Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : DP62-g0328A000200200006-7 OCI 2156/59 PRL (Guide No. 164) Copy x? 204 PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (PRL) USSR (1 MAY-31 AUGUST 1959) OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY NOT RELEASABLE TO F GN NATIONALS Approved For Release 2000/05/ Pk TA 2- 200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/2;2 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 OCI/CIA PRL (Guide No, 164) USSR May - August 1959 FOREWORD 1. CIA-Periodic Requirements Lists (PRL's), which are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence in CIA, are designed to point up the information required for current intelligence coverage of significant developments during the 4-month period covered by each PRL. 2. Coordination with the Department of State was initiated in 1958 and now includes the PRL's for all the world areas: (a) the USSR, (b) European Satellites and Yugoslavia, (c) Western Europe, (d) Near East/Africa, (e) Far East and (f) Latin America. This coordination on all the world areas has strengthened the value of the PRL's since they now include current intelligence requirements from the Intelli- gence and Regional Bureaus of the State Department, as well as those from the CIA Offices of Current Intelligence,.Research and Reports and Scientific Intelligence. In. addition, the PRL's include major intelligence deficiencies noted in the Post-Mortems of appropriate National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) approved by the US Intelli- gence Board (USIB)- -the principal governing body for US intelligence agencies under the chairmanship of the Director of Central Intelligence Agency. 3. The PRL's are disseminated to the collection components of all USIB agencies. It is recognized that the Lists may, in total, present requirements beyond the mission and capabilities of any single collection facility. However, to the extent that the collector has a capability, it is'hoped that these PRL's will provide effective guid- ance for current intelligence reporting. For those collectors who may not have access to background information,, explanatory paragraphs have been submitted with many of the requirements. 4. To facilitiate and possibly expand the use of the PRL, a l l items contained herein have been classified separately and bear one of the following classifications: SECRET (S), SECRET/NOFORN (S/NOFORN), CONFIDENTIAL (C), CONFIDENTIAL/NOFORN (C/NOFORN), OFFICIAL USE ONLY (OUO), and UNCLASSIFIED (U). 5. Comments on the PRL's are encouraged and should be directed to: a. Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI/CIA, Room 2019 Que Building, Code 163, Extension 2181; or b. Chief, Division of Intelligence Collection and Distri- bution (ICD), Department of State. 25X1A9a Chief, Requirements Branch, OCI/CIA Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA_l DP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) USSR' May - August 1959 PAGE Foreword Table of Cont4ntS USSR: i Ii I INTERNAL 1 XI I ][ I FOREIGN POLICY ECONOMIC 21, XV V MILITARY SCIENTIFIC SOVIET BLOC: I POLITICAL 5,9 XI, ECONOMIC 6:5 III MILITARY Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 . - - 8A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) PERIODIC REQUIREMENTS LIST (1 May - 31 August 1959) I. INTERNAL A. Party and Government 1. The only topic on the agenda of the special 21st Party Congress, held from 27 January to 5 February 1959, was the Seven-Year Plan. The issue of the "anti-Party group" was raised again, however, and the names of Pervukhin and Saburov were linked with the "group" for the first time publicly. The attacks varied in severity from speaker to speaker. (U) a. Were the differences merely variations on a theme, or did they represent real conflicts of view between members of the upper party hierarchy or individual Congress delegates?. The Congress took no further official action against the members of the "anti-Party group" despite the verbal attacks, (U) b. Are any further moves against them contemplated? Is there any likelihood that they will be brought to trial? (U) c. Conferences between key Soviet officials and members of the 70 foreign delegations to the Congress took place during and after the Congress. Information (other than appeared in the Soviet press at the time) is desired on the participants, especially on the Soviet side, and the specific points of discussion. Were there any other unpublicized proceedings connected with the Congress? (U) d. The next regular Party Congress has been scheduled for 1961. According to the Party rules it should be held early in 1960. Why was it postponed? (U) 2. Are there currently any signs of discord or conflict within the Presidium and Secretariat of the CPSU? (U) a. Who among the members of these bodies has the greatest influence with Khrushchev? (U) 3. Existing evidence suggests that each member of the All- Union party secretariat has a fairly well-defined field of responsibility. Brezhnev, for instance, appears to be concerned, among other things, with political work in the armed forces; Ignatov currently with agriculture. It is probable, in this connection, that each secretary oversees the work Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : jil A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/051F22E cA1[ &-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May ?- August 1959 USSR (Continued) I. INTERNAL (Continued) A. S. (Continued) of one or more of the departments of the central committee's apparatus. We are interested in any information on this break-down of responsibilities, particularly the following: (U) a. Aristov appears to be concerned with party cadres in the Russian republic. Is he also responsible for party cadres in the other republics? If not, who is? (U) b. Does Kirichenko have any specific areas of responsi? bility,or is he acting as Khrushchev's second in command on. the secretariat with general responsibilities for all matters involving the secretariat? (U) c. Does Suslov have any direct responsibilities in parti- cular fields of internal affairs? (U) d. Brezhnev's speech at the 21st Party Congress dealt almost exclusively with the metallurgical industry. What are his responsi- bilities in this field? (U) 4. Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee occur at irregular intervals and are seldom announced in advance. (U) a. Any indications of forthcoming plenums, as well as any information about the business of such meetings and the role of the Central Committee in policy making that does not appear in the Soviet press? (U) 5. Yu. V. Andropov, Ya. I. Kabkov, V. N. Malin, A. L. Orlov, and B, N. Ponomarev have been identified as heads of departments in the Central Committee apparatus. (U) they head? (U) a. What are the titles and functions of the departments b. Who are the organizational heads of the following departments: Party Organs for the Union Republics? Machine Building? Transport and Communications? Trade, Finance and Planning Organs? (U) 6. On 20 March 1959 I. I. Kuzmin was relieved as USSR Deputy Premier and simultaneously replaced as Gosplan chief by A. N. Kosygin. (U) Approved For Release 2000/%5/21 : f lft-FtfM 62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 C AYR[ 6F2-OV328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May ? August 1959 USSR (Continued) I. INTERNAL (Continued) A.. 6. a. Any further information regarding these changes? Kuzmin was appointed Chairman of the State Scientific-Economic Council, formed on 28 February 1959. (U) b. Additional data regarding the functions of this coun- cil and what the assignment means for Kuzmin's career is desired. (U) 7. V. Ye. Semichastny was replaced as All-Union Komsomol First Secretary on 25 March 1959. (U) a. What are the reasons for the change? (U) b. What is Semichastny`s new assignment? (U) 8. In recent months there have been shakeups in the party and government leadership in the Turkmen Republic (December 1958), Moscow Oblast (March 1959), and the Uzbek Republic (March 1959). (U) a. What are the causes and repercussions of these changes? (U) 9. K. Ye. Voroshilov, nominal President of the USSR, was seriously ill in February and March 1959. Information on the current state of his health or any indication of his possible replacement are desired. (U) 10. A collective farm congress to revise the collective farm statutes was scheduled last year to take place "early in 1959". As of April 1959 the Congress had not taken place nor received further publicity. Has the Congress been postponed? If so, why? (U) 11. A selected few collective farms are experimenting with a guaranteed annual wage for their members in lieu of the labor-day payment. Information is desired on the implementation of this system and reaction to it at official levels and among the peasantry. (U) 12. There have been obvious signs of disagreement between Moscow and Peiping with respect to the Chinese Communist Commune. Since December 1958 the Chinese have, at least overtly, reduced the ideological pretensions with which they had originally surrounded the commune develop- ment. Concrete information as to the steps by which this reconciliation or compromise between Moscow and Peiping was reached would be of great value. Information on the attitude of ranking Soviet officials toward the commune or other specifically Chinese Communist developments is of continuing in- terest. (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : f l*FLDF*2h90?28A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05V22F, 1A l P -00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) I. INTERNAL (Continued) A,13. We are interested in: a. The exact nature of the "Instructions to Party Organi- zations in the Soviet Army and Navy, issued in 1957, together with the 1958 revision; Instructions to Komsomol-Organizations of the Army and Navy; Re- gulations on Military Councils; Regulations for Marxist-Leninist evening universities and other schools in the armed forces; and Regulations for Political Organs of the Soviet Army and Navy. (C) b. The reason(s) behind the change in title of the Chief Political Directorate of the Ministry of Defense to Chief Political Direc- torate of the Soviet Army and Navy and whether this indicates a change in the subordination of the directorate; (U) c, The extent of party and KGB control in the armed forces; specifically, the relationship and areas of responsibility of the Chief Political Directorate, the Administrative Department of the CC/CPSU, the Military Councils, the KGB Special Sections, party organizations in the armed forces, local party organizations, political officers, and the military commanders; (S) d. The impact and significance of the recent policy that not only shAll the military commander be politically trained, but that the political officer receive military training. (U) e. The present jobs of Army Generals A. A. Luchinskiy and d of Colonels General M. A. Shalin, I, Z. Susavkov and S. M Shtemenko, (U) f. The present status of the GRU and the name of its chief. There.! have been reports that it is being reduced in force or re- organized. (S) B. Security 1. All information concerning the jurisdiction of the KGB and the MVD and their domestic and foreign activities would be of value. (U) We are particularly interested in the following things- a. Any information indicating KGB coordination and/or control of satellite security services; (U) (U) b. KGB operations and responsibilities inside the USSR; -4- Approved For Release 2000/05/22: CCIAR--RE P662-00328A000200200006-7 T Approved For Release 2000/05/225: &A R&P62-Q0328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May m August 1959 USSR (Continued) I. INTERNAL (Continued) B 1. c, jurisdictional subordination and personnel strength of the civil police (militsiya) and the internal troops; personnel strength of the border troops; (U) d. the identities of top and second echelon officials assigned to the central KGB in Moscow; e.g., the names of deputy chairmen and other top officials in addition to Lunev who has recently been again identified as First Deputy Chairman. (U) e. What is the present status of the KGB? Any indications that its powers are being reduced? That it is being reorganized? What significance is attached to the appointment of Shelepin as Chief of the KGB? (U) 20 The system of controls which are exercised over the travel and movement of Soviet citizens is an important indicator of the internal situation in the USSR. Information of this nature would be of great value. (U) 3. A number of measures adopted recently are designed to reduce in various ways the incidence of social evils and petty crime, particularly drunkeness, "hooliganism, and speculation. There is a continuing need for information on the causes of such phenomena, their prevalence, and the effectiveness of the measures taken to overcome them. (U) a. What is the working relationship between the worker's militia and the regular militia? (U) b. To what extent have the former taken over duties of the latter? (U) 4. Opportunities to observe tension between various national groups and mistreatment of minorities have grown as Soviet political con- trols have become somewhat loosened, There are continuing reports of nationalistic sentiments in various areas, discrimination against Jews, and anti-Semitic feelings. These subjects bear further watching to determine whether the regime is making any progress in its proposed ef- forts to correct violations of "Leninist" nationality policy committed under Stalin. (U) a. Are any new measures being taken to reduce tensions between Russians and local inhabitants in minority areas? (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 :4,CI$-WF 2EOO1i28A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 ~C -ADD6T-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May ? August 1959 USSR (Continued) 1. INTERNAL (Continued) B. 4. b. Is there any evidence of a change in the regime at- titude towards manifestations of national sentiment among minority groups? (U) c. A process of Russification of minority cultures has been taking place for many years, attested by various economic as well as potential factors. To what extent is coercion part of this process? (U) 5. The proposals for the reorganization of the educational system on 16 November 1958 included a provision that in minority areas, parents should be allowed to choose! individually whether their children will attend Russian-language or minority-language schools. Study of the alternate language would then be undertaken voluntarily only by those children who felt they could carry the extra work load in their studies. (U) a. How is this provision being received in the minority b. Are parents concerned at having to choose for their children between knowledge of the mother tongue and future professional advantages in knowing Russian? (U) (U) c. Which language seems to be the one chosen in the end? 6. Little current information is available concerning Soviet :Labor camps. (C) (C) a. How many camps presently exist, and where are they? b. What is their population? (C) c. How many and what categories of persons are presently being sent to labor camps? (C) d. Is the labor camp system being dissolved? (C) Approved For Release 2000/05g2N qARR1 P6?-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 CCIRADP690&28A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May m August 1959 USSR (Continued) 1. INTERNAL (Continued) C. Intellectual Expression, Education, and Religion 1. Controls on literature, art and other forms of intellectual expression have continued tight in 1959. There is evidence, however, that many intellectuals still oppose, if only passively, present controls. A regime spokesman at the RSFSR Writers Congress in December complained that Pasternak's fate "had disoriented even some progressive writers, sowing in their hearts doubts about the correctness of our decisions". Complaints about the persistence of "erroneous ideological attitudes" on the part of many writers and about the continued silence of many senior writers "whose voices should have been heard" have also been frequent at the regional writers congresses. (U) a, What are the attitudes of individual intellectual and cultural figures toward the Party's cultural policy? (U) b. Is the opposition of intellectuals crystallized against specific elements of control such as freedom to travel or censor- ship of foreign literature? (U) c. What are the regime's methods of reaching and per- suading intellectuals to recant and reform? (U) d. In what social sectors did the Pasternak affair arouse interest and what were the reactions? (U) e. What types of Soviet citizens have actually read Dr. Zhivago and what are their reactions? (U) f. What modern Soviet novels and poetry is the Soviet public reading? Which ones do they like? Why? (U) 2. Although intellectual disaffection among university stu- dents has evidently abated considerably since the late 1956-early 1957 period, the increase in foreign students visiting the USSR under exchange agreements and the continued insistence on ideological conformity may combine to produce new manifestations of intransigence and rebellion. (U) a, Any information on the state of mind among young Soviet intellectuals is desired. (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 SC EZD 6 -4328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/i2 CCD-FkDl~62-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) I. INTERNAL (Continued) C. ,3. Under the new Soviet law on education published 25 Decem- ber 1958, the much publicized goal of universal ten-year education has been dropped in favor of universal 8-year education. The vast majority of 15 and 16 year olds will go into production work upon completion of the 8-year general schoo]L? Adolescents with the will and stamina can continue their education inevening or correspondence courses and these that last the course can eventually go on to higher educational institutions. Boarding schools are to be increased in number and are to be established on both an 8 and 11 year basis, with greatly increased polytechnical training. The problems of special schools for children gifted in the arts and sciences and of language training in minority areas (see B-5) had ]both aroused special public interest, as indicated by letters carried in the Soviet press, and no decision on either point was announced in December. (U) by the public? social sector'? a, (U) b, (U) c. How is the proposed reorganization being received Is opposition or approval centered in any identifiable What changes in the social studies and humanities curricula are planned? (U) d. Has any decision been reached on the special schools and language training problems? (U) e., Can any individual or social sector of Soviet society be identified with a stand pro or con either of these issuers? (U) 4, The regime cited as justification for the reorganization of education the distaste shown by many of the younger generation for manual labor and the "difficulties" experienced in finding jobs for se- condary school graduates. (U) We need information which indicates; a. Any additional concerns which prompted these changes. (U) b. Amplification of the "difficulties" cited by the re- gime in finding jobs for secondary school graduates. (U) c, Any further light on Soviet youth's attitude toward manual labor. (U) Approved For Release 2000/0)/21 :(Cl-RLPP1162-00328AO00200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22S EgAERQPES-(I0328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May m August 1959 USSR (Continued) 1. INTERNAL (Continued) C. 5. There have been several references in the Soviet press in recent months to difficulties experienced in persuading management in in- dustry to accept as workers minors whose right to special working condi- tions is protected by law. The proposed educational reorganization suggests that this problem will be complicated by additional provisions for time off from work for individuals who work and study, either in the form of a shorter work-day or of a three-day work week. (U) 6, The educational reorganizations proposals also include changes in the vuzes (higher educational institutions). Students are to combine work and study for the first two to three years of their courses, and it has been recommended that qualified professionals in industry and agriculture be released part-time from their jobs to teach while teachers are periodically to leave their teaching to work in the "national economy." (U) a. What are the reactions to students and teachers to these proposals? (U) b, What are the detailed arrangements for "combining work and study" by students and for the exchanges of personnel between industry and agriculture and the vuzes? (U) 7. In an article in the British periodical New Statesman of 21 February 1959, a French professor who had lectured at the University of Moscow in October 1958 reported that at that time Soviet students were much exercised about a new work on the poet Mayakovsky which included many hitherto suppressed poems and showed that he had strongly resisted regime censorship. According to the article, the new work was published by the Soviet Academy of Sciences and was entitled Fresh Light on Mayakovsky. (U) a, What was its effect on students and intellectual circles? (U) b, Is there any evidence that the regime may be preparing to allow publication of any other hitherto suppressed work or to revise its official opinion on any other literary works? Whose? (U) 8. A few scattered reports have been received concerning al- legedly inadequate knowledge of Russian on the part of "many" university students, nationality unspecified, Moreover, speakers at the recent writers congresses have been more than usually caustic concerning gram- matical errors made by writers in their finished work. (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05V 22K- ]ARRIEPM-00328A000200200.006-7 PRL (=Guide No. 164) May ?_ August 1959 USSR (Continued) I. INTERNAL (Continued) C, 8. a. Is there any evidence that these complaints go beyond the usual ones of professors that their students have been badly prepared and of critics that writers are an illiterate lot? (C) 9. In early March 1959 the Soviet Union celebrated the 100th anniversaryo:f the birth of the Jewish short story writer, Sholem Aleichem, by the issuance of a new stamp in his honor and announced plans for the publication of a new edition of his works in Yiddish, the first Yiddish language publication in the USSR since 1948. (U) lished? What? (U) (U) a. b. C. Was this edition of Aleichem's work actually pub- What was the extent of public interest in it? (U) Is any further publication in Yiddish being planned? d. Is there any other evidence of a possible shift in the regime's attitude toward Jews? (U) Approved For Release 2000/05//22: CCIA--RDDP6 -00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/224 BAQF21NQ-db328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) II. FOREIGN POLICY A. General 1. Any indication of Soviet intentions to take unilateral steps? (U) 2. Soviet moves to extend assistance in the atomic energy field to non-Communist states, particularly in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and the reactions and attitudes of prospective recipient coun- tries. (U), 3, Behavior of Soviet Bloc personnel at the UN, particularly statements on disarmament questions and the possibility of UN consideration of the Berlin and German questions, (U) 4. Similarities or divergencies noted in Soviet and Com- munist China propaganda, behavior at international meetings, and general attitudes toward the US, (U) 5. Information that the USSR is seeking to establish diplo- matic relations, negotiate trade agreements, or establish informational or permanent trade representation with additional countries. (U) 6. Soviet interest or activity of any type in the Arctic and Antarctic, particularly Soviet reaction to US proposals for an in- ternational administrative arrangement for Antarctica. (C) 7. Any amplification of the Soviet "peaceful economic com- petition" program or evidence of price cutting on capital goods, with special interest in evidence of intra-Bloc competition or collaboration on bids for development projects in underdeveloped areas. (U) 8. Evidence of Soviet economic pressure upon Finland, Austria, the UAR, Afghanistan, or other countries with close ties to the USSR. (U) 9. Soviet approaches to Socialist parties abroad including proposals for contacts and invitations to Moscow. (U) 10. Soviet intentions in negotiations for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests under international control. (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 :~ IE-FPR620Q28A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05II2E C ilRI POJ-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued) B. Western Europe 1. Information on Soviet Bloc security measures to strengthen the Warsaw Pact or carry out other measures threatened to counter West Ger- man rearmament including the building of missile bases in the Satellites. (U) 2. Any reports of Soviet pressure on Poland to support Soviet foreign policy and to adopt more orthodox measures in domestic policy. (C) 3. Changes in Soviet terms for a German settlement and indi- cations of changes in tactics on the German question, particularly revi- sions'in Soviet relations with East Germany. (U) 4. All developments regarding the sealing off' of West Berlin from East Berlin, closing the East-West German border, Soviet moves to alter the juridical position of the three Western powers in Berlin and har- assments of Allied and West German rail, highway, or air access to West Berlin. (U) 5. Evidence of increasing Soviet efforts to draw Scandinavian countries away from their present Western orientation toward a more neutral course with closer ties with the USSR. Indications of Soviet attempts at a Baltic Neutrality (Security) Pact. (U) 6. Indications of continuing party contacts between the Bloc countries and Yugoslavia. Any sign of a breakdown in state relations or economic boycotts between the Bloc countries and Yugoslavia. Resumption of anti-Yugoslav broadcasts beamed to Yugoslavia. Reports of Soviet at- tempts to isolate Yugoslavia further from the Satellites. Information on the previous history of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and the factors that led to the break. (U) 7. Evidence of Soviet attitude toward De Gaulle regime, particularly Soviet position on the Algerian conflict. Soviet instructions to the French Communist Party on policy toward De Gaulle, (U) 8. Soviet proposals for European security schemes including the Rapackiplan and Soviet tactics in advancing these plans. (U) 9. Reports of Soviet instructions to West European Communist parties and the latters9 tactics in the campaign to prevent the building of missile bases there. (U) -12- Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/225 d1A1h[ 6$-8b328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May s August 1959 USSR (Continued) II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued) B. Western Europe (Continued) 10. Overtures to Italy, particularly proposals concerning Italy's inclusion in an "atom-'free?zone" or possible participation of Italy in any new summit conference. (U) 11. Soviet overtures to Spain, particularly proposals for trade expansion. (U) C. Asia-Africa 1. Indications of modification of the "peaceful coexistence" policy toward Asian neutrals, or of Soviet disillusionment with the poli- tical results of the policy: (U) a. Evidence of greater reliance on local Communist parties in achieving Bloc goals. (U) b. Details of Soviet proposals for a nuclear-free zone in Asia; comments of Soviet officials on this subject, as well as evidence that Moscow intends to initiate negotiations with Asian governments on this question. (U) 2, Information on the status of relations between Moscow and Peiping, particularly with reference to the question of primacy of interest in Far Eastern Satellite matters. Material covering the relations of the USSR and Communist China with North Korea, Inner and Outer Mongolia, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Any evidence that the USSR does, or does not, desire to promote Communist China's relations with non-Communist Asian countries, and efforts to secure more widespread recognition of/and ad- mission of Communist China to the United Nations. (C) 3. Indications that the USSR is discussing on a bilateral basis terms for an Arab-Israeli settlement with the countries concerned, (U) 4. Evidence of Soviet support for certain personalities or factions in Communist China. (U) 5. Japan a. Evidence of Sino-Soviet tactical or policy coordination to discredit the Kishi government on trade, nuclear or fishery issues-?a campaign which began prior to the Japanese elections in May 1955. (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 8- CkA-~Dg6 j 00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 ECCA-RD262+-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) II. FO1.i;EIGN POLICY (Continued) C. Asia-Africa (Continued) 5, b. Evidence of specific Sino-Soviet guidance to Japanese Communist Party on such questions as American forces and bases in Japan and a nuclear-free zone in Asia, (U) C. Efforts by Soviet officials to impress the Japanese with the possibility of extensive trade expansion and Japanese partici- pation in the economic development of Siberia, (C) d. Soviet proposals and expected negotiations for a cultural agreement with Japan. (U) e. New or revised Soviet proposals for a civil Air agree- ment which night be expected to meet previous Japanese objections. (U) f. Evidence that the USSR might allow fishing rights to the Japanese in hitherto restricted areas of the Kurils, as hinted'by a Soviet Far Eastern Service broadcast to Japan on 26 September 1958 (C) a. Evidence of Soviet intentions to fulfill the economic and technical assistance agreement with Indonesia, or of new moves to counter recent improvements in US-Indonesian relations. (U) b. Evidence of direct and/or increased Soviet contacts with the Indonesian Communist party (PKI) or of Bloc propaganda or other moves calculated to discredit Sukarno or Indonesian military leaders. (U) c. Expansion of Soviet scientific or cultural activities or exchanges. (C) d, Evidence of additional arms supplies to Indonesia by any Communist state. (S) 7. Progress in the implementation of Soviet technical as- sistance program in Ceylon, projects under consideration, and any efforts of Soviet officials to influence Ceylonese long-range planning, (C) 8. Evidence of overt Soviet encouragement or political sup- port for the CPI and particularly for the Communist Government of Kerala implying or stating criticism of the internal policies of the Indian Government.. (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 :FCIA-F~Df62F-100T328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued) C. Asia-Africa (Continued) 9. Progress in negotiations with Nepal to implement Soviet offers of economic assistance, especially in the field of civil aviation. (C) 10. Pakistan - a. Soviet efforts to stimulate Soviet-Pakistani trade through direct overtures to private interests. (U) b. Soviet efforts to develop economic and cultural con- tacts in East Pakistan. (C) c. Soviet efforts designed to foment domestic opposition to Pakistani-US defense ties. (C) 11. Travel of Soviet personnel in Kashmir, and attempts to develop direct contact with Kashmiri groups and individuals. (S) 12. Afghanistan - a, Progress in implementation of Soviet economic pro- jects, particularly the Salang Pass road, improvement of the port of Qizil Qala, and oil exploitation around Sar-i-Pul. (U) b. Details on the Soviet military assistance program: equipment supplied; role of Soviet military instructors and advisers; tactical exercises involving use of Soviet weapons. (S) c, Information on the possible establishment of a second Afghan airline and the projected Soviet role therein. (S) a. Evidence of increased Soviet-directed subversive activity in Iran, including support for the Tudeh Party and/or any other groups opposing the Shah's regime. (C) b. Soviet efforts to encourage opposition to the Shah in the Army. (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CALPl~P62-(p3f8A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/$2 ECIp4-1RDJR6200328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued) C. Asia-Africa (Continued) 13, c, Information on any form of Bloc economic pressure on Iran, such ,ass, failure to negotiate a trade agreement in April, withholding deliveries on usual purchases, disruption of construction on the two sugar factories being built by Poland in northeastern Iran, etc. (C) d. Evidence of Soviet military activity on Iran's north- ern border: designed to create "war-of-nerves" against the Shah's regime. (C) e. Any evidence of Soviet moves to end pressures on Iran and improve relations with, the Tehran government. (C) 14, Contracts of Soviet officials with private Turkish busi- ness interest designed to step up Soviet-Turkish trade or to sell Soviet factories and machinery. (U) 15. Contacts of Soviet officials with private Israeli busi- nessmen pointed toward a resumption of trade, (U) a. Implementation of Soviet-UAR economic projects, in- cluding, in particular, details of negotiations on the first phase of the Aswan High Dam. (U) b, Details concerning the establishment of regular com- mercial air service between Moscow and Cairo and of negotiations to buy late model Soviet passenger aircraft for Misrair, (S) c. Details of any evidence of Syrian Communist Party relations with Soviet officials. (S) d. Any information on friction between USSR and UAR over ideological questions and Soviet policies in Middle East, particularly Iraq. (C) a. Soviet approaches to Cypriot leaders. (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/2 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 SCIA-&P61Z00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) II, FOREIGN POLICY (Continued) C. Asia-Africa (Continued) 17. b. Soviet approaches to private Greek firms designed to push sales of Soviet goods in Greece. (U) c. Attempts by Soviet officials to keep alive the nuclear scare in connection with NATO bases in Greece. (C) 18. Arabian Peninsula a. Any attempt by Bloc officials to establish diplomatic, economic, or cultural contacts, either formally or informally, with Saudi Arabia. (U) b. Developments in the implementation of Bloc economic and military assistance programs in Yemen, and the movements of B-,loc per- sonnel to and within Yemen. (S) c. Efforts to influence internal developments or Yemeni foreign policy on the part of Soviet officials or technicians. (S) d. Attempts to develop Soviet-Yemeni cultural relations. (U) 19. Efforts to develop regular Soviet-Sudanese economic rela- tions, especially any Soviet effort to influence Sudanese policy through manipulation of its cotton purchases. (C) 20. Efforts of Soviet officials to establish direct contact with Libyan officials and commercial interests with a view toward estab- lishing regular economic and cultural relations. (U) 21. Iraq - a. Soviet efforts to negotiate a civil air agreement with Iraq. (S) b. Special interest in Soviet efforts to establish commercial or cultural centers other than in Baghdad. (S) c. Evidence of Soviet equipment and military advisers in Iraq, and information on the relations of such personnel, as well as UAR military training advisory personnel, with Iraqi officials. (S) Approved For Release 2000/05/22: C A2Wf -W3F8A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05$22: C A DIP92-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May -- August 1959 USSR (Continued) II. FOR:E:IGN POLICY (Continued) C. Asia-Africa (Continued) :'i:1, d. Details of any evidence of Iraq Communist Party rela- tions with Soviet officials. (S) e, Details of any evidence of Kurdish relations with Soviet officials. (S) f. Any evidence that Soviet officials are in a position to exert controlling influence in Iraqi Government decisions. (C) ;e;2. Morocco - a. Any Soviet activities directed against the maintenance of US bases in Morocco. (S) Morocco. (S) b. Any Bloc offers of economic aid, arms, etc., to c. Any information on relations between USSR and Moroccan Communist parties and other parties and groups. (S) 23. Tunisia - Tunisia. regime. (S) (S) a, b. Any Bloc offers of arms, economic aid, etc., Any Soviet or Bloc activities to undermine Bourguiba`s c. Relations between USSR and Tunisian Communist party and other political parties and groupings. (C) 24. Algeria a, Any Soviet or Bloc activities to cooperate with and support the Algerian Front of National Liberation (FLN) and its provisional government. (S) b, Any evidence of Bloc military support, arms, advisers, etc., to the FLN. (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 S E : C CIA-RE 62-00328A000200200006-7 T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 CFA-RDNY 0&28A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued) C. Asia-Africa (Continued) 24. c. Any Soviet or Bloc activities connected with the Algerian CP or other groupings. (S) d. Evidence that the USSR or any Eastern European govern- ment intends to extend diplomatic recognition to the Algerian Provisional Government. (U) 25. Libya a. Any Bloc offers of arms and economic aid. (S) b. Any Bloc activities directed against the US base in Libya or the Libyan regime. (S) 26. Sudan a. Soviet attitude toward the new regime: Bloc offers of support and approval, or, conversely, and Bloc activities to undermine the regime. (S) 27. Africa South of the Sahara a. Bloc support of regimes in Ghana, Guinea and Liberia; including offers of arms and economic aid, and conversely any Soviet ef- forts to undermine any of these regimes. (S) b. Soviet support, overt or covert, to movements for in- dependence or "national liberations"in British, French, Belgian, or Portuguese colonies, trusteeships; particularly Soviet attitude to Cameroon independence movement. (C) c. Activities of Soviet or Bloc fishing vessels off West Africa, particularly the ports of call and shore activities of the person- nel. (U) 28. Ethiopia, Somaliland, Eritrea a. Soviet or Bloc attitude and actions in regard to Ethiopian-Somali and Ethiopian-Eritrean relations. (S) b, Offers of assistance to above countries or groups. (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : f IAER@Pf,2-20428A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/0512 ECA-fkDD62'-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) II. FOREIGN POLICY (Continued) C,. Asia-Africa (Continued) 28, c. Sign of increase in Soviet propaganda or subversive activity in area. (S) d. Soviet overtures toward Emperior Haile Selassie before, or during, his forthcoming visit to the USSR. (U) D. Latin America 1. Any indications of Soviet efforts to promote neutralism" in Latin America and any reference to the area as a possible "peace zone. (U) 2. Any approaches to Latin American nations for establishment or reestablishment of diplomatic relations. (U) 3. Any implementation of Soviet willingness to extend eco- nomic aid to the area. (U) 4, Any evidence of Soviet contacts with,.or instructions to, Latin American Communist Parties. (U) Approved For Release 2000/05Y2E Q. A- fj -00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22S QIAf pbC-Op328A000200200006-7 PRY (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR, (Continued) III, %I cJNy TaiIC A. Policy, Planning, and Theory 1. Soviet General Economic Policy The best available indicator of Soviet general economic policy is contained in the Seven Year Plan for Economic develop- ment (1959-1965), adopted in February 1959, The plan, reportedly filling 28 volumes, has been made available to the West only in the summary version published in 8 pages of Pravda. Furthermore, as late as mid-March 1959, an annual plan for ` 9 9 has not yet been. published. (Ti) a,, Any additonal information about economic goals for 1965, about the annual phasing of the Seven Year Plan objectives, or about the progress of plan fulfillment in the early stages of the plan, will be helpful in filling out present knowledge of So- viet economic policy. (U) 2. National Economic Planning ao Any information on the actual working, in terms of the Seven Year Plan, of the new procedures for the planning of in- vestment whereby detailed investment plans are to be made up local- ly to comply with control figures for production passed down from the center. (U) ba Information relative to problems arising in con- nection with the census of fixed capital now scheduled for as of 1 January 1960. (U) c,, Current changes in categorizations of investment, in connection with the 1959 budgets, either USSR or republic. (U) do New changes in economic administrative regional. boundaries, their consolidation, or creation of echelons between the sovnarkhozy and RSFSR Council of Ministers. should be reported. (U) eo Any information about the supply sales--snab-sbyt-- system, and especially any changes introduced as a result of the reorganization of industrial management. (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 :LtIT-F DFt2F00T328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/03/22 :(PI-FVP,62-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) Am Policy, Planning, and Theory (Continued) 3. Economic Theory The .proposed formation of an Academy of Economics sug- gests that the role of economists in economic planning and decision making may be enhanced. (U) ao Information regarding current discussions on prob- lems swch as criteria of investment choice, price policy, programs and incentives for technologic innovation, and the adequacy of ex- isting value measures of performance should be reported because they highlight current problems and may indicate the probable direction of future policy. (U) b. Under present circumstances information on the back- ground of individual economists is of increasing importance, hence biographical and career dates should be reported, (U) B. Agriculture 1. Information is desired on total sown acreage in the USSR and the acreage devoted to the various. crops in 1959, (U) 2, What are the crop prospects in the Soviet Union in 1959, especially in those areas in which prospects are'either substantially above or below average? (U) 3, Are there indications that the administration of Soviet agriculture may be decentralized in the near future and the Ministry of Agriculture abolished? (U) 4. How much gain in efficiency is being realized in Soviet agriculture by collective farm ownership and operation of their own machinery as opposed to MTS ownership and operation of the machinery? (U) 5. What prices are to be paid by the state in purchasing the various agriculture products from collective farms in 1959? (U) 6, To what extent is the two-stage method of harvesting small grains decreasing harvesting losses? (U) Approved For Release 2000/0J/2 :CCIJ&-FfbFT62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/225 CEIACRCAP$2-g0328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No 0 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) Ba Agriculture (Continued) 7, The seven-year plan (1959-65) makes reference to a proposal "to make better use of highly fertile land in the zone of stable rainfall" in the European USSR (U)0 a. Does this imply the initiation of a specific program to accomplish this end (e.g. a program similar in scope to the new lands program? (U) b. Or is the proposal purposely only in. vague, general terms with no particular large scale program being planned? (U) 8. The seven-year plan makes reference to the necessi- ty of achieving increased labor productivity in agriculture. (U) as Do the Soviets expect to reduce the Soviet agricultural labor force substantially in the near future? (U) C. Agricultural Machinery Production 1. The Soviet Seven Year Plan stipulates the ever creasing employment of mechanical means in the harvesting of agri- cultural crops o yet, the production of corn harvesting combines has steadily and inexplicably declined in the face of a quantitatively in- adequate park of these machines. The USSR produced 19,000 and 12,400 corn harvesting combines, respectively, in the two six-month periods of 1957. In 1958, only 6,100 units were produced, at least 6,000 of which were produced in the first six months. The acreage de- voted to corn, meanwhile, continues to increase. The possibility exists that the reduction in combine output reflects unsuspected shifts in priority between machines for agriculture and machines for other purposes rather than a temporary cessation of production pending the development of a more satisfactory model. a. Information which might provide an explana- (b)building contribution to tion for use in the agricultural machine the forthcoming Soviet NIE is desired. S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/0%2;k: elA RIjPq,2-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May.- August 1959_. USSR (Continued) III., ECONOMIC (Continued) C. ricultural Machinery Production (Continued) 2. The Soviet Seven Year Plan did not provide quantita- tive output data for any major type of agricultural machine except grain combines (400,000 units). Khrushchev stated in December 1958 that plans for agricultural machinery production awaited estimates of agriculture's requirements. He did not indicate just when the estimates would be completed. (U) a. Do unit production plans now exist for other major types of agricultural machines such as comines for corn, sugar beets, and ensilage crops, cotton pickers, and tractor-drawn and tractor-mounted plows, drills, cultivators, and movers? (U) b. Seven Year Plan data on these and. other a.gri- cultural machines is desired as quickly as possible after it becomes available,. (U) D. Chemicals and Chemical Equipment Production 1. A part of the credit for the successful launching of the Soviet earth satellites and moon rocket has been given to the development of synthetic fuels. (U) a. What fuels and oxidizers are used in Soviet missiles--particularly in the Soviet ICBM and satellite types? (U) 2. Khrushchev has stated several times in recent months that the USSR has ample supplies of atomic bombs and would stop production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. (S) a. Because chemical inputs offer one of the best indicators of output of fissionable material, information is desired on production and consumption of the following key materials. fluorspar, hydrofluoric acid, fluorine, lithium ores and compounds, metallic calcium and calcium chloride. (S) (C) 3. The USSR has started to export fluorspar to Japan, a. What grades and amounts are being shipped? (C) b. Is there any evidence of additional Soviet trade in :fluorspar or other raw materials that may be used in the Soviet atomic energy program, such as, lithium ore or high purity calcium chloride? (C) -24- Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : fI&-F(D2190@28A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) D. Chemicals and Chemical Equipment Production (Continued) 4. The USSR plans to invest over 100 billion rubles in the development of the chemical industry in the new Seven Year Plan (1959-65). Trade agreements with several Western countries have been concluded. (C) a. Will part of this total be used for the devel- opment of support industries, such as, chemical machine building, and if so, how much? (U) b. What part of this total investment is intended for the purchase of chemical technology and equipment from the West? (U) C. From the Bloc? (U) 5. Strenuous efforts have been made by the Soviets in recent months to obtain chemical technology and equipment from the West. (S) a. What kinds of chemical plants and processes are the Soviets trying to purchase? (S) b. What are the annual production capacities? Where will the plants be installed in the USSR? (S) E. Electronics Production - and Automation 1. Recently the Soviet press announced the creation of a State Committee for Automation. This state committee will prob- ably take on some or most of the responsibilities of the abolished Ministry of Instrument Building and the Means of Automation. (U) What actually are the responsibilities of the State Committee for Automation in respect to the production and develop- ment of electronics automation equipment, including electronic com- puters (planning of production, controlling production plants)'? (S) b. What is the Committee's relation or comparison with the State Scientific-Technical Committee and with Gosplan? (U) c. Also, responsibilities of the new State Scient- ific-Economic Council and the Commission for Current Affairs? (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : QIArRlDPV-g;0328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/O5'2E : Cl RE P$2-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. '164) May.- August 1959. USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) E. Electronics Production - and Automation (Continued) 2. In the Seven-Year Plan announcement of November 1958, value figures were given for the planned production of instru- ments, including computers. (Instruments: 1965 18.5-19.2 bil.R., 1958/65.2.5-2.6 times; including computers: 1965 2.0-2.1, 1958/65 4.5.4.7 times), (U) a. What portion of these figures are for electron- ic instruments and electronic computers? (U) b. Do the figures include research and develop- ment in addition to production costs? (U) include? (U) c. What do the terms instruments and computers 3. In connection with inter-Bloc coordination and specialization planning through CEMA, information is required on special allocations of responsibility for the production and devel- opment of electronics products to the individual Soviet; Bloc coun- tries, and their successes and failures in each endeavor. (U) In- formation on the coordination of electronic computer production and development is desired, particularly progress in development of the allocation to East Germany of perfecting input systems for electronic computers for the USSR. (S) F. Electric and Nucle 1. In January 1959, the Ministry of Electric Power Stations was abolished, but no mention was made by the Soviet press of new arrangments for planning and control of electric power produc-, tion. (U) a. Information is desired on changes necessitated by abolition of the Ministry, and on the present system of planning and control. (U) b. Information also is desired on the reasons for abolishing the Ministry at this time. (U) S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 :;CIA-FtDl!62FDM28A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) F. Electric and Nuclear Power Production (Continued) 2. Recent Soviet pronouncements on the nuclear power program indicate that large nuclear power plants are under construc- tion, or planned, at Voronezh, Beloyarsk (Urals), Leningrad, and "somewhere in Siberia," and do not mention a "Moscow area" site as earlier reported. A Soviet map of proposed high voltage electric transmission lines shows that a location appearing to be at or near Mozhaisk will be an important junction of several high voltage lines, suggesting that a large electric power producer or consumer will be located at or near this small town, about 100 kilometers we: +_ .,f Moscow. (U) a. What are the planned target dates for initial and full operation of the nuclear power plants under construction? (C) b. Is there a nuclear power plant under construe-- tion near Mozhaisk? If not,what large electric power consumer will be located near Mozhaisk? (C) G. Fissionable Materials Soviet Premier Khrushchev told Senator Humphrey in December 1958 that the Soviet Union has so many weapons in stockpile that production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes could cease and that some existing weapons would be dismantled. a. Is there any evidence that the Soviet fission- able materials program has slowed down? For example, are there any indications of slowing down or stopping construction of fissionable materials production plants? (U) b. Has the search for and/or the procurement of uranium ore been cut back? (U) c. Have there been large scale shifts in person- nel from military connected to purely civilian or scientific pur- suits? (U) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/6%/2 cClk-FVDIF62-00328A000200200006-7 PRIG _ (Guide NO. 164) May - August 1959._ USSR (Continued) I I I , ECONOMIC (Continued) H. Geographic ? Time Zones In March 1957 a new system of time zones was instituted in the Soviet Union. Recent monitoring of local broadcasts indicates that the time zones actually in use in European Russia differ in many places from the zones which were published two years ago, although no revision has been announced. It is requested that information be obtained on the current relationship of local time to Moscow time for any city in the zone between 380E (approx. Moscow) and 50?E. (C) 1. Guided Missiles Deployment The current international situation Is infused with questions relating to capabilities and intentions to use guided mis- siles. Under such circumstances the chances of a break in forma- tion is Probably greater than otherwise. (C) 1. Recent information indicates that possibly a new type surface-to-air missile Is being phased into the Moscow SAM defense system. (C) a. Any confirmatory evidence of the possible pro- duction send/or deployment of this new weapon Is urgently needed. (C) 2. Recently, information has become available indicat- ing that there are 10 new assembly and/or storage type buildings at Moscow SAM site (NINW?1) which. are similar to two new buildings located at the Istra missile support area. This information is the first evidence of possible ,pon=sitet9 storage or assembly of missile at any of the Moscow sites. W) a. Any Information indicating completion or con- struction of similar storage or assembly areas at other Moscow SAM sites is urgently needed. (5) 3. Information concerning the support of guided mis- sile launrnchiag facilities by any mode of transport or the use of mobile iaunci ing facilities (trains, motor vehicles, etc a) is critically needed, (C) a. Photos and detailed descriptions, including markings, of transport equipment concerned are urgently needed. (C) b, Information on Initial and operational costs of this equipment is also required. (C) Approved For Release 2000/95/J2 aCf -?DD62-00328AO00200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 ::CIA4Wlt2E0M28A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May ? August 1959 USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) J. Insurance - East/West Trade The Soviet firm Ingosstrakh reportedly is expanding its insurance and reinsurance operations in Western Europe. Recent reports state that the premiums charged by Ingosstrakh and Ingos.-. strakh-backed Free World agendies are so low that they are believed to be non-profitable. (C) a. Provide the names of Free World firms backed by Ingosstrakh. (C) b. What rates are charged by Ingosstrakh and th Ingosstrakh-backed firms? (C) c. Provide information that may explain the motivation for charging rates considerably below established premiums. (C) d. Provide information that may confirm or deny the use of the insurance business for commercial or industril espion= age purposes. (C) e. Provide information linking these insurance activities with illicit East-West trade. (C) K. Motor Vehicles Production Articles in Soviet newspapers and periodicals of De-, cember 1958 and January and February 1959 have indicated that new plants are being built, and production of vehicles is being shifted on a major scale in accordance with the directives of the Seven Year Plan (1959-65). It is desired that information on the new location for the production of heavy diesel trucks, formerly made at Yaro- slavl', and on the new plant for passenger car production at Zaporoxh'ye, and on the new vehicle plants in East Siberia be ob- tained. (C) L. Nonferrous Metals Production 1. The Seven-Year Plan indicates plans to increase the output of aluminum, magnesium, and titanium--all metals with potential applications to the Soviet missile program. Aluminum, however, was reported to be in short supply by a speaker at the 21st Party Congress. (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : (NA$21 f2-1bV8A000200200006-7 V Approved For Release 2000/06/21 :(tl -F&F 2-00328A000200200006-7 PRL_ (Guide _No. 164) May.- August 1959_ USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) L. Nonferrous Metals Production (Continued) 1. a. Evidence of the level of actual or planned in- crease In magnesium and titanium is needed. (C) shortage. (C) b. Any evidence to support claim of aluminum c. Also specific evidence of applications of any of these light metals in the Soviet economy. (C) d. Particular emphasis should be given to substi- tuation of aluminum for copper, but need specific examples. (C) 2. According to the Seven-Year Plan, Soviet production of copper in 1965 will be 1.9 times that of 1958. Kazakhstan is one of the most important copper producing areas in the USSR. It was stated for the Sixth Five-Year Plan that Kazakhstan would produce 54 percent of the country's blister and 33 percent of the country's refined copper. (U) a. Evidence of the percent of the USSR's total output of both refined and blister copper to be produced by Kazakh- stan in 1965. (C) b. Also need Indication of the amount` of new capacity to be build during the Seven-Year Plan for the production of refined copper and blister copper. (C) M. Naval Vessel Construction 1. Submarine construction developments: The "2" "W," and "Q"class submarine construction programs have ended. A new class, tide "F"-class, is now building in the Sudomekh Shipyard in Leningrad. It is probable that other new submarine construction pro- grams are also underway in other areas of the USSR. (S) a. Information on new submarine construction proj- ects in the USSR is urgently required. This information should in- elude details of numbers of units building, types of propulsion and weapons systems . (S) b. Are there any indications of nuclear-powered submarines under construction at Severodvinsk or other ship building centers? (S) Approved For Release 2000/R5/J2CC A-?Df 62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 SCI -IRDR6Z0Q328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) M. Naval Vessel Construction (Continued) 2. Possible Guided Missile Cruisers: There are in- dications that the Sverdlov cruiser program has come to an end. Sev- eral of the last hulls built in this program have been maintained in an unfinished state in the Leningrade area. There is speculation that work on these ships has been suspended until suitable guided missile installations are available. (C) a. Information concerning the future of these ships is desired. (C) N. Transportation 1. Rail A total budgetary capital investment of 209-214 billion rubles has been recently announced under the Seven Year Plan for transport and communications. No breakdown was given either by year or mode for transport with the exception of a 110-115 billion ruble figure for the seven year railroad total. (U) a. Further breakdowns, both by year and mode of transport are required. (U) Recent reports of travellers to, from, and within, the USSR give repeated evidence of failure of Aeroflot to maintain schedules on both international and internal flights. It is not altogether clear whether these circumstances are the result of a general below-standard performance on the part of the Tu-104, of lack of patronage, of poor maintenance or of some other cause. The total number of flight cancellations or major delays on main routes for any recent period, moreover, is not known. (U) a. Collective performance data of recent vintage on Soviet high speed commercial is desired, together with major causes of delays and aborts. (U) S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/0S12E :(;l F P$2-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Co)at inued) III. ECONOMIC ;Continued) 0. Aircraft Production and Deployment 1. Soviet Heavy Bombers: a. The BISON four-engine jet heavy bomber was first displayed in Moscow in 1954 and the BEAR turboprop heavy bomber in 1955. Combined production of the two aircraft is estimated to be only abolat 140-150 aircraft as of mid-1958. Production of the BEAR is believed to have ceased by early 1957 and production of the BISON currently appears virtually to have ceased. Information is needed on possible continued production, movements and introduction into units of these aircraft. (S) b. Information is needed on a very large jet air- craft observed at Moscow/Fili airfield in the latter half of 1958 which has been designated BOUNDER. Attention should be directed''to unusual technical characteristics, especially the propulsion system. Information is needed on production, testing, movement and introduc- tion into operational units. (S) 2. Soviet Twin-engine Jet Medium Bomber: a. BADGER - Still being introduced into'operation- al units. Information is needed as to wheather these BADGERS re- present new or modified aircraft and, particularly, if they appear to be modified as tanker aircraft. (S) b. Information also needed on introduction into units other than those of the Long Rang Air Force. (S) 3. Light Bombers : Current information is needed on possible produc- tion and introduction into units of new-type light bombers including BLOWLAMP and BACKFIN. (S) 4. All Weather Interceptor: It is considered probable that the Soviets are en- gaged in some stage of production activity on a new all-weather inter- ceptor. This aircraft, probably designed the YAK-27, has been re- ported since 1956 but has not been sighted by western observers. (S) Information is needed on series on prototype produc- tion of this aircraft and its introduction into units. (S) Approved For Release 2000/95/2?Cci4- tiP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 :BLI-Ft]DR62H)OB28A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) 0. 5. New Attack Aircraft: Foreign vistors to the 1956 Air Show were also shown a static display of aircraft which included two new attack aircraft, both described as very crude in appearance. A twin-jet ground at- tack aircraft, since designated BRAWNY, was described as similar to but larger than the USAR B-26, with slightly swept wings and four- inch rockets mounted under each wing. Current data needed. (S) 6. New Supersonic Fighters: Two new families of fighters, including both sweptwing and delta-wing aircraft were displayed in the 1956 Air Show. Since that date none of these aircraft have been sighted by Western ob- servers. (S) a. Any new evidence on these aircraft? (S) b. The smaller delta-wing with pointed wing tips was designated Fishbed A and the clipped wing version of the same air- craft, Fishbed B. These aircraft were characterized by extensive use of wing fences. The sweptwing version of this fighter, designated Faceplate, has no wing fences. Any new data? (S) c. The larger, more advanced, delta-wing fighter, designated Fishpot had no wing fences visible. The swept-wing ver- sion of this aircraft, designated Fitter, has two wing fences on each wing. Any new data? (S) d. There is no firm information concerning which of these aircraft the Soviets intend to mass produce. Information on Soviet production intentions, testing, actual production of these aircraft, and their introduction into units is needed. (S) 7. Other Fighters: The first line Soviet fighters Fresco (MIG-17), and Farmer (MIG-19) are being phased out of production. Accurate in- formation on the phase out of production of these jet fighters is needed. (S) -33- S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 200WOS21 : $I/ RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 PRIG ' N o . 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) III? ECONOMIC (Continued) 0.18. New Transports: (1) CAMP - A twin-turboprop assault transport, design- ated CAMP. (AN-8), was displayed in the 1956 Air Show. Although it has, not appeared in numbers since then, a model of an AN-8 with a.... different fuselage was on display. at the Brussel's World Fair o 'Infor.- mation is needed which will clarify which model may be going into production. Information also is needed on actual production and in- troduction. into service. (2) CAMEL - the twin-jet CAMEL has been in service on Aeroflot lines since 1956 and also now flies on interna- tional routes> Information is needed on the number now in service with Aeroflot and with the military. Information aisco is , needed on production of this aircraft. (3) CAT - at least three different ver`- scone of the CAT (AN-10) have been reported since this aircraft first was displayed at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957. The AN-10A reportedly is an 100 passenger version and the AN-16 is a 130 passen- ger version. Information is needed on production and introduction into service. (4) COOKER (TU-110) - this four-engine jet transport has been 'derived from the older twin-engine jet CAMEL, Although first displayed: to the public at Moscow/Vnukovo Airfield in July 1957, the aircraft has not been seen in numbers. Information is needed on the possible production and introduction into service (5) COOT (IL-18) - this fourengine turboprop transport was displayed for the first time at Moscow%Vnukovc Airfield in July 1957 and is believed currently to be In series production o Information is needed on possible variants of the aircraft, production, and introduction Into service with Aero- flot or the military. (6) CLEAT - the existence of the CLEAT (TU- 114) first was confirmed by photos in the Soviet press on 3 November 1957, The aircraft, a very large four-engine turboprop, apparently has been derived from the BEAR heavy bomber, Two versions, the TU- 114 and the TU-114D, have been shown since November 1957? The latter :aircraft in appearance is very similar to the BEAR and apparently has a small passenger capacity, The TU-114, although probably derived from the BEAR, has a larger fuselage and can carry from 120 to 220 passengers, Information is needed on possible production of one or more of these models and on introduction into service. (7) CLOD (AN- 14) this short haul, twin-engine piston transport completed-its first test; flight in March 1958 and is believed to be scheduled for series production. Information is needed on production and introduc- tion into service. (S) S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : 6IAERDPB2-E0328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) III. ECONOMIC (Continued) 0. 9. Helicopters: Information.is needed on the production site of the Hook (MI-6) helicopter which was first observed in late 1957. In- formation is also desired on the production site of the small KA-18 (HOG), which the Soviets have stated will enter mass production at an early date. (C) Intelligence concerning production of the Horse (YAK- 25) remains obscure. Only a few of these helicopters have been ob- served since it was first sighted in the 1955 Air Show. Information concerning both production and the production site of these helicop- ters is needed. (C) 10. Aerial Refueling: Information is needed on Soviet development of aerial refueling techniques and equipment, including the development of new tanker aircraft and/or the modification of known aircraft such as xe BISON, BADGER, and the BEAR for tanker use. (S) 11. Unidentified Aircraft: In June 1958 an unidentified aircraft of double delta configuration was seen flying near Ramenskoye Airfield. The aircraft was moving very rapidly and, although no engines were seen, the sound seemed to be that of a standard jet engine. The size of the aircraft was estimated tentatively to be slightly smaller than that of BACKFIN. Further description of the aircraft is needed. Informa- tion also is needed on testing,-possible production, and introduc- tion into units. (S) S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIS-RRP6,2Q0A28AA000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May -.August 1959 USSR (Continued) IV. MILITARX A. Missiles (See also: USSR IV. Military, Section C. Army, Tactical Missiles; USSR, III. Economic, Section I,, Guided Missiles 15eveloPment; and USSR V. Scientific, Section D, Guided Missiles) 1. Information is urgently needed on the produc- tion, testing, operation use, and technical characteristics of guided missiles in all categories: surface=to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to=surface and air-to-air. (S) 2. Surface-to-Air Types a. Information on the air defense missile sites in the Moscow area including construction, training, and operational employment, and indications of alert, (5) b. A more flexible type of SAM system is ex- pected to be deployed at major target cities, possibly utilizing missiles of the type appearing in the Moscow 1957 parade. (5) Existence of defensive missile sites have been reported since 1956 at Leningrad and Baku. Report any evidence of exisiting missile defense facilities or related construction at these, or. other areas 25X1X1 likely to be defended. (S) d. Second generation surface-to-air missiles were observed in the 7 November 1957 Moscow parade., Report evi- dence of deployment of this missile into the Moscow SAM system. (5) 3. Air?to-Surface Types . The USSR is believed to be engaging in a comprehensive development program for air=to-surface missiles in- cluding cruise-types, Report evidence of testing, training and a. Short-range surface-to-surface missiles.(S) 4. Surface-to-Surface Types perational deployment of this category of missiles. (S) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : C*-RPP62jP0J2> A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/Q5/J2 ~ChA-ED t62-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) IV. MILITARY (Continued) A. Missiles (Continued) b. Information on longer range surface-to- surface types is also a priority requirement. (5) 5, Air-to-Air Types a, The USSR has a military requirement for ir-to-'air missiles, although little is known about their state of developnr.9nt. Information on the development, testing, training nd operational use of such missiles is urgently needed. (S) B. Air (See also USSR, III. Economic,.Section 0, Aircraft Production and Deployment) 1. Soviet S ace Research Program: (a) The Soviet Union is known to be engaged In a well-planned, high priority space flight program, although little is known about the locations of the development and test facilities engaged in this program or the experimental vehicles themselves, It is accepted that the USSR wil.1 soon attempt the launching and recovery of a large animal- bearing.artificial earth satellite as a progressive step in the Soviet space research program. Any information regarding such prep- arations or intentions is very valuables (b) Information concern- ing the research and development, testing and configuration of any Soviet manned high-altitude research vehicles is urgently needed. (S) Automation in Air Defense: It is believed that the USSR has underway a program to :eve op an automatic air defense system similar in concept to portions of the US SAGE sys- tem. Any information on such operational facilities as control point s,lines of communication, and equipment likely to be asso- ciated with such a system, together with any ideas on Soviet doc- trine for its employment would be of value. (S) 3, Air Defense for Key Target Areas: The USSR has assigned a compote of conventional an a rcralt forces, fighter :.aircraft and in the case of at least Moscow, a surface- to-air missile complex to defend critical target areas, Con- tinued surveillance of these areas for signs of exercising the equipment, or alerting personnel would be of value. Any infor- mation on how the Soviets intend to employ defensive weapons is of extreme Importance. (S -38- Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIfRRP@2-03814000200200006-7 USSR PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 IV, Military (Continued) C. Army 1, T ctical missiles There is a great need for any informa- tion on missile units. What are their size, organization, sub- ordination, equipment, and role in the parent organization? (S) b. Are surface-to-air missile units being as- signed to tactical units48 How are they integrated into the local air defense plan of the parent unit? Describe their organization and equipment. (S) co Are medium and long range rocket and mis- sile units attached to forward armies during the offensive? How re these missile units grouped (by battalion, regiment, or divi- sion)? What tactical and/or strategic missions are assigned to this type unit? (S) d, Have IRBM bases been established in sat- llite areas? Have plans been made and areas surveyed for the employment of mobile IRBM launchers in Satellite areas? (S) 2, Tables of Organization and Equipment (T/O & E's) How do current (T/O & E's) differ from previous tables for similar units? How many types bf divisions re there in current T/O & E's? Do plans exist for additional types of divisions or will some of the current types of divisions be abolished? (S) bd Is the tank regiment in the various divi- ions identical? Is the motorized rifle regiment in the various divisions identical in organization and equipment? (S) c, What air units (both fixed and rotary wing) are organic to the various divisions? (S) da Has the breakthrough artillery division been abolished or replaced by rocket and missile units? (S) 3, ,:3., Equipment Tanks, assault guns, and tracked vehicles (1) Has a new miniature or light tank been developed or placed in production? (S) -39- Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/0 /2 : &l4 Pf Pp2-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May m August 1959 USSR (Continued) IV.! MILITARY (Continued) C. Army (Continued) 3o ao (2) Has the T?54 tank been redesigned with a new type turret and increased frontal armor? What modifi- cations have been made to the original production model? How is the T-54 tank prepared for deep-water fording? Describe the infa- r?ed equipment provided with this tank, (5) (3) Has a larger gun been placed on the PT'76 tank? What other changes have been made in the basic am- phibious tank? (S) (4) What type assault guns are currently .in production? Has the T?54 chassis been adapted as an assault gun car?ri.age? Are assault guns being phased out in favor of heavy tanks? (S) (5) Is there a new amphibious personnel and equipment carrier larger than the K?61? (S) (6) To what extent have tracked prime- movers replaced wheeled vehicles? (5) ba Artillery (1) Has the new large self-propelled cannon (approx. 300 mm) been introduced into operation units? Describe the recoil mechanism and loading apparatus of each of these pieces. What is the range for the various types of shells for this weapon? (S) gun-howitzer be (2) To what extent has the Ma1.955 203 mm introduced into operational units? (,S) (3)) Has an antiaircraft gun larger than the dual 57 Inim been mounted on a tracked prime-mover? Describe the off- car?riagee radar for the self-propelled antiaircraft weapons, (S) (1) Is under development to replac hands of troops? (S) developed? (S) new family of small arms currently the post-war? w pons currently in the (2y Are new recoiless rifles currently being Approved For Release 2000/0W2&,: LSI f RRP*2-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22: CI9-11DUZO02BA000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) IV. MILITARY (Continued) C. Army (Continued) 4. Political training a. Has the amount of political training for enlisted men and officers been increased in the past two years? How are these periods of training scheduled? Who conducts this training and who is required to attend? (S) b. At what levels of organization is there a deputy commander for political affairs? What is his status rela- tive to the commander? Are many former political deputies now com- manding units? Are commanders attending special courses to qualify them as political deputies? (S) c, At what levels of organization do military councils exist? What is their function and membership? (S) d. Describe the party organization in units below division. What is the relationship between the political deputy and the party secretary? What is the relationship between the military party organization and the local civilian party organ- ization? (S) 4. Is the Main Political Administration directly subordinate to the Ministry of Defense? What is its rela- tionship to the central committee? (S) D. Navy 1. Movement of Submarines: Large numbers of Soviet long range submarines can operate effectively only from bases in the Northern and Pacific Fleet areas. (S) a. Information is needed on the deployment of such submarines from the Black Sea or Baltic Fleets to north- ern or Pacific waters or between the Northern and Pacific Fleets. (C) 2. Surface Operations in Open Waters: The:major Soviet, surface fleets operate either in the restricted waters in which they are stationed, as in the case of the Black and Baltic Sea Fleets, or in waters adjacent to Soviet territory. (S) a. Information is desired on exercises by Northern and Pacific Fleets in waters at some distance from Soviet territory. (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22: ClA DI%2ROd$AA000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/0g/2i :IJ-FfPP2-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) IV, MILITARY (Continued) D, Nam (Continued) 3, Amphibious Training: The Soviet Navy is be- lieved to have only TC1m t apablity for amphibious opera- tions, Such exercises have been reported infrequently., How- ever, within the past year two new classes of amphibious ves- sels have appeared in the Baltic Fleet area. a. Submarine participation in these maneuvers is of ifiterest. Include what role the submarine took in these exercises. (S) 4. Long Range Submarines: The Soviet Navy's long range submarines appear to have extended their operations to areas outside of Communist-controlled waters. (S) a. We are interested in information c3oncern- ing Soviet submarine patrols in international waters and the reasons for these patrols, (C) 5. Fleet Exercises: The specific themes of So- viet tactical and :tleet exert ses are unknown. Intensive training is usually conducted by Soviet naval units during the summer months, ending by October. (S) a, Information is needed on the type of exer- cises undertaken by the Soviet Fleet, and on the proficiency achieved in such exercises, Submarine maneuvers are of particu- lar concern. (C) 6. Atomic Warfare Trainin : Due to the develop- ment of nuclear weapons, would seem likely that- the Soviet Navy would be receiving training in at least the defensive as- pacts of atomic warfare. (S) a. Among the indicators of this type of train- ing would be. lectures,-issuances of pamphlets, washing down or decontamination of vessels, installation and practice-in the use of sprinkler system. (C) 7. Submarine Construction Developments: The 'dZw' "W" and"Q"-class submarine construction programs have ended. A new class, the '?F"-class, is now building in the Sudomekh Shipyard in Leningrad. It is probable that other new submarine construction programs are also underway in other areas of the USSR, (3) -42- Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : C A fQPq-OL03 +8A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 175) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) IV. MILITARY (Continued) D. Navy (Continued) 7. a, Information on new submarine construction projects in the USSR is urgently required. This information should include details of numbers of units building, types of propulsion and weapons systems. (S) 8. Possible Guided Missile Gruisers: There are indications that tfie Sverdlov cruiser program has come to an end. Several of the last hulls built in this program have been maintained in an unfinished state in the Leningrad area. There is speculation that work on these ships has been suspended until suitable guided missile installations are available. a.- Information concerning the future of these ships is desired. (S) 9. Naval Weapons and Ships to Non-Bloc nations: The USSR has transferre a number of warships and naval weapons to non-Bloc nations. (S) a. Information on further transfers of this nature are of interest. (S) 10. Scrapping or Mothballing of Warships: The USSR has scrapped some ships and apparently placed some small ships in mothballs. (S) a. Further information on this subject is desired. (C) S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : C AERPPf 2- V328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 1.64 ) May - August 1959 U SR (Continued) V. SCIENTIFIC, A. General Although the development of Soviet science has been progressing with astounding rapidity in the last few years, the XXI Party Congress in January 1959 laid even more emphasis than before on the importance of science for the material progress to be achieved under the seven-year plan. Soviet leaders aim to overtake and surpass the most advanced Western countries in all fields of basic and applied science. Meanwhile, they plan to concentrate on certain priority subjects, such as: increasing the supply of energy, particularly through controlled thermo- nuclear reaction; advanced theoretical physics; study of outer space; computers and automation; radio electronics; metallurgy and chemistry, especially synthetic materials; experimental biology, biophysics, and biochemistry. Unstated publicly, but understood, is continued attention to all science which supports the development of weapons. The new scientific program also calls for persistence in solving problems of planning and coordination of scientific activities and of geographical dispersal of institutions. (C) 1. Any recent evidence of new Russian goals, progress, success and failure? (U) 2. Specific information as to the intensity of current political., economic and military support to basic and applied science in the USSR, (C) 3. What is the competence of scientific and technical manpower and assignments, particularly in the field of specialization in basic and applied science and for specific ministries and subordinate institutes? (U) 4. Any new projects, planned or under study? (U) 5. Recent changes in Soviet scientific and technical policies or plans. (U) a..: Evidence of increased Soviet emphasis on the appli- cation of scientific and technical assets to develop new or unique methods of aggression, new or improved weapons and new or improved defensive measures. (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/ 2 Ce-jQf 6~-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) ,May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SctENTIFIC (Continued) A 7? Increased Soviet efforts to raise scientific and technical standards within the USSR to provide capabilities for continued advances in the basic and applied sciences and thereby the potential for scientific and technical productivity. (C) g,, Data on increased scientific and technical spending above level;;; previously planned. (C) 9, Any evidence of major changes or advances (break- through) in the fields of priority scientific interest. (C) 10; Current Soviet scientific and technical aid programs to Free World nations. (C) 11, Any details of specific scientific and technical projects of the new Seven Year Plan (1959-1965), particularly those assigned to the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Medium Machine Building (A:E, ministry). (C) The third phase of the Soviet Civil Defense program was scheduled to begin on 1 January 1959 and continue through 1960. Reports indicate that the 2nd phase, which emphasized 22 hours of instruction for every Soviet citizen above 15 years of age was scheduled to end on 31 December 1958; many rayons and oblasts, according to these reports, had not completed these 22 hours and some had not even started as of November 1958. (S) 1. Is there any evidence to show that Soviet Civil Defense authorities have begun the third phase of the CD program? (C) 2. If the 3rd phase of this program has begun, what are the details of instruction; (C) a. Number of hours of instruction? (C) b. Amount of time in training devoted to (1) BW defense (2) CW defense (3) Atomic Warfare defense? (C) program? (C) c. Specific age :level of student participation in this Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA--RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 -C1A-~D~6?E-0~328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued) Bo 3. Do the Soviets propose to complete the 2nd phase of CD training in areas which have not started it? (C) C. Electronics Since the end of World War II Soviet leaders have recognized that electronics research and development is one of the principal founda- tions of modern military and civil power, and they have placed the highest priority on the development of militarily important electronics equipment and electronic instrumentation for scientific investigation relating to other important areas (nuclear techniques, guided missiles, and earth satellites, geophysical exploration, etc.). The Soviet Union is now one of the world leaders in electronics, having already achieved parity with the US and other leading nations in some fields. As a result of the high emphasis they have placed on electron- ics (in terms of priority and allocation of personnel and resources), it is expected that the Soviets will continue to produce results in this field at an increasing rate. Most electronics research of military and strategic significance is controlled by the military but other important efforts are undertaken by the Academy of Sciences USSR, Soviet security organizations, and the State Committees responsible for radio electronics, defense technology, aviation technology, shipbuilding. As such, all in- formation related directly to important Soviet electronics objectives is subject to rigid and effective security controls. The main concentrations of Soviet research and development facilities are located in: Moscow, Leningrad, Khar'kov, Gor'kiy., Novosibirsk, and Tomsk. Experimental and testing programs are often carried out in remote areas or in secure coastal areas. (S) 1.. Information is especially desired on: a. New electronic air defense equipment (long-range radars, high-speed, high-capacity communications and data processing equipment, etc.). (S1~X1DOa b. circular antenna arrays, including accurate description, location, information on operating organization and personnel, and function of the array in each case. (S) 2. Specific information is desired ono a. The organization, direction, and trends in current computer research, development, and production; and on applications of present Soviet computers, (S) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22: ~IARRPJ2 990328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued) C. 2, b. Projects developing"in acoustical detection devices for submarines, aircraft and/or missiles. (S) (S) C. Infrared development, either scientific or military. d. Soviet comments on the use of infrared, either by the Soviet Bloc or by the West. (S) D:. Guided Missiles 1. The USSR is known to possess a large and dynamic program for the research and development of guided missiles and space satellites. In the past three years, the Soviets have displayed their proficiency in these fields with the successful firing of ICBM missiles to ranges of at least 3,50() miles, the launching of three artificial satellites and the showing of four types of guided missiles in the November 1957 Parade in Moscow. In addition, the USSR has announced that it fired a number of meteorological rockets in the Arctic, in the Antarctic and in central Russia, where a high altitude record for a single stage rocket was at- tained. German scientists recently returned from the USSR have also indicated that the USSR has a very advanced missile program which is capable of developing the most modern type of missiles and which holds a position of the highest priority. (S) a. Current data is desired regarding the Soviet guided missile program, including: organizations, facilities, policy and plans in the research and development of guided missiles, earth satellites and space travel. (S) 2. Recently a number of leading Soviet scientists were elected to membership or corresponding membership in the Department of Technical Sciences; thirteen of these have been identified or associated with the Soviet guided missile program. These persons are: V. P. Barmin (Launching and Handling Equipment), V. N. Chelomey (Guidance and Control), V. P. Gluhk,o (Liquid Rocket Engines), G. V. Kisaun'ko (Guidance and Con- trol), S. P. Korolav (Ballistic Missiles), V. I. Kuznetsov (Guidance and Control), S. A. Lavochkin (Surface-to-Air and Air-to-Air Missiles), A. L. Mints (Guidance and Control), V. P. Mishin (Ballistic Missiles), V. V. Novozhilov, G. I. Petrov (Earth Satellites), N. A. Pilyugin (Guidance and Control), A. A. Raspletin (Guidance and Control), M. S. Ryazanskiy (Bal- listic Missiles), V. V. Struminskiy, A. S. Zaymovskiy. (S) ?-48- Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CI DRP62- 00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued) D. 2. a, What scientific advances by these individuals war- ranted their being elected to the Academy of Sciences? (S) b. In what type of work have they been engaged for the past five years? (S) C. With what institutes or establishments are these persons affiliated? (S) 3. The following installations are among those believed to be engaged in the research of guided missiles or guided missile components: Institute of Mechanics, AS, Institute of Automatics and Telemechanics, AS, Moscow Higher Technical School, im, Bauman, Academy of Artillery"Sciences, Institute of Machine Studies, AS, Institute of Mineral Fuels, AS. (C) ao What have been the missile'-associated activities of these establishments in the past five years. (S) (S) b, Who are the leading scientists at these establishments? , What publications have these establishments published in the past five years, (S) d. In what current projects are they engaged? (S) eo With what other organization and installation are they associated? (S) fe What facilities (laboratories, design bureaus) do these establishments maintain or control? (C) 4. In 1955, the Soviets announced the formation of an Inter- agency Commission for Interplanetary Communications whose object was the establishment of a manned space station around the earth and space flight, Numerous persons associated with this Commission have evidenced consider- able knowledge of the Soviet guided missile program and have made state- ments regarding possible Soviet attempts at flight into space, such as trips to the moon. (C) a. What is the exact function of this Commission in re- search and development of earth satellites, space stations and space travel? (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-F,6~62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/2 :JI~-FPE62T00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Cont j:nued ) V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued) D. 4. b. Who are the members of the Commission? (C) c. What is the internal organization of the Commission? (C) Commission? (C) Commission? (C) d. What establishments are engaged in projects for the e. What current projects are being worked on by this f. Is the Commission associated with any military organization which is involved in the development or procurement of guided missiles? If so, identify. (C) 5. The Soviets have made numerous statements regarding their capability, to utilize guided missiles in the event of hostilities. (C) a. What is the policy of the USSR in they location and disposition of missile launch areas? (S) b, What is the military thinking regarding the future of short range ballistic missiles in military stockpiles? (S) c, What is the current Soviet military thinking in terms of defensive surface-to-air missiles against low-flying aircraft? (S) missiles? (S) d. What are the Soviet requirements for air-to-surface 6. Observation of a modified surface-to-air missile was reported during September-October 1958. (S) a, Report any evidence of deployment concept of the missile in the USSR. (S) equipment? (S) b. What are its technical characteristics and associated c. Report evidence of missile testing or production, (S) -50- Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : Ij-F DP 2j9Q328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SCIENTIFIC: (Continued) D. 7. Evidence has been obtained indicating that Plant 292 in Saratov was engaged in the Soviet SAM ancilliary equipment production and research. (S) a. Has this Plant continued in the missile support equip- ment.program? (S) b. If so, what is their present contribution: who are the associated suppliers and consumers? (S) E. Organization of Science 1. It is believed that the CPSU Central Committee apparatus includes a Scientific Department. (U) a. Who is the present head of this Department? (U) b. To what extent and in what ways do Soviet scientists influence the decisions of the top party and government leaders? (U) 2. On 20 January 1959 Meditsinskiy Rabotnik reported that the Council of Ministers, USSR, issued a decree changing the function and structure of the Ministry of Health. It is claimed that this was done to expand the rights and increase the responsibilities of the union republics for directing public health and to improve the structure and curtail the number of subordinate units of the Ministry of Health USSR. (U) a. In what specific respects have the rights of the union republics been expanded? (C) b. What responsibilities of the union republics have been increased over what they have always been? (C) c. Specifically, what previously subordinate units have now been curtailed as a result of the reorganization? (C) d. What organizational changes other than in item c have occurred in the Ministry of Health USSR as a result of the reportes structure change? (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. (Continued) E. Geophysical, Astrophysical, and Space Sciences 1. During the International Geophysical Year (IGY) and since the successful launching of "Sputnik I," the USSR has demonstrated spectacular interest in advancing Russian knowledge in geophysics, astro- physics, andL space science. All are fields of science that provide basic knowledge having military applications. (C) Current data is desired on: a. Developments in Soviet weather control, numerical' weather prediction using computers, or long-period weather forecasting. (U) b. New Soviet electronics, optical, photographic, or radioastronbmical equipment suitable for rocket and satellite tracking. (U) c. Soviet plans for space research including information on vehicles, scientific instrumentation, personalities, organizations, and ground facilities. (U) d. Developments in Soviet astronomical research related to space investigations including celestral mechanics as applied in cal- culating trajectories to the moon and planets. (U) e, Soviet advances in the development of seaborne and airborne gravimeters. (U) f. Indications that Soviets are using particular seismic stations for detection of 'Western nuclear tests. (U) g. Developments in Soviet geomagnetic instrumentation, particularly magnetometers of all types as utilized in space exploration. (U) h. Soviet efforts to drill deep holes (25-50 thousand ft. depth);through the earth crust. (U) i. Soviet oceanographic surveying including specific areas involved and types of observations being conducted. (U) J. Current operations of the Soviet research submarine "Severyauka.(U) activity. (,U) k. Current Soviet Arctic and Antarctic expeditionary ?-52 - Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/05/22: I~-F PR62E0Q?28A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. 'SCIENTIFIC (Continued) F. 1. 1. Current aspects of Soviet research in geological mineral exploration and mapping including specific areas and types of deposits discovered. (U) M. New Soviet geochemical prospecting techniques and areas being prospected using these techniques. (U) n. Indications of Soviets having transportation and construction problems in permafrost areas of USSR and developments in Soviet research on permafrost. (U) o. Soviet participation in International Geophysical Cooperation (IGG) - 1959. (U) G. Nuclear Power and Nuclear Research 1. At Geneva the Soviets repeatedly mentioned an experi- mental reactor test center located somewhere on the Volga or Kuybyshev Sea in Ul1yanovsk Oblast. (S) a. What is the exact location of this test center? (S) struction? (S) b, How many reactors are now in operation or under con- c. What were/will be the dates of operation of each of the reactors? (S) d. Are there chemical processing plants for nuclear fuel in this center? (S) e. Is there an experimental area which is isolated from the other areas? (S) the center? (S) f. What are the details and salient features concerning 2. One of the outstanding areas of Soviet metallurgical in- terest as shown at Geneva in 1958 was in the development and testing of plutonium and plutonium alloys. Although it is claimed by the Soviets that such research is performed in the Moscow area, there is ample reason to believe that development involving any significant quantity of plutonium is carried on elsewhere. (S) -53 - Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05422: CJA WY-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued) G. 2. a. Current information on research centers and personnel concerned with metallurgy of plutonium is very much needed. (S) 3. At Geneva Emelyanov spoke of a Beloyarsk nuclear power plant, implying that Beloyarsk was in the Urals, Details of a coal-burning thermal power plant at Beloyarsk 50 Km East of Sverdlovsk have appeared in the Soviet press. (S) a. Is the nuclear power station to be attached to,-or part of the thermal power plant at Beloyarsk or is it a separate entity? (S) Scientific and Technical Assistance Program 1. The Russian nuclear electric power program. has been widely advertised by the Soviets at home and to Bloc and non-Bloc countries through the Soviet technical assistance program. Some Satellites, as well as Yugo- slavia, Egypt, and India, have accepted technical assistance, materials and suppliers for nuclear electric power plants under the Soviet program. (C) a. The technical details of present and future Soviet developed nuclear electric power facilities at home and abroad are desired as well as plans for technical improvements. (U) 2. In March 1956, eleven Sino-Soviet Bloc nations (USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, East Germany, Communist China, North Korea, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania and Czechoslovakia) signed an agreement to unite their efforts for nuclear research and organized the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubna. North Vietnam became a member in September 1956, and it is probable that other Bloc and neutral countries will be invited to participate in the Institute. For example, Egypt and Yugo- slavia, with which the USSR already has nuclear cooperation agreements, may be asked to join. Invitations to India, Burma, Afghanistan, the Arab Countries and the Scandinavian countries are also considered likely. (C) institute? (C) a. What new member countries have been received in the b. Is there any evidence that the agreements are not being fulfilled? (C) c. What research projects are under study? (C) -54- Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 S C 4.2D '6 j-(p328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued) H. 2. d. What projects are being planned, and what is the degree of success or failure? (C) e. Are any defense or classified projects being studied? If so, give details. (C) f. What Soviet scientific and technical aid is being granted to the Soviet Bloc,countries? (U) g, What are the actual numbers of Soviet scientific and technical personnel involved? (U) h. What actual assistance has been given, as distinct from broad commitments expressed in aid agreements? (U) i. Any indication of Soviet intentions to extend scientific and operational assistance in the nuclear energy field to non-Communist states, particularly Asia and Latin America. (U) j. Any suggestions that the USSR is seeking to establish scientific and technical relations or training programs with additional countries in the underdeveloped areas. (U) k. All Soviet approaches to scientific and technical personnel, including proposals for contracts and invitations to visit and study in the USSR. (U) 3. There is considerable exchange of delegations and d Far East and other underdevelop- a Middl f th e n e specialists of countries o ed areas in Africa and South America with those of the USSR. (U) a. visited New Delhi, industry of India. On India (U) 15 October 1958 a group of medical specialists to help develop the drug and pharmaceutical (1) What were their recommendations? (C) (2) How many plants will be established? (C) duced? (C) (3) What drugs and pharmaceuticals will be pro- cians? (C) (4) Will the plants be manned by Soviet techni- -55- Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : IAC -RRDE 2--00328A000200200006-7 T PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SCIEN'IFI,C (Continued) H. 3. a. (5) Are East Indians being trained in the USSR to operate the plants? (C) (6) What quantities of production are planned? (C) (7) How is construction of plants to be financed? (C) (8) In what ways is Soviet medical aid to India being publicized? Is there much publicity about this aid within the USSR? (C) (9) What is the organizational structure of the governmental which sets the policy, establishes priority, and implements the aid program? (C) b. A Russian team, invited by the Government of India, arrived in New Delhi to establish a model pediatric hospital. Soviet experts, to be present for 2-3 years were to provide specialized training in all branches of pediatrics. (U) (1) Have any current references been made in the Soviet press to the operation of this hospital? (C) c. A seminar for foreign medical specialists and public health experts which lasted over a month was held in the USSR in October 1958. The seminar was designed to acquaint visitors with all facets of medical and: public health activities in the USSR. (U) months? (C) (1) Have similar seminars been held in recent d. A trade agreement was signed between Iraq and the USSR on 11 October 1958. The USSR is to supply among other things, pharmaceuticals to Iraq. (S) (1) Have pharmaceutical consignments been shipped? If so, what kinds of pharmaceuticals and in what quantity? (S) e. On 10 February 1959, the USSR donated medical equip- ment for an eye hospital in Damascus. (C) donated? (?') (1) What quantity and type of equipment were -?56- App. roved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 ~Clf-F pPR6?EO{ 328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued) H. 3. f. A 97-bed, Soviet-operated hospital was in operation in December 1958 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, (C) (1) What types of services are offered? (C) (2) Has the Soviet press carried any references to services of hospital? (C) g. The Ethiopian Government has accepted a Soviet offer to establish a school for hospital technicians in Addis Ababa. (S) (1) Has the school been established? (S) (2) Are Soviet instructors used? (S) (3) Are Ethiopian students being trained in the USSR? (S) h. A Soviet delegation arrived in Libya in February 1959 to examine the Libyan aspects of the Soviet proposal to construct two 50-bed hospitals to be located in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. (S) (1) Have any references been made in the Soviet press to the construction of these hospitals? (C) i. The Soviets began construction of a hospital located in Taunggyi, Burma, in 1958 and expect completion to be in 1961. Burmese personnel are to be trained in the USSR in preparation for staffing the hospital. (C) (1) Are any Burmese being trained in the USSR? (C) (2) Have any references been made in the Soviet press to the construction of their hospitals? (C) j. The Soviets began construction of a hospital in Phnom Penh, Cambodia in 1958 and completion is expected to be in 1960. (C) (1) Have any references been made in the Soviet press to the construction of their hospitals? (C) k. Nepal has under consideration a 50-bed Soviet gift hospital project offered to the King during his visit in June 1958 to the USSR. (C) Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 I -RRDP 62-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 USSR (Continued) V. SCIENTIFIC (Continued) H. 3. k. (1) Has offer been accepted? If so, have proposals for construction been made? (C) (2) Have any references been made in the Soviet press to the offer to build the hospital? (C) 1, In the latter part of 1958, 15 Nepalese students ac- cepted medical scholarships for study in the USSR, (U) in the USSR? (C) (1) Are any Nepalese medical students being trained (2) Have references been made in the Soviet press to the training of Nepalese medical students? (C) I. Social Science The reports of the 21st Congress CPSU and of the preparatory sessions preceeding it indicated a serious desire on the part of the Soviet leaders to develop a "new Soviet man" and to utilize social science research in liberating the oppressed of Africa and in achieving a World Communist State. (C) reforms? (C) 2. How much influence is exerted upon Soviet political ]Leaders by social scientists in the USSR? (C) 3. What, if any, ties exist between the research of the Africanists in the Academy of Sciences, USSR and the recent uprisings in Africa. (S) 4. Do the opinions of social psychologists p]..ay a role in programming ithe missile and space programs in the USSR? (5) 5. What is the degree of influence of the Academy of Social Sciences on the national and international policies of the USSR? (S) 1. What role did science play in formulating the education Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : CIA-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : ?I*F0Pfi2jP028A000200200006-7 PRY (Guide No. 164) PERIODIC REQUIREMEN?S LIST (1 May - 31 August 1959) I. POLITICAL A. Soviet-Satellite Relationship Soviet efforts since the fall of 1956 to reassert the"_-USSR's unquestioned leadership of the Communist Bloc and to reinforce Bloc unity have by now attained a large measure of success. The stability of the individual regimes has been shored-up and strengthened to the point that a sequence of events such as occurred in Poland and Hungary in 1956 is not likely to develop at the moment. Although Tito has long been read out of the Communist Bloc and the Yugoslavs have been at least ostensibly isolated ideologically, Moscow has also made efforts not to incur the unfavorable propaganda effects which resulted when the campaign was carried to much greater lengths during the 1948-53 period. With the application of political and limited economic pressure on the Yugoslavs, however, the Bloc's campaign has necessarily spilled over into the state sphere, and certain Bloc members (i.e., China, Albania, Bul- garia and Czechoslovakia) continue to take the lead in bitter polemics with Belgrade. Relations have been "frozen" with China and Albania, but neither the Bloc countries nor. Yugo- slavia appear to desire to initiate a complete break in rela- tions. Moreover, most of the Bloc countries continue, to main- tain at least trade ties with Belgrade. Within the Bloc, the most glaring divergency continues to be Polish Party Secretary Gomulka's determination, reaffirmed at the First March 1959 Polish Party Congress, to maintain a degree of independence, especially in dealing with Polish internal policies. (C) Despite the improved stability of the Bloc regimes, there are two recent developments which are likely to exacer- bate political tensions within many of these countries. The theses for the Soviet Seven Year Plan and Khrushchev's speech to the 21st Soviet Party Congress both reveal a new surge for- ward, based on the premise that the Soviet Union has reached a new stage of Communist development--that of P4all-out building of a Communist society." The impetus of this surge has already been reflected in the Satellites, especially in Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia, but more recently in Hungary, where Kadar's previous rather moderate approach to internal economic problems has been all but scrapped. This new surge is likely to be re- flected increasingly in the Satellites and cause exacerbation Approved For Release 2000/05/22: 15IAER0P92-B0 28A000200200006-7 Approved For Release 2000/( 5/? CCW-l?%62-00328A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May - August 1959 SOVX EST BLOC (Continued) .I:? POLITICAL (Continued) A. Soviet-Satellite Relationship (Continued) of pr.3pular hostility to the regimes. Furthermore, the fact that Poland is demonstrably not playing its part in this campaign may result in renewed friction in, its relations with Moscow. (C) 1. Evidence of increased pressure by the Bloc on Poland to greater conformity, (U) 2. Evidence of renewed internal difficulties caused by a step-up in the pace of "building socialism." (U) 3, Evidence that the USSR continues to permit one or another of the Satellites some autonomy in internal policies. Is there any evidence that the continued tension over Berlin is having any effect on the degree of autonomy permitted various Satellites? (U) 4. Evidence of Soviet plans to reduce further its troop strength in the Satellites, or conversely that the USSR has no plans .along this line whatsoever. (U) 5. Evidence that the number of Soviet officials in a given Satellite is increasing or decreasing, and why. (U) 6. Evidence that the Satellite regimes are re- verting in any way to the traditional hostilities that have long; a,ff licted the area. 7. Concerning such organizations as CEMA and the Warsaw Pact, what role is played by the Satellite representa- tives in these organizations? Are they rubber stamps, or are they: in fact permitted to take an active part in the orga,niza-- tion.'s activities, particularly in the discussion and formula tion of policies? (U) 8. What is the organizational structure of the new theoretical journal? What degree of influence do the var- ious Satellite countries exercise on editorial policy and how?(U) B. Communist Party Stability 1. Factionalism within the Satellite parties-- brought into the open with the 20th congress of the CPSU and the de-Stalinization campaign--remains a serious problem for Approved For Release 2000/05/22:"A-RDP62-00328A000200200006-7 S E C R E T Approved For Release 2000/05/22 : C4-@DLR60P348A000200200006-7 PRL (Guide No. 164) May,. - August 1959 SOVIET BLOC (Continued) 1. POLITICAL (Continued) B. Communist Party Stability (Continued) the Satel.lite.leader It may be exacerbated further by the new "sur e" forward in the Bloc. We need evidence of growth, or continuation, of this factionalism within Satellite parties or between parties. (U) a.. Report evidence of

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