resting place next to Lenin's in the Kremlin mausoleum during the 22nd Party Congress in 1961. When Brezhnev and Kosygin assumed power in October 196� they at first paid less attention to Stalinism than to Khrushchev's "subjectivism." Begin­ ning around the first of March 1965, however, evidence has pointed to a shift away from de-Stalinization and towards policies which smack of a Stalinist flavor. In the realm of literature, the most forceful reminder of Stalinism is seen in the Sinyavsky-Daniel Case. The sudden move of the KGB to arrest the authors in September 1965, their 5-months' detention incommunicado be­ fore the trial, the patently rigged trial in February 1966, the harsh sen­ tences of 7 years at hard iabor for Sinyavsky and 5 years at hard labor for Daniel, and the tenuousness of the charges -- producing anti-Soviet propa­ ganda -- all conjured up a grim image of Stalin's ways. *To some, Stalinism is equated with unprincipled political methods, mass starvation of peasants, blood baths, ruthless dictatorship, police re­ pressions, concentration camps, and thought control. Observers of con­ temporary Soviet society, when speaking of Stalinism, usually refer to such subjects as cultural and political orthodoxy, the degree of central­ ized planning and operation of the economy, and priority to the military in allocations of scarce goods. **Khrushchev deemed elimination of the deadening effects of Stalin's methods and psychological climate necessary for. the institution of pro­ gressive changes in the Soviet society. According to Robert.Conquest, such de-Stalinization could mean the beginning of the end of Soviet com­ munism. (Cont.) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/28: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400010003-5 25X1A2G Approved For Release 2005/08/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030013-2 November 1968 .. NEO-STALINISM IN THE SOVIET UNION " the serious violations by Stalin of Lenin's precepts, abuse of power, mass repres­ sions against honorable Soviet people, and other activities in the period of the personality cult make it impossible to leave the bier with his body in the mausoleum of V. I. Lenin." N.S. Khrushchev at Twenty­ second Party Congress, October 1961 ** *** Double or triple the guard beside his grave, So that he will not rise again, and with him -- the past •.. We carried him away -threw him out of the mausoleum, But how shall we remove Stalin from within Stalin's heirs? •.. True, there are those who hurl abuse at Stalin from the platform, Who secretly at night ponder their former glory... They were the former pillars: with no liking for empty slave camps, Or halls jammed with people where poets recite their verses... As long as the heirs of Stalin remain on this earth, I shall feel Stalin is still there in the mausoleum. From "Stalin's Heirs," by Yevgeny Yevtushenko. The term "Stalinism" has come to signify many things -- the arbitrary rule of a nation by a despot, the rigid control of a nation's economy, the collectivization of agriculture, the massive displacements of minority groups, the purge trials, forced labor camps, manic secretiveness, a mas­ sive secret police system, and, pervading everything, a reign of terror, The word can legitimately be stretched to fit the entire gamut of develop­ ments in the Soviet Union from the late 2O's until Stalin's death in 1953, during most of which time Stalin literally was responsible for every major action. Approved For Release 2005/08/17: CIA-RDP78-03061A000400030013-2 11a-o Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200690001-7 Secret • " DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Report Neo-Stalinism: Writing History and Making Policy Secret No. 1845/69 27 August 1969 40 . Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/29:.CIA-RDP03-02194R000200690001-7 13 September 1967 MEMORANDUM FOR Director of Central Intelligence SUBJECT Forthcoming Book: The Young Stalin by Edward Ellis Smith 1. Thia memorandum is for �nformation only and is in response to your request for an evaluation of a fol'thcoming book entitled The Young Stalin by Edward Ellb Smith (New York: Farrar. Stz-auaT Giroux, 1967). Z STA STA I ley proof• of The Youn& Stalin have been reviewed by of the DDI/Special lleeeareh Staff; hi• review i• attached. J.. ==-===i......,,n,,......,.,,:""l"'.an ce,-:__-_-_-_-��-- - - _--_7finda this book to contain a very eubstantiai -=- reaearch effort. Unfortunately, it appears that Mr. Smith's conclusions are frequently awkward and are not always borne out by the facts he pr•••nta. A great part of the book is devoted to the role of Stalin as a probable Okhrana aaent. Much of the reaearch for The Yowy Stalin was done in Okhraua t!lea rec�ntly opened to ac:holara at the Hoover Library at Stanford Univeraity •• well ae other Ru••ian materials in its collections. Walter Pforaheimer Curator Hietorical Intelligence Collection Attachment Review I S"TIAT I Distribution: Orig & 1 - Addressee w/att. � = �i�:��r.....------- 1:."i-. l -DDI l"' Asst. to Dir. (Goodwin) w/att. ,l • DDP w/att. 7 1 :,; _ {------ �ffi'r�Roliidiioo3ol),i� Approv!i��:Jw2eastos,2ec e1,e,..ROJi __; ) ) Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200810001-3 SECRET 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Report THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP STRUGGLE SECRET 5 July 1968 RSS No. 0030 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/13: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200810001-3 25X1 001-5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP85T01058R000608520 . . I ½�0 G Ccnml�"fp,q, 25X1 � .....,.,.DC.20S()S DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE 20 December 1985 Stalin's Ghost in Contemporary Soviet Politics Su■■ ary After thirty years. the assess ■ ent of Joseph Stalin's historical role re ■ains a controversial and highly charged political issue. The Soviet leadership atte ■pts to ■anipulate the Stalin ■yth to pro■ote regi■ e legiti■ acy--steering clear of any endorse ent of the •negative• aspects of his rule--while elites use the Stalin sy■bol to pro■ ote or oppose policies associated with his na■e. Like his i■■ediate predecessors. Gorbachev has adopted a differentiated approach toward the Stalin issue. He has publicly praised Stalin's warti■e role and the highly centralized and disciplined Stalinist econo■ic syste■• but he has resisted any larger rehabilitation of the dictator. So■ e straws in the wind suggest that Gorbachev ■ay favor a li■ited relaxation of Stalinist strictures on cultural life and on intra­ party policy discussions vhil• iontinuing to tighten the screws on overt dissidents.i� -�� ■ This memorandum was prepared bye___��- - the Office of Soviet Analysis. Comments and questions may �be directed to the author I or the Chief. Domestic Policy Division. on \ SOVA M 85-10221X 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 25X1 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/19: CIA-RDP85T01058R000608520001-5 - -- "- Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200800001-4 <....,..;r--1 '-'-'r·1--� , , -- SEe'.ltEI 25X1 DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE Intelligence Report •' ANNEX: THE STALIN ISSUE AND THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP ST RUGGLE 25X1 RSS No. 0030A/68 17 July 1968 SECRE'f 25X1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/16: CIA-RDP03-02194R000200800001-4